Independent Actions Under NRCP 60(d)(1) Require a Merits Defense; Trust-Notice Statutes Do Not Automatically Create Due Process Violations

Case: HESSER v. BLEA (CIVIL) (Nev. Mar. 9, 2026) — Supreme Court of Nevada, No. 89093 (Order of Affirmance)

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from an attempt by Addison Hesser, a beneficiary of the Royal Union Trust (“RUT”), to undo the effects of a prior, already-final judgment entered in litigation involving the trust and related “Royal” parties. In the prior case, Royal E.ssex, LLC v. Azteca Real Est. Partners LLC, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a judgment holding the Royal parties (including RUT) jointly and severally liable to Azteca Real Estate Partners and Danon Blea for distributions (if any) from a particular bankruptcy estate.

Hesser filed a new complaint before a different district judge, alleging that Blea and Azteca failed to notify him of counterclaims in the earlier litigation as allegedly required by NRS 163.120(2). He sought to “vacate” the prior judgment, contending that his lack of notice prevented his participation and caused prejudice to his beneficiary interest, especially because he was stationed abroad in the U.S. Army during the earlier proceedings.

The district court dismissed Hesser’s complaint. On appeal, the key issue was procedural and remedial: whether Hesser’s new lawsuit qualified as an “independent action” for relief from judgment under NRCP 60(d)(1), and if so, whether the alleged absence of notice amounted to the kind of “grave miscarriage of justice” Nevada law requires to sustain such a collateral attack on a final judgment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. Because the district court considered materials outside the pleadings, the Supreme Court treated the dismissal under standards applicable to summary judgment and reviewed the viability of the independent action de novo.

The court held that Hesser failed to meet the stringent requirements for an independent action under NRCP 60(d)(1). Specifically:

• Nevada precedent (especially Bonnell v. Lawrence, incorporating United States v. Beggerly) requires a showing of exceptional circumstances and a “grave miscarriage of justice,” which includes (as a practical matter in Nevada) presenting a “good defense on the merits” to the underlying judgment.
• Hesser did not articulate any merits defense to the underlying claims/counterclaims resolved in Royal E.ssex, LLC v. Azteca Real Est. Partners LLC.
• Even assuming NRS 163.120(2) applied and was violated, the court rejected the contention that the statutory notice issue equated to a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation. The trustee is ordinarily the real party in interest to litigate on behalf of a trust, and the trustee in the prior litigation actively litigated and defended the trust’s interests.
• The court also questioned whether Hesser had a sufficient “property interest” for due process purposes, characterizing his beneficiary interest as speculative because the prior judgment only reached potential bankruptcy distributions, not other trust assets.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Royal E.ssex, LLC v. Azteca Real Est. Partners LLC, No. 87401, 2025 WL 2426710 (Nev. Aug. 21, 2025) (Order of Affirmance)
  This was the prior litigation Hesser attempted to undermine. The court treated it as a final, affirmed judgment imposing joint and several liability limited to “any and all distributions, if any,” from the bankruptcy estate. The nature and limits of that judgment were central to rejecting Hesser’s claimed property deprivation and to the res judicata backdrop against which independent actions are assessed.
• Bonnell v. Lawrence, 128 Nev. 394, 282 P.3d 712 (2012)
  The controlling Nevada authority on independent actions for relief from judgment. Bonnell teaches that, after the time to pursue ordinary remedies lapses, an independent action survives only in “exceptional circumstances” to prevent a “grave miscarriage of justice” and only where relief is of a magnitude warranting departure from strict res judicata principles. The court here leaned on Bonnell for two points: (1) the demanding “grave miscarriage” standard, and (2) the expectation (drawn from federal doctrine) that the plaintiff show a “good defense” to the underlying cause of action.
• United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S 38 (1998)
  Quoted via Bonnell. Beggerly supplies the federal framework for independent actions: they are reserved for extraordinary cases and include elements such as having “a good defense to the alleged cause of action on which the judgment is founded.” The Nevada Supreme Court again treated that concept as integral to the “grave miscarriage of justice” assessment.
• Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988)
  Hesser invoked Peralta for the proposition that a lack of notice (a core due process failure) may justify relief without proving a merits defense. The court distinguished the case in substance: it held Hesser “mistakenly conflates” statutory noncompliance (assuming it occurred) with a constitutional due process violation, particularly given trust litigation norms and the speculative nature of his asserted property deprivation.
• Causey v. Carpenters S. Nev. Vacation Tr., 95 Nev. 609, 600 P.2d 244 (1979)
  Cited for the foundational proposition that “the trustee ... rather than the trust itself” is entitled to bring suit. This supported the court’s view that the trustee’s active litigation generally satisfies the mechanism by which trust interests are represented in court, undermining Hesser’s claim that his personal participation was constitutionally required.
• In re Richard H. Goldstein Irrevocable Tr., 142 Nev., Adv. Op. 41, 575 P.3d 72 (2025)
  Reinforced the trustee-as-real-party-in-interest concept and served as contemporary Nevada authority supporting the trust-representation principle.
• Hughes v. Tower Park Props., LLC, 803 F.3d 450 (9th Cir. 2015)
  Used to frame the limited circumstances in which beneficiaries may sue third parties to protect trust assets. The court found those exceptions inapplicable because the trustee initiated and “vigorously defended” the underlying litigation.
• Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Proceedings Against a Third Party § 107(2) cmt. c (Am. L. Inst. 2012)
  Cited for recognized exceptions allowing beneficiary litigation when “the trustee is unable, unavailable, unsuitable, or improperly failing to protect the beneficiary’s interest.” The court emphasized Hesser did not allege the trustee failed in this way.
• Malfitano v. Cnty. of Storey, 133 Nev. 276, 396 P.3d 815 (2017)
  Provided the due process framework: a claimant must show an established “liberty or property interest” that has been interfered with. The court invoked this to conclude Hesser’s asserted interest was “speculative at best,” given the limited reach of the underlying judgment and contingent nature of bankruptcy distributions.
• Bonnell v. Lawrence; A Cab, LLC v. Murray, 137 Nev. 805, 501 P.3d 961 (2021); Witherow v. State, Bd. of Parole Comm'rs, 123 Nev. 305, 167 P.3d 408 (2007)
  These cases supplied the review framework. Witherow and Bonnell explain that when extrinsic materials are considered on a motion to dismiss, the appellate court treats it like summary judgment review; A Cab, LLC v. Murray reiterates de novo review of summary judgment.
• In re Guardianship of Jones, 139 Nev. 139, 531 P.3d 1236 (2023)
  Cited for the principle that the Supreme Court may affirm on any ground supported by the record, even if not relied upon by the district court—important here because the Supreme Court’s analysis focused on the independent-action elements rather than solely on the “co-equal jurisdiction” rationale emphasized below.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Procedural posture and standard of review

Although the case began as a dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court considered excerpts from the prior Royal E.ssex litigation. Under Bonnell v. Lawrence and Witherow v. State, Bd. of Parole Comm'rs, that converts appellate review to the summary-judgment framework. The Supreme Court also reviewed the independent-action question de novo because it is a legal determination about the availability of a collateral remedy.

B. The narrow gateway for “independent actions” under NRCP 60(d)(1)

The court reaffirmed that NRCP 60(d)(1) preserves a court’s power to entertain an “independent action” to relieve a party from a judgment, but only in extraordinary circumstances—especially after the ordinary Rule 60(b) period has passed. Relying on Bonnell v. Lawrence (and United States v. Beggerly), it characterized the doctrine as an exceptional escape hatch from res judicata, not a substitute for timely post-judgment motions or appeal.

The decisive deficiency was Hesser’s failure to present any “valid defense on the merits” to the prior judgment. In the court’s framing, Nevada’s “grave miscarriage of justice” inquiry is not satisfied by process complaints alone when the plaintiff does not even attempt to show that the underlying judgment was substantively wrong or unjustified.

C. Statutory notice to beneficiaries vs. constitutional due process

Hesser’s central theory was that failure to notify him under NRS 163.120(2) amounted to a due process violation. The court rejected that move for two interlocking reasons:

• Representation principle in trust litigation: Under Causey v. Carpenters S. Nev. Vacation Tr., In re Richard H. Goldstein Irrevocable Tr., and NRCP 17(a)(1)(E), the trustee is the real party in interest and is ordinarily empowered to prosecute and defend actions affecting trust assets. The court emphasized the trustee in Royal E.ssex “vigorously defended” the counterclaims, and Hesser did not allege trustee incapacity, unavailability, unsuitability, or improper failure—conditions that might trigger beneficiary standing under Hughes v. Tower Park Props., LLC and the Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Proceedings Against a Third Party § 107(2) cmt. c.
• Protected interest requirement: Under Malfitano v. Cnty. of Storey, due process requires interference with an established property interest. The court found Hesser’s beneficiary “interest” affected by the judgment speculative because the judgment reached only potential bankruptcy distributions and did not threaten other trust assets. The contingent nature of bankruptcy proceeds—and the underlying findings of inequitable conduct and fiduciary breaches mentioned from Royal E.ssex—further supported the conclusion that Hesser had not shown a cognizable deprivation.

The court thus did not hold that NRS 163.120(2) is irrelevant; rather, it held that even if the statute applied and was not followed, that does not automatically establish a federal due process violation sufficient to bypass the stringent independent-action requirements.

D. “Co-equal jurisdiction” and the practical function of NRCP 60(d)

The district court dismissed in part on the principle that “[c]ourts of co-equal jurisdiction lack authority to overturn the acts of one another,” i.e., that a new district judge should not functionally reverse a final judgment entered by another district judge. While the Supreme Court affirmed on the independent-action failure (citing In re Guardianship of Jones to affirm on any supported ground), the opinion implicitly harmonizes these ideas: independent actions are not routine vehicles to relitigate or sidestep final judgments, particularly where the plaintiff cannot show the extraordinary circumstances demanded by Bonnell.

3.3 Impact

• Raises the bar for collateral attacks by nonparties tied to a party (e.g., beneficiaries): Beneficiaries seeking to upset trust-related judgments through NRCP 60(d)(1) should expect to satisfy the same “grave miscarriage of justice” rigor as direct parties—especially the practical requirement of articulating a plausible merits defense.
• Separates statutory notice regimes from constitutional due process: Even if a statute contemplates beneficiary notice, the failure to provide that notice will not necessarily amount to a Fourteenth Amendment violation where the trustee litigated and the beneficiary’s alleged property impact is contingent or speculative.
• Reinforces trustee primacy in litigation strategy and representation: By emphasizing trustee authority and the narrowness of beneficiary exceptions, the decision may discourage parallel litigation by beneficiaries dissatisfied with outcomes, absent allegations that fit recognized exception categories (trustee inability, unavailability, unsuitability, or improper failure).
• Clarifies the function of independent actions post-deadline: The opinion underscores that NRCP 60(d)(1) is not a backdoor appeal or a mechanism to re-open closed litigation based on procedural complaints alone.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

HESSER v. BLEA (CIVIL) tightens and clarifies Nevada’s approach to independent actions under NRCP 60(d)(1) in the trust-beneficiary setting. The court reaffirmed that such actions are reserved for exceptional cases and require a showing consistent with Bonnell v. Lawrence and United States v. Beggerly: a “grave miscarriage of justice,” which Hesser could not establish because he offered no merits defense to the underlying judgment.

The opinion also draws an important doctrinal line: even assuming noncompliance with NRS 163.120(2), that statutory issue does not automatically translate into a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation where the trustee actively litigated on the trust’s behalf and the beneficiary’s alleged property impact is contingent and speculative. The decision therefore reinforces finality, trustee primacy in trust litigation, and the narrowness of collateral relief from judgments in Nevada.