Incarceration-Explained Gaps Can Preserve “Same Course of Conduct” for Multi-Firearm Enhancements Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)

1. Introduction

Arthur Gene Young challenged the district court’s Guidelines calculations and the substantive reasonableness of his 168-month sentence following his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The appeal raised five sentencing issues: (1) whether a two-level enhancement for three or more firearms applied under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1); (2) whether a four-level enhancement applied for possessing a firearm “in connection with” another felony under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B); (3) whether a two-level obstruction enhancement applied under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for false statements to a probation officer; (4) whether a two-level reckless endangerment during flight enhancement applied under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2; and (5) whether the ultimate sentence was substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

The government relied heavily on trial evidence—especially body-worn camera footage of the arrest and a recorded interview—in defending the enhancements. A central dispute concerned whether firearm possessions from February and March 2021 could count as “relevant conduct” to a May 2023 firearm possession, despite the apparent time gap.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that:

• The district court properly found that Young possessed a firearm in February 2021 based on a recorded interview admitted during pretrial/trial proceedings, and it could rely on that evidence at sentencing.
• The February and March 2021 possessions constituted relevant conduct to the May 2023 offense for purposes of applying U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1), despite the nominal two-year separation, because Young was incarcerated for all but about thirty-eight days in that interval.
• The district court properly applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because Young committed Georgia felony obstruction during arrest and his loaded firearm had the potential to facilitate (or embolden) that felony.
• The district court properly applied U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 because Young willfully provided materially false information to a probation officer during the presentence interview.
• The district court properly applied U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 because Young’s flight—leading officers into a busy road and onto active train tracks while armed and physically struggling—recklessly created a substantial risk of serious harm.
• The within-Guidelines 168-month sentence was substantively reasonable; the district court permissibly gave great weight to dangerousness while still considering mental health treatment needs.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Standards of review and deference

• United States v. Dimitrovski: Provided the baseline review framework—Guidelines interpretation/application reviewed de novo; factfinding reviewed for clear error. This framing mattered because most issues turned on factual inferences (video interpretation, willfulness, materiality, risk assessment).
• United States v. Osorio-Moreno: Anchored abuse-of-discretion review for substantive reasonableness, reinforcing the appellate court’s restrained role.
• United States v. Irey (en banc) and United States v. Butler: Emphasized the “full measure of deference” and “ballpark of permissible outcomes” concepts; the panel used these to reject Young’s claim that the court overemphasized dangerousness.
• United States v. Sotelo: Noted the court does not formally presume within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable but “ordinarily expect[s]” they are; this expectation supported affirmance absent a concrete showing of imbalance.

B. Sentencing fact sources: using trial evidence and PSI facts

• United States v. White and United States v. Castellanos: These cases were central to the court’s approval of relying on trial evidence at sentencing. The panel used them to validate the district court’s use of (i) the recorded interview to establish February 2021 possession and (ii) bodycam footage to establish Georgia felony obstruction and reckless endangerment.
• United States v. Wade: Supported treating unobjected-to PSI allegations as admitted for sentencing purposes—critical to accepting the “only thirty-eight days out of prison” fact that drove the relevant-conduct temporal analysis.

C. Relevant conduct and “same course of conduct” under § 1B1.3

• United States v. Gyetvay: Framed relevant-conduct determinations as fact questions reviewed for clear error and was also invoked to reject any remand request for allegedly insufficient explicit factfinding where record evidence was “clearly identifiable.”
• United States v. Brooks: Supplied the three-factor test for “same course of conduct” (similarity, regularity, time interval). The panel treated felon-in-possession events as highly similar and found “some regularity” with three separate possessions.
• United States v. Maxwell: Provided the counterpoint that acts over a year apart can be “temporally remote.” The panel distinguished that concern by focusing on incarceration as a non-volitional explanation for the gap.
• United States v. Ruiz (7th Cir.): Persuasive authority for the proposition that non-volitional gaps (like incarceration) need not defeat a single course of conduct. The panel used this logic to treat the “effective” time interval—days actually at liberty—as comparable to shorter-gap cases.

D. “In connection with” under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

• United States v. James: Defined “in connection with” as contextually, causally, or logically related, while also cautioning that coincidence/accident is insufficient. This definition structured the panel’s conclusion that armed violent resistance inherently has facilitative potential.
• United States v. Jackson: Supported the proposition that “mere possession” can suffice where the firearm emboldens or has potential to facilitate the other offense. The panel used this to reject the argument that Young had to actually reach for or use the gun.
• United States v. Brooks (again): Reinforced the broad reading of facilitation/potential facilitation, which the court extended to the felony-obstruction context.

E. Georgia felony obstruction authorities

• Smith v. State: Provided the elements and, crucially, the rule that violently struggling can satisfy the “offering or doing violence” element even absent striking or explicit threats.
• Cole v. State and Harris v. State: Offered fact-pattern comparators. The panel analogized Young’s pushing/grabbing and struggle (including falling down an embankment) to the kinds of confrontations Georgia courts have deemed sufficient.

F. Obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1: willfulness and materiality

• United States v. Dedeker: Confirmed that materially false information to a probation officer during a presentence investigation supports § 3C1.1.
• United States v. Massey: Supplied the governing definition of willfulness—acting consciously with the purpose of obstructing justice. The panel deferred to the district court’s inference of intentional lying, emphasizing timing (disavowal only after discovery) and representation by counsel.
• United States v. Beaufils: Reinforced deference to district court credibility assessments, which helped the panel uphold the finding that Young’s mental-illness explanation did not negate willfulness on this record.
• United States v. Doe: Defined materiality (“if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue”) and emphasized the “conspicuously low” threshold—pivotal in holding that false childhood-trauma narratives could influence § 3553(a) sentencing considerations.
• United States v. Odedina: Supported the proposition that false information is material if it could affect sentencing, even if it did not actually do so.

G. Reckless endangerment during flight under § 3C1.2

• United States v. Matchett: Functioned as the controlling analogue—wrestling with an officer while a loaded gun is in the defendant’s pocket can create a substantial risk via possible accidental discharge. The panel used this to justify the enhancement even though no one was injured.
• United States v. Wilson: Supplied key limitations: flight alone is insufficient; the defendant’s conduct must create the risk (not merely the officers’ conduct). The panel treated Young’s route (busy road, active tracks) and armed struggle as defendant-created risk.

H. Substantive reasonableness and factor-weighting discretion

• United States v. Shaw and Gall v. United States: Supported the principle that sentencing courts may attach great weight to one § 3553(a) factor over others. The panel relied on this to reject the claim of improper “single-factor” sentencing.
• United States v. Rodriguez: Reinforced that the weight given to any § 3553(a) factor is committed to the district court’s sound discretion.
• United States v. Kuhlman: Supported the rule that district courts need not explicitly discuss every § 3553(a) factor so long as they considered them.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. § 2K2.1(b)(1): Counting firearms via relevant conduct, with incarceration narrowing the “true” time gap

The enhancement required that “the offense involved” between three and seven firearms. The district court reached three by counting: (1) the May 2023 firearm (offense of conviction), (2) a February 2021 firearm, and (3) a March 2021 firearm. The panel’s reasoning proceeded in two steps.

1. Proof of February 2021 possession: The court treated the recorded interview—admitted through pretrial/trial proceedings—as competent sentencing evidence and credited Young’s admission of firearm possession in February 2021. Relying on White and Castellanos, the panel made clear that the evidentiary “channel” (trial record) is fair game at sentencing even if originally offered for another purpose and even if the defendant later pleaded guilty.
2. Relevance of 2021 possessions to 2023 offense: Applying Brooks’ similarity/regularity/time-interval framework, the panel emphasized: (i) similarity was effectively “identical” (multiple felon-in-possession events); (ii) regularity existed because there were three separate occasions; and (iii) the time interval, though two years on the calendar, shrank dramatically because Young was out of prison only about thirty-eight days—making the practical opportunity to reoffend much more contiguous. The court used Ruiz to treat incarceration as a non-volitional explanation that can preserve a “single course of conduct.”

This is the opinion’s most rule-like move: it operationalizes temporal proximity in a way that is sensitive to time-at-liberty rather than calendar time alone.

B. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B): Armed violent resistance as “in connection with” felony obstruction

The panel upheld the “another felony offense” as Georgia felony obstruction, using bodycam footage to show refusal to comply, movement into dangerous terrain, and physical struggle (pushing/grabbing; falling down an embankment; continued resistance requiring a Taser). By relying on Smith v. State, Cole v. State, and Harris v. State, the panel treated “violently struggling” as sufficient violence for the felony.

On the “in connection with” nexus, the court adopted an expansive view grounded in James, Brooks, and Jackson: a loaded firearm possessed during the violent resistance had the potential to facilitate the felony—through possible use, escalation leverage, or emboldening—even if Young never brandished or reached for it (beyond briefly patting the pocket). The enhancement was not defeated by the absence of actual use; potential facilitation sufficed.

C. § 3C1.1: False life-history claims to probation as willful, materially obstructive

Young’s lies about his mother and childhood drug exposure were not contested as false; the questions were willfulness and materiality. The panel affirmed willfulness by deferring to the district court’s permissible inference of intentional deception, noting (1) the delayed disavowal until after discovery and (2) counsel’s presence during the interview. The mental-illness/delusion explanation did not compel a contrary finding under clear-error review, especially given Beaufils’ deference to credibility calls.

Materiality was straightforward under Doe and Odedina’s low threshold: if believed, the story could influence the court’s § 3553(a)(1) assessment of “history and characteristics” and thereby the sentence.

D. § 3C1.2: Risk creation through route choice and armed physical struggle

The panel accepted that walking-speed flight can still be reckless endangerment when paired with situational danger: leading officers into a busy road and onto active train tracks, while armed with a loaded firearm and physically struggling. Invoking Matchett, it treated the risk of accidental discharge during a struggle as a substantial risk of serious injury, even absent actual injury. Wilson’s constraint—focus on defendant-created risk—was satisfied because the risk flowed from Young’s path and resistance choices.

E. Substantive reasonableness: permissible emphasis on dangerousness

The panel held the district court did not “overemphasize” dangerousness improperly. Under Shaw and Gall v. United States, a court may give a single factor “great weight,” and Rodriguez frames such weighing as discretionary. The opinion also noted the district court considered mental-health treatment and declined to impose the statutory maximum because of mental-health problems, which undercut the notion of one-factor sentencing. Under Irey, Butler, and Sotelo, the within-Guidelines sentence fell comfortably within the range of permissible outcomes.

3.3 Impact

• Relevant conduct and temporal proximity: The decision’s most consequential guidance is methodological: when assessing the “time interval” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, courts may account for incarceration and other non-volitional interruptions, treating “opportunity to offend” as the meaningful temporal metric. This strengthens the government’s ability to aggregate separated firearm possessions for § 2K2.1(b)(1) where a defendant’s liberty was brief.
• Broad “in connection with” application to resisting/obstructing arrests: By holding that a loaded gun in the pocket during violent obstruction has facilitative potential even absent use or brandishing, the opinion supports more frequent application of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) in arrest-resistance scenarios.
• § 3C1.1 reaches false “mitigation narratives”: The opinion underscores that lies aimed at sympathetic mitigation (family history, childhood trauma) can be “material” because § 3553(a)(1) makes personal history relevant. This may encourage defense counsel to treat biography claims in presentence interviews with the same verification discipline as offense facts.
• Low-speed flight can still trigger § 3C1.2: The case illustrates that the enhancement is about risk creation, not speed—dangerous environments (roads, train tracks) and armed struggles can supply the “substantial risk.”
• Limitations: The opinion is “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” so it does not formally create binding circuit precedent. Still, it synthesizes existing published Eleventh Circuit authority (notably Brooks, James, and Matchett) in a way that may be persuasive in similar sentencing disputes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Clear error” review: The appellate court will not reweigh evidence; it will reverse fact findings only if left with a firm conviction the district court made a mistake. If the district court’s view is “plausible” in light of the record, the finding stands.
• “Relevant conduct” (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3): Sentencing can account for certain conduct beyond the conviction offense if it is part of the same course of conduct/common plan. For firearms, multiple felon-in-possession incidents may be grouped if sufficiently similar, repeated, and temporally connected—where temporal connection can consider incarceration.
• “In connection with” another felony (U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)): The gun need not be fired or brandished. If possessing it could help (or embolden) the other felony—like resisting arrest—the enhancement can apply. But if the gun’s presence is purely accidental/coincidental, it should not.
• Obstruction of justice at sentencing (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1): Lying to a probation officer can be obstruction if the lie is willful and “material.” “Material” means it could influence the judge’s decision, even if it ultimately does not.
• Reckless endangerment during flight (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2): Running fast is not required. The key question is whether the defendant’s conduct during flight created a substantial risk of serious harm—e.g., leading officers into traffic or train tracks, or struggling while armed.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Arthur Young affirms a suite of Guidelines enhancements in a felon-in-possession sentencing and, most notably, demonstrates how incarceration can “explain” an apparent temporal gap for relevant-conduct purposes under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, thereby supporting aggregation of firearms for U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1). It also reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s broad interpretation of “in connection with” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) in armed resistance-to-arrest situations, applies a low materiality threshold for false mitigation narratives under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and confirms that low-speed flight can still warrant U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 when the defendant’s choices create serious risks. On substantive reasonableness, the decision reiterates the substantial discretion district courts have to prioritize public safety within the § 3553(a) framework.