Judicial Ethics Rules Do Not Govern Executive Agencies: Separate Prosecutorial and Adjudicative Roles Can Satisfy Due Process

In re John Grismore, 2024 VT 70
Supreme Court of Vermont | November 8, 2024 | Opinion by Carroll, J.

1. Introduction

In In re John Grismore, the Vermont Supreme Court addressed the impartiality requirements governing an administrative agency that prosecutes professional misconduct charges and adjudicates them through separate participants. Franklin County Sheriff John Grismore challenged the Vermont Criminal Justice Council’s refusal to disqualify itself from proceedings that resulted in permanent revocation of his law-enforcement officer certification.

The challenge centered on Attorney Kim McManus, who prosecuted the disciplinary case while also serving as the Council’s associate general counsel on other matters. Grismore argued that this ongoing professional relationship created an appearance of bias requiring recusal under the Vermont Code of Judicial Conduct or, independently, constitutional due process.

The Court rejected both arguments. It reaffirmed that the Judicial Code does not apply to executive-branch adjudicators unless the Legislature makes it applicable. It also held that Grismore had not demonstrated a due-process violation: McManus did not advise the adjudicating Council about this case, the Council had independent counsel, and members involved in the preliminary investigation did not participate in the decision.

The decision’s central distinction is between institutional overlap and impermissible individual role mixing. An agency’s employment of both prosecuting counsel and adjudicators does not itself establish unconstitutional bias. What matters is whether advocacy and decisionmaking are improperly combined in the particular proceeding.

2. Background and Procedural Setting

The Council’s disciplinary authority

Under 20 V.S.A. § 2351(b)(2), the Council maintains professional standards for Vermont law-enforcement officers by receiving complaints, adjudicating misconduct charges, and imposing certification sanctions. Sections 2406 and 2407 govern available sanctions and their limitations.

The statutory framework distinguishes three categories of misconduct. Category A includes specified criminal conduct. Category B covers gross professional misconduct, including certain willful policy violations and substantial departures from professional standards, such as a first excessive-force offense. Category C concerns allegations relating to Council processes or operations.

The Council’s Professional Regulation Subcommittee investigates complaints and determines whether further proceedings are warranted. Crucially, its procedures prohibit a member who considered a respondent’s matter on the Subcommittee from voting or participating in the Council’s deliberative or executive sessions concerning the resulting disciplinary proceeding. This internal separation became central to the constitutional analysis.

The charges and recusal motion

In June 2023, Grismore received notice alleging Category B gross professional misconduct for violating the Statewide Policy on Police Use of Force. The allegation was that he had recklessly and unnecessarily kicked a person in police custody, without a legitimate reason, causing pain. An accompanying letter was signed by McManus; the notice and explanation of allegations were signed by the Council’s Executive Director.

An initial Category A allegation involving simple assault was not adjudicated. A separate criminal case was pending, and the administrative hearing proceeded solely on the Category B allegation.

Grismore moved to disqualify the Council. He maintained that its familiarity with McManus as its legal adviser would lead it to favor her as prosecutor. He also relied on procedural emails involving McManus and the Council Chair. His attorney was included in those communications.

The Council denied the motion. It concluded that the Judicial Code did not apply and explained that:

  • Grismore would receive the notice and hearing protections required by the Vermont Administrative Procedure Act;
  • independent conflict counsel represented the Council in the proceeding and had not participated in the investigation or charging process; and
  • the deciding Council members would not have participated in the investigation, Subcommittee review, or referral for adjudication.

The hearing and disciplinary decision

The Council held a two-day hearing in November and December 2023. Before the merits hearing, its Chair invited any member who felt unable to remain impartial to recuse. No member did so. Both sides presented evidence, including testimony, documents, and video.

The Council unanimously found Category B misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence. It characterized the force as objectively unreasonable, unnecessary, punitive, and inconsistent with reasonable alternatives. A majority of eligible members voted to revoke Grismore’s certification permanently. No Subcommittee member participated in the decision.

Grismore did not challenge either the misconduct finding or the sanction on appeal. The Supreme Court therefore reviewed the recusal and due-process questions, not the substantive correctness of the excessive-force determination or the proportionality of permanent revocation.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the Council’s order on two principal grounds.

  1. The Vermont Code of Judicial Conduct did not govern the Council. Council members remain executive-branch officials even when exercising adjudicatory powers. Under existing Vermont precedent, extending the Judicial Code to them requires legislative action. Neither the Council’s expanded authority nor its regulatory importance justified departing from that rule.
  2. The challenged arrangement did not establish unconstitutional bias. McManus prosecuted the matter but did not advise the adjudicating Council, participate in its deliberations, or draft its final order. The Council relied on independent counsel, and the investigative Subcommittee was excluded from adjudication. Grismore failed to overcome the presumption that administrative decisionmakers act honestly and impartially.

The Court reviewed the legal and constitutional issues de novo. Because the Judicial Code was inapplicable, it did not decide whether the arrangement would have violated that Code had the Code governed the proceeding.

4. Analysis of the Precedents Cited

A. Judicial ethics rules and executive-branch adjudication

IN RE CRUSHED ROCK, Inc., 150 Vt. 613, 557 A.2d 84 (1988)

This was the controlling precedent on the Judicial Code’s reach. An Act 250 permit holder sought to disqualify the Environmental Board after the Board brought a superior-court action concerning permit violations and then continued administrative revocation proceedings. The permit holder argued that the Board had prejudged the matter and violated the Judicial Code by refusing disqualification.

Although the Court vacated the Board’s decision on other grounds, it rejected the Judicial Code argument. The Code derived from the judiciary’s authority to regulate judicial officers, including 4 V.S.A. § 3 and Vermont Constitution, chapter II, §§ 30 and 36. Extending that regime to executive-branch officers implicated the separation of powers under chapter II, § 5 and was a legislative choice.

Grismore reaffirmed that boundary. The Court rejected both an invitation to overrule the precedent and an attempt to distinguish it based on the Council’s asserted regulatory importance. The earlier opinion also informed the separate due-process analysis through its warning against improper intermixing of administrative roles.

McISAAC v. UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT., 2004 VT 50, 177 Vt. 16, 853 A.2d 77

A university employee challenging a tenure decision sought to disqualify a Vermont Labor Relations Board panel member who had previously reviewed her application. She argued that administrative adjudicators were subject to the same disqualification standards as judges.

The Court rejected that proposition and reaffirmed that applying the Judicial Code to executive-branch proceedings required legislative action. In Grismore, this subsequent reaffirmation demonstrated that the rule was not confined to environmental permitting or to one particular administrative structure. The Legislature had still not extended the Code to administrative proceedings.

Ferry v. City of Montpelier, 2023 VT 4, 217 Vt. 450, 296 A.3d 749

The Court cited this decision to acknowledge that stare decisis is not absolute. Vermont precedent can be reconsidered. Its role here was to frame, rather than foreclose, Grismore’s request for overruling: the Court considered the request but found no persuasive basis to abandon the existing rule.

In re Barber, 2018 VT 78, 208 Vt. 77, 195 A.3d 364

This decision supplied the countervailing principle of restraint: courts do not lightly overturn precedent where the governing rule can be changed through another authorized process. In Grismore, that reasoning reinforced the importance of legislative responsibility for extending judicial-conduct requirements beyond the judiciary.

B. Constitutional impartiality and the presumption against bias

WITHROW v. LARKIN, 421 U.S. 35 (1975)

This United States Supreme Court decision supplied the foundational constitutional rule that administrative proceedings, like judicial proceedings, require a fair hearing before an unbiased decisionmaker. It also supported the presumption of honesty and integrity afforded to administrative adjudicators.

Those principles establish the opinion’s balance: administrative adjudication is constitutionally constrained, but an agency’s enforcement responsibilities do not alone prove that its decisionmakers are biased.

Sec'y, Agency of Nat. Res, v. Upper Valley RegT Landfill Corp., 167 Vt. 228, 705 A.2d 1001 (1997)

The Court relied on this Vermont application of the impartiality presumption to place the burden on Grismore. He needed to establish a constitutionally significant problem rather than infer partiality merely from the Council’s existing professional relationship with McManus.

In re JLD Props, of St. Albans, LLC, 2011 VT 87, 190 Vt. 259, 30 A.3d 641

This decision illustrated circumstances requiring constitutional disqualification. There, a board chair expressed open contempt for participants as outsiders and elitists, effectively questioning their legitimacy in the proceeding. It supported the statement that constitutional disqualification is required only in the most extreme cases.

The contrast mattered: Grismore identified no comparable hostility, prejudgment, or demonstrated favoritism. His argument instead depended on the possibility of unconscious institutional loyalty.

Burch-Clay v. Taylor, 2015 VT 110, 200 Vt. 166, 130 A.3d 180

The Court used this precedent for three related propositions: legal and due-process questions receive de novo review; bias or prejudgment may defeat a fair hearing; and due process generally does not tolerate a single individual’s performance of incompatible functions within an adjudicative proceeding.

Its importance lies in identifying the relevant inquiry. The question was not simply whether the Council had several institutional functions, but whether individuals improperly crossed the line between building the prosecution and deciding the case.

C. Separating prosecution from adjudication

In re 2007 Admins. of Appropriations of Water of Niobrara River, 820 N.W.2d 44 (Neb. 2012)

This decision recognized that assigning prosecutorial work to agency personnel who will not participate in the eventual decision is a common and recommended administrative arrangement. It supported the legitimacy of internal functional separation rather than mandatory disqualification of an entire agency.

La Petit Auberge, Inc. v. R.I. Comm'n for Hum. Rts., 419 A.2d 274 (R.I. 1980)

The Court cited this case for the absence of unconstitutional bias where the same individuals were not both constructing the adversarial case and deciding the issues. It reinforced the significance of the Council’s separation between the investigative Subcommittee and the adjudicating members.

BURHOE v. WHALAND, 356 A.2d 658 (N.H. 1976)

This case supplied the contrasting example: due process is violated when a hearing officer presents one party’s case, cross-examines the opposing witnesses, and then decides the dispute. Nothing comparable occurred in Grismore’s proceeding because McManus advocated but did not adjudicate.

Bruteyn v. State Dental Council &Examining Board, 380 A.2d 497 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977)

This was Grismore’s principal persuasive authority and the most important factual comparison. There, the prosecuting attorney also advised the dental board before, during, and after the hearing. The attorney provided advice during preliminary procedures, advised on evidentiary motions, and participated in drafting the final order. The board lacked independent counsel.

The Pennsylvania court found the proceeding constitutionally tainted despite the absence of proof of actual prejudice. That feature is significant: a structural defect can violate due process without direct evidence that the outcome changed.

The Vermont Supreme Court found the case unpersuasive on the materially different facts before it. McManus did not advise the deciding Council, discuss the merits with its members, or draft its order. Independent counsel advised the Council throughout. Her work with the Subcommittee did not create the same problem because its members were excluded from adjudication.

D. Adequate briefing of constitutional claims

State v. Bergquist, 2019 VT 17, 210 Vt. 102, 211 A.3d 946

This decision established that inadequately raised and briefed arguments will not be considered, even when constitutional issues are asserted. It supported the Court’s refusal to develop additional due-process theories for Grismore beyond the argument he actually presented.

Carpin v. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 2024 VT 27, 319 A.3d 715

This case similarly declined to address a constitutional claim supported only by a passing reference and no authority. Together with Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a), it limited the scope of review in Grismore. The Court evaluated the developed comparison to Bruteyn, but did not treat a generalized invocation of due process as sufficient to present additional constitutional theories.

5. Legal Reasoning

A. Performing adjudicative work does not make an agency part of the judiciary

Grismore’s Judicial Code argument depended on function: because the Council heard evidence, applied law, and imposed sanctions, he argued that it should observe the ethical standards governing judges. The Court instead treated the source and constitutional location of the Council’s authority as decisive.

Quasi-judicial functions do not transform executive officials into judicial officers. The Judicial Code’s reach therefore could not be expanded merely because an administrative decision had serious consequences or because the Legislature had enlarged the Council’s regulatory responsibilities.

This was principally a reaffirmation of existing law, not the creation of a new exemption from impartiality. The Code’s inapplicability left the Council fully subject to constitutional due process and applicable statutory procedures.

B. Procedural fairness required more than notice, but notice was not disputed

The Council’s proceedings were governed by the Vermont Administrative Procedure Act, including the notice and hearing requirements of 3 V.S.A. § 809 and the written-decision requirement of § 812. Grismore did not dispute adequate notice or a fair opportunity to respond.

Those protections did not, by themselves, answer the impartiality objection: a well-noticed hearing can still be constitutionally defective if the decisionmaker is biased. The Court therefore separately examined whether the challenged professional relationship compromised adjudication.

C. Actual separation, not merely separate job titles, supported the result

The record established several mutually reinforcing safeguards:

  • Separate adjudicators: members who investigated or reviewed the complaint on the Subcommittee did not decide it.
  • Separate legal advice: independent counsel advised the Council on this proceeding before, during, and after the hearing.
  • No prosecutorial participation in decisionmaking: McManus did not advise on evidence, discuss the merits with deciding members, or help draft the final order.
  • No demonstrated favoritism: the cited procedural emails were consistent with advocacy and showed no indicia of bias.

These facts distinguished an agency lawyer’s permissible prosecution of a matter from an impermissible combination of prosecutor and confidential legal adviser to the tribunal in that same matter. The Court’s reliance on an administrative-law treatise further supported the proposition that common agency employment, without more, does not establish a constitutional violation.

D. The holding does not require proof of actual prejudice in every case

Although Grismore failed to demonstrate conscious or unconscious favoritism, the opinion should not be read to require direct proof of subjective bias whenever roles overlap. The Court distinguished, rather than rejected, the structural concerns illustrated by Bruteyn.

The narrower holding is that the professional relationship identified here, coupled with the undisputed separation of functions, did not overcome the presumption of impartiality. A prosecutor’s participation in adjudicative advice or order drafting would present a materially different case.

6. Potential Impact and Limits

For administrative agencies

The opinion supports enforcement structures that separate investigative and prosecutorial work from adjudication. Agencies can draw practical guidance from the safeguards upheld here: exclude investigative participants from deliberations, use independent adjudicative counsel, and prevent prosecutors from advising decisionmakers or drafting their decisions.

The decision does not declare independent counsel a universal constitutional requirement in every administrative case. It establishes that independent representation was a particularly important safeguard on this record.

For respondents and reviewing courts

A recusal challenge requires more than an assertion that the prosecutor regularly works for the agency. Relevant evidence may include confidential merits communications, prosecutorial advice on evidentiary rulings, participation in deliberations, involvement in order drafting, or statements demonstrating hostility or prejudgment.

The briefing discussion also has practical force. A constitutional argument must explain the relevant legal standard and connect it to the record; courts need not develop undeveloped theories for an appellant.

For legislative policy

The Court left the Legislature free to impose additional ethics or recusal requirements on administrative adjudicators, including by making judicial-conduct standards applicable. That allocation of authority does not diminish courts’ responsibility to enforce existing constitutional protections.

Limits of the precedent

  • The Court did not decide whether the Judicial Code, if applicable, would have required recusal.
  • It did not approve every combination of agency functions or every continuing relationship between prosecutors and adjudicators.
  • It did not adjudicate the separate assault allegation or review the merits of the misconduct finding and sanction.
  • Its due-process analysis was tied to the established safeguards and the arguments adequately presented on appeal.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Quasi-judicial capacity
An agency acts like a court by hearing evidence and deciding legal rights. That function does not make it part of the judicial branch.
Recusal or disqualification
Withdrawal or exclusion of a decisionmaker because participation would violate an applicable impartiality requirement.
Due process
The constitutional requirement of fair procedures, including a meaningful hearing before an unbiased decisionmaker.
Presumption of honesty and integrity
Administrative adjudicators are ordinarily assumed to act impartially. A challenger must provide a sufficient basis to displace that assumption.
Separation of functions
Keeping those who investigate and prosecute a case apart from those who decide it and advise the decisionmakers.
Conflict counsel
Independent legal counsel used when the agency’s regular attorney has another role that prevents that attorney from advising the adjudicators in the matter.
De novo review
The appellate court decides the legal issue independently rather than deferring to the agency’s legal conclusion.
Stare decisis
The practice of following precedent unless a sufficient reason justifies changing the law.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard requiring a proposition to be more likely true than not true. The Council used this standard to find misconduct; that finding was not challenged on appeal.

8. Conclusion

In re John Grismore preserves the distinction between judicial ethics rules and constitutional administrative fairness. Executive agencies do not become subject to the Vermont Code of Judicial Conduct simply because they adjudicate disputes, but their proceedings must still satisfy due process.

The decisive safeguard was meaningful separation: the prosecutor did not advise or assist the adjudicators in deciding the case, independent counsel represented them, and investigative participants were excluded. On that record, the Council’s relationship with its regular attorney did not require disqualification, and the permanent certification revocation remained in effect.