Interlocutory Appeal Bar: Partial Summary Judgment Foreclosing Only Permanent Injunctive Relief Is Appealable Under § 1292(a)(1) Only If Carson Is Satisfied

1. Introduction

In Rey v. LCMC Health Care Partners (5th Cir. July 9, 2026), five nearby residents (Tomas Rey, Melisa Rey, Robert K. Denny, Victoria Emmerling, and Nicole Williamson) sued a New Orleans children’s hospital and related entities (collectively, LCMC/Children’s Hospital) over alleged nuisance from helicopter noise and vibrations after the hospital relocated its helipad to a new tower nearer their homes.

The plaintiffs sought (among other relief) a mandatory permanent injunction requiring the hospital to relocate the helipad or otherwise abate the alleged nuisance. The district court, on partial summary judgment, held that FAA regulatory preemption barred a permanent injunction forcing helipad relocation, but allowed the nuisance claim for general damages to proceed to trial. Plaintiffs immediately appealed, contending the partial summary-judgment order was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) as an order that “refus[ed] an injunction.”

The central issue on appeal was appellate jurisdiction: whether a nonfinal partial summary-judgment order that forecloses permanent injunctive relief is immediately appealable under § 1292(a)(1) without satisfying the Supreme Court’s Carson requirements for orders with only the “practical effect” of denying an injunction.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the district court’s partial summary-judgment ruling did not explicitly deny an injunction (no injunction motion was before the court), but did have the practical effect of denying permanent injunctive relief by holding such relief preempted. Because this fell into the “practical effect” category, the appeal could proceed only if plaintiffs satisfied Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc.—showing (1) a serious, perhaps irreparable consequence and (2) that the order can be effectually challenged only by immediate appeal. Plaintiffs made no attempt to satisfy either factor. That failure was dispositive.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The court’s jurisdictional analysis is built around the final-judgment rule, the narrow exception in § 1292(a)(1), and the distinction between orders that explicitly deny injunctive relief and those that only have the practical effect of doing so.

A. Fifth Circuit framing of jurisdiction and narrow construction

  • Chandler v. Phx. Servs., L.L.C., 45 F.4th 807, 812 (5th Cir. 2022): cited for the threshold obligation to assess appellate jurisdiction first.
  • Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981): the governing Supreme Court standard for interlocutory appeals where an order has only the “practical effect” of denying an injunction, requiring a showing of serious/irreparable consequence and the necessity of immediate appeal.
  • Anderson v. Hutson, 114 F.4th 408, 415 (5th Cir. 2024): reinforces that § 1292(a)(1) is a limited exception construed narrowly to avoid “floodgate” appeals.

B. Explicit injunction rulings vs. “practical effect” rulings

  • Sherri A.D. v. Kirby, 975 F.2d 193, 203 (5th Cir. 1992): § 1292(a)(1) permits immediate appeal of interlocutory orders that explicitly grant or deny injunctive relief.
  • Navy v. Sch. Bd. of St. Mary Par., 166 F.4th 550, 554 (5th Cir. 2026): cited alongside Sherri A.D. to underscore “explicit” injunction rulings as the cleanest § 1292(a)(1) category.
  • In re Ft. Wor. Chamber of Com., 100 F.4th 528, 533 (5th Cir. 2024): notes routine interlocutory review of preliminary-injunction denials.

C. Why permanent injunction denials rarely qualify for interlocutory review

  • Shanks v. City of Dallas, 752 F.2d 1092, 1096–97 (5th Cir. 1985): a foundational Fifth Circuit statement that § 1292(a)(1) “functions primarily” for preliminary (not permanent) injunctions, and that interlocutory denials of permanent injunctions rarely cause irreparable harm during the pendency of the case.
  • Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Preferred Cap. Inv. Co., 664 F.2d 1316, 1319 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982): explains why refusal of permanent injunctive relief generally presents a “lesser threat” of irreparable harm, since relief can be granted after final judgment and on appeal.

D. Fifth Circuit skepticism and the plaintiff’s burden under Carson

  • Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 650 F.2d 617, 621–22 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1981): (i) questions whether interlocutory review of permanent-injunction denials is ever proper in some circumstances, and (ii) holds there is no interlocutory jurisdiction when appellants fail to attempt to show irreparable consequences. The court relied heavily on this “no attempt” principle to dispose of the appeal.
  • Thomas ex rel. D.M.T. v. Sch. Bd. St. Martin Par., 756 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2014); Roberts v. St. Regis Paper Co., 653 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1981): both reinforce the two-part Carson test and, in Roberts, the point that seeking only permanent relief (without preliminary relief) undermines any claim of imminent irreparable harm from waiting for final judgment.
  • Atwood Turnkey Drilling v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 875 F.2d 1174, 1176 (5th Cir. 1989): confirms that when orders are not denominated injunctions, Carson applies to determine § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction.

E. Circuit split survey (comparative authority)

The panel emphasized that some circuits treat partial summary-judgment denials of permanent injunction claims as immediately appealable more readily, but the Fifth Circuit adheres to the Carson-factor approach when the denial is only by “practical effect.”

  • Chi. Joe's Tea Room, LLC v. Village of Broadview, 894 F.3d 807, 812 & n.1 (7th Cir. 2018): Seventh Circuit permits interlocutory jurisdiction when the district court “strip[s] the case of its equitable component,” without applying Carson.
  • Shee Atika v. Sealaska Corp., 39 F.3d 247, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1994): Ninth Circuit treats Carson factors as “simply irrelevant” when partial summary judgment denies a permanent injunction request.
  • Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 867 F.2 d 1455, 1464 (3d Cir. 1989); I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund Benefit Plan A v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 21, 24 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1989): cited for Third and D.C. Circuit approaches favoring appealability when the merits effectively deny injunctive relief.
  • Cuomo v. Barr, 7 F.3d 17, 19–20 (2d Cir. 1993): closely analogous; Second Circuit requires Carson to appeal partial summary judgment denying permanent injunction relief. Also highlights that failure to seek preliminary relief is relevant to irreparable-harm analysis.
  • Plymouth Cnty. Nuclear Info. Comm., Inc. v. Bos. Edison Co., 655 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1981); Anderson v. City of Boston, 244 F.3d 236, 238 (1st Cir. 2001): First Circuit cases denying interlocutory jurisdiction where immediate serious consequences are not shown.
  • Sims Varner & Assocs., Inc. v. Blanchard, 794 F.2d 1123, 1126–27 & n.6 (6th Cir. 1986); Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher, 70 F.3d 1474, 1479–80 (6th Cir. 1995); Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 566, 570 (10th Cir. 1997); Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1287, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2010): cited to show multiple circuits apply Carson to “practical denial” scenarios involving partial summary judgment.
  • MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Basis, Inc., 962 F.2d 978, 982 (10th Cir. 1992): used to distinguish orders ruling on express injunction motions from orders with only practical effect.

F. Treatise authority

The panel cited 16 Wright & Miller's Federal Practice & Procedure § 3924.1 (3d ed. 2026) for the proposition that routine interlocutory review of orders narrowing or denying permanent relief is unwarranted, and that failure to seek a preliminary injunction is strong evidence there is no irreparable consequence requiring immediate appeal.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Start with the final-judgment rule. Interlocutory appeals are disfavored; § 1292(a)(1) is a narrow exception.
  2. Ask whether the order explicitly grants/denies an injunction. Here, it did not—no injunction motion was pending.
  3. Classify the order as having only the “practical effect” of denying an injunction. The preemption ruling barred a permanent injunction forcing helipad relocation and thus “closed the door” on that final remedy.
  4. Apply Carson. Because the denial was by practical effect, plaintiffs had to demonstrate: (a) serious, perhaps irreparable consequences from waiting, and (b) that immediate appeal was the only effective way to challenge it.
  5. Find waiver/failure of proof. Plaintiffs did not attempt to satisfy either Carson factor, which ended the inquiry.
  6. Confirm the absence of urgency from plaintiffs’ litigation conduct. The court emphasized plaintiffs did not: seek a preliminary injunction; seek Rule 54(b) separate final judgment; pursue § 1292(b) certification; request expedited trial or expedited appellate review—each omission undermining any claim of imminent irreparable harm caused by the delay.

Notably, the Fifth Circuit did not decide the merits of the FAA preemption holding. The appeal turned entirely on jurisdiction: whether the interlocutory posture allowed immediate review.

3.3. Impact

  • Reinforces a procedural gatekeeping rule in the Fifth Circuit. Litigants cannot transform partial summary judgment foreclosing permanent injunctive relief into an automatic interlocutory appeal under § 1292(a)(1).
  • Practical effect triggers Carson, and Carson must be argued. The decision operationalizes a strict requirement: if the order is not an explicit injunction ruling, appellants must substantively brief the Carson factors or face dismissal.
  • Strategic implications for nuisance/environmental or operational-impact suits. Where plaintiffs seek to halt ongoing conduct (noise, vibrations, emissions), failing to pursue preliminary relief will make it much harder to claim irreparable harm sufficient for immediate appeal if permanent injunctive relief is narrowed.
  • Encourages use of alternative appellate pathways. The court’s discussion signals that parties who truly face interim harm should consider: preliminary injunction motions, § 1292(b) certification, Rule 54(b) judgments, or expedition requests—rather than relying on § 1292(a)(1).
  • Limits “piecemeal appeals” in complex civil litigation. The ruling supports the final-judgment rule by preventing immediate appeals whenever an equitable remedy is pared back mid-case.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Final-judgment rule
Generally, you may appeal only after the district court has entered a final judgment resolving the whole case. This prevents repeated, fragmented appeals while the case is ongoing.
Interlocutory appeal
An appeal taken before final judgment. These are exceptions, not the norm, and are tightly limited by statute and precedent.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
A statute allowing immediate appeals from certain nonfinal orders involving injunctions (e.g., granting or refusing them). Courts construe it narrowly to avoid excessive interlocutory appeals.
Explicit denial vs. “practical effect” denial
An explicit denial occurs when the court actually rules on an injunction request (often a preliminary injunction motion). A practical-effect denial happens when an order (like partial summary judgment) effectively eliminates injunctive relief, even though the court did not rule on an injunction motion.
Carson factors
For practical-effect cases, the appellant must show (1) serious, perhaps irreparable harm from waiting until final judgment, and (2) that immediate appeal is necessary because the issue cannot be effectively reviewed later.
Permanent vs. preliminary injunction
A preliminary injunction is temporary, designed to prevent irreparable harm while the case is pending. A permanent injunction is a final remedy typically entered after the merits are decided; its denial usually does not create interim harm requiring immediate appellate intervention.
Rule 54(b), § 1292(b), expedition
Procedural tools to seek earlier appellate review or faster resolution when delay may cause harm: Rule 54(b) (separate final judgment for certain claims), § 1292(b) (certified interlocutory appeal on controlling legal issues), and motions to expedite trial or appellate review.

5. Conclusion

Rey v. LCMC Health Care Partners establishes (and strongly reinforces) a Fifth Circuit procedural rule: when a nonfinal order forecloses a permanent injunction only by “practical effect,” § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction exists only if the appellant satisfies—and meaningfully argues—the Carson factors. Plaintiffs’ failure to do so required dismissal. The decision underscores the Fifth Circuit’s commitment to narrow interlocutory review, discourages piecemeal appeals, and signals to litigants that claims of urgency must be supported by both record and procedural choices (notably, seeking preliminary relief or other mechanisms for timely review).