Irrelevant Evidence Before the Grand Jury Does Not Automatically Defect the Indictment Absent Pervasive, Willful Prosecutorial Misconduct

1. Introduction

People v Stencel arises from a fatal single-vehicle crash on March 2, 2022, in the Town of Lancaster, Erie County, in which two passengers died after the vehicle struck a mailbox and a tree and burst into flames. The defendant, Ryan Stencel, escaped; the passengers did not.

The People presented evidence to a grand jury that the defendant was traveling well above the 35 mph speed limit under snowy nighttime conditions. The People also presented toxicology evidence that the defendant’s blood tested positive for cannabinoids, including “active” cannabinoids. The grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts of criminally negligent homicide (Penal Law § 125.10).

The litigation then pivoted to whether the cannabinoid evidence was relevant to impairment and culpability. The trial court later precluded the cannabinoid evidence for trial as irrelevant and highly prejudicial absent expert testimony tying cannabinoids to impaired operation. Relying on that later preclusion ruling, County Court (on renewal) dismissed the indictment as defective under CPL 210.35 (5), reasoning that the grand jury was misled into inferring impairment and that, without cannabinoid evidence, the People had only “speeding in poor road conditions,” which the court deemed insufficient under People v Cabrera.

The People appealed. The Fourth Department reversed, reinstated the indictment, and remitted for further proceedings—holding that the later determination of irrelevance did not, without more, establish the kind of prosecutorial misconduct that “impairs the integrity” of grand jury proceedings within CPL 210.35 (5).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Department held that County Court erred in dismissing the indictment on the theory that the presentation of cannabinoid evidence—later precluded at trial as irrelevant—rendered the grand jury proceedings defective. The appellate court emphasized:

• Dismissal under CPL 210.35 (5) is an “exceptional remedy” reserved for “rare cases” involving a pervasive, typically willful pattern of bias and misconduct.
• Mere evidentiary error or the later exclusion of evidence (even as irrelevant and prejudicial) does not satisfy the “impairment of integrity” standard.
• Evidence later deemed inadmissible at trial may nevertheless support an indictment if it was not inherently incompetent and not barred by a per se exclusionary rule.
• The required analysis has two distinct prongs—(1) impairment of integrity and (2) potential prejudice—and they must not be conflated.

The court therefore reversed, denied renewal relief on the merits, reinstated the indictment, and remitted.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Grand jury dismissal standard; prosecutorial role and misconduct

• People v Huston, 88 NY2d 400 (1996): The backbone of the decision. Huston describes the prosecutor’s “broad powers and duties” and “wide discretion” in presenting to the grand jury, while also setting the high bar for dismissal as an “exceptional remedy” in “rare cases.” Stencel applies Huston to reject the idea that later-excluded evidence alone equals a defective grand jury.
• People v Thompson, 22 NY3d 687 (2014): Supplies the modern formulation: dismissal requires an “over-all pattern of bias and misconduct” that is “pervasive” and “typically willful.” Stencel uses Thompson to underscore that “erroneous handling of evidentiary matters” is not enough.
• People v Darby, 75 NY2d 449 (1990): Central to the Fourth Department’s critique of County Court’s analysis. Darby articulates the “very high hurdle” of showing “impairment of the integrity” of the grand jury process and treats prejudice as a separate prong. Stencel invokes Darby to fault County Court for effectively merging “prejudicial” and “flawed” into an impairment finding.
• People v Pelchat, 62 NY2d 97 (1984): Establishes the prosecutor’s duty of fair dealing and the prohibition against accepting an indictment known to be based on false, misleading, or legally insufficient evidence. Stencel distinguishes this case: there was no showing the People knew the cannabinoid proof was “irrelevant” when presented, and no showing it was false.
• People v Hill, 5 NY3d 772 (2005): Recognizes that a prosecutor may not give an inaccurate and misleading answer to a legitimate grand juror inquiry. County Court viewed the “there will be other witnesses” response as contributing to an inference of impairment. The Fourth Department implicitly treats this, at most, as the kind of isolated evidentiary/handling issue that does not meet the Huston/Thompson threshold absent a pervasive pattern.
• People v Lancaster, 69 NY2d 20 (1986) and People v Di Falco, 44 NY2d 482 (1978): Cited for the prosecutor’s legal-advisor role in the grand jury and the authority to decide witness competency and instruct on legal significance of evidence. Stencel uses these to contextualize prosecutorial discretion and why ordinary evidentiary disputes generally do not rise to a dismissal-level defect.
• People v Wisdom, 23 NY3d 970 (2014): Reinforces that dismissal is not warranted without evidence of a “nefarious design” to cause unfairness. Stencel relies on Wisdom to emphasize the absence of bad faith.

B. Indictment sufficiency despite later trial inadmissibility

• People v Suber, 19 NY3d 247 (2012), People v Gordon, 88 NY2d 92 (1996), People v Swamp, 84 NY2d 725 (1995), People v Oakley, 28 NY2d 309 (1971): These cases supply the doctrinal bridge that defeats County Court’s core premise: evidence later deemed inadmissible can still support an indictment, so long as it is not inherently incompetent and not barred by a per se exclusionary rule. Stencel treats the cannabinoid proof as the type of evidence that might be excluded later for relevance/prejudice reasons without being per se incapable of supporting a prima facie case in the grand jury.
• People v Sabella, 35 NY2d 158 (1974): Cited for the grand jury’s legal-sufficiency framework that defers “quantity or weight” issues. Stencel uses Sabella to reinforce that the grand jury stage is not where discretionary trial-evidentiary disputes are typically resolved.

C. Criminally negligent homicide and “dangerous speeding”

• People v Cabrera, 10 NY3d 370 (2008): The defendant relied on Cabrera to argue speed alone is insufficient absent an “additional affirmative act” transforming “speeding” into “dangerous speeding.” Although the Fourth Department’s reversal turned primarily on the grand-jury-defect standard rather than a full merits re-weighing of Cabrera, the case frames the parties’ dispute: County Court believed cannabinoids supplied the missing “additional affirmative act,” and once excluded, the indictment collapsed. The appellate court instead held the grand jury dismissal remedy was misapplied.

D. Appellate preservation and abandonment (procedural backdrop)

• People v Concepcion, 17 NY3d 192 (2011) and People v LaFontaine, 92 NY2d 470 (1998): Used to explain the appellate court’s limited review power under CPL 470.15 (1) where an issue was not expressly decided below.
• People v Currington, 219 AD3d 1701 (4th Dept 2023), People v Cardoza, 218 AD3d 1291 (4th Dept 2023), People v Wilson, 213 AD3d 1217 (4th Dept 2023): Cited for the rule that arguments not pursued on appeal are abandoned—relevant to the People’s timeliness position.
• People v Lamont, 144 AD3d 1330 (3d Dept 2016) and People v Silva, 122 AD2d 750 (1st Dept 1986): Cited for the proposition (raised by the People) that CPLR 2221 renewal may be inapplicable in criminal practice, but Stencel declines to reach that question because the order under review did not expressly decide it.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Fourth Department’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

Step 1: Identify the governing dismissal framework

Under CPL 210.35 (5) and CPL 210.20 (1) (c), dismissal requires a failure to conform to grand-jury requirements “to such degree that the integrity thereof is impaired and prejudice to the defendant may result.” The court emphasizes (via Huston, Thompson, Darby) that:

• Dismissal is exceptional and rare.
• Isolated evidentiary errors do not qualify.
• “Impairment of integrity” is a distinct, high hurdle; prejudice is separate and cannot substitute for impairment.

Step 2: Apply that framework to “later deemed irrelevant” evidence

County Court treated the later preclusion ruling as establishing that the grand jury heard “prejudicial and flawed” evidence that misled it about impairment. The Fourth Department rejects the retroactive logic: at the time of the grand jury presentation, no court had ruled the evidence irrelevant, and there was no record basis to find the People knew it was irrelevant then.

Critically, the court warns that affirmance would functionally create a broad rule: whenever trial-level discretion later excludes evidence as irrelevant/unduly prejudicial, defendants could repackage that as a grand-jury defect and seek dismissal. That would contradict the Court of Appeals’ consistent insistence on the exceptional nature of the remedy.

Step 3: Reconcile “trial inadmissibility” with “grand jury sufficiency”

Using Swamp, Gordon, Suber, and Oakley, the court underscores the longstanding distinction between:

• Per se excluded or inherently incompetent evidence (never sufficient to support an indictment), and
• Evidence later excluded at trial after further development (which may still have supported a prima facie grand jury case).

Here, the cannabinoid evidence was precluded as irrelevant and prejudicial absent a particular expert nexus showing; that is a contextual, discretionary trial ruling—not a per se bar and not a finding that the grand jury testimony was “incompetent evidence” under CPL 70.10 (1). Thus, its presence in the grand jury record did not itself establish a CPL 210.35 (5) defect.

3.3 Impact

For grand jury practice in New York

• Limits retroactive “trial-ruling-to-grand-jury-defect” arguments: The decision fortifies the idea that later evidentiary preclusion (especially discretionary relevance/prejudice rulings) does not automatically translate into an impaired grand jury proceeding.
• Re-centers the two-prong Darby analysis: Courts must separately address (1) impairment of integrity and (2) potential prejudice, rather than letting prejudice drive the outcome.
• Reinforces prosecutorial discretion absent bad faith: Unless the record shows knowing use of false/misleading evidence, deceptive answers to grand jurors, or a pervasive pattern of misconduct, dismissal is unlikely.

For vehicular homicide cases involving cannabinoids

• Grand jury vs. trial evidentiary standards diverge: Even if cannabinoid evidence may be excluded at trial absent a tight impairment nexus, prosecutors may still attempt to present such evidence at the charging stage without automatically risking dismissal—so long as the presentation is not deceptive and the evidence is competent.
• Cautionary note for prosecutors: Although Stencel rejects dismissal here, it leaves intact Hill and Pelchat-type constraints: if a prosecutor affirmatively misleads the grand jury about what the toxicology proves (or what later witnesses will establish), the calculus could change.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Defective grand jury proceedings” (CPL 210.35 [5]): Not every mistake qualifies. The defect must be so serious that it undermines the fairness/regularity (“integrity”) of the grand jury process, and it must be capable of prejudicing the defendant.
• “Integrity” vs. “prejudice” (from People v Darby): Integrity asks: was the process corrupted in a systemic or fundamental way (often tied to willful misconduct or knowing deception)? Prejudice asks: could the error harm the defendant? Many things are prejudicial; far fewer impair integrity.
• “Competent evidence” (CPL 70.10 [1]): Evidence that is legally acceptable for the grand jury to consider. It can include evidence that might later be excluded at trial for context-specific reasons, so long as it is not inherently incompetent or barred by a per se rule.
• “Per se exclusionary rule”: A rule that makes certain evidence categorically unusable for particular purposes (as opposed to evidence excluded because, in a given case, it is too prejudicial or insufficiently tied to a fact in issue).
• “Dangerous speeding” and People v Cabrera: Cabrera is commonly read to require more than mere speeding to establish criminal negligence in vehicular deaths—some additional circumstance or conduct that elevates the risk to “substantial and unjustifiable.” In Stencel, the appellate court did not resolve the case by re-litigating that merits question; it focused on the threshold question whether alleged evidentiary error in the grand jury warranted the exceptional remedy of dismissal.

5. Conclusion

People v Stencel reinforces a disciplined, high-threshold approach to CPL 210.35 (5): the later exclusion of evidence—here, cannabinoid blood-test evidence deemed irrelevant absent an impairment nexus—does not automatically mean the grand jury’s integrity was impaired. By separating “integrity” from “prejudice” (per People v Darby) and by reiterating that dismissal is reserved for rare, pervasive, typically willful misconduct (per People v Huston and People v Thompson), the Fourth Department limits efforts to convert discretionary trial evidentiary rulings into retroactive invalidations of indictments.

Practically, the decision signals that challenges to questionable evidence presented to grand juries will generally be addressed through suppression, preclusion, limiting proof at trial, and adversarial testing—rather than by the extraordinary remedy of dismissing the indictment—unless the record shows knowing deception, falsehood, or a pervasive pattern undermining the grand jury process itself.