MDLEA Jurisdiction in a Foreign EEZ and “Statelessness-by-Nonconfirmation,” Plus Harmless Career-Offender Error Under Keene

Case: United States v. Mario Tovar (consolidated appeals with Luis Alfonso Nunez and Geraldo Rodriguez), Eleventh Circuit (per curiam), Aug. 28, 2026 (Not for Publication).
Primary subjects: Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) constitutionality; Felonies Clause; “vessel without nationality” definition; nexus/due process; sentencing harmless error after guideline mistake.

1. Introduction

The appeals arise from a Coast Guard interdiction of a vessel carrying roughly 800 kilograms of cocaine off Colombia. The vessel bore no indicia of nationality. Although one defendant claimed Colombian nationality (a “claim of registry”), Colombia could neither confirm nor deny registration. The Coast Guard treated the vessel as “without nationality” and therefore “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” under the MDLEA.

All three defendants—Luis Alfonso Nunez, Mario Tovar, and Geraldo Rodriguez—were convicted after a bench trial of:

• Conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine on a covered vessel, 46 U.S.C. § 70506(b); and
• Possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine on a covered vessel, 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1).

On appeal, all defendants advanced constitutional challenges centered on Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause (Art. I, § 8, cl. 10). Rodriguez additionally challenged his sentence, arguing that the district court wrongly applied the career-offender enhancement based on prior conspiracy convictions.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held:

• The defendants’ jurisdictional and constitutional challenges to the MDLEA prosecutions were foreclosed by binding circuit precedent—including challenges based on the vessel’s location in Colombia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the MDLEA’s definition of “vessel without nationality,” and the absence of a U.S. nexus.
• As to sentencing, the panel agreed the district court erred in treating Rodriguez as a career offender after United States v. Dupree, but it declined to remand because the district court expressly stated it would impose the same sentence regardless, and the 240-month sentence was substantively reasonable under the correctly calculated range, applying United States v. Keene.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

1) Standards of review and appellate posture

• United States v. Hill, 119 F.4th 862 (11th Cir. 2024): Provided the review framework—constitutional issues reviewed de novo, but issues first raised on appeal reviewed for plain error. The “no nexus” due process argument was reviewed under this stricter standard and failed at the threshold because circuit precedent already rejected it.
• United States v. Fox, 926 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2019): Supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for substantive reasonableness review.
• United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc): Controlled the guideline question—holding that inchoate offenses such as conspiracy are not “controlled substance offenses” for the career-offender enhancement. This made the district court’s career-offender application erroneous.

2) MDLEA + Felonies Clause: EEZ treated as “high seas”

• United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024): Decisive on the EEZ issue. The panel treated another nation’s EEZ as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes and rejected the argument that customary international law limits Congress’s Felonies Clause power. That precedent directly defeated the claim that interdiction in Colombia’s EEZ fell outside Congress’s authority.

3) MDLEA “vessel without nationality”: nonconfirmation suffices

• United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025): Controlled the “statelessness” argument. It upheld 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C), which treats a vessel as “without nationality” when the claimed nation of registry does not “affirmatively and unequivocally assert” nationality. The opinion again emphasized that international law does not constrain Congress’s statutory definition for MDLEA purposes in this context.

4) No U.S. nexus required for due process in MDLEA stateless-vessel cases

• United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014): Foreclosed the due process / nexus argument. The panel relied on Campbell for the proposition that Congress may extend criminal jurisdiction to any stateless vessel in international waters trafficking drugs, and that due process is satisfied because the MDLEA gives clear notice in an area of universally condemned conduct.
• Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th at 1382–83: Reinforced that a nexus challenge is foreclosed.

5) Harmless guideline error via alternative sentence + reasonableness review

• United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006): The engine of the sentencing affirmance. When the district court says it would impose the same sentence even if the guideline issue is resolved the other way, the appellate court can affirm if the sentence is substantively reasonable under the correct range.
• United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2006): Anchored the inquiry in the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
• United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2016): Emphasized the district court’s discretion in weighing individual § 3553(a) factors.
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Provided the “definite and firm conviction” standard for finding substantive unreasonableness—setting a high bar for reversal.
• United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633 (11th Cir. 2014): Supported the inference that a sentence within the guideline range (and well below the statutory maximum) is ordinarily reasonable. Here, the panel found the 240-month sentence fell near the low end of the corrected range and far below the life maximum.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) MDLEA jurisdiction and the Felonies Clause

The court’s reasoning follows a familiar Eleventh Circuit sequence in MDLEA cases:

• Statutory coverage: The MDLEA criminalizes drug trafficking on “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(b), and applies extraterritorially, § 70503(b).
• Jurisdictional hook: The statute includes “a vessel without nationality,” § 70502(c)(1)(A), defined to include the scenario where a claimed registry is met with nonconfirmation by the claimed nation, § 70502(d)(1)(C).
• Constitutional authority: The defendants argued that Congress’s Felonies Clause power is limited by customary international law and by geography (EEZ vs. “high seas”). The panel rejected both, not by re-litigating the merits, but by applying Alfonso and Canario-Vilomar, which reject those limitations in this circuit.

2) Due process and the “nexus” argument

The defendants’ nexus theory—that the Fifth Amendment requires a U.S. connection for prosecution—failed because the Eleventh Circuit treats MDLEA stateless-vessel prosecutions as consistent with due process. Under Campbell, the statute provides sufficient notice because drug trafficking on stateless vessels on the high seas is universally condemned. The panel additionally noted the argument was raised for the first time on appeal, invoking Hill’s plain-error framework.

3) Sentencing: error acknowledged, but no remand

Post-Dupree, conspiracy convictions cannot serve as predicates for the career-offender enhancement. The panel accepted that the district court’s career-offender designation was incorrect. The decisive move, however, was Keene:

• The district court explicitly stated it would impose the same 240-month sentence “under any circumstance,” satisfying the alternative-sentence premise.
• The panel then recalculated the range as if Rodriguez were not a career offender (criminal history IV; offense level 35; range 235–293 months) and concluded 240 months was substantively reasonable given the large drug quantity, repeated criminal history, and § 3553(a) goals (deterrence, public protection, punishment), citing Martin, Croteau, and Irey.

C. Impact

1) MDLEA litigation in the Eleventh Circuit

Although unpublished, the opinion underscores the practical reality that three common MDLEA defenses remain nonstarters in this circuit when the facts fit:

• EEZ-based limits on Felonies Clause power (rejected via Alfonso);
• International-law challenges to the MDLEA’s statelessness definition, especially nonconfirmation scenarios (rejected via Canario-Vilomar); and
• Nexus/due process challenges for stateless-vessel interdictions on the high seas (rejected via Campbell and reiterated via Canario-Vilomar).

2) Sentencing practice after Dupree

The decision also illustrates how guideline errors may be insulated from remand when district courts:

• Make a clear alternative sentence record; and
• Anchor the chosen sentence in specific § 3553(a) considerations sufficient to survive substantive reasonableness review under the corrected range, consistent with Keene.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Felonies Clause: A constitutional provision authorizing Congress to define and punish “felonies committed on the high seas.” Defendants often argue it does not reach certain waters or must track international law. In this circuit, the cited precedents reject those limits for the contexts discussed.
• Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): Waters extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal baseline. A coastal state has special economic rights there, but (as applied in Eleventh Circuit precedent) EEZ location does not remove MDLEA prosecutions from Felonies Clause “high seas” treatment.
• “Vessel without nationality” (MDLEA): A statutory category that can include a vessel where a nation is claimed but the claimed nation does not confirm the registry. That statutory “statelessness” triggers U.S. jurisdiction under the MDLEA.
• Nexus requirement: Some extraterritorial prosecutions require a U.S. connection. Under Eleventh Circuit MDLEA doctrine for stateless vessels on the high seas, due process is satisfied without a particular U.S. nexus because of the universally condemned nature of the conduct and statutory notice.
• Career-offender enhancement: A guideline rule that substantially increases ranges for certain repeat offenders. After Dupree, conspiracy (an “inchoate” offense) does not qualify as a predicate “controlled substance offense” for this enhancement in the Eleventh Circuit.
• Keene harmless-error/alternative-sentence doctrine: Even if the guidelines were miscalculated, an appellate court may affirm if the district court clearly would impose the same sentence anyway and that sentence is reasonable under the correct range.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the MDLEA convictions by treating the defendants’ constitutional objections as settled questions under circuit precedent: an interdiction in Colombia’s EEZ may be treated as occurring on the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes; the MDLEA may deem a vessel “without nationality” when the claimed nation does not affirmatively confirm registry; and due process does not require a U.S. nexus for stateless-vessel drug trafficking on the high seas.

On sentencing, the panel recognized a post-Dupree career-offender error but applied Keene to affirm because the district court’s alternative sentence was clear and the 240-month term was substantively reasonable under the corrected guideline range and the § 3553(a) factors.