Intent for Stalking-Based Personal Safety Orders May Be Inferred from Deliberate Conduct Causing Emotional Distress

1. Introduction

In L.M. v. D.P. (Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, April 21, 2026), the Court affirmed a circuit court order upholding a personal safety order (PSO) issued to protect D.P. from her neighbor, L.M. The dispute arose from a long-running neighborhood conflict involving an alleged boundary-line controversy and D.P.’s claims that L.M. watched her in her backyard. After D.P. erected privacy measures (a fence extension using metal posts and a tarp), L.M. damaged those posts and was also alleged to have caused scorch marks on D.P.’s fence and to have threatened to burn down the fence and the home.

The key legal issue on appeal was whether the evidence supported the circuit court’s conclusion that L.M. committed a predicate act under W. Va. Code § 53-8-4(a) sufficient to justify a PSO—specifically, whether his conduct constituted stalking under W. Va. Code § 61-2-9a(a), including the statute’s intent component.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the circuit court’s order, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that L.M.’s behavior satisfied the statutory prerequisites for issuance of a PSO. Although the circuit court did not use the word “intent,” it found L.M. acted “deliberately” in damaging D.P.’s property (bending the metal posts), and the Supreme Court accepted that “deliberate” connotes intentional action. The Court further relied on evidence and findings that L.M.’s course of conduct caused D.P. emotional distress (including testimony that she sought medical treatment and medication for anxiety).

The Court also declined to reach L.M.’s arguments regarding “legitimate and lawful purpose” in the harassment definition because the PSO statute is phrased in the disjunctive: establishing one predicate act under W. Va. Code § 53-8-4(a) is sufficient.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 198 W. Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d 538 (1996) (Syl. Pt. 1)
    Role in the decision: This case supplied the governing appellate standard of review for a circuit court order entered after a bench trial: (1) the final order/ultimate disposition is reviewed for abuse of discretion; (2) underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error; and (3) questions of law are reviewed de novo.
    Effect: The standard materially shaped the outcome. L.M.’s challenge largely asked the Supreme Court to reweigh whether the evidence supported “intent” and “emotional distress.” Under a deferential framework, the Court focused on whether the circuit court had a permissible evidentiary basis for its findings (e.g., “deliberately” damaging property; medical evidence of anxiety), rather than substituting its own factfinding.
  • State v. Easton, 203 W. Va. 631, 510 S.E.2d 465 (1998)
    Role in the decision: The Court cited Easton for the interpretive canon that when the Legislature uses the disjunctive “or,” it “ordinarily connotes an alternative.”
    Effect: This allowed the Court to narrow the appeal: once stalking under W. Va. Code § 61-2-9a(a) was found sufficient under W. Va. Code § 53-8-4(a)(2), the Court did not need to evaluate whether harassment (and its “legitimate and lawful purpose” component) independently supported the PSO.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Statutory PSO framework and burden of proof

    The Court grounded the PSO analysis in W. Va. Code § 53-8-7(a)(2)(A)(i-ii), which requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that (i) the respondent committed an underlying act listed in W. Va. Code § 53-8-4(a), and (ii) the petitioner has a reasonable apprehension of continued unwanted/unwelcome contact.

  2. Predicate act satisfied via “stalking” under W. Va. Code § 61-2-9a(a)

    The circuit court found that L.M.’s conduct constituted a violation of W. Va. Code § 61-2-9a(a)—stalking—by engaging in a course of conduct directed at D.P. with intent to cause fear for safety or to cause substantial emotional distress, and that it did cause distress. The Supreme Court emphasized two components:

    • Intent may be inferred from “deliberate” conduct.
      L.M. argued the circuit court failed to find “intent.” The Supreme Court rejected that framing: the circuit court found L.M. acted “deliberately” in committing “eight acts of destruction” (bending each post). The Supreme Court reasoned that “deliberate” is synonymous with “intended” or “intentional,” so an intent finding existed in substance even if not phrased in the statutory term.
    • Substantial emotional distress supported by findings and testimony.
      The Supreme Court relied on the circuit court’s explicit finding that D.P. would reasonably experience emotional distress from the repeated provocations (property destruction coupled with scorch damage and the context of perceived staring) and on record evidence that D.P. sought medical treatment and medication for anxiety.
  3. Disjunctive structure foreclosed the need to decide harassment arguments

    L.M. separately argued the circuit court failed to address whether his conduct had a “legitimate and lawful purpose” (a concept tied to harassment). The Supreme Court declined to reach that issue because W. Va. Code § 53-8-4(a)(2-3) is written in the disjunctive—only one predicate act is required—and stalking satisfied § 53-8-4(a)(2).

3.3. Impact

  • Clarifies how intent can be shown in PSO stalking theories.
    Trial courts need not mechanically recite the word “intent” if their factual findings demonstrate intentionality (e.g., describing conduct as “deliberate” and supported by admissions). Appellate review is likely to uphold PSOs where the order reflects an intent finding in substance.
  • Affirms that property-related acts can be part of “course of conduct.”
    The opinion illustrates that repeated acts affecting a neighbor—such as damaging privacy measures or other provoking conduct—may support a stalking-based PSO when coupled with proof of resulting substantial emotional distress, even when the broader dispute has a civil flavor (e.g., boundary disagreements).
  • Streamlines PSO litigation by emphasizing the disjunctive predicate-act structure.
    Petitioners (and courts) may focus on proving one well-supported predicate act under § 53-8-4(a) rather than litigating every possible theory (stalking, threats, harassment). Respondents should likewise recognize that defeating one theory may not matter if another is adequately proven.
  • Channels boundary-line conflicts into civil proceedings while preserving protective relief.
    The circuit court’s encouragement to resolve the boundary dispute separately signals an important practical point: PSOs are not substitutes for quiet title or adverse possession litigation, but protective orders can still issue when the interpersonal conduct crosses into stalking/harassment behavior.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Personal Safety Order (PSO)
A court order designed to protect a person from certain harmful conduct (such as stalking or threats). It can impose restrictions on contact and behavior even without a criminal conviction, using a civil burden of proof.
Preponderance of the evidence
The “more likely than not” standard. The petitioner must show it is more probable than not that the predicate acts occurred and the statutory criteria are met.
Bench trial
A trial decided by a judge rather than a jury. On appeal, factual findings receive deference (clear-error review).
Abuse of discretion / clearly erroneous / de novo
  • Abuse of discretion: the appellate court asks whether the decision was within the range of reasonable choices.
  • Clearly erroneous: the appellate court defers to factfinding unless left with a firm conviction a mistake was made.
  • De novo: no deference; the appellate court decides the legal question anew.
Stalking under W. Va. Code § 61-2-9a(a)
A “course of conduct” directed at a person, undertaken with intent to cause fear for safety or substantial emotional distress, or that causes that distress. In this decision, the Court treated “deliberate” conduct as sufficient to establish the intent element in substance.
Disjunctive “or” in statutes
When a law lists alternatives separated by “or,” proving one alternative generally suffices. Here, proving stalking as a predicate act made it unnecessary to decide harassment-related arguments.

5. Conclusion

L.M. v. D.P. reinforces that, in PSO proceedings premised on stalking, a circuit court’s intent finding need not be formulaic: describing conduct as “deliberate” and grounding that description in admissions and objective acts can satisfy the intent component of W. Va. Code § 61-2-9a(a). The decision also underscores the practical importance of the disjunctive structure of W. Va. Code § 53-8-4(a): once one predicate act is established by a preponderance of the evidence, appellate courts need not reach other theories. Going forward, the opinion supports robust protective relief when neighbor disputes escalate into repeated, intentional provocations that cause substantial emotional distress, while leaving property-line ownership questions to separate civil litigation.