Invited Error Forecloses Sixth Amendment Sentencing-Inquiry Claims When the Defendant Disclaims Substitute Counsel

Case: United States v. Michael Arnet Thomas (6th Cir. July 10, 2026) (not recommended for publication)
Issue Focus: Sixth Amendment right to counsel at sentencing; district court’s duty to inquire into dissatisfaction with counsel; invited-error doctrine

1. Introduction

Michael Arnet Thomas pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing a stolen firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) and agreed to a 120-month sentence. A week before sentencing, Thomas sent a pro se letter to the district court expressing “some concerns” with counsel, while also signaling he wanted to “move forward.” At sentencing, the district court addressed the letter on the record, asked whether Thomas sought new counsel, and whether current counsel could adequately represent him.

On appeal, Thomas argued that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by failing to inquire sufficiently into his dissatisfaction—especially given that the letter itself was not in the appellate record. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Thomas’s own on-the-record disclaimers both (i) triggered the invited-error doctrine and (ii) independently showed no Sixth Amendment deficiency in the court’s inquiry.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that even assuming Thomas’s letter was sufficient to trigger a duty to inquire about substitution of counsel, his claim failed for two reasons:

• Invited error foreclosed appellate review: Thomas repeatedly told the court he was not requesting a new lawyer, that counsel could adequately represent him, and that the court should proceed with sentencing—thereby “inviting” any alleged error in not probing further.
• No error (and thus no plain error) in any event: Because the Sixth Amendment inquiry’s purpose is to determine whether there is good cause to substitute counsel, Thomas’s express disavowal of substitution eliminated the need for a deeper inquiry into “good cause.”

The court also rejected the argument that the missing letter prevented meaningful appellate review: while including the letter would have been best practice, the live colloquy adequately showed that Thomas did not want substitute counsel.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is built from three interlocking lines of Sixth Circuit doctrine: (1) the right to counsel at sentencing and when it is “implicated” by dissatisfaction, (2) the district court’s duty to inquire and the limits of that duty, and (3) invited-error principles that can bar appellate relief.

1) Sentencing as a “critical stage”

• King v. Bobby, 433 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2006): Cited for the foundational proposition that sentencing is a “critical stage” at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. This frames Thomas’s complaint as constitutionally cognizable in principle.

2) When dissatisfaction triggers a duty to inquire / substitution standards

• Benitez v. United States, 521 F.3d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 2008): Used to define when the Sixth Amendment is implicated—when a defendant seeks to “change the status of his representation,” including substitution. Also cited for the rule that a defendant need not “affirmatively request” substitute counsel to implicate the Sixth Amendment. But the court distinguished Benitez on its facts.
• United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009): Supplies the operative duty-to-inquire standard: when a defendant brings “any serious dissatisfaction with counsel” to the court’s attention, the court must inquire to determine whether “good cause” exists for substitution. This is the doctrinal hook for Thomas’s requested remand.
• United States v. Steele, 919 F.3d 965, 973 (6th Cir. 2019): Emphasizes that the right to counsel of choice is not absolute and that courts weigh “good cause” against the public interest in efficient justice. This supports the general proposition that substitution is discretionary and context-sensitive.
• United States v. Iles, 906 F.2d 1122, 1131 (6th Cir. 1990): Cited twice for constraints on the duty to inquire: the defendant must “show his hand” before the court must engage substitution inquiry; and appellate courts should not assume a defendant misrepresented his own position when he disclaimed dissatisfaction or a desire to change counsel.
• United States v. Henderson, 626 F.3d 326, 339-40 (6th Cir. 2010): Central to the holding. Henderson supports the view that when a defendant does not request new counsel and expresses satisfaction (or at least acceptance) of current counsel, the district court does not abuse its discretion by not ordering substitution.
• United States v. Salaam, 2024 WL 3163256, at *7 (6th Cir. June 25, 2024): Reinforces Henderson in a procedural posture resembling Thomas’s: where the defendant withdrew a motion for substitute counsel and affirmed he wanted to proceed, the district court did not abuse discretion by continuing.

3) Invited error, manifest injustice, and plain-error backstops

• United States v. Akridge, 62 F.4th 258, 264 (6th Cir. 2023): Provides the invited-error definition and the default rule that appellate review is foreclosed unless declining review would create “manifest injustice.”
• United States v. Montgomery, 998 F.3d 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2021): Clarifies when “manifest injustice” may warrant review of invited error—particularly when the government is equally to blame and the error is constitutional or Guidelines-related. The Thomas panel used this to reject manifest injustice because the government had no role in curtailing inquiry.
• United States v. Clay, 162 F.4th 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2025): Establishes that if invited-error review is undertaken, the standard is plain error. The court then noted Thomas would lose even under plain-error review.
• United States v. Woods, 61 F.4th 471, 482 (6th Cir. 2023): Used by analogy to show how a litigant’s affirmative representations to the court can “invite” the very error later challenged. Thomas’s repeated assurances functioned similarly.

4) Record completeness and defendant letters

• United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129, 132 (6th Cir. 1991): Cited for “best practice” that such letters should be included in the record, and as a contrast case where remand was appropriate because the record did not show whether the court considered letters or ruled on explicit substitution requests.

B. Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds in a layered sequence designed to resolve the case on the narrowest, most disposition-driving grounds.

Step 1: The constitutional framework and the conditional duty to inquire

The court accepted that sentencing triggers the Sixth Amendment (per King v. Bobby), and that serious dissatisfaction can oblige a district court to inquire (per United States v. Vasquez). But it questioned whether the letter even met that threshold, emphasizing two uncertainties: (i) the letter did not clearly ask for new counsel, and (ii) the court’s description of it did not suggest “serious dissatisfaction.” Because the letter was absent from the record, however, the panel did not rest its decision on that ambiguity and instead assumed arguendo that a duty to inquire existed.

Step 2: Invited error as the controlling appellate doctrine

The panel then treated Thomas’s on-the-record answers as dispositive. The colloquy showed:

If the alleged error was that the court “cut the inquiry short,” Thomas’s insistence that the court proceed, coupled with explicit affirmations of satisfaction/adequacy, made him the author of the very procedural path he later attacked. Under United States v. Akridge, such invited error generally bars appellate review absent “manifest injustice.”

Applying United States v. Montgomery, the court found no manifest injustice because (i) the government did not contribute to any truncated inquiry and (ii) the court was not persuaded that declining review would produce a fundamentally unfair outcome given Thomas’s clear waiver-like conduct on the record.

Step 3: No Sixth Amendment error even under plain-error review

The panel then explained that even if it proceeded to plain-error review (as contemplated by United States v. Clay), Thomas still would lose. The Sixth Amendment inquiry at issue serves a specific function: determining whether good cause exists to substitute counsel. Where a defendant expressly rejects substitution and confirms current counsel’s adequacy, further inquiry into “good cause” would be purposeless and potentially contrary to the defendant’s stated preference. On this logic, the district court’s brief inquiry satisfied the constitutional requirement.

This is where the court most sharply distinguished Benitez v. United States: in Benitez, remand was required because the district court made no inquiry despite the defendant’s explicit statements that he had fired counsel and did not want counsel representing him. Thomas’s record was the opposite—he repeatedly confirmed he wanted to proceed with the same lawyer.

Step 4: The missing letter does not undermine adequacy of review

The panel acknowledged (via United States v. Jennings) that including the letter in the record would have been best practice. But it separated two questions:

• Triggering question: Did the letter create a duty to inquire in the first place?
• Adequacy question: Once inquiry occurred on the record, was it constitutionally sufficient?

The letter’s absence might affect the triggering question, but the panel assumed the trigger in Thomas’s favor. As to adequacy, the sentencing transcript itself—containing Thomas’s disclaimers—was enough to affirm.

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision crystallizes a practical rule likely to influence Sixth Circuit district-court practice and appellate litigation tactics:

• Appellate leverage diminishes after explicit on-the-record disclaimers: Defendants who raise concerns in letters but then explicitly disclaim any request for substitution and affirm counsel’s adequacy may face invited-error barriers to later Sixth Amendment challenges about the court’s inquiry depth.
• Inquiry is keyed to substitution, not generalized dissatisfaction: The opinion frames the duty-to-inquire as purposive—aimed at deciding whether to replace counsel—so when the defendant affirmatively rejects that remedy, the constitutionally required inquiry correspondingly contracts.
• Record-building remains important, but not outcome-determinative here: The court’s “best practice” note about placing letters in the record flags an avoidable appellate complication. Future litigants seeking remand will likely emphasize Jennings-like scenarios—explicit substitution requests with unclear judicial action—rather than Thomas-like disavowals.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Critical stage”: A point in a criminal case where legal assistance is constitutionally required because important rights or outcomes are at stake. Sentencing qualifies.
• “Substitute counsel”: Replacing a defendant’s current attorney (often appointed counsel) with a different attorney, typically upon a showing of “good cause” (e.g., conflict of interest or irreconcilable breakdown in communication).
• Duty to “inquire”: When a defendant signals serious problems with counsel, the judge must ask enough questions to determine whether substitution is warranted.
• “Invited error”: A doctrine preventing a party from complaining on appeal about an error that party caused—such as urging a court to proceed, then claiming the court erred by proceeding.
• “Plain error” review: A highly deferential appellate standard applied when an issue was not properly preserved; the error must be clear and must affect substantial rights and the fairness of the proceeding.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Michael Arnet Thomas affirms that while sentencing is a Sixth Amendment “critical stage” and serious dissatisfaction can require a judicial inquiry, a defendant’s clear on-the-record disavowal of substitute counsel and affirmation of counsel’s adequacy can (1) trigger invited-error principles that foreclose appellate relief and (2) substantively satisfy the Constitution by eliminating the need for extended “good cause” exploration. The opinion also reiterates a practical lesson from United States v. Jennings: defendant letters should be preserved in the record, even when the transcript ultimately carries the day.