Interlocutory Appeals Under C.A.R. 4.1 Do Not Reach Statutory “Exclusion” Orders Under Colorado’s Body-Worn Camera Law

A. Precedents Cited

• People v. S.X.G., 2012 CO 5

  The Court relied on S.X.G. for the foundational principle that an appellate court must confirm its jurisdiction even if the parties do not raise the issue. This provides the doctrinal basis for the Court’s sua sponte jurisdictional scrutiny and frames dismissal as a mandatory consequence of jurisdictional limits rather than a discretionary choice.

• People v. Brown, 2022 CO 11

  Brown is used to restate the scope of C.A.R. 4.1 and section 16-12-102(2): immediate prosecution appeals are permitted only for certain suppression orders grounded in constitutional violations. The Court uses Brown to anchor the proposition that C.A.R. 4.1 is not a general mechanism for interlocutory review of evidentiary rulings.

• Phillips v. People, 2026 CO 21

  Phillips does the heavy definitional work: (1) it connects the enumerated criminal rules (Crim. P. 41(e), 41(g), 41.1(i)) to constitutional protections, and (2) it distinguishes “suppress” from “exclude.” The Court quotes Phillips for the point that suppression is a “specialized term” typically reserved for evidence obtained illegally in violation of constitutional rights, and it underscores that “suppress and exclude do not travel together as interchangeable terms.”

  By invoking Phillips, the Court frames the jurisdictional inquiry as one of legal category: an “exclusion” order grounded in a statute does not become a “suppression” order appealable under C.A.R. 4.1 merely because it keeps evidence from the jury.

• People v. Lindsey, 660 P.2d 502 (Colo. 1983)

  Lindsey supplies two linked constraints: (1) C.A.R. 4.1 interlocutory appeals are limited to the issues covered by the rule, and (2) the prosecution may not use a proper C.A.R. 4.1 appeal as a vehicle to obtain review of other pretrial evidentiary decisions. The Court uses Lindsey to reject any attempt to treat this statutory exclusion ruling as functionally equivalent to suppression.

• People v. Morrison, 583 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1978)

  Quoted through Lindsey, Morrison adds the “piggybacking” prohibition: parties may not append non-C.A.R. 4.1 issues to obtain interlocutory review of rulings outside the rule. The citation reinforces that jurisdiction is not expandable by artful framing.

• People v. Havens, 2025 CO 65

  Havens is the Court’s key comparator, demonstrating when body-worn camera issues may arise in a C.A.R. 4.1 appeal without expanding jurisdiction. In Havens, the appealed order was a classic Fourth Amendment suppression ruling (lack of probable cause after a clerk’s statement was deemed inadmissible under section 24-31-902). Because the district court there suppressed evidence on constitutional grounds, the Court had jurisdiction.

  Schneider distinguishes Havens on precisely that point: here, the district court’s ruling was “expressly and solely” under section 24-31-902, without any constitutional suppression analysis. Thus, Havens confirms the boundary rather than softening it: body-camera statutory consequences may be part of a broader constitutional suppression analysis, but they do not independently create C.A.R. 4.1 jurisdiction.

• People v. Soron, 2026 CO 3

  Soron is cited as another example where C.A.R. 4.1 jurisdiction existed because the trial court “expressly looked to Crim. P. 41(e),” analyzed search-warrant doctrine, and relied on Fourth Amendment principles—even though statutory matters and privilege issues were also in the background.

  The contrast sharpens the Court’s rule: jurisdiction turns on the actual basis of the district court’s ruling. Where the ruling is rooted in Crim. P. 41 and constitutional principles, C.A.R. 4.1 may apply; where the ruling is purely statutory exclusion under section 24-31-902, it does not.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

1. Jurisdiction is mandatory and must be verified. Citing People v. S.X.G., the Court treats jurisdiction as a threshold issue.

2. C.A.R. 4.1 and section 16-12-102(2) are narrow and text-bound. They authorize interlocutory prosecution appeals only from orders granting pretrial motions under specific criminal rules—Crim. P. 41(e), 41(g), and 41.1(i)—each tied to constitutional protections (Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments). The Court thus conceptualizes C.A.R. 4.1 as a limited exception to the general final-judgment rule.

3. The appealed order was an “exclusion” ruling under a statute, not a “suppression” ruling under the enumerated rules. The defendant moved to exclude testimony pursuant to section 24-31-902’s remedial scheme (permissive inference and rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility for unrecorded evidence). The district court’s findings and conclusions addressed only whether police violated section 24-31-902 and did not mention Crim. P. 41 or constitutional grounds. Under Phillips v. People, the Court treats “suppress” as a term of art not interchangeable with “exclude.”

With those premises, the conclusion follows: because the order does not fall within the enumerated categories of C.A.R. 4.1, the Supreme Court cannot entertain the interlocutory appeal, regardless of the order’s practical effect on the prosecution’s case.

C. Impact

1. A clarified jurisdictional boundary for prosecution interlocutory appeals.
Schneider reinforces that the prosecution cannot obtain immediate appellate review under C.A.R. 4.1 merely because a pretrial ruling excludes important evidence. The basis of the ruling matters: constitutional “suppression” under the enumerated rules is appealable; statutory “exclusion” under section 24-31-902 is not.

2. Litigation strategy will shift toward how motions are framed and decided.
The decision highlights that appellate jurisdiction turns on the trial court’s stated grounds. Where body-worn camera noncompliance affects Fourth Amendment issues (e.g., probable cause, warrant sufficiency), Havens shows that C.A.R. 4.1 jurisdiction may exist because the operative ruling is constitutional. But Schneider makes clear that a standalone statutory remedy under section 24-31-902 does not trigger interlocutory review.

3. Trial courts’ articulation of grounds becomes consequential.
Because Schneider focuses on what the district court did (and did not) rely on—no Crim. P. 41 discussion, no constitutional analysis— trial courts’ written or oral rulings will be scrutinized for their legal predicates. This may encourage more explicit rulings where both statutory and constitutional arguments are presented.

4. The body-worn camera statute’s evidentiary sanction remains primarily a trial-level remedy.
The statute’s rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility can significantly shape what the jury may hear, yet Schneider indicates that such rulings will ordinarily not be reviewed immediately at the Supreme Court via C.A.R. 4.1. That reality may increase the practical leverage of section 24-31-902 motions in pretrial litigation.