Keene Harmless-Error Affirmance for Disputed Safety-Valve Eligibility When the District Court Would Impose the Same Substantively Reasonable Sentence

I. Introduction

In United States v. Pedro Santacruz (11th Cir. Aug. 26, 2026) (unpublished), Pedro Santacruz appealed his 187-month sentence imposed on resentencing for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. This appeal followed an earlier Eleventh Circuit decision (United States v. Santacruz, No. 23-12391 (11th Cir. Dec. 4, 2024) (unpublished)) that affirmed the district court’s drug-quantity/base-offense-level findings and firearm enhancement, but vacated and remanded on the aggravating-role adjustment.

On remand, Santacruz raised three primary challenges: (1) denial of “safety-valve” relief under U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(18) and 5C1.2(a); (2) allegedly erroneous drug-weight attribution (including disparity with his codefendant); and (3) substantive unreasonableness of the 187-month sentence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on all grounds.

II. Summary of the Opinion

• Safety valve: The court did not decide whether the district court erred in denying safety-valve relief, because any assumed error was harmless under United States v. Keene—the district court stated it would impose the same sentence regardless, and the sentence was substantively reasonable even under the lower assumed guideline range.
• Drug quantity: The challenge was barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine because the prior appeal had already affirmed the district court’s drug quantity and base offense level calculation.
• Substantive reasonableness: The 187-month sentence (a 23-month downward variance) was affirmed as a reasonable exercise of discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of review and sentencing framework

The opinion begins by anchoring the applicable review standards:

• United States v. Maisonet, 121 F.4th 194, 199 (11th Cir. 2024): provides that factual findings relevant to safety-valve relief are reviewed for clear error. This matters because safety-valve eligibility frequently turns on fact-bound determinations (e.g., firearm possession “in connection with” the offense).
• United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008): reiterates that “reasonableness” review asks whether the district court abused its discretion. Pugh is used repeatedly as the Eleventh Circuit’s baseline for substantive-reasonableness analysis.
• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007): supplies the Supreme Court’s “totality of the circumstances” approach and the rule that appellate courts may not presume unreasonableness for non-guidelines sentences, and must give “due deference” to the district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors.

2. Safety-valve and firearm “connection” doctrine

• United States v. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 82, 96 (11th Cir. 2013): provides the governing articulation of when a firearm is possessed “in connection with” a drug offense—e.g., proximity to drugs, or facilitation by emboldening the defendant, serving as an integral part of a transaction, instilling confidence, or acting as a “badge of office.”
  In this case, Carillo-Ayala sets the substantive legal lens for Santacruz’s safety-valve argument, even though the panel ultimately resolves the claim on harmlessness grounds rather than definitively applying the test to the record.

3. Harmless error in guidelines disputes: the Keene/Olson pathway

• United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1348 (11th Cir. 2006): establishes that the Eleventh Circuit need not resolve a disputed guidelines issue if it would not affect the sentence’s outcome. Keene also supplies the operational method: assume error, recalculate the guideline range without the challenged ruling, and then assess substantive reasonableness to confirm “truly harmless” error.
• United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266, 1275 (11th Cir. 2025): refines Keene into a two-part condition: (1) the district court states it would have imposed the same sentence even absent the alleged error; and (2) the sentence is substantively reasonable.
  Here, Olson is essential because the panel treats the district court’s explicit “same sentence regardless” statements as the trigger that allows the court to bypass a definitive safety-valve ruling.

4. Law-of-the-case doctrine on remand

• United States v. Stein, 964 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2020): supplies the rule that issues decided explicitly or by necessary implication in a prior appeal cannot be revisited, subject to narrow exceptions (substantially different evidence, change in controlling law, or clear error causing manifest injustice).
  The panel applies Stein to foreclose Santacruz’s renewed drug-quantity challenge because the earlier Santacruz appeal already affirmed the district court’s drug-quantity/base-offense-level calculation.

5. Substantive-reasonableness and disparity doctrine

• United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 2022): supports two propositions used here: the district court may assign great weight to one § 3553(a) factor, and the court’s failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not mean it ignored it.
• United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254-56 (11th Cir. 2015): reinforces that guidelines are only one consideration and places the burden on the appellant to show unreasonableness in light of the record and § 3553(a).
• United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101-02 (11th Cir. 2009): is used to address disparity arguments—especially the principle that defendants who assist the government are not similarly situated to those who do not, and that raw statistical comparisons require proof of similarity.
• United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202, 1237 (11th Cir. 2015): supplies the caution that disparity between codefendants’ sentences is generally not an appropriate basis for relief on appeal.
• United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007): supports the proposition that an acknowledgment of considering § 3553(a) is sufficient; the court need not discuss each factor.
• United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir. 2010): is cited for the appellate court’s restraint in reweighing § 3553(a) factors so long as the sentence is reasonable.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Safety-valve denial resolved through Keene harmlessness

The core doctrinal move in the opinion is procedural: rather than decide the merits of safety-valve eligibility, the panel applies the Keene framework (as described through Olson) because the district court made unequivocal alternative findings on the sentence it would impose.

The district court stated it would impose the same 187-month term “regardless of the application of [] safety-valve,” reiterating that even if the guidelines were lower due to the firearm/safety-valve issue, the sentence remained “correct” based on the § 3553(a) analysis (drug quantity, seriousness, and mitigating post-incarceration conduct).

Following Keene, the panel:

1. Assumed error in the denial of safety-valve relief;
2. Recalculated the guideline range as if safety-valve applied (offense level 35, criminal history category I, range 168–210 months);
3. Confirmed the 187-month sentence fell within that assumed-correct range and was substantively reasonable.

The decisive point is that the harmlessness finding turns not merely on the district court’s “same sentence” statement, but on the appellate court’s independent confirmation of substantive reasonableness under the assumed-lower guideline range—matching the “truly harmless” requirement articulated in Keene.

2. Drug-quantity challenge barred by law-of-the-case

Santacruz’s attempt to revisit drug-weight attribution ran into United States v. Stein’s law-of-the-case rule. Because the earlier appeal affirmed the drug quantity and base offense level determinations, the issue was not open for relitigation on remand absent an exception.

The panel expressly found none of Stein’s exceptions applied: there was no new trial, no substantially different evidence at resentencing, no change in controlling law, and no showing that the prior decision was clearly erroneous such that it would work a manifest injustice.

3. Substantive reasonableness upheld under § 3553(a) and deference principles

Applying Pugh and Gall, the panel reviewed the totality of circumstances and emphasized the district court’s broad discretion to weigh § 3553(a) factors (supported by Butler and Rosales-Bruno). The court highlighted record indications that the district judge considered: the guideline range, party arguments, the seriousness of the offense, deterrence and protection of the public, defendant characteristics, and disparity concerns.

On disparity arguments, the panel relied on Docampo to distinguish defendants who cooperate from those who do not, and on Cavallo to minimize the appellate force of codefendant disparity claims. It further rejected Santacruz’s “national average” comparison because he did not establish comparability to the defendants reflected in the statistics (again invoking Docampo’s requirement of meaningful similarity).

C. Impact

• Practical precedent for sentencing appeals (within the Circuit): Even though unpublished, the decision exemplifies a recurring Eleventh Circuit pathway: where a district judge clearly states an identical sentence would be imposed regardless of a disputed guidelines issue, the appellate court may affirm without resolving the dispute, so long as it can validate substantive reasonableness under the assumed-correct range. This encourages litigants to focus appellate energy on whether the alternative sentence explanation is clear and whether the sentence is reasonable under the corrected range.
• Reinforcement of remand limits: The opinion underscores that after a partial remand, defendants generally cannot re-litigate affirmed guideline components (like drug quantity) absent the narrow Stein exceptions. This promotes finality and channels remand proceedings toward the issues actually reopened by the appellate mandate.
• Disparity arguments remain difficult without comparators: By invoking Docampo and Cavallo, the court signals that codefendant disparities—especially when cooperation differs—rarely justify appellate relief, and that statistical “average sentence” claims require a developed showing that the defendant is similarly situated to the comparison group.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Safety-valve relief (U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a); § 2D1.1(b)(18))

A guidelines mechanism that can reduce a qualifying drug defendant’s sentence (including a two-level reduction under § 2D1.1(b)(18)) if the defendant meets specific requirements, one of which is that the defendant did not possess a firearm “in connection with” the offense.

“In connection with” a drug offense (firearm)

Under United States v. Carillo-Ayala, a firearm is connected if it is near drugs or if it facilitates the offense—e.g., it emboldens the defendant, helps ensure the transaction, deters interference, or functions as a “badge of office.”

Clear error review

A highly deferential standard for fact findings. The appellate court will not reverse unless left with a firm conviction that the district court made a mistake.

Harmless error in guidelines disputes (Keene)

Even if the district court arguably misapplied the guidelines, the appellate court can affirm if the sentence would be the same anyway (as the district court states) and the sentence is reasonable even under the corrected range.

Law-of-the-case doctrine

Once an appellate court decides an issue, that decision generally governs later stages of the same case. On remand, parties cannot reargue resolved issues unless one of the narrow exceptions applies (new evidence, new law, or manifest injustice).

Substantive reasonableness

A sentence is substantively reasonable if, considering the whole record, it reflects a permissible weighing of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and falls within the range of reasonable sentencing outcomes.

Converted drug weight

A guideline method that translates different controlled substances into a single standardized “converted” metric to determine the base offense level. Disputes often concern attribution (what quantity is foreseeable or attributable to a defendant).

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Santacruz’s 187-month sentence by (1) applying Keene (as operationalized by Olson) to treat the disputed safety-valve issue as harmless in light of the district court’s clear “same sentence regardless” statement and the sentence’s substantive reasonableness under the assumed-lower range; (2) enforcing the law-of-the-case doctrine under Stein to bar renewed drug-quantity litigation; and (3) upholding the sentence as a permissible exercise of discretion under § 3553(a), consistent with the deference principles of Gall, Pugh, and related Eleventh Circuit precedent.