Juvenile-Transfer Sentencing: On-the-Record Consideration of W. Va. Code § 61-11-23(c) Need Not Enumerate Each Factor; Within-Limits Fixed-Term Sentences Are Not Proportionality-Reviewed Absent Impermissible Factors

1. Introduction

In State of West Virginia v. Connor Crowe (W. Va. Apr. 21, 2026) (memorandum decision), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed a circuit court sentencing order imposing two consecutive forty-year terms for two convictions of second-degree murder. The petitioner, Connor Crowe, committed the homicides at age thirteen, was initially proceeded against in juvenile court, and later was transferred to adult criminal jurisdiction, where he entered a negotiated guilty plea to second-degree murder.

The appeal raised two core issues: (1) whether the circuit court failed to comply with West Virginia Code § 61-11-23(c)—which requires consideration of enumerated mitigating circumstances when sentencing a juvenile transferred to adult court—and (2) whether an effective eighty-year aggregate sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate given the petitioner’s youth.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing because it demonstrated awareness of § 61-11-23(c), directed the probation officer to address the statutory mitigating circumstances in the presentence investigation report (PSI), adopted the PSI as findings of fact without objection, and also addressed multiple mitigating considerations on the record. The Court further rejected the proportionality challenge, concluding that because the sentence was within the statutory range for second-degree murder and was not based on an impermissible factor, it was not subject to appellate review; and Miller v. Alabama did not control because this was not a juvenile life-without-parole case.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

• State v. Lucas, 201 W. Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (1997)
  Role in the decision: Lucas supplies the foundational sentencing-review principle—appellate review is deferential (abuse of discretion) unless a statutory or constitutional command is violated. The Court relied on Lucas (through later cases) for the proposition that required sentencing considerations must be “placed ... into the record,” but that the method can be either an order or statements at a hearing.
• State v. Hall, 250 W. Va. 631, 906 S.E.2d 284 (2023)
  Role in the decision: Hall is the Court’s direct interpretive guide for W. Va. Code § 61-11-23(c). The Crowe Court quoted Hall’s key clarifications: (i) the sentencing court must “place its consideration” of the mandatory factors into the record; (ii) the court satisfies the statute if the record shows it “actually considered” the factors; and critically, (iii) the court “need not expressly consider each factor by name or quote the statute,” so long as the record demonstrates awareness and consideration. Crowe is therefore best understood as an application—and reinforcement—of Hall’s operational standard.
• State v. Patrick C., 243 W. Va. 258, 843 S.E.2d 510 (2020)
  Role in the decision: Patrick C. anchors the standard of review for constitutional issues: proportionality and other constitutional claims are reviewed de novo. The Court used this to frame how it would approach the disproportionality argument, even though it ultimately concluded appellate review was limited.
• State v. Vance, 164 W. Va. 216, 262 S.E.2d 423 (1980)
  Role in the decision: Vance is cited for West Virginia’s explicit proportionality principle in Article III, Section 5: “Penalties shall be proportioned to the character and degree of the offence.” Crowe recognizes this state constitutional baseline but proceeds to the doctrine restricting when proportionality review is undertaken on appeal.
• Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W. Va. 523, 276 S.E.2d 205 (1981)
  Role in the decision: Wanstreet is cited for the Court’s general practice of limiting proportionality review to cases “where there is either no fixed maximum set by statute or where there is a life recidivist sentence.” Crowe uses this limitation to conclude the petitioner’s sentence—bounded by a fixed statutory maximum—falls outside ordinary proportionality review.
• State v. Goodnight, 169 W. Va. 366, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982)
  Role in the decision: Goodnight supplies the controlling “within statutory limits and not based on an impermissible factor” rule: such sentences “are not subject to appellate review.” Crowe applies Goodnight to foreclose proportionality-based appellate relief because the sentence was within the statutory range for second-degree murder and the petitioner did not allege reliance on an impermissible factor.
• Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)
  Role in the decision: The Court distinguished Miller as addressing mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders. Because Crowe involved fixed-term sentences (two forty-year terms) rather than juvenile LWOP, the Court concluded Miller did not establish that the effective eighty-year aggregate sentence was unconstitutional.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Compliance with W. Va. Code § 61-11-23(c)

The key statutory command was that the circuit court “shall consider” the mitigating circumstances listed in W. Va. Code § 61-11-23(c) when sentencing a person who committed a felony as a juvenile and was transferred to adult jurisdiction. The petitioner argued the circuit court’s discussion was incomplete and that adopting the PSI “without further analysis” was insufficient.

The Court’s reasoning followed the Hall framework:

1. Awareness plus record evidence is the touchstone, not a checklist recital.
   Crowe reiterates that a sentencing court need not name each factor or quote the statute, so long as it demonstrates awareness of the statutory duty and makes a record showing it actually considered the relevant mitigation.
2. Directing a PSI to address the statutory mitigation—and adopting it—can satisfy the “on the record” requirement.
   The circuit court explicitly instructed the probation officer to address the § 61-11-23(c) factors in the PSI. At sentencing, it adopted the PSI as findings of fact without objection. The Supreme Court treated these steps as significant evidence that the circuit court integrated the statutory mitigation into the sentencing calculus.
3. Independent oral findings strengthened the record of consideration.
   Beyond the PSI, the circuit court discussed multiple mitigation-related subjects on the record: intellectual capacity, participation/planning, rehabilitation, mental-health evaluations (including the disputed autism diagnosis), and trauma/abuse allegations. The sentencing remarks emphasized planning, intelligence, low empathy, and the court’s view that remorse was tied to being caught, all of which supported the chosen sentence within the statutory range.

In short, the Court treated the circuit court’s process as meeting the statutory requirement because the record—PSI plus sentencing colloquy plus written order— showed actual consideration of the mandatory mitigating circumstances.

B. Disproportionality Challenge to Consecutive Forty-Year Terms

Although the petitioner framed the claim as constitutional disproportionality based on youth, the Court resolved it largely through West Virginia’s established limits on appellate review of sentences:

• Fixed statutory maximum: Second-degree murder carries a definite term of “not less than ten nor more than forty years.” The petitioner received forty years on each count, i.e., within the statutory ceiling.
• No impermissible factor alleged: The petitioner did not contend the circuit court relied on a prohibited consideration (e.g., race, religion, vindictiveness). His argument instead repackaged the alleged § 61-11-23(c) deficiency.
• Goodnight bar to review: Because the sentence was within statutory limits and not based on an impermissible factor, the Court held it was not subject to appellate review.
• Miller distinguished: Miller’s juvenile LWOP rule did not map onto an aggregate term-of-years sentence imposed for second-degree murder convictions.

The Court therefore concluded the sentence was not unconstitutionally disproportionate.

3.3. Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision, Crowe has practical importance in three ways:

1. Operational guidance on § 61-11-23(c) compliance: It underscores that compliance can be shown through a combination of (a) a PSI expressly addressing the statutory mitigation, (b) adoption of that PSI on the record, and (c) targeted oral findings—even without a factor-by-factor recitation.
2. Reinforcement of sentencing finality for within-range terms: It reaffirms that, absent impermissible factors (and outside the special proportionality-review categories), appellate courts will not reweigh mitigation to second-guess a sentence within a fixed statutory maximum—even where the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense.
3. Limits of Miller-based arguments in term-of-years cases: The Court’s treatment signals continued resistance (at least under the cited authority and the posture presented) to extending Miller’s juvenile LWOP doctrine to lengthy consecutive term-of-years sentences via generalized disproportionality claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Transferred to adult criminal jurisdiction”

A juvenile case that begins in juvenile court can be moved to adult criminal court under specified statutory conditions. Here, transfer occurred after motions to transfer were filed (including the juvenile’s own motion) and the matter proceeded as a felony case in circuit court.

W. Va. Code § 61-11-23(c) mitigating circumstances

A legislatively specified list of youth-related considerations (age, impetuosity, home environment, mental health, trauma, rehabilitation potential, and more) that the sentencing judge must consider when sentencing someone for a felony committed as a juvenile after transfer to adult court. The judge must show that consideration on the record, but does not have to mechanically recite each item.

Presentence Investigation Report (PSI)

A report prepared by probation services to assist sentencing. It commonly includes personal history, criminal history, victim impact information, treatment needs, and sentencing-related factors. In Crowe, the circuit court directed the PSI to address the § 61-11-23(c) mitigating circumstances.

“Abuse of discretion” review

A deferential appellate standard. The reviewing court does not decide what sentence it would have imposed; it asks whether the lower court made a clear error in judgment or violated legal requirements.

Proportionality (W. Va. Const. art. III, § 5; Eighth Amendment)

The constitutional idea that punishment should fit the crime. In West Virginia, proportionality review on appeal is typically limited to certain categories (e.g., no statutory maximum or life recidivist sentences). If a sentence is within statutory limits and not based on impermissible factors, appellate review is generally foreclosed under Goodnight.

5. Conclusion

State of West Virginia v. Connor Crowe confirms that when sentencing a transferred juvenile under W. Va. Code § 61-11-23(c), a circuit court need not tick through each mitigating circumstance by name; it must instead create a record demonstrating awareness and actual consideration— something that may be accomplished through a properly prepared PSI, its adoption on the record, and meaningful sentencing remarks. The decision also reinforces West Virginia’s restrictive appellate posture toward proportionality challenges to fixed-term sentences that fall within statutory bounds and are not based on impermissible factors, while distinguishing Miller v. Alabama as inapplicable outside the juvenile LWOP context presented there.