Late Witness-List Updates Do Not Make a CPL 245 Certificate of Compliance “Illusory” Absent a Lack of Due Diligence

I. Introduction

People v James (2026 NY Slip Op 00406 [3d Dept Jan. 29, 2026]) is a Third Department decision addressing three recurring criminal practice issues: (1) whether belated additions to a witness list render the People’s certificate of compliance (COC) “illusory” under CPL article 245, thereby affecting statutory speedy trial calculations under CPL 30.30; (2) whether the evidence was legally sufficient and not against the weight of the evidence for narcotics and paraphernalia convictions premised on constructive possession and intent to sell; and (3) whether a search warrant for a hotel room was supported by probable cause, and whether a Batson challenge required further inquiry.

The case returned to the Third Department after a prior remittal (229 AD3d 1008 [3d Dept 2024]) directing Supreme Court to develop the record on the People’s diligence and to determine whether late witness-list changes made the initial COC illusory.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. On the remitted speedy trial/discovery issue, it held that the People exercised due diligence and made reasonable inquiries; the later witness-list modifications did not render the initial COC illusory, and defendant’s CPL 30.30 claim failed. The Court further held:

  • the proof was legally sufficient (to the preserved extent) and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence;
  • the hotel-room search warrant was supported by probable cause and suppression was properly denied;
  • Supreme Court properly denied defendant’s Batson challenge for failure to make a prima facie showing;
  • the sentence was not unduly harsh or severe.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Discovery Compliance, “Illusory” Certificates, and CPL 30.30 Consequences

The decision is anchored in the Court of Appeals’ due-diligence framework from People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023), which held that a COC is not invalid merely because later disclosures occur; the dispositive question is whether the People exercised “due diligence” and made “reasonable inquiries” such that they made “reasonable efforts to comply with statutory directives.” The Third Department applied People v Bay to conclude that later witness-list updates—when grounded in earlier disclosure or later-acquired information promptly turned over—do not make the COC illusory.

The Court’s remittal posture arose from its own prior decision (229 AD3d 1008 [3d Dept 2024]), where it faulted the original record for relying on a generalized affirmation and for failing to document what the People actually did to locate and disclose discoverable information. That remittal reflects an emerging theme in CPL 245 litigation: appellate courts require a record showing case-specific diligence, not boilerplate.

The Court distinguished the problem addressed in People v McCarty, 221 AD3d 1360 (3d Dept 2023), lv denied 40 NY3d 1093 (2024), and relied more generally on People v Bonilla, 229 AD3d 850 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 42 NY3d 1018 (2024), for the proposition that the inquiry is functional: whether late disclosures reflect noncompliance versus reasonable updating as relevance becomes clearer.

On late identification of non-law-enforcement witnesses, the Third Department followed the reasoning of People v Burrows, 237 AD3d 1481 (4th Dept 2025), lv denied 43 NY3d 1054 (2025), People v Odusanya, 235 AD3d 1299 (4th Dept 2025), lv denied 43 NY3d 965 (2025), and People v Robbins, 206 AD3d 1069 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 39 NY3d 942 (2022): when the People do not know a custodian’s identity until the institution designates someone, diligence is shown by prompt disclosure once learned—not by clairvoyance.

The Third Department’s own recent application of Bay in People v Contompasis, 236 AD3d 138 (3d Dept 2025), lv denied 43 NY3d 1007 (2025), is used to reinforce the point that the “illusory COC” doctrine is not a strict liability rule for late additions; it is a diligence-based inquiry. With the COC deemed valid, the statutory speedy trial claim failed under People v Grandoit, 242 AD3d 1298 (3d Dept 2025).

2. Sufficiency, Weight of the Evidence, Constructive Possession, and Intent to Sell

The Court reiterated legal sufficiency and weight standards from People v Lall, 223 AD3d 1098 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 41 NY3d 984 (2024), and People v Ashe, 208 AD3d 1500 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 39 NY3d 961 (2022), with People v Alger, 206 AD3d 1049 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 38 NY3d 1148 (2022), as additional weight-review authority.

On constructive possession, the Court relied on People v Paul, 202 AD3d 1203 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 38 NY3d 1034 (2022), and People v Shabazz, 177 AD3d 1170 (3d Dept 2019), for the proposition that dominion or control over the area where contraband is found may establish possession—here, the key card plus proof defendant rented/was listed for the room.

In conducting weight review, the Court invoked deference to credibility determinations in People v Furman, 152 AD3d 870 (3d Dept 2017), lv denied 30 NY3d 1060 (2017). For intent to sell, it cited People v Garcia-Toro, 155 AD3d 1086 (3d Dept 2017), lv denied 30 NY3d 1115 (2018), and for paraphernalia proof it cited People v Hollis, 219 AD3d 1686 (4th Dept 2023), lv denied 40 NY3d 1039 (2023).

On preservation of sufficiency arguments, the Court followed People v Reinfurt, 241 AD3d 1015 (3d Dept 2025), and—consistent with standard Third Department practice—emphasized that weight review necessarily considers whether the People proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt, citing People v Starnes, 206 AD3d 1133 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 38 NY3d 1153 (2022), and People v Shackelton, 177 AD3d 1163 (3d Dept 2019), lv denied 34 NY3d 1162 (2020).

3. Search Warrants, Nexus, and Deference

The Court summarized probable-cause principles using People v Jackson, 206 AD3d 1244 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 38 NY3d 1151 (2022), and People v Cazeau, 192 AD3d 1388 (3d Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 963 (2021), reiterating that the application must support a reasonable belief that evidence may be found in the place to be searched. It also stressed the presumption of validity and “great deference” owed to issuing judges, citing People v Oliver, 172 AD3d 1457 (3d Dept 2019), lv denied 34 NY3d 1080 (2019).

The Court analogized the case to warrant approvals in People v Brown, 167 AD3d 1331 (3d Dept 2018), emphasizing nexus: defendant’s admission he came from the hotel, the key card, glassine envelopes, marijuana, and codefendant’s packaged crack supported a reasonable belief that additional drugs would be in the room.

In Footnote 2, the Court rejected the argument that the odor of marijuana did not support probable cause at the time, relying on nonretroactivity principles from People v Pastrana, 41 NY3d 23 (2023), cert denied ___ US ___, 144 S Ct 1066 (2024). It distinguished later developments referenced in People v Martin, 242 AD3d 18 (3d Dept 2025), lv granted 44 NY3d 985 (2025), and applied earlier Third Department precedent permitting searches based on odor at that time: People v Sanchez, 196 AD3d 1010 (3d Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 1029 (2021), and People v Hines, 172 AD3d 1649 (3d Dept 2019), lv denied 34 NY3d 951 (2019).

4. Batson Procedure and Prima Facie Requirements

The Court applied the classic three-step framework from People v Bridgeforth, 28 NY3d 567 (2016), and cited People v Wright, 42 NY3d 708 (2024), as current Court of Appeals guidance on Batson administration. It used Third Department applications in People v Thaxton, 222 AD3d 1175 (3d Dept 2023), and People v Hunter, 219 AD3d 975 (3d Dept 2023), to emphasize that step two (requiring a race-neutral reason) is only reached if the movant first makes a prima facie showing at step one.

Although acknowledging that a single strike can suffice in some circumstances (People v Ramseur, 233 AD3d 1093 [3d Dept 2024]), the Court held defendant’s showing was conclusory: merely noting the juror was Black and asserting “rehabilitation” without articulating facts supporting an inference of purposeful discrimination. The Court contrasted this with circumstances like those in People v Cruz, 228 AD3d 1019 (3d Dept 2024), where the record supported proceeding further.

5. Sentencing Review

The Court relied on the Appellate Division’s interest-of-justice authority under CPL 470.15 (6) (b) and cited People v Faublas, 216 AD3d 1358 (3d Dept 2023), lv denied 40 NY3d 934 (2023), and People v Burton, 215 AD3d 1054 (3d Dept 2023), lv denied 40 NY3d 927 (2023), to uphold the sentence as not unduly harsh or severe. It also noted that a sentencing challenge is not moot merely due to release to supervision, citing People v Belcher-Cumba, 226 AD3d 1219 (3d Dept 2024).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Core Holding: Late Witness-List Changes + Diligence = No “Illusory” COC

The remittal required Supreme Court to determine whether later witness-list additions undermined the validity of the original COC. On the developed record, the Third Department accepted three key factual showings:

  • Two Colonie officers: their identities were already in initial discovery (listed as present at the arrest); later adding them to a witness list reflected evolving trial relevance, not discovery concealment.
  • State Police investigator: the People learned of involvement upon receiving a phone extraction report in January 2021 and disclosed the report (with the investigator’s name) within two weeks.
  • Hotel records custodian: the People initially identified the role (“[r]ecords custodian from [the hotel]”) and later provided the name promptly once the hotel identified the testifying person.

Under CPL 245.20, the People must exercise due diligence and make reasonable inquiries. The Court treated “illusory COC” as a functional label for a COC filed without those efforts. Because the People documented reasonable steps and prompt supplementation, the COC stood, and the defense could not convert ordinary, good-faith supplementation into a CPL 30.30 violation.

2. Constructive Possession and Intent to Sell in a Hotel-Room Setting

The Court then moved to the merits. It held that constructive possession was supported by proof defendant rented and occupied the room (guest list confirmation) and possessed the key card. Although the drugs were not on defendant’s person, the dominion/control inference was sufficient.

On intent to sell, the Court relied on circumstantial indicia: quantity of drugs, absence of personal-use paraphernalia, presence of a large quantity of glassine envelopes, unusual travel narrative at 3:15 a.m., and lack of luggage. These circumstances supported the jury’s inference that defendant possessed narcotics with intent to sell and possessed paraphernalia with knowledge/intent it be used for packaging narcotics.

3. Probable Cause and Nexus for the Hotel-Room Warrant

The Court’s warrant analysis reflects a pragmatic nexus approach: the traffic stop produced packaging materials and drugs; defendant admitted he came from the hotel; the key card tied him to the room; and the application included investigative experience that dealers use rental vehicles and store supply elsewhere. Even without stating the codefendant was associated with the room, the totality supported a reasonable belief that additional drugs would be found there, warranting deference to the issuing judge.

4. Batson: Step One Must Be Developed, Not Asserted

The Court’s Batson holding is procedural but significant: a defendant cannot force step two merely by pointing to a juror’s race and asserting rehabilitation. The movant must articulate a “sound factual basis” supporting an inference of discrimination—e.g., comparative juror analysis, pattern of strikes, disparate questioning, or other circumstances suggesting purposeful exclusion. Without that, the trial court may end the inquiry at step one.

C. Impact

1. Discovery Practice: Building a Record of “Due Diligence”

The decision reinforces that post-COC supplementation—especially witness-list refinement—will not automatically invalidate a COC. The critical litigation point becomes record development: what the People did, when they learned information, and how promptly they disclosed it. After the remittal in 229 AD3d 1008 [3d Dept 2024], People v James illustrates what prosecutors should be prepared to show (documented timelines and explanations tied to this case), and what defense counsel must probe (gaps suggesting lack of inquiry rather than mere late relevance).

2. Trial Proof: Key Cards and Guest Lists as Constructive Possession Evidence

The opinion confirms that hotel-room constructive possession can be supported by modest but concrete linkage: possession of a room key and proof the defendant rented/was listed for the room may suffice to send the case to the jury, particularly when paired with other trafficking indicia.

3. Batson Motion Practice: The Need for Specific, Articulated Facts

The decision signals that Batson challenges in the Third Department will be scrutinized at step one. Counsel should be prepared to articulate the factual basis for an inference of discrimination in real time (not in appellate briefing), or risk denial without the People ever being required to state a race-neutral reason.

4. Search Warrants: Totality-of-the-Circumstances and Deference

For warrant litigation, the Court underscores deference to the issuing judge when the application connects drugs/packaging discovered during a stop with a specific location and includes contextual facts supporting dealer behavior. The Footnote 2 discussion also previews that marijuana-odor probable cause disputes remain highly date-sensitive pending evolving statutory interpretation and decisions such as People v Martin.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Certificate of Compliance (COC): a filing by the People stating they have complied with automatic discovery obligations under CPL article 245.
  • “Illusory” COC: a COC treated as ineffective because it was filed without the required due diligence/reasonable inquiry, often revealed by significant undisclosed material that should have been located and turned over earlier.
  • CPL 30.30: New York’s statutory speedy trial rule; certain periods are chargeable to the People if they are not ready for trial within specified time limits.
  • Legal sufficiency vs. weight of the evidence: sufficiency asks whether any rational juror could convict viewing evidence favorably to the People; weight review asks whether the verdict is supported when the appellate court weighs credibility and competing inferences.
  • Constructive possession: possession inferred from control over the place where contraband is found (e.g., dominion/control over a hotel room), even if the item is not on the person.
  • Probable cause / nexus: the warrant application must show a fair probability evidence will be found at the place to be searched; “nexus” is the link between the suspected crime and that location.
  • Batson challenge: a claim that a peremptory strike was exercised based on race; the movant must first show facts supporting an inference of discrimination before the opponent must give a race-neutral reason.

V. Conclusion

People v James meaningfully consolidates post-People v Bay discovery doctrine in the Third Department: later witness-list updates do not render a COC illusory where the People demonstrate due diligence, reasonable inquiry, and prompt supplementation upon learning new information. On the merits, the Court reaffirmed established principles governing constructive possession in a hotel setting, intent-to-sell inferences from circumstantial trafficking indicators, deference to judicially approved warrants, and the requirement that Batson challenges be supported by articulated facts at step one. Collectively, the decision emphasizes record-building—by prosecutors to prove diligence, and by defense counsel to preserve and substantiate procedural challenges.