Interactive-Process ADA Claims Fail Absent Evidence of a Feasible, Safe Accommodation for Essential Job Communications

Introduction

Buccieri v. Brewster Ambulance Service, Inc. (1st Cir. July 13, 2026) is an ADA failure-to-hire case arising from Brewster Ambulance Service’s refusal to hire John Buccieri—who is deaf and primarily uses American Sign Language (ASL)—as a Chair Car Driver, a position involving solo transport of medically fragile patients. Buccieri requested the accommodation of Video Relay Services (VRS) (via his phone) to communicate with dispatch, plus a phone holder.

The central issues were: (1) whether Buccieri could perform the job’s essential functions with a reasonable accommodation; (2) whether Brewster’s proposed/considered accommodations would impose undue hardship or create direct threat risks; and (3) whether Brewster could be liable for a failure to engage in the interactive process when no workable accommodation existed.

After a bifurcated jury trial on liability, the jury’s answers suggested Brewster prevailed on “failure to hire” but Buccieri prevailed on “failure to engage in an interactive process.” The district court granted Brewster’s Rule 50(b) motion and entered judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) for Brewster. The First Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit affirmed JMOL for Brewster because no reasonable jury could find a reasonable accommodation that would allow Buccieri to perform the essential communication functions of the Chair Car Driver position (or the alternative Day Care Van Driver position) without undue hardship to Brewster.

Critically, the court held that an employer cannot be liable on an interactive-process theory where the record forecloses a finding that the applicant could perform the job’s essential duties with a reasonable accommodation. The court also emphasized that the ADA does not require an employer to accept accommodations that increase safety risks (e.g., distracted driving) or that effectively eliminate essential job functions (here, real-time communication with patients, facilities, and dispatch).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Interactive process: duty exists, but liability depends on feasibility

  • EEOC v. Kohl's Department Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2014): Cited for two propositions: (i) the interactive process is a “two-way street” requiring participation from both sides; and (ii) the process is aimed at exploring alternative reasonable accommodations. Here, the First Circuit used Kohl’s primarily to situate the interactive-process doctrine, but ultimately resolved the case on a more foundational point: the absence of any workable accommodation defeats interactive-process liability.
  • Enica v. Principi, 544 F.3d 328 (1st Cir. 2008): Quoted (via Kohl’s) for the concept that an accommodation request can create a duty to engage in an informal dialogue about accommodation options. The court treated this duty as real but not dispositive: dialogue is not a substitute for an accommodation that actually works.
  • Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2001): The decision’s key doctrinal anchor. Kvorjak states an employer cannot be held liable on an interactive-process theory where “the record forecloses a finding that the plaintiff could perform the duties of the job[] with . . . reasonable accommodation.” The Buccieri panel applied this rule directly: once the evidence forecloses a feasible accommodation, the interactive-process verdict cannot stand.
  • Echevarría v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 856 F.3d 119 (1st Cir. 2017) and Lang v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 813 F.3d 447 (1st Cir. 2016): Reinforce that omission or imperfection in the interactive process is “of no moment” if the record shows the employee cannot perform essential duties with or without reasonable accommodation. Buccieri uses these cases to confirm that interactive-process claims are not free-standing: they rise and fall with the accommodation merits.

2) Essential functions and safety: no duty to remove essential duties or accept unsafe alternatives

  • Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2001): Also cited for the proposition that “[t]he law does not require an employer to accommodate a disability by foregoing an essential function of the position.” The court used this principle to reject Buccieri’s attempt to reframe the job around mirror-only monitoring or reduced real-time communication with patients.

3) Rule 50/JMOL standards and appellate posture

  • Intercity Maint. Co. v. Loc. 254, Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, 241 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2001): Provides the standard for reviewing Rule 50 sufficiency challenges de novo and affirming JMOL when there is “no legally sufficient evidentiary basis” for a verdict.
  • McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288 (1st Cir. 1998): Cited for the rule that the appellate court may affirm on any independent basis supported by the record when the Rule 50 issues are preserved.
  • Quiles-Quiles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006): Cited in connection with the “only result permitted by the evidence” formulation; also referenced to show appellate courts may consider sufficiency arguments beyond the district court’s particular reasoning.
  • Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006): Used to emphasize preservation: without a proper Rule 50(b) renewal after a Rule 50(a) motion, sufficiency review may be unavailable. In Buccieri, the court found preservation satisfied.

4) Limits on sua sponte post-verdict rationales for JMOL

  • Santos-Arrieta v. Hosp. Del Maestro, 14 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2021) and Robles-Vazquez v. Tirado Garcia, 110 F.3d 204 (1st Cir. 1997): The panel faulted the district court for referencing verdict-form inconsistency/impropriety rationales that were not properly raised as Rule 50 grounds, because Rule 50(b) generally forbids granting JMOL on grounds not included in the Rule 50(a) motion. Nonetheless, the First Circuit affirmed on a properly preserved sufficiency theory (lack of evidence of a feasible accommodation).

5) Waiver by underdeveloped argument

  • Xirum v. Bondi, 141 F.4th 345 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990)): Cited to note waiver where a party does not develop an argument (here, Brewster did not pursue a verdict-form impropriety argument on appeal).

Legal Reasoning

  1. Identify the essential functions with record specificity. The court treated communication as central to both the Chair Car Driver and Day Care Van Driver roles: communication with dispatch (fast-paced, radio-based), with medical facilities staff, and with patients—including in emergencies. The record included undisputed testimony about medically fragile passengers, emergency scenarios, and the operational design (single driver in Chair Cars; radio dispatching designed to minimize distraction).
  2. Evaluate the requested accommodation and the alternatives actually supported by evidence. Buccieri’s only requested accommodation was VRS plus a phone holder to communicate with dispatch. The jury itself found that accommodating him with the requested accommodation(s) would be an “undue hardship and/or” “direct threat.” On appeal, Buccieri argued other accommodations existed (text/tablet dispatch; structured mirror-monitoring; reassignment), but the First Circuit concluded the trial record did not support that these alternatives would enable him to perform essential functions without undue hardship or safety risk.
  3. Safety and distracted driving mattered as part of “reasonableness” and “undue hardship/direct threat.” The court credited unrebutted evidence that Brewster’s radio system had safety advantages (one-button, eyes-on-road) compared to cell-phone/tablet alternatives, and that distracted driving was the company’s leading accident cause. The ADA did not require Brewster to adopt a communication modality that would predictably increase risk.
  4. Interactive-process liability cannot survive without a viable accommodation. Even assuming imperfections in the employer’s dialogue, the court applied Kvorjak/Echevarría/Lang: if no reasonable accommodation exists to permit performance of essential functions, there is no actionable interactive-process failure. Thus, the jury’s interactive-process “yes” answer could not stand as a matter of law.
  5. Affirm on preserved grounds despite district-court missteps. Although the panel noted error in the district court’s reference to unraised JMOL rationales (per Santos-Arrieta), it affirmed because Brewster had preserved the dispositive sufficiency issue in its Rule 50(a) and Rule 50(b) submissions.

Impact

  • Strengthens (and operationalizes) the First Circuit’s “no feasible accommodation, no interactive-process liability” line. Buccieri is a clear application of Kvorjak/Echevarría/Lang in a high-safety, real-time communications setting: interactive-process claims cannot become an end-run around the core requirement of a workable accommodation.
  • Emphasizes evidence-based essential-functions analysis in transportation/healthcare-adjacent jobs. Employers with safety-sensitive roles can expect courts to scrutinize the actual workflow design (e.g., radio dispatch chosen to reduce distraction) when assessing whether proposed accommodations are reasonable or create direct-threat risks.
  • Signals limits on “technology-based” accommodation arguments without concrete proof. Plaintiffs may need to present competent evidence that proposed tech solutions are reliable, available at the relevant time, and compatible with safety and operational requirements (not merely conceivable).
  • Procedure: reinforces Rule 50 discipline. The opinion reiterates that JMOL must rest on grounds raised in Rule 50(a) and renewed under Rule 50(b), while also confirming the appellate court’s ability to affirm on preserved, record-supported grounds.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Essential functions
The fundamental job duties (not marginal tasks). If an applicant cannot perform them with a reasonable accommodation, the ADA does not require hiring.
Reasonable accommodation
A change or aid enabling performance of essential functions, so long as it is workable in practice and does not impose undue hardship or create prohibited safety risks.
Interactive process
A back-and-forth dialogue to identify possible accommodations. It is not, by itself, a guarantee of liability; it matters only if a workable accommodation could have been found.
Undue hardship
Significant difficulty or expense (including major operational disruption). In safety-sensitive contexts, the analysis overlaps with the practicality and reliability of communication systems.
Direct threat
A significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.
JMOL (Rule 50)
A ruling that the evidence cannot legally support the jury’s verdict. Rule 50(a) is made before the case goes to the jury; Rule 50(b) renews it after the verdict.
De novo review
The appellate court gives no deference to the district court’s legal conclusion on sufficiency and independently evaluates whether the record supports the verdict.

Conclusion

Buccieri v. Brewster Ambulance Service, Inc. reaffirms a decisive ADA principle in the First Circuit: an interactive-process verdict cannot stand where the evidence shows no reasonable accommodation exists that would enable the applicant to perform the job’s essential functions without undue hardship or unacceptable safety risk. The opinion also underscores that, in safety-sensitive transportation roles, courts will treat real-time communication and distraction-minimization as core operational realities when judging the feasibility of proposed accommodations.