Misdemeanor Conversion Has No Automatic $1,000 Restitution Cap, but Recovery Must Follow the Offense of Conviction

Case: United States v. Malakhov, No. 25-1319-cr
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Decided: November 12, 2026
Opinion: Judge Joseph F. Bianco, joined by Judges José A. Cabranes and Gerard E. Lynch.

Introduction

In United States v. Malakhov, the Second Circuit clarified two distinct limits governing restitution for misdemeanor conversion of federal property. First, the $1,000 threshold separating misdemeanor and felony treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 641 does not automatically cap restitution for a misdemeanor conviction. Second, restitution must nevertheless compensate losses caused by the conduct underlying the particular offense of conviction—not by a different theory of wrongdoing supported by the broader investigative record.

The defendant, Arkady Malakhov, pleaded guilty to misusing a portion of federal research funds after receiving them. The district court instead calculated restitution as though he had been convicted of fraudulently obtaining the entire grant disbursement. That mismatch required vacatur of the $200,000 restitution award, even though the appellate court rejected Malakhov’s proposed $1,000 ceiling.

The decision therefore separates three questions that can easily become conflated: what establishes a misdemeanor conviction, what conduct that conviction encompasses, and what actual financial loss that conduct caused.

Background and Procedural History

The research grant and disputed expenditures

Malakhov was the chief executive officer of Solid Cell, Inc., a company that applied for funding from the National Science Foundation under the Small Business Innovation Research program. The proposed Phase I project concerned thermoelectric technology for recovering energy associated with liquefied natural gas regasification.

NSF awarded Solid Cell a $225,000 grant in July 2017. The award documentation also identified a $14,702 project fee that could be used for any purpose. NSF ultimately disbursed only $200,000 because the remaining $25,000 was contingent on submission and acceptance of a final report.

The application identified Yuriy Lobunets as principal investigator. Under the solicitation, the principal investigator needed to be primarily employed by Solid Cell and legally authorized to work for it in the United States when the award began. These requirements were distinct from the program’s ownership-related citizenship requirements. Lobunets lacked the necessary work authorization when the grant was awarded and when Malakhov requested the two $100,000 payments.

In requesting those payments, Malakhov certified compliance with the award’s conditions and the principal investigator’s availability. Lobunets obtained a visa in October 2017. By early November, Malakhov had informed NSF that the planned work had not yet begun.

Meanwhile, the record described substantial expenditures unrelated to the proposed research, including business-loan repayments, payments to Malakhov, compensation for services predating project work, an invoice for an unrelated university project, and personal credit-card payments. By November 8, 2017, the bank account that had received the $200,000 contained only $1,289.59.

Malakhov nevertheless maintained that Solid Cell later completed the research and incurred $232,976 in project-related costs. He supplied a final report during sentencing and asserted that NSF had disabled his account before he could submit it through the agency’s system. The appellate court did not resolve these assertions.

The negotiated conviction

The original indictment charged wire fraud, false-document offenses, and concealment. Some counts were dismissed before the guilty plea, and the remaining indictment counts were dismissed at sentencing.

On November 21, 2024, Malakhov pleaded guilty to a single misdemeanor conversion charge under § 641. The information did not identify a dollar amount. The plea agreement stated that he converted a portion of each disbursement to his own use or conveyed funds to others for purposes unrelated to the project. During his plea allocution, he similarly acknowledged spending some of the money on unrelated business expenses.

Those formulations became decisive. They admitted unauthorized expenditures after receipt of the funds, without establishing that obtaining the funds was itself the criminal conduct underlying the conviction.

Sentencing and appeal

The district court imposed three years of probation and ordered $200,000 in restitution to NSF. It rejected Malakhov’s argument that misdemeanor restitution could not exceed $1,000 and concluded that NSF’s actual loss was the entire amount it had been fraudulently induced to disburse.

On appeal, Malakhov challenged both conclusions. He did not challenge the district court’s calculation of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range.

Summary of the Opinion

  1. No automatic $1,000 cap: A misdemeanor conviction under § 641 requires proof that the converted property had some value, not proof that its value was $1,000 or less. Because neither the charging instrument nor the plea materials imposed a monetary limitation, restitution was not categorically capped at $1,000.
  2. The award exceeded the established offense theory: Malakhov admitted converting part of the funds through unauthorized spending. He did not plead guilty to fraudulently inducing NSF to disburse the entire $200,000. The district court therefore used the wrong basis for calculating restitution.
  3. A limited remand was necessary: The Second Circuit vacated only the restitution portion of the judgment and remanded for a determination of NSF’s actual loss attributable to the conversion offense.

The court did not determine a replacement amount or decide whether later research expenditures and the final report reduced NSF’s compensable loss.

Analysis: Legal Reasoning

1. Restitution is mandatory only within its statutory boundaries

The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, principally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A and 3664, required restitution for the covered property offense. Section 3664(f)(1)(A) calls for payment of the full amount of the victim’s losses. But “full amount” does not mean every loss associated with the defendant’s relationship with the victim. It means the actual loss caused by the conduct composing the offense of conviction.

The analysis therefore proceeds in sequence: identify the offense’s nature and scope, determine which losses that conduct caused, and quantify those losses. A court cannot begin with the total money disbursed and assume that the conviction necessarily makes the entire amount recoverable.

The government bears the burden of proving the victim’s resulting loss by a preponderance of the evidence under § 3664(e). Appellate review distinguishes legal conclusions, reviewed anew, from factual findings, reviewed for clear error, within the overall abuse-of-discretion framework.

2. The felony threshold does not become a restitution ceiling

Section 641 criminalizes several forms of interference with government property, including knowing conversion. Its penalty provisions distinguish offenses involving more than $1,000 from misdemeanor treatment carrying a maximum of one year’s imprisonment.

The critical distinction is between the elements necessary to establish the misdemeanor and the additional valuation element necessary to establish the felony. A misdemeanor requires a government-owned “thing of value,” but the government need not establish an upper limit on that value. Felony treatment requires the additional allegation and proof that the statutory value threshold was exceeded.

Consequently, a prosecutor’s acceptance of a misdemeanor disposition does not itself establish that the converted property was worth no more than $1,000. Nor does the misdemeanor label prevent a sentencing court from determining a greater compensable loss under the MVRA’s evidentiary standard.

The court nevertheless recognized a separate possible limitation: the actual factual scope of a guilty plea may constrain restitution. A charging instrument or plea expressly confined to property of a specified value could present a different case. Here, however, the information contained no dollar amount, and the plea’s references to a “portion” and “some” of the funds did not establish a $1,000 ceiling.

This reasoning preserves the difference between offense classification and compensation. Rejecting the proposed ceiling did not establish that $200,000 was the proper award; it merely removed one proposed legal barrier to an award exceeding $1,000.

3. Unauthorized spending is not the same offense theory as fraudulent receipt

The district court treated NSF’s disbursements as money that Malakhov should never have received. Under that approach, the agency lost the entire $200,000 because it would not have made the payments had it known the true circumstances concerning the principal investigator.

But the plea established a different wrong: after the money reached Solid Cell’s account, Malakhov knowingly spent part of it for unauthorized purposes. The information, agreement, and allocution consistently identified that post-receipt misuse as the offense conduct.

The distinction matters causally. Fraudulent procurement potentially concerns the decision to release the entire payment. Conversion through unauthorized expenditures concerns the funds diverted and the actual loss that diversion produced. The same transaction may support both theories, but proof or suspicion of both does not make both part of a conviction based on only one.

The district court relied partly on defense counsel’s sentencing-stage concession that Malakhov had falsely certified Lobunets’s availability. That concession did not cure the mismatch between the restitution theory and the conduct established by the plea materials.

The earlier dismissal of a false-document count reinforced the court’s reading of the record. The operative principle, however, was not a categorical prohibition on considering anything mentioned in a dismissed count. It was the requirement that restitution remain connected to the specific conduct underlying the conviction.

4. The actual-loss calculation remains unresolved

Once fraudulent inducement ceased to be the governing theory, the competing accounting evidence became important. Malakhov’s forensic accountant supported his assertion that Solid Cell incurred $232,976 in project costs. NSF’s accountant disputed the claimed costs under federal cost principles, award conditions, and documentation requirements.

According to the government’s presentation, the NSF expert considered no claimed costs established as allowable and concluded that, at most, $60,149 should proceed to an allowability determination. That figure was not a finding that $60,149 had to be credited against restitution.

The district court had not resolved these disputes because its fraudulent-inducement analysis made later performance irrelevant. On remand, it must address the extent of the misspending and whether, and to what extent, project expenditures and the report affect NSF’s actual loss from the conversion.

The appellate court neither accepted Malakhov’s claim of zero loss nor endorsed the government’s accounting. It prescribed the correct legal inquiry while leaving factual resolution to the district court.

Precedents Cited and Their Role

A. Statutory authority, causation, and the offense of conviction

United States v. Zangari, 677 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2012)

This decision supplied the foundational proposition that a sentencing court’s restitution authority depends on statute and is limited by statute. It prevented the analysis from becoming a general inquiry into fairness or whether NSF deserved repayment independently of the conviction.

United States v. Marino, 654 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 2011)

The court relied on this precedent for the paired requirements of direct causation by the offense conduct and actual victim loss. These requirements explain why evidence of serious misconduct alone could not sustain the particular $200,000 award.

United States v. Goodrich, 12 F.4th 219 (2d Cir. 2021)

This was the central methodological authority. It directs courts to identify the offense’s “nature and scope” and, after a guilty plea, examine the charging instrument, plea agreement, and allocution. Applying that method revealed that Malakhov admitted unauthorized spending, not fraudulent procurement of the entire disbursement.

United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2013)

The opinion invoked this decision both to connect the MVRA’s victim definition to the specific conduct underlying conviction and to distinguish restitution from Guidelines loss. Conduct properly considered in an offense-level calculation does not automatically support restitution. It also supported the qualification that plea-defined factual limits can matter even when the misdemeanor statute itself supplies no restitution ceiling.

B. Proof and appellate review

United States v. Bahel, 662 F.3d 610 (2d Cir. 2011)

This case confirmed the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for resolving disputes concerning restitution. Its role is particularly important on remand, when the competing accounting submissions must be evaluated under the correct offense theory.

United States v. Afriyie, 27 F.4th 161 (2d Cir. 2022)

This decision supplied the governing review framework: legal conclusions receive de novo review, factual findings receive clear-error review, and reversal ultimately rests on abuse of discretion. Here, the controlling defect was legal—the use of an offense theory not established by the conviction.

C. Statutory interpretation and contextual reading

Seife v. FDA, 43 F.4th 231 (2d Cir. 2022); United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2011); and United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670 (2d Cir. 1994)

These authorities established the text-and-context approach used to interpret § 641. The court examined the statutory language, the setting in which valuation appears, and the relationship between the substantive prohibition and the penalty provisions.

United States v. Rowland, 826 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2016), and Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009)

These decisions explain that clear statutory meaning ends the interpretive inquiry; interpretive canons and other aids become necessary only if ambiguity remains. Their citation supported resolving the asserted monetary cap through the statute’s text and established interpretation rather than resorting to legislative history or lenity.

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), and Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019)

The court used these authorities to reject an isolated reading of the phrase “ceiling value” in an earlier opinion. The passage from Kanter v. Barr came expressly from then-Judge Barrett’s dissent and served as persuasive guidance: judicial opinions should not be dissected word by word as though they were statutes. Neither citation independently established the restitution rule.

D. The controlling § 641 interpretation and contrary lower-court decisions

United States v. Lee, 833 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2016)

This was the principal authority supporting rejection of the $1,000 cap. The defendant there stole Postal Service pallets, but the indictment omitted an allegation that their value exceeded $1,000. The court held that value above the threshold is an element of felony § 641 liability, making the omission erroneous, although harmless.

Its explanation of the statutory elements was decisive here: proof of taking or converting a government-owned thing with some value establishes the misdemeanor; proof of the additional threshold amount establishes the felony. Thus, a misdemeanor does not require an affirmative finding that value was $1,000 or less.

Malakhov emphasized the earlier opinion’s reference to a misdemeanor “ceiling value.” Read in context, however, that phrase addressed the government’s argument about felony elements. It did not establish a restitution ceiling or override the opinion’s explicit explanation of misdemeanor liability.

United States v. Payne, No. 09-MJ-517, 2009 WL 5062099 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 2009), and United States v. Mingo Lamar, 295 F. Supp. 3d 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)

The Second Circuit rejected the premise of these nonbinding decisions insofar as they treated every misdemeanor § 641 conviction as necessarily limited to property worth $1,000 or less. It additionally distinguished United States v. Mingo Lamar because the information there expressly charged property and money “not exceeding $1,000 in value.” That difference illustrates why plea-specific language can matter even without an automatic statutory cap.

United States v. Malakhov, No. 22-CR-6093, 2025 WL 1224349 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2025)

The appellate court accepted the district court’s conclusion that a misdemeanor admission and a greater restitution valuation are not logically inconsistent. It rejected the separate conclusion that the full disbursement represented recoverable loss because NSF had been fraudulently induced to pay it. These were independent issues, and correctness on the first did not save the second.

E. Fraudulent-inducement cases: distinguished rather than extended

Kousisis v. United States, 605 U.S. 114 (2025)

The Supreme Court’s decision explained the fraudulent-inducement theory of wire fraud: material deception can induce a transfer of money or property even when the defendant supplies something in return and does not seek net pecuniary loss. The Second Circuit used that description to identify the theory the district court had effectively applied.

Its citation did not transform Malakhov’s conversion plea into a fraud conviction. Nor did the court treat the requirements for establishing fraud as eliminating the MVRA’s separate actual-loss requirement.

United States v. Agrawal, 97 F.4th 421 (6th Cir. 2024)

This decision upheld restitution for an entire SBIR Phase II grant following wire-fraud convictions involving false application statements, including a forged letter. It was distinguishable because fraudulent acquisition of the grant was part of the conviction itself. The government would not have awarded the grant had it known the truth.

United States v. Davis, 53 F.4th 833 (5th Cir. 2022)

The district court relied on this decision’s treatment of funds the government was fraudulently induced to pay. The Second Circuit distinguished it because the underlying convictions were for wire fraud. That factual and legal predicate was absent from Malakhov’s negotiated conversion conviction.

United States v. Aldissi, 758 F. App’x 694 (11th Cir. 2018), and United States v. Jha, 613 F. App’x 212 (4th Cir. 2015)

These unpublished decisions likewise sustained full-grant restitution following fraud or false-statement convictions. They supported recovery on their own conviction records, not a general rule that every misuse of research-grant money makes the entire grant recoverable.

United States ex rel. Longhi v. United States, 575 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Anghaie, 633 F. App’x 514 (11th Cir. 2015)

These False Claims Act decisions were more remote because they concerned civil liability. Both involved deception used to obtain research funding that otherwise would not have been paid. Their damages analyses could not establish that fraudulent procurement formed part of Malakhov’s criminal conviction or displace the MVRA’s offense-specific restrictions.

F. The government-benefits analogy and the limits of remand review

United States v. Agrawal and United States v. Douleh, 239 F. App’x 694 (2d Cir. 2007)

The opinion also discussed the Guidelines distinction between benefits received by unintended recipients and benefits diverted to unintended uses. The former may implicate the full payment; the latter focuses on the diverted portion. The summary order in United States v. Douleh and the fuller discussion in United States v. Agrawal supplied an analogy supporting the distinction between wrongful receipt and wrongful expenditure.

United States v. Certified Env't Servs., Inc., 753 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2014)

This authority supplied an important qualification: Guidelines loss and restitution are not identical calculations. The government-benefits framework was therefore illustrative, not a substitute for applying the MVRA to the conversion conviction. The court also recognized that research grants differ from public-assistance benefits conferring defined entitlements.

Havens v. James, 76 F.4th 103 (2d Cir. 2023)

The principle that an appellate court is a “court of review, not of first view” explained the limited remand. The Second Circuit corrected the governing legal theory but left unresolved accounting, allowability, and valuation questions to the district court.

Potential Impact

Plea language will be central to restitution disputes

The decision reinforces the importance of drafting the information, factual stipulations, and allocution precisely. A misdemeanor label alone does not limit financial exposure to $1,000. Conversely, broad allegations elsewhere in the prosecution record cannot automatically expand a plea admitting only a narrower form of misconduct.

Grant cases require separation of eligibility from expenditure

Future courts must distinguish allegations that an applicant was ineligible to receive an award from allegations that a recipient spent awarded funds improperly. Both may be serious, but they do not necessarily establish the same offense or compensable loss. Full-award fraud precedents cannot replace examination of the actual conviction.

Accounting evidence must answer the correct causal question

Once unauthorized spending is the governing conduct, evidence about the diverted amounts, allowable project costs, and subsequent performance may require resolution rather than categorical dismissal. The opinion does not establish that later work automatically erases a conversion loss or that every claimed research expense deserves credit.

The holding has important limits

  • It does not bar restitution above $1,000 for misdemeanor conversion.
  • It does not hold that conversion restitution must always be less than the full disbursement.
  • It does not decide whether Malakhov’s research or report conferred compensable value on NSF.
  • It does not disturb the probation sentence or decide the unchallenged Guidelines calculation.
  • It does not decide Malakhov’s additional appellate arguments, which the court found unnecessary to resolve.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conversion
Knowingly exercising unauthorized control over someone else’s property. Here, the admitted conduct involved spending government grant funds for unrelated purposes after receiving them.
Offense of conviction
The particular crime and underlying conduct established by the conviction—not every allegation investigated or originally charged.
Restitution
A court-ordered payment compensating a victim for qualifying actual loss. It is distinct from a fine imposed as punishment.
Fraudulent inducement
Using material deception to persuade someone to transfer money or property. It concerns obtaining the payment, rather than merely misusing it afterward.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard requiring a proposition to be more likely true than not. The government must satisfy it when proving the amount of restitution loss.
Relevant conduct
A sentencing concept that can include conduct beyond the conviction itself. Its broader reach does not automatically carry over to restitution.
Vacatur and limited remand
The appellate court set aside the restitution provision and returned that issue to the district court for reconsideration without undoing the remainder of the judgment.

Conclusion

United States v. Malakhov rejects both an artificially narrow restitution ceiling and an impermissibly broad restitution theory. A misdemeanor § 641 conviction can support restitution exceeding $1,000, but only for actual losses caused by the conduct underlying that conviction.

The decision’s central lesson is straightforward: the misdemeanor label does not determine the restitution amount, and allegations beyond the established offense cannot substitute for proof of its resulting loss.