Later Dismissal Supports Appellate Jurisdiction; Unpronounced Reentry Reporting Duties Cannot Stand

1. Introduction

United States v. Martinez-Ornelas addresses two distinct questions: whether the later dismissal of an unresolved indictment count permits appellate review, and whether a written supervised-release condition may impose a reporting obligation omitted from the district court’s oral sentence.

Valentin Martinez-Ornelas pleaded guilty, without a written plea agreement, to conspiracy to possess at least 500 grams of methamphetamine mixture with intent to distribute and one substantive possession-with-intent-to-distribute count. A third count remained unresolved through the plea and sentencing proceedings. The district court imposed 180 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. It also revoked an earlier term of supervised release and imposed a separate 24-month prison sentence, six months of which would run consecutively to the new sentence.

The disputed written supervision condition required Martinez-Ornelas to report immediately to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, follow its instructions until deportation proceedings concluded, and remain outside the United States following a deportation order unless legally authorized to return. It additionally required him, upon reentry, to report to the nearest probation office within 72 hours. At sentencing, however, the district court stated that he “shall not reenter the United States illegally.”

The Fifth Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction after the district court dismissed the outstanding count. Applying controlling circuit authority, it then ordered removal of the additional written probation-reporting requirement. Because this opinion is unpublished, its significance lies principally in its resolution of the jurisdictional question presented and its application of existing sentencing precedent, rather than the announcement of a broadly binding new rule.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Appellate jurisdiction existed after dismissal of the remaining count

When Martinez-Ornelas filed his appeal, Count Three had neither been adjudicated nor dismissed. In March 2026, while the appeal was pending, the government moved to dismiss that count without prejudice, and the district court granted the motion.

The Fifth Circuit held that it could proceed because every count had now resulted either in conviction and sentence or in dismissal. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(2), the earlier notice of appeal related forward to the entry of judgment resolving the remaining count. The court expressly declined to decide whether it would have possessed jurisdiction had Count Three remained unresolved.

The written judgment added an impermissible reporting burden

The court treated the 72-hour probation-reporting requirement as an additional obligation, not merely a restatement of the oral prohibition against illegal reentry. Under United States v. Lezama-Ramirez, the oral sentence controlled that conflict.

The remedy was narrowly limited

Although the opening discussion referred generally to vacating special condition 2, the final disposition precisely limited the relief: only the requirement to report to the nearest probation office within 72 hours after reentry was vacated. The case was remanded to conform the written judgment accordingly. The court did not disturb the prison sentence, the five-year supervision term, or the other components of the immigration-related condition.

3. Analysis of the Precedents Cited

A. Jurisdiction, finality, and premature notices of appeal

Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987)

This decision supplies the threshold requirement that an appellate court examine its own jurisdiction, even without a party’s objection. Accordingly, the parties’ agreement that the appeal was timely did not eliminate the separate question whether the unresolved count prevented appellate review.

Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984)

The court invoked this Supreme Court decision for the criminal final-judgment rule: appellate review ordinarily awaits conviction and imposition of sentence. It establishes the starting point for analyzing whether proceedings in the district court have reached an appealable conclusion.

United States v. Wilson, 440 F.2d 1103, 1104–05 (5th Cir. 1971)

This precedent establishes that the Fifth Circuit lacks jurisdiction when a defendant has been convicted on multiple counts but has not been sentenced on every conviction. It did not directly resolve Martinez-Ornelas’s situation: his remaining count was unadjudicated, rather than a conviction awaiting sentence. The panel therefore treated the precise issue as previously undecided in the circuit.

United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142, 1148 n.2 (1st Cir. 1995)

The First Circuit’s approach treats unresolved counts as an obstacle to jurisdiction. Crucially, however, the outstanding counts in that case were later dismissed. The court then exercised jurisdiction by treating the earlier notice of appeal as filed on the date of dismissal under Rule 4(b)(2). That later-dismissal reasoning provided a direct analogy for the Fifth Circuit’s resolution here.

United States v. Kaufmann, 951 F.2d 793, 795 (7th Cir. 1992)

The panel cited this decision as evidence that the Seventh Circuit, like the First Circuit, generally regards unresolved counts as preventing appellate jurisdiction. Its role was to identify one side of the inter-circuit disagreement, not to establish the specific later-dismissal solution adopted here.

Yockey v. Horn, 880 F.2d 945, 948 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989)

This decision also supported the unresolved-count approach. Like United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, it involved a later dismissal that allowed the earlier notice of appeal to become effective under Rule 4(b)(2). Together, these authorities supported proceeding once the outstanding count had been resolved.

United States v. King, 257 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001)

The Ninth Circuit takes a different approach: counts are severable, and a sentence on an individual count may be reviewed despite outstanding matters on other counts. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged this alternative but did not adopt it. Dismissal of Count Three made choosing between the competing approaches unnecessary.

United States v. Martinez, 496 F.3d 387, 388–89 (5th Cir. 2007)

This authority distinguishes appellate timing from subject-matter jurisdiction. An untimely criminal notice of appeal does not itself deprive the Fifth Circuit of jurisdiction, and the government can forfeit a timeliness objection by failing to assert it. The opinion relied on this principle in addressing the procedural delays, while separately examining finality.

B. Pronouncement of supervised-release conditions

United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 563 (5th Cir. 2020)

This decision establishes the foundational requirement that discretionary supervised-release conditions under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) must be pronounced at sentencing. The rule ensures that such obligations are part of the sentence imposed in the defendant’s presence, rather than appearing for the first time in the written judgment.

United States v. Medel- Guadalupe, 987 F.3d 424, 430 n.6 (5th Cir. 2021)

This case qualifies what pronouncement requires. A court need not read every condition verbatim: express oral adoption of a presentence report containing the conditions can suffice when the defendant reviewed that report with counsel. Its significance here is that the governing doctrine permits incorporation by reference; it does not impose a rigid requirement of word-for-word recitation.

United States v. Lezama-Ramirez, 173 F.4th 191, 195 (5th Cir. 2026)

This was the controlling merits precedent. There, the oral sentence prohibited reentry following deportation without the Secretary of Homeland Security’s written permission. The written condition additionally required reporting to probation within 24 hours after reentry. The government conceded that the reporting requirement imposed an additional burden, and the court required the written judgment to conform to the oral sentence.

The panel regarded that factual pattern as directly controlling here. Replacing a 24-hour deadline with a 72-hour deadline did not remove the essential problem: the written judgment imposed a separate affirmative reporting obligation absent from the oral pronouncement. The precedent also explains why a defendant cannot necessarily object at sentencing to an additional requirement revealed only by the later written judgment.

United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 353–54 (5th Cir. 2020)

This decision recognizes that an oral “shorthand reference” to written supervision conditions does not necessarily create a conflict. The panel acknowledged that the sentencing judge likely intended to compress the immigration-related conditions into a prohibition against illegal reentry.

Nevertheless, the more directly applicable holding in United States v. Lezama-Ramirez required treating the additional reporting duty as a substantive burden. Thus, the decision preserves a distinction between permissible shorthand and a written condition that expands the defendant’s obligations.

United States v. Currier, 160 F.4th 656, 658 (5th Cir. 2025)

The court cited this case for the remedial principle that a written judgment conflicting with the oral sentence must be amended to match the oral pronouncement. It supports correction of the written record rather than expansion of the sentence to accommodate the written condition.

United States v. Chicol-Najarro, 147 F.4th 531, 533–34 (5th Cir. 2025)

This decision likewise supports the controlling force of the oral sentence and the remedy of conforming the written judgment. Together with United States v. Currier, it supplied the basis for the limited remand ordered here.

4. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Later resolution avoided a broader jurisdictional ruling

The jurisdictional analysis was deliberately narrow. The court recognized competing approaches to appeals involving unresolved counts but did not decide which approach the Fifth Circuit should generally follow. Instead, it focused on the changed procedural circumstances: Count Three had been dismissed, and no count remained pending.

Rule 4(b)(2) allowed the previously filed notice to relate forward. The court therefore did not require Martinez-Ornelas to restart the appellate process merely because the final outstanding count was resolved after his notice. The dismissal’s “without prejudice” designation did not prevent jurisdiction in this case, although such a dismissal is not an acquittal or a merits determination.

The resulting holding should not be overstated. It establishes jurisdiction on the completed procedural record before the panel; it does not establish that sentencing on some counts always permits an immediate appeal while other counts remain unresolved.

B. Prohibiting illegal reentry and requiring probation reporting are different obligations

The central sentencing distinction is functional. A prohibition against illegal reentry tells the defendant what conduct to avoid. A requirement to report to probation within a fixed period demands an additional act after return. Compliance with the former does not necessarily satisfy the latter.

Accordingly, even a legally authorized return could trigger the written reporting obligation. That obligation was not simply another way of expressing the prohibition on illegal reentry. Under the controlling precedent, it increased the defendant’s supervision duties and therefore could not stand solely because it appeared in the written judgment.

C. Binding precedent outweighed a plausible shorthand explanation

The panel acknowledged a practical explanation for the discrepancy: the district court may have intended its brief oral instruction to summarize the written immigration conditions. But judicial intent did not resolve the problem. Under United States v. Lezama-Ramirez, the additional reporting duty remained a burden requiring proper pronouncement.

The decision consequently concerns how a condition becomes part of the sentence, not whether a reentry-reporting condition is inherently unlawful. The court did not hold that such a requirement could never be imposed through an adequate sentencing pronouncement.

5. Potential Impact

• Careful disposition of indictment counts: Courts and counsel should confirm that every count has been resolved. An overlooked count can complicate appellate finality even after imprisonment and supervision have been imposed.
• Preservation of premature appeals: The decision supports allowing an earlier notice to become effective after dismissal of an outstanding count, while leaving unresolved the treatment of counts that remain pending.
• More precise sentencing practice: Courts imposing immigration-related supervision should distinguish restrictions on reentry from separate duties to contact ICE or probation. Clear pronouncement or valid incorporation reduces discrepancies.
• Focused review of written judgments: Defense counsel should compare written conditions with the oral sentence and any properly incorporated materials, particularly where the judgment adds affirmative duties or deadlines.
• Narrow corrective relief: A discrete conflict can justify removal of the offending requirement without disturbing otherwise unaffected portions of the sentence.

These implications must be read alongside the opinion’s unpublished status. The merits analysis principally applies established circuit law, especially United States v. Lezama-Ramirez, rather than independently creating a new published sentencing rule.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

Final judgment

The procedural point at which a criminal case is sufficiently complete for ordinary appellate review. Conviction and sentencing are central, but unresolved counts may complicate finality.

A notice of appeal that “relates forward”

An earlier-filed notice is treated as effective when the later event needed to complete the judgment occurs. Here, that event was dismissal of the remaining count.

Jurisdiction versus timeliness

Jurisdiction concerns the court’s authority to decide the appeal. Timeliness concerns compliance with the filing deadline. The opinion treats these as distinct questions; the government’s failure to raise timeliness does not eliminate the court’s duty to examine jurisdiction.

Supervised release

A period of court-ordered supervision after imprisonment during which the defendant must comply with applicable conditions.

Oral pronouncement and written judgment

The oral pronouncement is the sentence announced at the hearing. The written judgment records it. When the writing adds a conflicting discretionary burden, the oral sentence controls.

Incorporation by reference

A court may adopt identified conditions from a reviewed document instead of reading each condition aloud, provided the applicable notice and pronouncement requirements are satisfied.

Vacatur and remand

Vacatur removes the challenged ruling or provision; remand returns the case to the district court. Here, both were limited to correcting the additional reporting requirement.

7. Conclusion

United States v. Martinez-Ornelas combines a narrow jurisdictional resolution with a straightforward application of oral-sentencing doctrine. Dismissal of the outstanding count permitted appellate review through the earlier notice of appeal, without deciding whether review would have been available while that count remained unresolved.

On the merits, the written 72-hour probation-reporting requirement imposed an additional burden absent from the oral sentence. The court therefore removed that requirement alone. The broader lesson is precision: resolve every count, clearly pronounce discretionary supervision duties, and ensure that the written judgment records rather than enlarges the sentence.