2. Background and Summary of the Opinion
The pending misconduct allegations
A notice of petition and verified petition dated August 13, 2024, commenced a disciplinary proceeding under 22 NYCRR 1240.8. The petition alleged 17 charges involving Sekou Coulibaly, Jose Rebaza, Norberto Mussenden, Adonis Betances, and Ngawang Choeyang. The alleged violations included:
- Lack of diligence and neglect: violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3(a) and 1.3(b), respectively, in three client matters.
- Failure to refund unearned fees: violations of rule 1.16(e) in four matters.
- Inadequate status communication: a violation of rule 1.4(a)(3) in one matter.
- Failure to answer reasonable requests for information: violations of rule 1.4(a)(4) in two matters.
- Conduct affecting justice and professional fitness: violations of rules 8.4(d) and 8.4(h), respectively, concerning the client matters collectively.
A separate investigation concerned Gabriel Alexander. Gonzalez acknowledged that he had failed to notify Alexander timely of his April 2021 suspension and had not returned a $1,500 legal fee despite promising repayment.
The resignation affidavit
In an affidavit sworn to on August 15, 2025, Gonzalez acknowledged the pending proceeding and investigation and attested that he could not successfully defend against the charges and allegations. He stated that his resignation was voluntary, free from coercion or duress, and submitted with full awareness that acceptance would result in disbarment and removal from the roll of attorneys.
He also consented to specified restitution, continuing jurisdiction over future restitution or Lawyers’ Fund reimbursement applications, interim restrictions on new representations and fiduciary-account activity, and public disclosure of the identified disciplinary records upon acceptance.
The court’s disposition
The Grievance Committee recommended acceptance of the resignation but took no position on Gonzalez’s requested effective date. Finding that the application complied with 22 NYCRR 1240.10, the court:
- Granted the application to resign and disbarred Gonzalez effective immediately.
- Denied his request for an effective date of May 14, 2021, or, alternatively, November 14, 2022.
- Required continued compliance with the rules governing suspended and disbarred attorneys.
- Ordered client restitution or reimbursement of the Lawyers’ Fund, depending on compensation already provided.
- Authorized enforcement of the financial obligations through a civil money judgment.
The decision was unanimous.
3. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited
The opinion cites two earlier decisions, both titled Matter of Gonzalez. They establish the respondent’s disciplinary history and existing suspended status. Neither is discussed as supplying a controlling test for accepting resignation, ordering restitution, or determining retroactivity.
Matter of Gonzalez, 194 AD3d 152
In the April 14, 2021 decision, the court suspended Gonzalez for six months, effective May 14, 2021. This precedent matters in three ways. First, it establishes the initial suspension underlying his status in the present proceeding. Second, May 14, 2021 was the first date to which he sought to backdate his disbarment. Third, the separate Alexander complaint concerned his failure to communicate that suspension timely.
The present opinion does not describe the misconduct underlying that earlier suspension. It therefore does not support conclusions about whether those earlier violations resembled the current allegations or how their relative seriousness influenced the disposition.
Matter of Gonzalez, 201 AD3d 122
In a separate decision dated December 8, 2021, the court imposed an 18-month suspension effective November 14, 2021, consecutive to the first suspension. This decision establishes that Gonzalez’s disciplinary history involved a second, separately imposed sanction rather than a single suspension.
The present court did not treat the earlier suspensions as requiring a retroactive effective date for disbarment. However, it did not explain its denial through a detailed analysis of the earlier decisions. Their role is primarily historical and procedural; the opinion does not extract a broader rule about crediting suspension periods toward disbarment.
B. Legal Reasoning
1. Compliance with the disciplinary-resignation framework
The court’s express reason for accepting the resignation was that the application complied with 22 NYCRR 1240.10. The affidavit supplied the essential assurances described in the opinion: disclosure of pending disciplinary matters, acknowledgment of an inability to defend successfully, voluntariness, and awareness of the consequences.
This is not an ordinary administrative withdrawal from practice. Gonzalez resigned while facing professional-misconduct allegations, and the accepted resignation produced an order of disbarment. The distinction matters because the resulting order formally removed his professional status and preserved disciplinary safeguards and financial remedies.
The court did not conduct a charge-by-charge merits adjudication in this opinion. Its disposition rested on the qualifying resignation affidavit, including Gonzalez’s acknowledgment that he could not successfully defend. Accordingly, the commentary must distinguish the petition’s allegations from findings reached after a contested disciplinary hearing.
2. Acceptance of resignation did not establish entitlement to backdating
Gonzalez sought two alternative retroactive dates. The court accepted his resignation but denied both requested dates, making disbarment effective immediately upon the October 21, 2026 order.
The practical distinction is important: satisfying the requirements for disciplinary resignation did not secure every requested term of the disposition. Nor did the Committee’s neutrality on retroactivity result in acceptance of the proposed dates.
The holding is narrower than a categorical prohibition on retroactive disbarment. The court supplied no separate explanation for rejecting backdating, identified no governing multi-factor test, and did not state that retroactive relief is unavailable in every case. The decision establishes that such relief was denied here, not a universal rule resolving all future requests.
3. Financial accountability survived resignation
Under Judiciary Law § 90(6-a), the court ordered a coordinated system of restitution and Lawyers’ Fund reimbursement. The specified direct-restitution amounts total $32,750:
Specified client restitution, subject to compensation already provided
| Client |
Amount |
| Sekou Coulibaly | $750 |
| Jose Rebaza | $1,500 |
| Norberto Mussenden | $7,500 |
| Adonis Betances | $15,000 |
| Ngawang Choeyang | $6,500 |
| Gabriel Alexander | $1,500 |
| Total | $32,750 |
|---|
The order addresses three compensation situations:
- Fund awards: Gonzalez must reimburse the Lawyers’ Fund for awards made to the six identified clients.
- No Fund awards: he must make the specified restitution directly to the clients.
- Partial Fund awards: he must make direct restitution to the extent the clients remain uncompensated.
This structure seeks to avoid duplicate recovery while preventing Fund compensation from relieving the attorney of responsibility. It also protects the Fund’s resources by shifting the reimbursed loss back to the responsible lawyer.
Gonzalez additionally consented to continuing jurisdiction over future applications for restitution or Fund reimbursement. Acceptance of resignation therefore did not operate as a financial release.
4. Civil enforcement gave the monetary obligations practical force
Under Judiciary Law § 90(6-a)(d), the opinion and order may be entered as a civil judgment enforceable as a money judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction. Enforcement is available to the person entitled to payment or, where subrogated to that person’s rights, to the Lawyers’ Fund.
The specified offsets for Fund payments coordinate enforcement with compensation already received. Importantly, the opinion authorizes entry and enforcement of a judgment; it does not report that collection has occurred.
5. Disbarment carried continuing protective obligations
The court required Gonzalez to continue complying with 22 NYCRR 1240.15. Under Judiciary Law § 90, he must also continue to refrain from practicing law, appearing as an attorney before courts or public authorities, giving legal opinions or advice, and holding himself out as an attorney. The prohibition on practice extends to practicing through employment or agency for another; it is not limited to maintaining an independent law office.
If he possesses a secure pass issued by the Office of Court Administration, he must return it immediately and certify that return in his compliance affidavit under 22 NYCRR 1240.15(f).
His affidavit also addressed the period before acceptance: he would undertake no new client representations, accept no retainers for future services, and conduct no fiduciary-account transactions except payments to persons entitled to the funds. Because he was already suspended, these undertakings should not be understood as permission to continue otherwise prohibited legal work.
6. Public accountability accompanied the disposition
Gonzalez acknowledged that acceptance would make the order and the records and documents relating to the identified allegations, including his affidavit, public records under Judiciary Law § 90(10). The significance is specific: this disciplinary resignation would not leave the identified allegations and supporting resignation materials outside public scrutiny.
C. Potential Impact
The opinion offers practical guidance for disciplinary applications, although its limited reasoning constrains broader precedential claims.
- For attorneys seeking resignation: a compliant application can result in immediate disbarment, but compliance does not itself secure a requested retroactive date.
- For disciplinary authorities: the decision illustrates how resignation, client compensation, Fund reimbursement, public disclosure, and continuing compliance duties can be addressed in one order.
- For injured clients: the order provides a route to enforce specified restitution as a money judgment, rather than leaving repayment solely as an undertaking in an affidavit.
- For the Lawyers’ Fund: reimbursement and subrogation provisions preserve recovery rights after client compensation.
- For future courts: the decision is a useful application of existing rules, but not a detailed authority establishing when retroactive disbarment must be granted or denied.
The opinion should therefore be read as an integrated disciplinary disposition, not as a new sanction schedule or a general ruling on the appropriate punishment for every instance of neglect or unearned-fee retention.