Judicial Review of “Extraordinary Circumstances” in VAWA Motions to Reopen: Commentary on Sarkisov v. Bondi (6th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

In Arsen Sarkisov v. Pamela Bondi, No. 23-3965 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed, as a matter of first impression, whether courts have jurisdiction to review the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) determination that a noncitizen failed to show “extraordinary circumstances” justifying an untimely motion to reopen under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) special rule, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III).

The petitioner, Arsen Sarkisov, a Russian national with a long-standing final order of removal, had obtained an approved VAWA self-petition based on abuse by his now-deceased U.S.-citizen spouse. He then sought to reopen his removal proceedings outside the ordinary time limits, arguing that the abuse and its psychological consequences constituted “extraordinary circumstances” warranting waiver of the one-year deadline applicable to VAWA-based reopening.

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion, authored by Judge Karen Nelson Moore, does two important things:

1. It holds that the question whether a VAWA petitioner has “demonstrate[d] extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to the alien’s child” under § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) is a reviewable mixed question of law and fact, and thus a “question of law” within the “safe harbor” of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
2. It interprets the statutory phrase “extraordinary circumstances” as a legal standard, clarifies that it is not limited to circumstances that directly cause filing delay, and applies a deferential standard of review to uphold the BIA’s conclusion that Sarkisov’s six-year delay was not excused.

While the court ultimately denies the petition for review, its jurisdictional and interpretive holdings significantly shape the landscape for VAWA-based motions to reopen and, more broadly, for judicial review of discretionary immigration relief in the post–Guerrero-Lasprilla/Wilkinson era.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Background and Procedural History

• Arsen Sarkisov, a Russian citizen, entered the United States without admission or parole and was placed into removal proceedings in 2005.
• He conceded removability and initially sought asylum based on his experiences as an Armenian in Russia.
• He later married a U.S. citizen, sought voluntary departure to process an immigrant visa, and was granted voluntary departure in late 2012.
• He did not depart, and the voluntary departure order converted into a final order of removal (2013).
• About six and a half years later, he filed a motion to reopen based on an approved VAWA self-petition, alleging physical and emotional abuse by his former U.S.-citizen wife and resulting psychological trauma, including a diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder.
• The IJ denied reopening, finding no “extraordinary circumstances” justifying the lateness; the BIA affirmed, emphasizing the six-year delay and the 18-month delay after VAWA approval.
• Sarkisov petitioned for review; a prior panel denied his motion to stay removal, and the merits are resolved in the current decision.

B. Holdings

1. Jurisdiction: The Sixth Circuit holds that it has jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination whether a VAWA petitioner has “demonstrate[d] extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to the alien's child” under § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III). This is a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore a “question of law” reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D)’s safe harbor, even assuming the jurisdiction-stripping provision of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies.
2. Nature of “extraordinary circumstances” standard: The phrase “extraordinary circumstances” is a judicially manageable legal standard, not an unbounded discretionary judgment. It is distinct from the ultimate discretionary decision whether to grant reopening.
3. Scope of “extraordinary circumstances” in this context: The standard may cover (a) circumstances that make it especially equitable to reopen (e.g., particularly severe abuse), and/or (b) circumstances that prevent timely filing (e.g., trauma, natural disasters). Unlike some other provisions, § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) does not limit “extraordinary circumstances” to those causing the delay.
4. Merits: Applying a deferential standard to this highly fact-bound mixed question, the court upholds the BIA’s determination that the abuse-related psychological trauma did not constitute “extraordinary circumstances” excusing a six-year delay (or an 18-month delay after VAWA approval). The petition for review is therefore denied.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Motions to Reopen and General Framework

• Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010). Cited to emphasize that motions to reopen are a critical procedural mechanism to ensure “a proper and lawful disposition” of immigration proceedings. Initially created by regulation, motions to reopen are now codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).
• Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008). Defines a motion to reopen as a mechanism by which a noncitizen asks the BIA to revise its decision in light of newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances.

These cases frame the importance of reopening while making clear that Congress has also imposed strict timing and procedural limits.

B. Jurisdiction-Restricting and Jurisdiction-Preserving Provisions

• 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) & (ii). These provisions limit judicial review of certain discretionary immigration judgments, including:
  • § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i): Bars review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” under enumerated sections (e.g., cancellation of removal).
  • § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii): Bars review of “any other decision or action of the Attorney General” where the authority “is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.”
• 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). The “safe harbor” restoring jurisdiction over “constitutional claims or questions of law.” This provision is the linchpin of the court’s jurisdictional analysis.
• Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022). Reinforces that judicial review over discretionary immigration decisions is “sharply circumscribed,” and clarifies that pure factual determinations in discretionary relief contexts are largely unreviewable.
• Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142 (6th Cir. 2021). Provides the Sixth Circuit’s analytic framework: courts must look to the substance of the claim rather than the label; a claim cloaked as a question of law but in reality only attacking discretionary fact-finding is unreviewable.

C. Mixed Questions and “Questions of Law”

• Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020).
  • The Court held that whether a noncitizen exercised “due diligence” for purposes of equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a motion to reopen is a mixed question of law and fact—that is, the application of a legal standard to settled facts.
  • Such mixed questions are “questions of law” within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(D), and thus reviewable despite jurisdictional bars on reviewing discretionary decisions.
• Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024).
  • Interprets the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” requirement in cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), as a legal standard to be applied to established facts.
  • Holds that applying this standard is a reviewable mixed question under § 1252(a)(2)(D), even though the ultimate discretionary decision on cancellation is unreviewable.
  • Clarifies that mixed questions that are “primarily factual” must be reviewed deferentially, but are still questions of law for jurisdictional purposes.
• Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024).
  • Applies Wilkinson to interpret “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” using dictionary definitions and contextual analysis.
  • Emphasizes that courts interpret such statutory standards de novo (post–Loper Bright), but review the BIA’s application of them to facts deferentially when the question is highly fact-specific.

These cases form the doctrinal backbone for the court’s conclusion that “extraordinary circumstances” in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) is a reviewable legal standard.

D. Discretion & “To the Satisfaction of the Attorney General”

• Rahman v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 399 (6th Cir. 2025).
  • Interprets 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), which allows waiver of certain inadmissibility grounds when “it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General” that refusal of admission would cause “extreme hardship.”
  • The court reads “to the satisfaction of the Attorney General” as signaling that determining whether evidence meets the standard is itself vested in the Attorney General’s inherently discretionary judgment, rendering such determinations unreviewable.

In Sarkisov, the court contrasts this language with § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), which lacks any “to the satisfaction” phrase, supporting the conclusion that the standard is a judicially enforceable legal one rather than wholly committed to agency discretion.

E. Equitable Tolling and “Extraordinary Circumstances”

• Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010).
  • Articulates the familiar two-part test for equitable tolling: (1) diligent pursuit of rights; and (2) “some extraordinary circumstance” stood in the way of timely filing.
  • Defines “extraordinary circumstances” as context-dependent and emphasizes flexibility in assessing what counts as extraordinary.
• Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005). Earlier articulation of the same equitable tolling test cited in Holland.
• In re Morales-Morales, 28 I. & N. Dec. 714 (BIA 2023).
  • The BIA adopts the Holland/Pace framework for equitable tolling of filing deadlines in immigration appeals, specifically focusing on when an “extraordinary circumstance” interrupts reasonable expectations about an event’s occurrence.
• Diaz-Valdez v. Garland, 122 F.4th 436 (1st Cir. 2024). Cited as an example of a court reversing a BIA determination that no extraordinary circumstance warranted equitable tolling of an untimely appeal.
• Chaudhary v. Bondi, No. 24-3890, 2025 WL 1420925 (6th Cir. May 16, 2025). Another example of judicial review of whether an extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing.

The opinion treats the equitable tolling case law as instructive for understanding “extraordinary circumstances,” given the similar phrasing and conceptual function in excusing tardiness.

F. VAWA Reopening in Other Circuits

• Pena-Lopez v. Garland, 33 F.4th 798 (5th Cir. 2022).
  • Held that “extraordinary circumstances” under § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) presents a mixed question of law and fact and is thus reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D).
• Magana-Magana v. Bondi, 129 F.4th 557 (9th Cir. 2025).
  • Adopts a similar approach, treating § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) as a two-step framework (eligibility + discretion) and allowing review of the eligibility component.

The Sixth Circuit aligns itself with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits and explicitly distances itself from pre–Guerrero-Lasprilla or insufficiently reasoned decisions in other circuits that had suggested broader unreviewability.

G. Sua Sponte Reopening and Pre–Safe Harbor Cases

• Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2004).
  • Held that denials of sua sponte reopening were unreviewable, relying on a regulatory scheme and pre–§ 1252(a)(2)(D) framework.
• Lopez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2021). Reaffirms that sua sponte reopening remains a purely discretionary, unreviewable decision.
• Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). Establishes the principle that agency actions are presumptively reviewable unless “statutes are drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion,” in which case the action is “committed to agency discretion by law” under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).

The Attorney General invoked Heckler to argue that “extraordinary circumstances” is too standardless to review. The Sixth Circuit rejects this analogy, pointing out that, unlike the purely discretionary “exceptional situations” doctrine in sua sponte reopening, § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) is framed as a defined legal threshold plus discretionary decision.

IV. Legal Reasoning in Sarkisov

A. The Statutory Framework: VAWA-Based Motions to Reopen

Motions to reopen are governed generally by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). The default rule is:

• Timing: A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order of removal. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).
• Exceptions:
  • Asylum-related exception, § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
  • VAWA “special rule” for battered spouses, children, and parents, § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv).

Under the VAWA special rule:

• The noncitizen has up to one year after the final order (rather than 90 days) to file a motion to reopen for VAWA-related relief. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III).
• Beyond that year, “the Attorney General may, in the Attorney General’s discretion, waive this time limitation in the case of an alien who demonstrates extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to the alien’s child.” Id. (emphasis added).

The court parses this as a two-step framework:

1. Eligibility: Has the alien demonstrated “extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to the alien’s child”? This is a legal standard applied to facts.
2. Discretionary Relief: If eligible, should the Attorney General (through the BIA) exercise discretion to waive the time limit and grant reopening?

Only the first step—the interpretation and application of “extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to the alien’s child”—is reviewable. The ultimate discretionary choice at the second step remains unreviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B).

B. Jurisdiction: Why “Extraordinary Circumstances” Is Reviewable

The Attorney General argued that § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) falls under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which bars review of decisions where the authority is “specified … to be in the discretion of the Attorney General,” and that the phrase “extraordinary circumstances” is so open-ended as to be effectively non-justiciable under the Heckler v. Chaney “no meaningful standard” doctrine.

The Sixth Circuit proceeds in two analytical steps:

1. Assumption of applicability of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii): The court does not definitively decide whether § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies, but assumes it does and then focuses on the § 1252(a)(2)(D) safe harbor.
2. Safe Harbor Analysis: Relying on Guerrero-Lasprilla and Wilkinson, the court holds that:
   • “Extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to the alien’s child” is a legal standard, similar in kind to “due diligence” or “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”
   • Applying that standard to undisputed facts is a mixed question of law and fact, which qualifies as a “question of law” under § 1252(a)(2)(D).
   • Therefore, even if § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) nominally applies, § 1252(a)(2)(D) restores jurisdiction to review the BIA’s eligibility determination.

The court rejects the idea that “extraordinary circumstances” is too formless to review. It notes:

• Both “due diligence” and “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” are equally open-textured yet judicially manageable.
• The statutory text here lacks any “to the satisfaction of the Attorney General” language, which in Rahman was central to deeming the determination wholly discretionary.
• The structure of § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III)—eligibility + discretionary relief—matches the structure analyzed in Wilkinson and Moctezuma-Reyes.

The Attorney General’s analogy to sua sponte reopening is unpersuasive because:

• Cases like Harchenko were decided under pre–§ 1252(a)(2)(D) frameworks and involved non-statutory, purely discretionary relief with no judicially enforceable standard.
• By contrast, § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) is statutory and expressly includes a substantive legal threshold for eligibility.

C. Interpreting “Extraordinary Circumstances” in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III)

Because the meaning of “extraordinary circumstances” is a purely legal question, the court interprets it de novo.

1. Dictionary Definitions and Legal Usage

• Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024): Defines “extraordinary circumstances” as “a highly unusual set of facts that are not commonly associated with a particular thing or event.”
• Merriam-Webster / OED: “Extraordinary” means “going beyond what is usual, regular, or customary” or “exceptional to a very marked extent”; a “circumstance” is a “condition, fact, or event” that accompanies or conditions another event.

Thus, “extraordinary circumstances” refers to highly unusual, non-typical conditions or events that accompany the case.

2. Relationship to Other Statutory “Extraordinary” and “Exceptional” Standards

The court contrasts § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) with other provisions:

• Asylum Filing Deadline: 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) allows belated asylum filing when there are “extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing.” The regulations flesh this out (serious illness, disability, ineffective assistance, etc.).
• In Absentia Orders: 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i) allows rescission of an in absentia removal order within 180 days when the failure to appear was due to “exceptional circumstances,” defined in § 1229a(e)(1) as circumstances “beyond the control of the alien” such as “battery or extreme cruelty,” serious illness, or death of a close family member.

Critically, these provisions tie the extraordinary/exceptional circumstance directly to the cause of delay or nonappearance. By contrast, § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) does not explicitly require that extraordinary circumstances “relate to” or “cause” the lateness.

The court thus reads § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) more broadly:

• It can cover situations where the severity of the abuse or trauma makes it especially compelling, as a matter of fairness, to reopen the case—even if not strictly a cause of delay.
• It can also cover circumstances that do prevent timely filing (e.g., incapacitating trauma, natural disasters, catastrophic events), akin to equitable tolling contexts.

This broader reading is reinforced by BIA non-precedential decisions:

• In re Tatiara Pinho-De Oliveira (2018) – Using extraordinary circumstances to describe cases where the underlying abuse is particularly severe.
• In re Aminot Adewunmi-Dunn (2017) & In re Martin Perez-Sanchez (2018) – Focusing on whether extraordinary circumstances prevented timely filing.

The court declines to narrow the concept to only delay-causing events, distinguishing from the asylum and in absentia contexts where Congress explicitly linked circumstances to the delay.

D. Application: Why the BIA Did Not Err on the Merits

On the merits, the issue is whether the BIA erred in applying the “extraordinary circumstances” standard to the facts of Sarkisov’s case.

1. Standard of Review

Relying on Wilkinson and Moctezuma-Reyes, the court treats this as a highly fact-intensive mixed question and therefore reviews the BIA’s application of the standard deferentially, not de novo. The BIA’s decision must be upheld so long as it is not unreasonable or based on an error of law.

2. The BIA’s Reasoning

The BIA:

• Acknowledged that “the abuse and resulting psychological effects could explain some reasonable delay in filing the motion to reopen.”
• Concluded, however, that those circumstances did not “constitute extraordinary circumstances excusing the 6-year delay between the finality of the order of removal and the filing of the motion.”
• Further noted that, even starting the clock from the approval of the VAWA self-petition, Sarkisov did not show how his psychological condition justified another 18-month delay in filing.

The record included a psychological report diagnosing Sarkisov with moderate-to-severe generalized anxiety disorder largely attributable to the abuse. The BIA accepted the existence of trauma but did not consider it sufficiently extraordinary to excuse such prolonged delay.

3. The Sixth Circuit’s Evaluation

Sarkisov argued that the BIA:

• “Ignored” or undervalued the ongoing nature of his psychological trauma.
• Applied too stringent a threshold in light of VAWA’s protective purpose.
• Should have treated “battery or extreme cruelty” (an element common to VAWA self-petitions) as effectively amounting to “extraordinary circumstances,” drawing on the “exceptional circumstances” definition in § 1229a(e)(1).

The Sixth Circuit rejects each contention:

1. No failure to consider evidence: The BIA expressly acknowledged “abuse and resulting psychological effects” and recognized potential for “some reasonable delay.” Its conclusion that these facts did not justify an extended six-year and 18‑month delay is within the bounds of reason, especially subject to deferential review.
2. VAWA’s purpose vs. statutory limits: The court invokes Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987), to stress that no statute pursues its purposes “at all costs.” Congress expanded access to reopening for VAWA petitioners but expressly limited untimely motions to those involving “extraordinary circumstances” or “extreme hardship to the alien’s child.” Reading the statute to cover virtually any abuse (the core of most VAWA claims) would collapse the extraordinary requirement.
3. Battery/Extreme Cruelty ≠ Extraordinary Circumstances: The “exceptional circumstances” definition in § 1229a(e)(1) (which includes “battery or extreme cruelty”) applies to a specific in absentia context, where such battery is relatively unusual. In the VAWA context, by contrast, battery or extreme cruelty is common to many cases. Automatically equating any such abuse with “extraordinary circumstances” in the VAWA reopening provision would effectively render the word “extraordinary” meaningless there.

Given the length of the delay and the deferential standard of review, the court holds that it cannot say the BIA acted unreasonably or misapplied the statutory standard. It therefore denies the petition for review.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Motion to Reopen

A motion to reopen is a request to re-open a previously completed removal (deportation) case. The noncitizen must present:

• New evidence or changed circumstances not previously presented, and
• Compliance with strict filing deadlines (usually 90 days, extended to one year under VAWA, with a potential waiver for “extraordinary circumstances”).

Reopening is not automatic; even if the person meets the basic criteria, the BIA still exercises discretion whether to grant relief.

B. VAWA Self-Petition and Special Motion to Reopen Rule

VAWA allows certain noncitizens abused by U.S.-citizen (or lawful permanent resident) family members to file their own immigration petitions (“self-petitions”) without relying on the abusive relative. Once a VAWA petition is approved, the noncitizen may seek immigration relief, including cancellation of removal or adjustment of status.

Because many VAWA-eligible individuals are already under final orders of removal, Congress created a special rule:

• They get a one-year window (instead of 90 days) to file a motion to reopen.
• If they miss that year, they can still seek reopening if they can show “extraordinary circumstances” or “extreme hardship to the alien’s child.”

C. Jurisdiction-Stripping vs. Safe Harbor

• Jurisdiction-stripping provisions (§ 1252(a)(2)(B)) limit courts’ ability to review certain discretionary decisions by the immigration agencies.
• Safe harbor (§ 1252(a)(2)(D)) restores jurisdiction over “constitutional claims or questions of law,” including mixed questions (legal standards applied to facts).
• Mixed question: Not simply “what happened?” (fact), and not just “what does the statute mean?” (pure law), but “did the agency correctly apply this legal rule to these specific facts?”

In Sarkisov, the court classifies the “extraordinary circumstances” determination as a mixed question, hence a “question of law” for jurisdictional purposes.

D. “Extraordinary Circumstances” vs. “Exceptional Circumstances”

These phrases appear in different contexts and are not interchangeable:

• “Extraordinary circumstances” in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) (VAWA reopening) is not expressly tied to the cause of delay and is used as a threshold for a waiver of the time bar.
• “Exceptional circumstances” in § 1229a(e)(1) (in absentia orders) must be “beyond the control of the alien” and are tied directly to causing the nonappearance.

The court resists importing the in absentia definition wholesale into the VAWA reopening context.

E. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling is a doctrine allowing late filings in extraordinary situations. A litigant must usually show:

1. Diligent pursuit of rights, and
2. An “extraordinary circumstance” that prevented timely filing.

The concept here helps to inform—but does not mechanically control—what counts as “extraordinary circumstances” for purposes of VAWA reopening.

VI. Impact and Significance

A. Clarifying Judicial Review of VAWA Reopening Decisions

The most immediate impact of Sarkisov is jurisdictional: in the Sixth Circuit, noncitizens whose VAWA-based motions to reopen are denied on the ground that they did not show “extraordinary circumstances” (or “extreme hardship to the alien’s child”) can now seek judicial review of that determination.

• This aligns the Sixth Circuit with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits (Pena-Lopez, Magana-Magana), contributing to an emerging consensus that the eligibility prong of § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III) is reviewable.
• It narrows the reach of earlier, more categorical readings of jurisdiction-stripping provisions from circuits that had treated such determinations as unreviewable discretion, especially where decided pre–Guerrero-Lasprilla.

B. Two-Step Analysis for Discretionary Relief

Sarkisov reinforces a pattern in modern immigration jurisprudence:

1. A statutory provision often contains a legal eligibility standard (e.g., hardship, extraordinary circumstances).
2. If that standard is met, the agency then exercises a separate, unreviewable discretion to grant or deny relief.

Courts may review:

• How the agency interprets the standard, and
• How it applies the standard to the facts (subject to deference for fact-intensive questions), but not
• The agency’s ultimate weighing of discretionary factors once eligibility is established.

This framework provides practitioners and courts with a structured way to separate reviewable from unreviewable issues in appeals.

C. Practical Guidance for VAWA Practitioners

From a practice perspective, Sarkisov carries several implications:

• Record-building is critical. Because courts will review the “extraordinary circumstances” determination, it is essential to build a robust record before the IJ and BIA:
  • Detailed declarations explaining how abuse and trauma affected the ability to pursue relief over time.
  • Psychological or medical evidence connecting the abuse to functional impairments, especially regarding the ability to seek legal help or file on time.
  • Documentation of efforts to seek counsel or information (to show diligence where relevant).
• Timeliness remains central. Even where underlying abuse is severe and trauma significant:
  • Very long, unexplained or weakly explained delays (as in Sarkisov’s six years and 18 months post-VAWA approval) will be difficult to justify.
  • Attorneys should move promptly once VAWA relief is granted and be prepared to explain any intervening delay in detail.
• VAWA’s humanitarian purpose has limits. While courts recognize the protective purpose of VAWA, they will not interpret it to obliterate explicit statutory restrictions, such as express time limitations and the “extraordinary” qualifier.

D. Doctrinal Development of “Extraordinary Circumstances”

By explicitly interpreting “extraordinary circumstances” as a legal standard and situating it among analogous standards (asylum extraordinary circumstances, in absentia exceptional circumstances, equitable tolling), the court contributes to a more coherent body of law on:

• What types of events or conditions are “ordinary” versus “extraordinary” in immigration contexts.
• How trauma, mental health, and power imbalances in abusive relationships can—but do not automatically—constitute bases for excusing late filings.

Future cases may refine this by:

• Identifying particular patterns of abuse or psychological impact that do cross the line into extraordinary circumstances, even for extended periods.
• Clarifying the interplay between diligence-like concepts and the “extraordinary circumstances” threshold in this specific VAWA reopening setting.

E. Post–Chevron Administrative Law Context

The opinion cites Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), via Moctezuma-Reyes, to underscore that courts now interpret statutes de novo, without Chevron deference to agency interpretations. In this environment:

• Courts will increasingly be the final arbiters of open-textured legal standards like “extraordinary circumstances.”
• Agencies retain discretion only where Congress clearly indicates decisions are committed to agency judgment (e.g., via “to the satisfaction of the Attorney General” formulations) or where the issue is purely discretionary case-by-case weighing.

Sarkisov fits into this broader shift by treating the interpretive question as one for the judiciary while leaving the final discretionary call to the agency.

VII. Conclusion

Sarkisov v. Bondi is significant less for its ultimate disposition—denial of a single petition for review—than for the doctrinal footholds it creates.

First, the decision cements the principle that eligibility determinations under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), specifically whether a VAWA movant has “demonstrate[d] extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship to the alien’s child,” are reviewable mixed questions of law and fact under § 1252(a)(2)(D). This leaves the BIA’s final discretionary decision intact but ensures that the legal standards guiding eligibility are subject to judicial oversight.

Second, the court offers a careful interpretation of “extraordinary circumstances” in the VAWA reopening context, grounded in dictionaries, statutory comparisons, and related case law. The term is understood to denote highly unusual, non-typical facts that may either justify reopening in fairness or explain delay, but it is not satisfied merely by circumstances common to many VAWA cases, such as the existence of abuse itself.

Third, by applying a deferential standard to the BIA’s fact-specific judgment in a case involving a long unexplained delay, the Sixth Circuit signals that success on review will likely require both a solid evidentiary record and a credible, detailed account of how particular extraordinary circumstances actually affected the timing of the filing or the fairness of the proceedings.

In sum, Sarkisov refines the contours of judicial review, statutory interpretation, and equitable considerations in VAWA-based motions to reopen. For courts, it provides a template for distinguishing reviewable legal standards from unreviewable discretionary judgments. For advocates and noncitizens, it underscores both the opportunity for appellate review of adverse “extraordinary circumstances” determinations and the continuing importance of prompt action and meticulous documentation in seeking relief.