Narrigan v. Goldberg: Takings Challenges to Unclaimed-Property Interest Are (i) Unripe Before a Claim-and-Refusal and (ii) Cannot Support Prospective Relief Once the Alleged Taking Is Complete

Introduction

In Narrigan v. Goldberg (1st Cir. Mar. 18, 2026), Thomas R. Narrigan filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Massachusetts’s Treasurer and Receiver General, Deborah B. Goldberg, in her official capacity. Narrigan challenged portions of Massachusetts’s Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 200A, alleging that the statute’s interest-payment provisions effect an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause (as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment).

Critically, Narrigan alleged the Commonwealth “holds” his unclaimed property (supported by a website screenshot), but he had not filed a claim to recover that property under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 200A, § 10(a). He sought only declaratory and injunctive relief aimed at the Commonwealth’s future handling of unclaimed-property disputes.

The central issues on appeal were jurisdictional: whether Narrigan’s theories satisfied Article III standing and ripeness requirements given (i) the absence of a claim for return of property and (ii) the exclusively prospective relief requested.

Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit (Lynch, J.) affirmed dismissal on Article III grounds, explaining that Narrigan’s allegations were “susceptible to two readings,” and both fail:

  1. If Narrigan’s theory is that Massachusetts will pay an insufficient interest rate when he reclaims his property, the claim is not ripe because no taking of the property’s time-value occurs until he makes a claim and the Treasurer refuses to remit constitutionally required interest.
  2. If Narrigan’s theory is that a completed taking already occurred when the property was delivered to the Treasurer, that past injury does not confer standing to obtain prospective declaratory or injunctive relief absent a continuing injury or a sufficient likelihood of recurrence—neither of which was plausibly alleged.

The court thus affirmed dismissal without needing to resolve the district court’s Eleventh Amendment and merits rulings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standing doctrine (injury, causation, redressability; prospective-relief limits)

  • TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife) supplied the core three-part standing test: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The court used this framework to test whether Narrigan’s alleged harm was “actual or imminent” and whether prospective relief could redress it.
  • Roe v. Healey provided the specific rule for prospective relief: past injury alone is insufficient; the plaintiff must show a continuing injury or a “sufficient threat that the injury will recur.” This was decisive under the “completed taking” reading.
  • Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps., Inc. v. Yellen reinforced the First Circuit’s requirement that standing for injunctive relief demands ongoing harm or a likelihood of future harm—supporting dismissal where Narrigan’s asserted injury, on one reading, was completed.
  • James v. Hegar (5th Cir.) was cited to underscore that allegations of a past unconstitutional taking do not, by themselves, establish standing for prospective relief.
  • Kerin v. Titeflex Corp. was cited for the standard of review (de novo) and to note that, because no class was certified, standing is assessed solely for the named plaintiff.

2) Ripeness and Article III justiciability

  • Trump v. New York and Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus framed ripeness as an Article III “case-or-controversy” requirement closely related to standing.
  • Reddy v. Foster (quoting Lab. Rels. Div. of Constr. Indus. of Mass., Inc. v. Healey) supplied the “sufficient immediacy and reality” formulation. The court applied it to reject a claim dependent on contingencies: whether Narrigan would file a claim, and whether the Treasurer would deny constitutionally required interest.
  • Doe v. Bush provided the de novo ripeness standard.
  • Jensen v. R.I. Cannabis Control Comm’n, Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC v. Weymouth, and Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. supplied the “chain of speculation or contingencies” principle—central to the panel’s holding that Narrigan’s “interest-rate” theory was unripe.
  • Whitfield v. Municipality of Fajardo supported the court’s decision to consider ripeness/standing even though the parties emphasized standing on appeal: federal courts must notice jurisdictional defects sua sponte.

3) Takings timing and “just compensation” measurement

  • Knick v. Township of Scott drove the opinion’s bifurcation: (i) a takings claim accrues “as soon as” the government takes property without paying, and (ii) compensation is a remedy for a constitutional violation already suffered at the time of the taking (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego (Brennan, J., dissenting)). The panel used Knick to explain why a “taking-at-delivery” theory could be ripe even if the owner never filed a reclaim claim.
  • Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash. (quoting Olson v. United States) supplied the key valuation principle: just compensation aims to put the owner “in as good a position pecuniarily” as if the property had not been taken, and it is measured by the owner’s loss, not the government’s gain. The panel invoked this to show why interest/time-value analysis cannot be done abstractly before the relevant facts are known.
  • Cerajeski v. Zoeller supported the proposition that “interest on interest-bearing unclaimed property is unclaimed property too,” i.e., time-value can itself be property. But the First Circuit used that point to conclude the opposite of immediate liability: a taking of that interest does not occur until there is a claim and a refusal to pay what is constitutionally required.

4) Comparative authority on unclaimed-property “earnings”

  • Maron v. Chief Fin. Officer (11th Cir.) was distinguished. There, the Eleventh Circuit found ripeness where the statute made clear that “earnings accrued” after liquidation and investment would not be compensated, making a claim-and-denial unnecessary. The First Circuit contrasted Massachusetts’s statute, which may entitle a claimant to the full preexisting interest rate (up to 5%) under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 200A § 10(e), and noted that Narrigan did not supportably allege a certain denial of earnings/interest.

5) District court decision and sovereign-immunity backdrop

  • Narrigan v. Goldberg, 772 F. Supp. 3d 182 (D. Mass. 2025) was summarized for its holdings on standing, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and merits. The First Circuit ultimately affirmed on Article III grounds without adopting the district court’s additional rationales.
  • The district court’s discussion of Ex parte Young (mentioned by name in the record) formed part of the procedural history, but the First Circuit did not rely on sovereign-immunity doctrine to resolve the appeal once it concluded Article III was unmet.

Legal Reasoning

A. Two constructions of the complaint, two jurisdictional failures

The panel read Narrigan’s pleadings charitably but concluded that, regardless of how the theory is framed, jurisdiction fails: either the alleged injury is future and contingent (raising ripeness problems), or it is past and completed (raising standing problems for prospective relief).

B. Why the “insufficient interest rate” theory is unripe

Under Narrigan’s “ongoing loss of time value” framing, the court held no completed taking of the time-value had occurred because the Treasurer has not yet refused to pay whatever interest the Constitution might require. The alleged injury depends on events that may never happen: Narrigan might not file a claim; the Treasurer might pay interest consistent with the statute; or the factual predicates for “reasonable interest” might not support Narrigan’s asserted measure of loss.

The opinion emphasized that the constitutional measure is the owner’s loss (Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash.), which may require fact-specific inquiry into: (i) whether the property was interest-bearing, (ii) the relevant time period, (iii) what value the property would have had in the owner’s hands, and (iv) how Massachusetts’s statutory interest provisions apply. Because these are “uncertain and contingent events,” adjudication would risk an advisory opinion.

C. Why the “completed taking at delivery” theory lacks standing for prospective relief

The court accepted that Knick v. Township of Scott allows a takings claim to accrue at the time of the uncompensated taking. If the “taking” occurred when the property was delivered to the Treasurer, that injury is not ongoing—it is a past event. Yet Narrigan sought only prospective declaratory and injunctive relief, which requires a continuing injury or a real threat of recurrence (Roe v. Healey; Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps., Inc. v. Yellen).

The panel rejected Narrigan’s attempt to treat continued custody as an ongoing taking for standing purposes in the posture presented. Even if the property remains with the Commonwealth, the “taking itself,” on this theory, “already occurred,” and Narrigan did not plausibly allege he would again experience the same alleged taking in the future.

Impact

  • Claim-and-refusal becomes functionally central to “interest/time-value” takings challenges in the First Circuit. Plaintiffs who argue that a state unclaimed-property regime undercompensates interest will generally need a concrete denial (or a statutory certainty of denial) to satisfy ripeness.
  • Prospective-only remedies are difficult for “completed taking” theories. If a plaintiff characterizes the taking as having occurred when property was transferred to the state, the remedy naturally looks retrospective (compensation), yet Narrigan signals that plaintiffs cannot rely on that completed past injury to obtain forward-looking injunctions without alleging likely recurrence.
  • Pleading strategy and remedial design will change. Future litigants may (i) file an administrative claim first and plead an actual denial of constitutionally adequate interest; (ii) plead a statutory certainty of nonpayment (as in the distinction drawn from Maron v. Chief Fin. Officer); and/or (iii) seek relief tailored to redress past harm (subject to sovereign-immunity constraints).
  • Class actions face early jurisdictional headwinds. Because standing is assessed at least initially through the named plaintiff (Kerin v. Titeflex Corp.), unclaimed-property class complaints that seek only declaratory/injunctive relief may be especially vulnerable unless the named plaintiff can show ongoing injury or likely recurrence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Ripeness
A case is ripe when the dispute is concrete enough to decide now. If the alleged harm depends on future “maybes” (e.g., “I might file a claim; the state might deny it”), courts treat it as premature.
Standing (for injunctive/declaratory relief)
To get a forward-looking court order, it is not enough to show you were harmed in the past. You must show the harm is continuing or likely to happen again.
Takings Clause & “time value” (interest)
The Takings Clause requires “just compensation” when government takes private property for public use. The “time value” of money/property refers to what an owner loses when deprived of use of the asset over time—often measured by interest or comparable economic value. The court’s key point was that whether that loss exists, and how much, cannot be determined until the relevant facts (and any refusal to pay) are concrete.
Prospective vs. retrospective relief
Prospective relief (injunction/declaration) aims to prevent future violations; retrospective relief compensates for past harm. Narrigan held that a completed taking theory does not, without more, justify prospective relief.
Unclaimed property “custody” vs. “escheat”
Some unclaimed-property regimes are custodial (the state holds property for the owner to reclaim), while escheat more permanently transfers title to the state. The opinion’s discussion (including its reliance on Cerajeski v. Zoeller) treats interest as potentially part of what remains claimable unless and until a legal rule clearly cuts it off.

Conclusion

Narrigan v. Goldberg establishes a practical jurisdictional rule for unclaimed-property takings litigation in the First Circuit: (1) a challenge alleging unconstitutional underpayment of interest is generally unripe until the claimant seeks return and the state refuses to pay constitutionally adequate interest (absent a statutory certainty of denial), and (2) a theory that the taking was completed when the property was transferred to the state cannot support standing for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief without plausible allegations of continuing harm or likely recurrence. The decision re-centers these disputes on Article III justiciability and will shape how future plaintiffs plead timing, injury, and remedies in challenges to unclaimed-property regimes.