Maccagnan v. Cherry Creek School District No. 5: No Due-Process Property Interest for Colorado Principals on One-Year Contracts; Equal Pay Act Pretext Not an Element; Comparator Proof Turns on the Decisionmaker Who Caused the Differential Treatment

1. Introduction

In Maccagnan v. Cherry Creek School District No. 5 (10th Cir. July 17, 2026), the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court’s (i) partial summary judgment rejecting multiple constitutional and statutory claims arising from a Colorado school principal’s demotion, and (ii) mid-trial judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on the remaining sex-discrimination theories.

Parties. Plaintiff-Appellant Linda Maccagnan, a longtime Cherry Creek employee and elementary school principal, sued the School District and senior officials (including Superintendent Dr. Scott Seigfried, Deputy Superintendent Dr. Jennifer Perry, and Chief HR Officer Brenda Smith) after she was demoted from principal to assistant principal.

Background. The demotion followed escalating staff and parent complaints and a teachers’ union “Listening Tour” reporting broad concerns about leadership, communication, trust, and fear of retaliation. District leadership cited “loss of confidence of staff” as the reason for demotion.

Key issues on appeal. The court addressed (1) whether a principal employed under one-year contracts had a protected property interest in continued employment as principal (procedural due process), (2) the proper framework for Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) claims and whether “pretext” is required, (3) municipal liability pleading/proof under § 1983 (Monell), (4) comparator evidence and “similarly situated” requirements at trial, (5) hearsay and Rule 403 challenges to staff-interview notes, and (6) whether the trial record supported a reasonable inference that sex was a motivating factor (JMOL on Equal Protection/Title IX disparate treatment and Title IX stereotyping).

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Procedural due process (summary judgment affirmed). Ms. Maccagnan lacked a protected property interest in remaining principal of High Plains. The Teacher Employment, Compensation, and Dismissal Act (“TECDA”) did not confer tenure-like protections for principals, and the District’s pattern of routinely renewing one-year contracts did not create a “legitimate claim of entitlement.”
  • Equal Pay Act (summary judgment affirmed, with a doctrinal correction). The district court erred by treating “pretext” as an essential element of an EPA claim. Nevertheless, summary judgment was affirmed because the District proved the pay differential was based on a “factor other than sex”—experience credit as recommended by a neutral compensation consultant—and no rational jury could find otherwise.
  • § 1983 Equal Protection municipal liability (summary judgment for the District affirmed). The plaintiff failed to plead or support an “official custom or policy to discriminate,” as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services.
  • Comparator evidence (evidentiary ruling affirmed). Testimony about a male principal (Ryan Langdon) was properly excluded because the alleged disparate treatment depended on different immediate supervisors’ responses, and the shared higher-level officials were not shown to have made the differential “coaching vs. rapid demotion” decision.
  • Staff-interview notes (evidentiary ruling affirmed). Dr. Roybal’s notes were admissible as non-hearsay to show their effect on the decisionmakers’ state of mind (why they acted), and the district court did not abuse discretion under Rule 403.
  • JMOL (affirmed). Based on the evidence admitted at trial, no reasonable jury could find sex or gender was a motivating factor in the demotion. The court emphasized that Rule 50 review is limited to the trial record, not excluded evidence from summary judgment materials.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Procedural Due Process: Property Interest Must Be an Entitlement, Not an Expectation

  • Mathews v. Eldridge (two-step inquiry: protected interest, then adequate process) supplied the baseline framework the panel applied.
  • Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth anchored the entitlement requirement: a “unilateral expectation” is insufficient; the plaintiff must show a “legitimate claim of entitlement.”
  • Adams Cnty. School Dist. No. 50 v. Dickey provided Colorado’s articulation of property interests arising from “rules or mutually explicit understandings” creating a sufficient expectancy.
  • Brown v. Independent School District No. I-06 was pivotal: absent a statutory or contractual right to renewal, consecutive annual contracts “ordinarily” do not create a property interest in “indefinite renewal.”
  • Colorado TECDA cases and administrator-specific authority underscored the statutory gap: Johnson v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Stanczyk v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, Draper v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, and the Tenth Circuit’s Colorado-focused Heutzenroeder v. Mesa Cnty. Valley Sch. Dist. 51 (persuasive, though unpublished).
  • The panel also relied on Tenth Circuit formulations of property interests and restrictions on discretion: Eisenhour v. Weber County, McDonald v. Wise, Roberts v. Winder, and Hennigh v. City of Shawnee.

How these precedents shaped the result. The court treated TECDA as addressing certain teacher-contract procedures, not creating an entitlement to a particular administrative role. And it treated repeated renewals and workplace assumptions as falling on the “expectation” side of Roth and Brown v. Independent School District No. I-06, not the “entitlement” side.

B. Equal Pay Act: Strict Liability Structure and Employer’s Burden on Affirmative Defenses

  • Riser v. QEP Energy and Mickelson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. provided the two-step EPA structure: (1) prima facie case, then (2) employer’s proof of one of four statutory defenses, including a “factor other than sex.”
  • Washington County v. Gunther was cited for the conceptual distinction between EPA and Title VII frameworks.
  • Brownlee v. Gay & Taylor, Inc. supplied the key doctrinal point: plaintiffs may rebut defenses by showing pretext, but are not required to prove pretext as an element.
  • The panel also drew support from outside-circuit authority confirming that “pretext” is not a third EPA step: Baker v. Upson Reg'l Medical Ctr. and Hayes v. Clariant Plastics & Coatings USA, Inc..

How these precedents shaped the result. The court corrected the district court’s analytic error (importing a Title VII-style pretext step), but affirmed because the employer’s affirmative defense was established so clearly (experience-credit methodology via a third-party consultant) that no rational jury could find the wage differential was based on sex.

C. Municipal Liability Under § 1983: Monell Pleading/Proof Requirements

  • Monell v. Department of Social Services supplied the core requirement: an “official custom or policy” must cause the constitutional violation.
  • Tenth Circuit municipal-liability elements were set out via Arnold v. City of Olathe, with additional grounding in Burke v. Regalado, Donahue v. Wihongi, and Graves v. Thomas.
  • On official-capacity claims, Kentucky v. Graham and Sawyers v. Norton clarified that suing officials in their official capacities is functionally suing the entity.

How these precedents shaped the result. Even though the plaintiff’s individual-capacity equal protection claim proceeded past summary judgment against certain officials, the district could not be liable without allegations/evidence of a discriminatory custom or policy. The panel emphasized that the complaint and summary judgment briefing were “completely devoid” of that Monell theory.

D. Comparator Evidence and “Similarly Situated” Employees

  • The court relied on comparator principles in Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n, Ibrahim v. All. for Sustainable Energy, LLC, Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc., and Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc..
  • It recognized that “same supervisor” is not always mandatory where a shared decisionmaker exists, citing Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc. and Lacaze v. Gourley.
  • It upheld exclusion authority grounded in relevance and comparator shortcomings, including Curtis v. Okla. City Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ..

How these precedents shaped the result. The panel reframed the comparator question around the specific differential treatment alleged (coaching time/opportunities after Listening Tour concerns). Because that differential treatment was attributable to different immediate supervisors and there was no showing that shared higher-ups dictated that differential response, the comparator evidence did not support a “similarly situated” inference.

E. Hearsay and State-of-Mind Use in Employment Cases

  • The panel relied on the “effect on the listener” non-hearsay principle as articulated in United States v. Murry and United States v. Martinez.
  • In the employment context, it cited Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc. (and similar unpublished cases) to show that third-party statements can be admitted to explain decisionmakers’ motivations and actions.
  • For Rule 403, it emphasized deference to trial courts, citing Old Chief v. United States and Tenth Circuit standards including United States v. Parker-Miliorini Int'l LLC.

F. JMOL and the Trial-Record Constraint

  • The standard for JMOL was restated using Eisenhour v. Weber County, Burke v. Regalado, and Rule 50 itself.
  • The panel used Dupree v. Younger to reinforce that sufficiency review is anchored in the “complete trial record,” and that Rule 50 addresses whether there was sufficient evidence admitted at trial.
  • Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. framed when JMOL is proper even in discrimination cases: weak evidence of falsity plus abundant nondiscriminatory evidence can warrant judgment as a matter of law.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. No Property Interest in Continued Employment as Principal

The court’s due process analysis turned entirely on the first step of Mathews v. Eldridge: whether Ms. Maccagnan had a protected property interest. She did not. Colorado principals were employed on one-year contracts; TECDA’s teacher-focused procedures did not extend tenure-like protections to principals; and the District’s routine renewals did not rise above a unilateral expectation under Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth. The Administrator’s Agreement also vested employment decisions within the Board’s discretion, undercutting any claim of substantive restrictions on demotion.

B. Equal Pay Act: Correcting the Framework Without Changing the Outcome

The panel sharply distinguished EPA analysis from Title VII-style pretext sequencing. The EPA is “a form of strict liability” as described in Mickelson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.: once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie wage disparity for substantially equal work, the employer bears the burden to prove a statutory defense. The district court erred by treating pretext as an “essential element” the plaintiff must prove. But the Tenth Circuit affirmed because the employer’s “factor other than sex” defense (experience-credit methodology; Oehm Consulting’s recommendations made without gender data) was conclusive on this record—any alleged miscalculation did not change that the pay system was experience-based.

C. § 1983 Equal Protection Claim Against the District: Monell Was Missing

On the entity claim, the panel emphasized that § 1983 municipal liability is not respondeat superior. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services and its Tenth Circuit elaborations, the plaintiff needed allegations and proof of an official policy/custom that caused intentional sex discrimination. The court accepted the district court’s later clarification that such a theory was absent from the pleadings and summary judgment presentation—making summary judgment for the District proper regardless of any earlier ambiguity.

D. Comparator Evidence: “Similarly Situated” Must Match the Claimed Differential Decision

The court’s evidentiary holding is best understood as a causation-and-relevance decision: if the claimed disparate treatment is the difference between (i) two years of coaching and (ii) four months before a demotion recommendation, the comparator must share the decisionmaker(s) responsible for that difference. Here, the divergent treatment arose from different immediate supervisors (Mr. Mullner vs. Dr. Roybal). The presence of shared higher-level officials (Dr. Perry and, earlier, Dr. Seigfried) did not render the employees similarly situated where those officials were not shown to have directed the differential coaching/demotion timeline.

E. Notes as Non-Hearsay: Decisionmaker’s State of Mind, Not Truth

Dr. Roybal’s staff-interview notes were admitted to show what information Dr. Perry (and, indirectly, Dr. Seigfried) considered and why they concluded staff confidence had collapsed—classic “effect on the listener” usage. The panel treated this as non-hearsay under Rule 801(c) because the notes were not admitted to prove that the staff’s criticisms were true, but that the criticisms (accurate or not) drove the employment decision. The Rule 403 ruling was affirmed because the notes were highly probative of the asserted nondiscriminatory reason for the demotion.

F. JMOL: No Trial Evidence Permitted a Finding that Sex Was a Motivating Factor

The panel affirmed JMOL for a straightforward reason: Ms. Maccagnan’s disparate-treatment theory depended on comparator evidence that was not admitted at trial. Under Dupree v. Younger and Rule 50’s design, sufficiency is judged on the evidence the jury actually heard. Without admitted comparator proof, the record showed demotions of both women and men for staff-confidence problems (and in some instances harsher outcomes for men), and no reasonable jury could infer sex-based motivation.

On stereotyping, the court applied Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and the Tenth Circuit’s Title IX stereotyping discussion in Throupe v. Univ. of Denv.: the plaintiff must show both (1) stereotypes are in play and (2) the employer actually relied on them in the challenged decision. The Listening Tour’s criticisms (communication, micromanagement, collaboration) were largely gender-neutral; the more charged descriptors were not substantiated in the written summary and lacked identified sources and context. Critically, the record did not show that decisionmakers relied on sex stereotypes—as opposed to loss of staff trust—in demoting her. Under Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., the combination of weak stereotyping evidence and abundant nondiscriminatory evidence supported JMOL.

3.3. Impact

  • Colorado public-school administrators’ due process claims. The decision reinforces that one-year administrator contracts, even if routinely renewed, typically do not create a protected property interest absent clear statutory, contractual, or mutually explicit restrictions on discretion.
  • EPA litigation in the Tenth Circuit. The opinion provides a clear doctrinal correction: “pretext” is not a mandatory third step under the EPA. Plaintiffs may use pretext-like evidence to contest an employer’s affirmative defense, but the employer retains the ultimate burden to prove the defense.
  • Monell discipline for § 1983 employment suits. Plaintiffs must plead and support an entity-policy/custom theory; otherwise, the case will collapse to individual liability (if any) even where an underlying Equal Protection theory survives against individuals.
  • Comparator evidence at trial. The decision signals a practical trial focus: comparator relevance depends on who made the decisions that created the disparity, not merely whether organizational charts overlap at higher levels.
  • Trial-record constraint for JMOL and appeal. Litigants cannot rely on excluded comparator proof to resist JMOL; preserving and successfully admitting critical discrimination evidence is decisive when the case goes to Rule 50.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Property interest (procedural due process)
Not a general interest in keeping a job, but a legally enforceable entitlement—typically created by statute, contract, or binding policy limiting the employer’s discretion. A strong expectation or common practice of renewal is usually not enough.
Equal Pay Act “factor other than sex” defense
Even if a woman is paid less than a man for substantially equal work, the employer avoids liability if it proves the pay difference is explained by a lawful factor (e.g., experience, seniority, merit) rather than sex.
Monell municipal liability
A governmental entity is not automatically liable for its employees’ constitutional torts. The plaintiff must connect the violation to an official policy, custom, or decision that counts as the entity’s own act.
“Similarly situated” comparator
A comparator is useful only if differences in outcomes can plausibly be attributed to discrimination rather than different supervisors, standards, misconduct, timing, or decision processes.
Non-hearsay “effect on the listener”
An out-of-court statement can be admitted not to prove it was true, but to show it influenced what the decisionmaker believed and why the decisionmaker acted.
JMOL (Rule 50)
A mid-trial judgment entered when the evidence actually admitted would not allow a reasonable jury to rule for the plaintiff on a required element.

5. Conclusion

Maccagnan v. Cherry Creek School District No. 5 is a multi-doctrine employment case with practical lessons: administrators on annual contracts in Colorado generally cannot convert routine renewals into due process property interests; EPA claims remain a two-step, strict-liability framework where pretext is not an element; Monell must be pleaded and proved to reach entity liability under § 1983; comparator evidence must match the decisionmakers who produced the differential treatment; and Rule 50 sufficiency review lives and dies on the evidence admitted at trial. The opinion thus tightens the linkage between pleading theory, admissibility strategy, and the ultimate ability to reach a jury on discrimination claims.