Liability-Caps as Waivers of Immunity, not Damage Limits – Commentary on Bain v. City of Cheyenne, 2025 WY 67

Introduction

On 18 June 2025 the Wyoming Supreme Court issued a significant decision in Clifford C. Bain v. City of Cheyenne & Edward Brookman. The Court addressed whether the $250,000 “cap” in Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-118(a)(i) of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA) violates Art. 10, § 4(a) of the Wyoming Constitution, which forbids legislative “laws limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death of any person.”

Mr. Bain, severely injured when a city bus struck his motorcycle, argued that the cap unconstitutionally limits damages. The City conceded negligence but asserted the statutory limit. The district court upheld the statute, and the Supreme Court granted a writ of review. The core issue: is § 1-39-118(a)(i) a damages limitation or merely a boundary on the State’s partial waiver of sovereign immunity?

Summary of the Judgment

Holding: Section 1-39-118(a)(i) is a constraint on the State’s waiver of governmental immunity, not a limitation on recoverable damages; therefore it does not offend Art. 10, § 4(a).
Result: The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Bain’s motion for partial summary judgment and left the $250,000 cap intact.
Reasoning in brief: “Liability” in the WGCA refers to legal responsibility; the statute fixes the extent to which immunity is waived, not the quantum of damages. Interpreting otherwise would distort the statutory scheme, destabilise public coffers, and conflict with established precedent recognising legislative control over suits against the State.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners, 575 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1978) – The Court’s abrogation of common-law governmental immunity prompted legislative enactment of the WGCA. Oroz provides historical context: immunity is now statutory, not judicial.
Troyer v. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 722 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1986) – Upheld WGCA’s bar on certain tort claims, holding that limiting the right of action is permissible even when Art. 10, § 4(a) forbids damage caps. Bain relies heavily on Troyer’s distinction between causes of action and damages.
Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235 (Wyo. 1982) – Found a workers’-comp statute restricting co-employee suits constitutional because it affected liability, not damages. Bain applies Meyer’s analytic framework to governmental immunity.
Diamond Surface, Inc. v. Cleveland, 963 P.2d 996 (Wyo. 1998); Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Pfeifle, 317 P.3d 573 (Wyo. 2014); Wyo. State Hosp. v. Romine, 483 P.3d 840 (Wyo. 2021) – All reiterate that WGCA immunity is broad and waivers are strictly construed.
Federal District decision Millward v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2018 WL 9371676 (D. Wyo. 2018) – Persuasively interpreted § 1-39-118 as a cap on the waiver, not damages. Though non-binding, the Supreme Court quoted it approvingly.

Legal Reasoning of the Court

“Section 118(a)(i) serves to define the extent to which governmental immunity is waived. It is not a limitation on damages.” – Jarosh, J.

The Court’s reasoning progressed through five logical steps:

Plain Language – “Liability” is undefined in the WGCA; ordinary meaning (Black’s Law, prior decisions) equates it with “legal responsibility,” not “damages.”
Structure of the WGCA – § 1-39-104 confers immunity “except” for enumerated waivers; § 1-39-118 merely quantifies those waivers. Read in pari materia, the cap is integral to the waiver, not collateral.
Constitutional Avoidance – If two interpretations exist, courts must adopt the one preserving constitutionality (citing Cir. Ct. v. Lee Newspapers). Recognising the cap as an immunity provision avoids a clash with Art. 10, § 4(a).
Prior Jurisprudence – Troyer/Meyer already distinguished liability limits from damage caps; Fugle treats extra insurance as an “increased waiver,” reinforcing the cap-as-waiver view.
Public Policy Balance – Unlimited governmental liability threatens fiscal stability; the WGCA’s purpose statement (§ 1-39-102) aims to balance injured parties’ equities with taxpayer protection. A capped waiver achieves that equilibrium.

Impact of the Judgment

Clarifies Constitutional Landscape – Sets a definitive Wyoming precedent that Art. 10, § 4(a) is not triggered by statutory ceilings on governmental liability.
Stabilises Public Finance Exposure – Reassures municipalities and insurers that the long-standing $250,000 per-claimant cap remains enforceable unless the legislature raises it.
Guidance for Litigants – Plaintiffs must frame challenges to WGCA caps on other constitutional grounds (e.g., equal protection) or lobby the legislature; Art. 10, § 4(a) is now foreclosed.
Administrative Strategy – Public entities may continue purchasing supplementary insurance (under § 1-39-118(b)) if they desire higher coverage, knowing the baseline cap is secure.
Ripple Effect – The ruling, though state-specific, provides persuasive authority for other jurisdictions wrestling with similar “cap versus immunity waiver” debates.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Governmental (Sovereign) Immunity: The doctrine that the State and its subdivisions cannot be sued without consent. Wyoming’s consent is codified in the WGCA, which specifies when and how much the government can be liable.
Waiver of Immunity: A statute in which the State voluntarily exposes itself to lawsuits. It is not the same as a damages cap; it defines whether the plaintiff can sue, not how large the judgment can be once suit is allowed.
Liability vs. Damages: Liability = legal responsibility; damages = monetary sum awarded. A statute may restrict liability (i.e., the right to recover) without dictating the amount of damages within that restricted right.
Article 10, § 4(a), Wyoming Constitution: Prevents the legislature from placing numerical limits on damages in personal injury/death cases. It does not forbid the legislature from deciding whether the State may be sued at all.
Summary Judgment: A procedural device allowing courts to decide issues of law without trial when no material facts are disputed. Bain’s constitutional challenge was resolved via cross-motions for summary judgment.

Conclusion

The Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Bain v. City of Cheyenne cements a crucial doctrinal divide: legislative caps contained in the WGCA are integral to the State’s conditional waiver of immunity and fall outside the “damage-cap” prohibition of Art. 10, § 4(a). By reaffirming that immunity waivers may be narrowly tailored both in subject matter and monetary scope, the Court preserved the delicate balance between compensating injured citizens and safeguarding public treasuries. For practitioners, the ruling forecloses Art. 10, § 4(a) as an avenue of attack against WGCA monetary limits, while signalling that meaningful change, if desired, must arise from legislative action rather than constitutional litigation.

Liability-Caps as Waivers of Immunity, not Damage Limits – Commentary on Bain v. City of Cheyenne (2025 WY 67)