Indefinite Unpaid Leave Is Not an Effective ADA Accommodation When Reassignment to a Vacant Position Is Possible

Introduction

In Ibrahima Dieng v. Orkin, LLC (4th Cir. Aug. 5, 2026), the Fourth Circuit addressed a recurring ADA workplace problem: an employee becomes unable to perform his original, physically demanding job after an injury, requests reassignment to lighter work, and the employer instead keeps him on extended unpaid leave without meaningful engagement.

Plaintiff-appellant Ibrahima Dieng, a long-time Orkin pest control technician in Maryland, suffered a knee injury and was medically cleared to return only in a “light-duty” capacity. He repeatedly sought reassignment to less physically demanding roles (notably customer service and sales). Orkin did not meaningfully respond, did not discuss options with Dieng, and left him on unpaid leave for roughly sixteen months until he resigned.

The case presented two principal issues: (1) whether summary judgment was proper on Dieng’s ADA failure-to-accommodate claim premised on reassignment, given evidence of vacant “light-duty” positions and a largely absent interactive process; and (2) whether Dieng could pursue an ADA unlawful-termination claim (constructive discharge theory) despite what he filed— and did not file— in his administrative charge.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded summary judgment on the ADA failure-to-accommodate claim, holding that genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether Orkin was required to reassign Dieng to a vacant light-duty position and whether Orkin’s choice to keep him on indefinite unpaid leave was an effective accommodation.

The court affirmed summary judgment on the ADA unlawful termination claim on administrative exhaustion grounds: Dieng’s MCCR/EEOC charge alleged failure to accommodate and identified an end date months before his resignation; the termination theory was neither alleged nor reasonably within the expected scope of the administrative investigation. Accordingly, the termination claim was not exhausted.

Judge Quattlebaum concurred as to exhaustion and agreed remand was necessary on failure to accommodate, but dissented in part on scope—contending reassignment to a sales role was not supported by a genuine factual dispute and proposing a narrower remand primarily focused on customer service vacancies during a limited time period.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc., 126 F.4th 244 (4th Cir. 2025) — Reiterated the summary judgment posture: facts and inferences must be viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.
  • Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Offs. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562 (4th Cir. 2015) — Used repeatedly for core ADA principles: (a) definition and proof structure for disputes of material fact at summary judgment (quoting Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2013)); (b) “not all job requirements are essential”; and (c) the interactive process is triggered when an employee communicates disability and desire for accommodation, even without pinpointing a specific accommodation (citing Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2013)).
  • US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) — Central to the panel’s “effectiveness” framing: a reasonable accommodation must be effective; an ineffective adjustment is no accommodation at all.
  • Tarquinio v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab, 141 F.4th 568 (4th Cir. 2025) — Provided the governing four-element failure-to-accommodate test and clarified that an employer violates the ADA by failing to engage in good faith in the interactive process so long as a reasonable accommodation was possible.
  • Wirtes v. City of Newport News, 996 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2021) — Cited for the general preference that accommodations keep employees in their current position when feasible, and (in the concurrence/dissent) for the notion that reassignment can be “disfavored” in the Circuit’s case law.
  • Elledge v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC, 979 F.3d 1004 (4th Cir. 2020) — A pivotal point of clarification. The district court treated reassignment as a “last resort” in a way the panel found misleading in this context: once an employee cannot perform the original job, reassignment becomes a required avenue to assess (absent undue hardship), rather than a categorical escape hatch. The separate opinion relied heavily on Elledge’s deference to the employer’s view of “essential functions.”
  • Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 2004) — Quoted (via Elledge) for the definition of an essential function: it must bear more than a marginal relationship to the job.
  • EEOC v. St. Joseph's Hosp. Inc., 842 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2016) — Persuasive authority for a key doctrinal move: when reassignment is sought, the essential-functions inquiry focuses on the desired position, not the employee’s current/previous job.
  • Jones v. Solomon, 90 F.4th 198 (4th Cir. 2024) — Used to reject the idea that a plaintiff’s “self-serving” declaration is inherently insufficient: such affidavits can defeat summary judgment if grounded in personal knowledge/firsthand experience. The panel reinforced the jury’s role in weighing such evidence (citing Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc., 41 F.4th 370 (4th Cir. 2022)).
  • Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., 789 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2015) — Cited for the concept of reasonable accommodation as changes providing meaningful equal employment opportunity.
  • Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. Of Med. & Biomedical Scis., 804 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2015) — Quoted for the maxim that the hallmark of a reasonable accommodation is effectiveness.
  • Hannah v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 72 F.4th 630 (4th Cir. 2023) — Distinguished. The court explained that unpaid leave may be reasonable where the disability is temporary and the employee is expected to return to the same job. Here, the record showed Orkin was on notice Dieng’s limitations were not temporary and he could not return to pest technician work.
  • White v. Honeywell, Inc., 141 F.3d 1270 (8th Cir. 1998) — Noted for the proposition that forced unpaid medical leave may support constructive discharge, though the Fourth Circuit did not reach the merits due to exhaustion.
  • Hollis v. Morgan State Univ., 153 F.4th 369 (4th Cir. 2025) and Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc., 41 F.4th 370 (4th Cir. 2022) — Framed the exhaustion standard: judicial claims must be reasonably related to, or expected to follow from, the administrative charge investigation.
  • Separate opinion authorities shaping the narrower view of disputes: D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 1998) (deference to employer on essential functions); Knibbs v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200 (4th Cir. 2022) (summary judgment inferences); Pfaller v. Amonette, 55 F.4th 436 (4th Cir. 2022), CTB, Inc. v. Hog Slat, Inc., 954 F.3d 647 (4th Cir. 2020), and Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 2004) (limits on self-serving opinion evidence); Anderson v. Diamondback Inv. Grp., LLC, 117 F.4th 165 (4th Cir. 2024) (employee must request accommodation); Perdue v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, 999 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 2021) (no duty to create new positions).

Legal Reasoning

  1. Reassignment cases turn on the essential functions of the target job, not the job the employee can no longer do. The panel held the district court erred by ending the analysis once it found Dieng could not perform pest control technician duties. Because Dieng sought reassignment, the relevant question became whether he could perform the essential functions of the customer service and/or sales roles, with or without accommodation.
  2. “Indefinite unpaid leave” is not reasonable if it is ineffective in context. The court treated “effectiveness” as a necessary feature of reasonableness (drawing heavily from Barnett and echoing Dean). If Orkin’s plan was simply to keep Dieng on unpaid leave hoping he would return to a job he medically could not perform, the accommodation was illusory. The court’s framing is a meaningful doctrinal signal: leave is not a universal safe harbor; it must plausibly advance return-to-work in a legally relevant way.
  3. Failure to participate in the interactive process can support liability when a reasonable accommodation was possible. Applying Tarquinio and Jacobs, the panel found evidence that Orkin did not meaningfully engage at all: ignored texts/emails, did not discuss limitations or vacancies, and did not respond to counsel’s communications. Critically, the panel linked process failure to substance: Dieng offered evidence that positions became available and were filled while he remained on leave.
  4. Self-serving declarations are not categorically excluded at summary judgment. The panel rejected the notion that Dieng’s sworn declaration about the practical demands of sales work could be disregarded simply because it supported his case. Under Jones v. Solomon, firsthand testimony can create genuine disputes for the jury. The panel emphasized the court’s limited role at summary judgment (reinforced via Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc.). The separate opinion disagreed, characterizing the sales position as heavy-duty as a matter of undisputed record and viewing Dieng’s declaration as insufficient.
  5. Exhaustion strictly constrained the termination theory. Even though the panel acknowledged the concept of constructive discharge (and that lengthy unpaid leave could support it, citing White v. Honeywell, Inc.), it affirmed dismissal because Dieng’s administrative charge alleged only failure to accommodate and identified a discriminatory period ending before he resigned. Under Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc. and Hollis v. Morgan State Univ., the termination claim was not reasonably within the charge’s scope.

Impact

  • Limits “parking” disabled employees on unpaid leave. The opinion strengthens an employee-protective principle: employers cannot reflexively choose open-ended unpaid leave where reassignment to a vacant position the employee can do is plausibly available. Leave may still be reasonable, but not where it functions as indefinite stasis untethered to an actual return-to-work path.
  • Re-centers reassignment as a real statutory option when the original job is no longer possible. By correcting the district court’s broad “last resort” reading of Elledge v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC, the panel reduces the risk that reassignment is treated as practically optional once an employee becomes unable to perform the prior role.
  • Incentivizes documented interactive-process conduct. The factual narrative—unanswered communications, no exploration of vacancies, no discussion of limitations—illustrates the litigation risk of poor process. Post-decision, employers in the Fourth Circuit have stronger reason to document outreach, vacancy review, and good-faith discussions, especially where reassignment is requested.
  • Procedural caution for plaintiffs: exhaust termination theories. The exhaustion holding is a warning: if constructive discharge or termination is in play, the charge should be amended or filed to encompass it. Otherwise, even a potentially strong merits narrative may never be reached.
  • Future litigation likely to focus on scope questions the split highlights. The separate opinion tees up recurring disputes: whether a role is truly “light-duty,” how much deference to afford job descriptions, the relevant time window for reassignment duties, and whether vacancies in other branches/geographies must be considered. The majority largely treated these as jury questions on this record; the concurrence/dissent urged narrower legal boundaries.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable accommodation
A workplace change that enables a qualified employee with a disability to have a meaningful opportunity to work (unless it causes undue hardship). Under the ADA, examples include schedule changes, job restructuring, or reassignment to a vacant position.
Effective accommodation
An accommodation must work in practice. If it does not address the barrier created by the disability (for example, indefinite unpaid leave when the employee cannot return to the old job), it may be deemed ineffective and therefore not “reasonable.”
Essential functions
The fundamental duties of a position. In reassignment cases, the key question becomes whether the employee can perform the essential functions of the new job sought, not the job the employee can no longer perform.
Interactive process
A good-faith back-and-forth between employer and employee to understand limitations and identify workable accommodations. It is triggered when the employee communicates disability and a desire for accommodation.
Summary judgment
A pretrial ruling. If genuine disputes of material fact exist—facts a jury could reasonably decide either way—the case must go to trial.
Administrative exhaustion
Before suing under the ADA, an employee generally must file an EEOC (or state agency) charge. The later lawsuit must match (or be reasonably related to) what the charge alleged or what an investigation would reasonably cover.
Constructive discharge
A legal theory that treats a resignation as a termination when working conditions are made so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to resign. The court here did not decide the merits due to failure to exhaust.

Conclusion

Dieng v. Orkin, LLC establishes a clear Fourth Circuit message: when reassignment to a vacant position may allow a disabled employee to return to work, an employer cannot substitute indefinite unpaid leave and call it a reasonable accommodation—because an accommodation must be effective. The decision also reiterates that reassignment disputes hinge on the essential functions of the target position and that summary judgment cannot be granted by disregarding competent, firsthand employee testimony.

At the same time, the opinion underscores procedural discipline: termination theories must be exhausted in the administrative charge process. The result is a split outcome with a forward-looking doctrinal center of gravity—effective accommodations, genuine interactive engagement, and meaningful consideration of reassignment.