4. Analysis: Governing Principles and Precedents
A. The central holding: immunity is subject to a statutory filing deadline
K.S.A. 21-5231(a) grants immunity from criminal prosecution and civil action for force justified under the specified Kansas statutes. But the substantive protection does not eliminate procedural requirements for invoking it.
K.S.A. 22-3208(4) states:
“The motion to dismiss shall be made at any time prior to arraignment or within 21 days after the plea is entered.”
The statute permits enlargement when the court finds that the grounds were unknown to the defendant and could not reasonably have been discovered during the prescribed period.
The controlling role of State v. Jones
State v. Jones, 298 Kan. 324, 311 P.3d 1125 (2013), supplied the decisive precedent. It expressly characterized statutory self-defense immunity as an affirmative defense to which K.S.A. 22-3208(4) applies. It also established that statutory interpretation receives unlimited appellate review.
The interpretive difficulty arose from another statement in State v. Jones: immunity must be asserted before trial begins or a dispositive plea is entered. Because that case concerned an immunity claim first raised on appeal, it had no occasion to analyze compliance with the ordinary 21-day deadline.
The Court of Appeals treated the pretrial language as authorizing an immunity motion at any point before trial or a guilty or no-contest plea. The Supreme Court rejected that reading. The two timing rules operate at different levels:
- The ordinary filing rule: before arraignment or within 21 days after a plea.
- The extension rule: enlargement requires previously unknown grounds that reasonable diligence would not have uncovered.
- The outer limit identified in the precedent: an immunity claim cannot be saved for trial’s completion and then asserted for the first time on appeal; the Court understood the pretrial language as limiting permissible enlargement, not replacing the statutory deadline.
This reading preserves both the statute’s express requirements and the earlier decision’s rejection of belated appellate invocation.
Why Riggins could not obtain an extension
The record showed that Riggins had asserted self-defense immediately upon arrest and had filed a pro se self-defense motion in March 2020. The district court nevertheless found that the operative request for an immunity hearing was not made until counsel’s May 28, 2021 motion. Riggins did not challenge that determination.
The earlier filing therefore mattered as evidence of knowledge, not as an effective substitute for the later immunity motion. The district court’s observation that Riggins had “ample time” to raise the matter reinforced the absence of a basis for statutory enlargement.
Affirmance on an alternative ground
The district court denied immunity without expressly deciding that the motion was untimely. The Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the denial under the “right for the wrong reason” doctrine:
- State v. Parks, 312 Kan. 487, 476 P.3d 794 (2020), permits affirmance when an alternative basis supports the district court’s ruling.
- State v. Overman, 301 Kan. 704, 348 P.3d 516 (2015), similarly recognizes that a correct result may stand despite an erroneous stated rationale.
These cases allowed the Court to avoid deciding the disputed use of preliminary-hearing testimony. The decision therefore does not establish whether that testimony was admissible at the immunity hearing.
State v. Phillips, 312 Kan. 643, 479 P.3d 176 (2021), supplied the general bifurcated review standard for immunity rulings: factual findings are reviewed for substantial competent evidence, while legal conclusions receive de novo review. Here, the decisive question was legal, and the relevant filing dates and prior knowledge were established by the record.
B. Jury instructions: factual support, preservation, and prejudice
The Court carefully separated whether an instruction should have been given from whether its omission justified reversal. That separation explains why an instructional error did not necessarily produce relief.
The framework and supporting precedents
- State v. Hollins, 320 Kan. 240, 564 P.3d 778 (2025), establishes the three-stage inquiry: reviewability and preservation, instructional error, and reversibility. Legal and factual appropriateness are assessed with unlimited review.
- State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 559 P.3d 792 (2024), requires consideration of factual support in the light most favorable to the requesting party. It also places the burden of showing error and prejudice on a defendant claiming clear error.
- State v. Hardwick, 321 Kan. 519, 582 P.3d 555 (2026), explains that some evidence supporting rational factfinding under the defense theory is sufficient; it need not be strong or conclusive.
- State v. Salary, 301 Kan. 586, 343 P.3d 1165 (2015), and State v. Rodriguez, 295 Kan. 1146, 289 P.3d 85 (2012), support the proposition that evidence warranting a lesser-included-offense instruction may come solely from the defendant’s uncorroborated testimony.
- State v. Qualls, 309 Kan. 553, 439 P.3d 301 (2019), supplies a related principle for self-defense instructions: even testimony contradicted by other witnesses and physical evidence may suffice to warrant an instruction.
- State v. Peters, 319 Kan. 492, 555 P.3d 1134 (2024), explains that preservation affects the reversibility stage rather than simply foreclosing review.
- State v. Banks, 322 Kan. ___, 2026 WL 2542017 (2026), citing State v. Moore, 319 Kan. 557, 556 P.3d 466 (2024), states the clear-error threshold: the reviewing court must be firmly convinced that the outcome would have differed had the instruction been given.
For preserved errors, State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), distinguishes constitutional from nonconstitutional harmlessness. Drawing on Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), constitutional harmlessness requires the beneficiary of the error to establish the absence of a reasonable possibility that it contributed to the verdict. Nonconstitutional harmlessness asks whether there is no reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.
Resolution of the three instructional claims
| Proposed instruction |
Requested at trial? |
Court’s conclusion |
| Voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense |
No |
Factually appropriate, but omission was not clear error. |
| Involuntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense |
No |
Not factually appropriate; no instructional error. |
| Reckless involuntary manslaughter |
Yes |
Factually appropriate; omission was harmless under the nonconstitutional standard. |
Imperfect-self-defense voluntary manslaughter
Under K.S.A. 21-5404(a)(2), this form of voluntary manslaughter involves a knowing killing based on an honest but unreasonable belief that deadly force was justified. By contrast, complete self-defense requires a reasonable belief that deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.
The majority found some evidentiary support for an honest but unreasonable belief. Riggins described a knife attack; Batemon supported his claim that Haynes attacked him; and he had cuts on his leg. The State, however, offered evidence that he brought the knife and that his injuries were superficial.
Nevertheless, the omission did not satisfy clear-error review. The Court understood the jury’s rejection of complete self-defense, in the circumstances of this case, as rejecting Riggins’ account that Haynes attacked him with a knife. His asserted fear arose only after that alleged attack. The Court was not firmly convinced that the jury would nonetheless find an honest but unreasonable belief in the need for deadly force.
This is a record-specific prejudice analysis. It should not be generalized into a rule that rejection of complete self-defense always makes an imperfect-self-defense instruction unnecessary or harmless.
Imperfect-self-defense involuntary manslaughter
State v. Dotson, 319 Kan. 32, 551 P.3d 1272 (2024), describes this theory as a killing during a lawful act performed unlawfully, such as lawful defensive action carried out with excessive force.
The Court found no evidentiary basis for that intermediate account. Under Riggins’ version, he redirected a knife held by an attacker and did not use it after she dropped it. The evidence did not support a scenario in which Haynes used nondeadly force and Riggins responded with excessive deadly force. The instruction therefore was not factually appropriate.
Reckless involuntary manslaughter
The relevant precedents distinguish an intentional physical act from an intentional killing:
- State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012), supplies the recklessness standard: conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, amounting to a gross deviation from reasonable care.
- State v. Gentry, 310 Kan. 715, 449 P.3d 429 (2019), explains that the unintentional-but-reckless mental state concerns the killing, not merely the underlying act.
- State v. Deal, 293 Kan. 872, 269 P.3d 1282 (2012), recognizes that deliberate conduct can produce an unintentional but reckless death.
- State v. Montgomery, 322 Kan. 152, 587 P.3d 738 (2026), reinforces that a defendant’s testimony alone may support an instruction when viewed favorably to the defense.
Riggins’ testimony that he redirected the knife without intending to kill Haynes supported the requested instruction. The district court erred by treating his testimony as insufficient merely because it was self-serving.
Applying the nonconstitutional harmlessness standard identified in State v. Holley, 313 Kan. 249, 485 P.3d 614 (2021), on rehearing 315 Kan. 512, 509 P.3d 542 (2022), the Supreme Court nevertheless found no reasonable probability of a different outcome. The extensive blunt-force injuries, multiple deep stab wounds, eyewitness accounts of repeated stabbing, flight, and concealment strongly contradicted a merely reckless killing. The jury’s finding of a knowing, heat-of-passion killing further supported the Court’s conclusion.
C. Trial self-defense remains distinct from pretrial immunity
The untimely immunity motion did not prevent Riggins from presenting self-defense to the jury. This distinction is essential: immunity seeks to prevent prosecution from proceeding, while trial self-defense seeks to justify conduct otherwise constituting a crime.
- State v. Keys, 315 Kan. 690, 510 P.3d 706 (2022), identifies self-defense as an affirmative defense justifying otherwise criminal conduct.
- State v. Haygood, 308 Kan. 1387, 430 P.3d 11 (2018), together with K.S.A. 21-5108(c), places the burden on the State to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant presents competent supporting evidence.
- State v. Mendez provides the sufficiency-review standard: view the evidence favorably to the State without reassessing credibility or resolving evidentiary conflicts.
- State v. Zeiner, 316 Kan. 346, 515 P.3d 736 (2022), emphasizes the exceptional nature of reversal based on testimony so incredible that no reasonable factfinder could rely on it.
Riggins argued that the State could not disprove self-defense because Crissup and Carley had not witnessed the fight’s beginning. The Court rejected the premise that direct observation of the initial encounter was indispensable.
State v. Shields, 315 Kan. 814, 511 P.3d 931 (2022), permits convictions based entirely on circumstantial evidence and does not require exclusion of every other reasonable conclusion. State v. Brown, 316 Kan. 154, 513 P.3d 1207 (2022), recognizes jurors’ authority to draw reasonable evidentiary inferences.
Here, evidence that Riggins arrived carrying the knife, testimony describing his attack on Haynes, forensic evidence inconsistent with parts of his account, and his own statements after concealment permitted rejection of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The absence of an eyewitness to the first blow did not compel acceptance of his narrative.
D. Posttrial representation: an assumed violation and a limited harmlessness ruling
After trial, the district court allowed Riggins to represent himself. He later argued that the court had not obtained a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel because it inadequately explained the dangers of self-representation and the proceedings ahead.
The Supreme Court assumed a constitutional violation rather than definitively resolving the waiver’s validity. Although the record referred to an extended off-the-record discussion, the Court did not treat that reference as establishing an adequate waiver.
Why structural error was not decided
Riggins maintained that the violation required automatic relief as structural error. The Court held that he had not adequately developed the argument on review.
State v. Pewenofkit, 307 Kan. 730, 415 P.3d 398 (2018), citing Friedman v. Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts, 296 Kan. 636, 294 P.3d 287 (2013), treats an argument unsupported by pertinent authority or an explanation of its legal soundness as inadequately briefed. Those authorities supported waiver of the structural-error contention.
Accordingly, the decision does not establish that an invalid posttrial counsel waiver can never be structural error. The classification issue was left unresolved because of briefing deficiencies.
The harmlessness analysis
Both parties alternatively requested constitutional harmless-error review. Applying State v. Ward, the Court placed the burden on the State to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court relied on the presumptive sentence, the ordinary handling of the posttrial motions, and the absence of a demonstrated effect on the proceedings. State v. Albano, 313 Kan. 638, 487 P.3d 750 (2021), was cited for the rule that appellate courts ordinarily lack jurisdiction to review presumptive sentences.
This part of the opinion is notably confined to the case’s posture. Ordinary sentencing and motion practice do not categorically eliminate the importance of counsel. Future cases may present concrete lost arguments, discretionary sentencing issues, or other consequences requiring a different assessment. The Court’s reliance on the absence of an effect on the “trial,” despite the posttrial timing of the alleged violation, also counsels against reading its abbreviated analysis as a comprehensive rule for all posttrial deprivations of counsel.
E. Ineffective assistance and the denial of a new trial
Review standards
K.S.A. 22-3501(1) authorizes a new trial when required in the interest of justice. The Court relied on:
- State v. Davidson, 315 Kan. 725, 510 P.3d 701 (2022), for abuse-of-discretion review of new-trial rulings.
- State v. Younger, 320 Kan. 98, 564 P.3d 744 (2025), for the definition of abuse of discretion: unreasonable action or a decision based on legal or factual error.
- State v. Peters for the challenging party’s burden to establish that abuse.
- State v. Evans, 315 Kan. 211, 506 P.3d 260 (2022), for substantial-competent-evidence review of factual findings and de novo review of legal conclusions concerning ineffective assistance.
The substantive test came from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), adopted in Kansas by Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 694 P.2d 468 (1985). A defendant must show both objectively deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a different result without that deficiency.
State v. James, 319 Kan. 178, 553 P.3d 308 (2024), supplied the detailed formulation: courts must avoid hindsight, presume reasonable professional assistance, and assess prejudice against the totality of the evidence.
Failure to add aggravated battery to the immunity request
Riggins argued that counsel should have sought immunity for striking Carley as well as for the force used against Haynes. The Court of Appeals criticized counsel’s omission but found no available relief because the jury had rejected self-defense under a burden higher than probable cause.
The Supreme Court took a different route. Even assuming deficient performance, adding aggravated battery to the same untimely immunity motion would not have produced immunity. Thus, the asserted omission caused no established prejudice.
State v. Phillips, citing Sola-Morales v. State, 300 Kan. 875, 335 P.3d 1162 (2014), supported addressing the prejudice prong first.
The scope matters. The decision rejects the claim as presented—failure to include another charge in an already late motion. It does not resolve a distinct, adequately developed claim that counsel was ineffective for missing the filing deadline itself. Nor does it adopt a general rule that conviction automatically cures every lost opportunity for pretrial immunity.
Failure to request imperfect-self-defense involuntary manslaughter
This claim also failed on prejudice. Because the instruction lacked factual support, counsel’s failure to request it could not establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
The rejected verdict form
The Court of Appeals had rejected a separate claim concerning counsel’s failure to inspect an initially improper verdict form or request polling. Riggins did not pursue that ruling in his cross-petition or supplemental briefing. The Supreme Court therefore expressly left it outside the issues under review.
F. Cumulative error
State v. Guebara, 318 Kan. 458, 544 P.3d 794 (2024), requires assessment of errors together, considering their nature, relationship, treatment by the trial judge, and the overall evidentiary strength. When constitutional error is included, their combined effect must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court aggregated the erroneous denial of the reckless-involuntary-manslaughter instruction and the assumed posttrial counsel-waiver violation. It concluded that their different timing and lack of demonstrated combined effect made them harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The omitted imperfect-self-defense voluntary-manslaughter instruction was not included. Under State v. Waldschmidt, 318 Kan. 633, 546 P.3d 716 (2024), an unpreserved instructional issue that is not clearly erroneous does not enter cumulative-error analysis.