Martinez Exception Requires a Substantial Underlying Strickland Claim: Todaro v. Houtzdale

Introduction

Joseph Todaro, Sr. (the “Appellant”) challenges the dismissal of his federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 following his guilty plea in a Pennsylvania state court for rape of a mentally disabled person and failure to register as a sex offender. The key issue on appeal to the Third Circuit was whether Todaro’s procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim could be excused under the narrow Martinez v. Ryan exception. At the heart of the dispute was trial counsel’s alleged failure to challenge the admissibility of hearsay at the preliminary hearing in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, and later developments such as Commonwealth v. McClelland. The Third Circuit’s decision on April 8, 2025, clarifies the requirement that only “substantial” underlying Strickland claims can survive Martinez’s cause-and-prejudice gateway.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Todaro’s habeas petition. It held that:

Todaro’s claim alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge hearsay-only evidence at his preliminary hearing was procedurally defaulted in the Pennsylvania courts and not excused under Martinez v. Ryan.
Under Martinez, only an underlying ineffective-assistance claim that is “substantial”—meaning it has some merit—can excuse a procedural default when post-conviction counsel was deficient in raising that claim.
Applying the law as it stood at the time of Todaro’s plea, Pennsylvania rules and precedents (including Rule 542(E) and the Superior Court’s Ricker and McClelland I decisions) permitted hearsay to establish a prima facie case at preliminary hearings. Thus, Todaro’s Strickland claim was not “substantial.”
Because the underlying claim failed on its merits, the Martinez exception did not apply and federal habeas relief was properly denied.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Martinez v. Ryan (566 U.S. 1, 2012): Established that a procedural default may be excused if (1) post-conviction counsel was ineffective in the initial collateral-review proceeding and (2) the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is “substantial.”
Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668, 1984): Set forth the two-prong test for ineffective assistance—deficient performance and prejudice.
Hill v. Lockhart (474 U.S. 52, 1985): Clarified how Strickland’s prejudice prong applies to guilty pleas—showing a reasonable probability of a different (trial) outcome.
Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz (581 A.2d 172, Pa. 1990): Held that hearsay alone cannot sustain a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing.
Pa. R. Crim. P. 542(E) (amended 2011, expanded 2013): Permits hearsay evidence to establish any element of an offense at a preliminary hearing.
Commonwealth v. Ricker (120 A.3d 349, Pa. Super. 2015): Applied amended Rule 542(E) to allow hearsay-only evidence at preliminary hearings.
Commonwealth v. McClelland I (165 A.3d 19, Pa. Super. 2017) and McClelland II (233 A.3d 717, Pa. 2020): Confirmed hearsay sufficiency under Rule 542(E) and declined to overrule Verbonitz.
Tollett v. Henderson (411 U.S. 258, 1973) and United States v. Porter (933 F.3d 226, 3d Cir. 2019): Address the limits on collaterally challenging counsel’s performance after a guilty plea.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis unfolded in three steps:

Procedural Default and Martinez Exception. Todaro conceded his Strickland claim was defaulted in state PCRA proceedings. Under Martinez, to excuse that default he had to show (a) post-conviction counsel performed deficiently in raising the claim and (b) the underlying Strickland claim was “substantial.”
Substantiality of the Underlying Claim. The Court examined the preliminary hearing record and the state of Pennsylvania law at the time. Although Verbonitz originally barred hearsay-only proofs, Rule 542(E) and controlling Superior Court precedent (Ricker, McClelland I) permitted hearsay. Trial counsel’s failure to object did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness because the law then allowed the Commonwealth’s proof. Nor could Todaro show prejudice, as the plea agreement spared him a mandatory life sentence.
Denial of Habeas Relief. Because the underlying ineffective-assistance claim lacked merit, Todaro failed the “substantiality” requirement. Martinez did not apply, and the procedural default stood. The Third Circuit therefore affirmed dismissal without reaching additional grounds.

Impact

This decision reinforces and clarifies several important dimensions of federal habeas practice:

Martinez’s limited exception remains tightly confined to meritorious Strickland claims. Judges must conduct a threshold merits analysis before applying Martinez.
Counsel’s performance is assessed against the governing law at the time of the events. Attorneys need not predict future rule changes or reversals.
State procedural rules (like Pennsylvania’s amended Rule 542) and appellate interpretations directly inform federal habeas review of preliminary hearing challenges.
Defendants who plead guilty face a high bar to collaterally challenge counsel’s pre-plea decisions, especially when a plea offers significant sentencing concessions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural Default: When a defendant fails to raise an issue in state court according to state rules, federal courts normally refuse to hear the claim.
Martinez Exception: A narrow doorway allowing some defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims to be heard if initial post-conviction counsel was incompetent and the trial-counsel claim is not frivolous.
Strickland Test: To win an ineffective-assistance claim, a defendant must prove (1) counsel’s performance was unreasonably poor and (2) the flaws changed the outcome.
Prima Facie Case at Preliminary Hearing: The minimal showing of evidence needed to hold a defendant for trial. In Pennsylvania, hearsay now suffices under Rule 542(E).

Conclusion

Todaro v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI underscores that the Martinez exception does not swallow the procedural-default doctrine. Federal courts will only excuse state procedural defaults when post-conviction counsel’s errors combine with an underlying Strickland claim that possesses real merit. Here, because Pennsylvania law then permitted hearsay-proof at preliminary hearings, Todaro’s challenge failed on the merits. The Third Circuit’s ruling thus reaffirms both the rigorous Martinez gateway and the necessity of evaluating counsel’s performance in light of contemporaneous law.