MDLEA Jurisdiction in Foreign EEZs and Keene Harmless-Error Treatment of Post-Dupree Career-Offender Misclassification

1. Introduction

This consolidated, non-argument Eleventh Circuit decision (marked “NOT FOR PUBLICATION”) arises from the interdiction of a vessel off the coast of Colombia carrying approximately 800 kilograms of cocaine. Defendants Luis Alfonso Nunez, Mario Tovar, and Geraldo Rodriguez were tried in a bench trial and convicted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“the Act” or “MDLEA”) of (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and (2) possession with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine aboard a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Rodriguez also challenged his sentence.

The appeals presented two clusters of issues:

  • MDLEA constitutionality and jurisdiction: whether Congress exceeded its authority under the Felonies Clause by applying the MDLEA to conduct in Colombia’s exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”), by defining “vessel without nationality” beyond what customary international law recognizes, and by prosecuting absent a U.S. nexus.
  • Sentencing: whether Rodriguez was erroneously treated as a career offender based on prior conspiracy convictions, and whether any such Guidelines error required resentencing.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed all convictions and Rodriguez’s sentence. On the merits, the panel held that each constitutional/jurisdictional challenge was foreclosed by binding circuit precedent:

  • Foreign EEZs are “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, making MDLEA enforcement there proper.
  • Congress may define “vessel without nationality” to include vessels for which the claimed nation “does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert” nationality, even if customary international law would not treat the vessel as “stateless.”
  • No U.S. nexus is required for MDLEA prosecution of noncitizens on stateless vessels, and due process is satisfied because the MDLEA gives clear notice and drug trafficking is universally condemned.

As to sentencing, the court accepted (and the government conceded) that applying the career-offender enhancement was error under United States v. Dupree. But the panel declined to remand because the district court explicitly stated it would impose the same 240-month sentence regardless of the career-offender designation, and the sentence was substantively reasonable under the correct (lower) Guidelines range.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Standard of review framework

  • United States v. Hill, 119 F.4th 862, 866 (11th Cir. 2024): Used to set the standard for constitutional challenges raised for the first time on appeal—review is for plain error. This mattered for defendants’ late-raised “no nexus” due-process/Felonies Clause argument.
  • United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc): Cited both for de novo review of Guidelines interpretation and, centrally, for its holding that inchoate offenses (including conspiracy) are not “controlled substance offenses” under the career-offender enhancement. This drove the panel’s conclusion that the district court erred in treating Rodriguez as a career offender.
  • United States v. Fox, 926 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2019): Supplies the abuse-of-discretion standard for substantive reasonableness review.

MDLEA jurisdiction and the Felonies Clause

  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 823, 827 (11th Cir. 2024): Directly foreclosed the argument that Colombia’s EEZ is not “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, and rejected the premise that customary international law limits Congress’s Felonies Clause authority in this context.
  • United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374, 1379-81 (11th Cir. 2025): Foreclosed the challenge to 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C), holding Congress did not exceed Felonies Clause authority by deeming a vessel “without nationality” where the claimed nation neither confirms nor denies registry; also reinforced the rejection of nexus-based challenges.
  • United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 810-12 (11th Cir. 2014): Foreclosed the due process and “no nexus to the United States” argument, holding MDLEA prosecution of noncitizens on stateless vessels does not offend due process because the statute gives clear notice and drug trafficking is universally condemned.

Harmless error and substantive reasonableness in sentencing

  • United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349-50 (11th Cir. 2006): Provides the dispositive framework—no resentencing is required if (1) the district court would have imposed the same sentence even under the defendant’s preferred Guidelines calculation, and (2) the sentence is substantively reasonable under the correct range. The panel applied Keene because the district judge expressly stated the sentence would be the same “under any circumstance.”
  • United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2006): Used to identify § 3553(a) purposes (seriousness, respect for law, just punishment, deterrence, protection of the public) that anchor substantive reasonableness review.
  • United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th Cir. 2016): Cited for the broader list of § 3553(a) factors and the principle that the weight assigned to each is largely within the district court’s discretion.
  • United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Supplies the demanding standard for reversing as substantively unreasonable—only when the court has a “definite and firm conviction” of a clear error in judgment in weighing § 3553(a).
  • United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 656 (11th Cir. 2014): Supports the “ordinary expectation” that within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable and highlights the relevance of a sentence being well below the statutory maximum.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) MDLEA applicability in Colombia’s EEZ

The defendants’ first jurisdictional argument attempted to narrow Congress’s Felonies Clause power by importing customary international law limits into the constitutional phrase “high seas,” asserting an EEZ is not “high seas.” The panel treated the issue as already settled by United States v. Alfonso, which held that an EEZ is part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes and that MDLEA enforcement there is proper.

Operationally, the court’s reasoning is straightforward: because binding precedent treats foreign EEZ waters as “high seas” for the relevant constitutional inquiry, the location of interdiction did not deprive Congress of authority to criminalize the conduct through the MDLEA.

(B) “Vessel without nationality” under § 70502(d)(1)(C)

The second argument targeted the MDLEA’s statutory definition of “vessel without nationality,” specifically § 70502(d)(1)(C). Here, the vessel had no indicia of nationality; one defendant claimed Colombian nationality; and Colombia’s government “could neither confirm nor deny” registration. Under the statute, that response is enough to treat the vessel as “without nationality” and therefore within U.S. jurisdiction.

The defendants argued Congress could only reach vessels deemed “stateless” under international law; the panel again relied on binding authority, United States v. Canario-Vilomar, which rejected that constraint and held that international law does not limit Congress’s authority to define “stateless vessel” for MDLEA purposes.

(C) No-nexus due process and Felonies Clause challenge (plain error)

The third challenge—raised for the first time on appeal—asserted that due process and the Felonies Clause require a connection to the United States. Applying United States v. Hill, the panel reviewed only for plain error and found none because United States v. Campbell (and reaffirmation in United States v. Canario-Vilomar) foreclosed the claim: Congress may extend jurisdiction to stateless vessels in international waters engaged in drug trafficking, and due process is satisfied because the MDLEA gives clear notice against universally condemned conduct.

(D) Rodriguez’s career-offender error and why it did not matter

On sentencing, the court accepted that United States v. Dupree rendered Rodriguez’s conspiracy priors insufficient to trigger career-offender status. But the panel applied United States v. Keene to avoid remand:

  • Same-sentence finding: The district court expressly stated that even without career-offender status it would impose the same 240-month sentence.
  • Substantive reasonableness under the correct range: Assuming the correct Guidelines range (235–293 months), the 240-month sentence sat near the low end and far below the statutory maximum (life), supporting reasonableness under United States v. Stanley.
  • § 3553(a) justification: The district court referenced seriousness, deterrence, and Rodriguez’s history (including multiple prior convictions and the scale of the attempted importation), which the panel evaluated through United States v. Martin, United States v. Croteau, and United States v. Irey.

3.3 Impact

MDLEA litigation: continued foreclosure of common constitutional defenses

Although unpublished, the decision reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s settled approach to three frequently litigated MDLEA issues:

  • EEZ interdictions: Arguments that EEZ waters fall outside “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes remain barred by United States v. Alfonso.
  • Statelessness definition: Challenges asserting that § 70502(d)(1)(C) exceeds international-law concepts of statelessness remain barred by United States v. Canario-Vilomar.
  • No-nexus theories: Due process/nexus arguments remain barred by United States v. Campbell, and when raised late face the additional procedural barrier of plain-error review under United States v. Hill.

Sentencing: post-Dupree errors may not yield relief when the judge “would do it anyway”

The opinion illustrates a pragmatic appellate pathway after United States v. Dupree: even where the Guidelines were misapplied, relief may be denied under United States v. Keene if the district court makes a clear alternative sentencing statement and the sentence is substantively reasonable under the correct range. Practically, it encourages litigants to develop a record on substantive reasonableness and encourages sentencing judges (when appropriate) to make explicit alternative-variance findings to reduce the need for remands.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Felonies Clause: A constitutional provision allowing Congress to “define and punish” felonies “committed on the high seas.” Here, it is the asserted constitutional hook for applying U.S. drug laws far from U.S. territory.
  • Exclusive economic zone (EEZ): A maritime band extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal baseline where the coastal state has certain resource-related rights. The Eleventh Circuit treats EEZ waters as “high seas” for Felonies Clause analysis.
  • “Vessel without nationality” (stateless vessel): Under the MDLEA, a vessel can be treated as without nationality if the claimed country of registry does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” confirm the claim. That status makes the vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the statute.
  • Customary international law: International norms derived from consistent state practice and a sense of legal obligation. The cited Eleventh Circuit precedents hold customary international law does not limit Congress’s MDLEA definitions for Felonies Clause purposes in the manner defendants argued.
  • Plain error review: A stricter appellate standard applied when an argument was not preserved in the trial court; relief is granted only for clear, obvious errors affecting substantial rights.
  • Career-offender enhancement & “controlled substance offense”: A Guidelines provision that sharply increases sentencing ranges for certain repeat offenders. Under United States v. Dupree, conspiracy (an “inchoate” offense) is not treated as a qualifying “controlled substance offense” for that enhancement in this circuit.
  • Substantive reasonableness (§ 3553(a)): An appellate check on whether the sentence is reasonable in light of statutory sentencing goals (punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, etc.), not merely whether the Guidelines were calculated correctly.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed MDLEA convictions stemming from an interdiction near Colombia by applying established circuit precedent that (1) foreign EEZs qualify as “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes, (2) Congress may define “vessel without nationality” as the MDLEA does in § 70502(d)(1)(C), and (3) MDLEA prosecutions of stateless-vessel drug trafficking do not require a U.S. nexus to satisfy due process. On sentencing, the court acknowledged a post-Dupree career-offender error but affirmed under Keene because the district court would have imposed the same sentence and that sentence was substantively reasonable under the correct Guidelines range.