Incapacity Does Not Trigger § 813 Disclosure Duties in Vermont Revocable Trusts; Probate Court Must Consider Amendment to Seek Trustee Removal Under § 706

A. Precedents Cited

1) Appellate jurisdiction and review limits in probate matters

The Court began by confirming its jurisdiction over “questions of law” in probate appeals under 12 V.S.A. § 2551. It relied on In re Est. of Johnson, 158 Vt. 557 (1992), for the principle that Vermont Supreme Court review in probate matters is limited to pure questions of law and will not extend to issues turning on factual distinctions gleaned from the record.

It further analogized to In re Peter Val Preda Trs., 2019 VT 61, where the Court reviewed dismissal of a trustee-removal petition because the decision turned solely on legal questions—reinforcing that the present appeal (statutory interpretation of § 603 and § 813) was properly before it.

2) Statutory interpretation methodology

The Court applied standard Vermont interpretive rules, citing Flint v. Dep't of Lab., 2017 VT 89, for the “plain meaning” approach: implement clear statutory language as written, resorting to other tools only if ambiguity exists. That framework mattered because the core dispute was whether the statutory structure of the Vermont Trust Code left room for beneficiary information rights during settlor incapacity.

3) Trustee disclosure obligations and their limits

To emphasize that trustee disclosure duties are not boundless even when they apply, the Court cited Est. of Alden v. Dee, 2011 VT 64, explaining that a trustee’s duty to disclose “does not require the trustee to inform the beneficiaries of every aspect of administration of the trust.” This precedent supported the Court’s careful parsing of § 813 into tiered disclosure duties depending on beneficiary status—while still holding that § 603 can foreclose those duties entirely during revocability.

4) Uniform Trust Code persuasive authority on revocable trusts

The Court relied on out-of-state authority interpreting parallel Uniform Trust Code provisions, citing:

• In re Stephen M. Gunther Revocable Living Tr., 350 S.W.3d 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011), for the proposition that because a trustee of a revocable trust owes no duty to beneficiaries before the settlor’s death, beneficiaries are not entitled to pre-death accountings.
• In re Tr. No. T-1 of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474 (Iowa 2013), to similar effect.

These cases served as persuasive confirmation of the Vermont Court’s reading of § 603(a): revocability places beneficiaries’ would-be rights under the settlor’s control.

5) Using uniform-law comments to infer legislative intent

A significant part of the Court’s reasoning rested on the Official and Vermont Comments to the Vermont Trust Code. The Court cited:

• Bissonnette v. Wylie, 162 Vt. 598 (1994), for the proposition that comments to uniform provisions are a “strong indication” of legislative intent when Vermont adopts a uniform act.
• Springfield Tchrs. Ass'n v. Springfield Sch. Dirs., 167 Vt. 180 (1997), to support an “intentional omission” inference: when the Legislature models a statute on a uniform act but declines to adopt certain language, the omission is presumed deliberate.

These interpretive precedents amplified the importance of Vermont’s choice not to adopt optional capacity-dependent language in § 603.

6) Trustee removal standing during settlor incapacity

On trustee removal, the Court highlighted the Official Comment to § 706 (as enacted) stating that a beneficiary’s right to seek removal does not apply “while the settlor has capacity”—implying that if the settlor lacks capacity, beneficiary standing can exist even for a revocable trust. The Court cited In re Conservatorship of Abbott, 890 N.W.2d 469 (Neb. 2017), which allowed beneficiaries to seek removal of a trustee of a revocable trust where the settlor was alive but incapacitated under a comparable statute.

7) Pleading amendment liberal standard and abuse of discretion

The Court grounded its remand on two Vermont authorities:

• Bevins v. King, 143 Vt. 252 (1983), emphasizing Vermont’s liberal tradition of allowing amendments where no prejudice results.
• PeakCM, LLC v. Mountainview Metal Sys., LLC, 2025 VT 50, for the principle that failure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of discretion—used here because the probate division effectively denied amendment by not addressing it.

8) Distinguishing petitioner’s cited cases

The Court distinguished Tr. Created Under the Will of Damon, 398 P.3d 645 (Haw. 2017), Snell v. Snell, 2016 WY 49, and Jacob v. Davis, 738 A.2d 904 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999), because they did not involve revocable trusts—thereby limiting their relevance to the § 603/§ 813 interaction controlling this case.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The statutory architecture: § 813 duties exist, but § 603 controls during revocability

The Court treated § 813 as a detailed disclosure regime that grants different information rights depending on beneficiary status:

• § 813(a): duties to keep qualified beneficiaries reasonably informed and to respond to information requests unless “unreasonable under the circumstances.”
• § 813(b)(1): duty to furnish the trust instrument to any beneficiary upon request (this is the relief petitioner initially sought and obtained).
• § 813(c): annual report duties to distributees and to other beneficiaries who request it.

But the Court treated § 603(a) as a gatekeeper: “While a trust is revocable,” beneficiary rights are “subject to the control of” the settlor, and trustee duties are owed “exclusively to” the settlor. Accordingly, even if § 813 would otherwise give a beneficiary a pathway to information, § 603 forecloses that pathway while the trust remains revocable.

2) Incapacity does not convert a revocable trust into an irrevocable one under Vermont’s enactment

Petitioner argued that because 14A V.S.A. § 601 ties capacity to the ability to revoke or amend, the settlor’s alleged incapacity should effectively render the trust irrevocable, triggering beneficiary information rights. The Court rejected this by emphasizing:

• The Official Comment to § 103: “The fact that the settlor becomes incapacitated does not convert a revocable trust into an irrevocable trust.”
• The Vermont Comment to § 603: Vermont intentionally did not adopt the Uniform Trust Code’s optional language “and the settlor has capacity to revoke the trust,” choosing instead a rule under which incapacity does not change the settlor’s control; an agent may exercise retained powers.

This interpretive move is the decision’s most consequential doctrinal point: Vermont’s version of § 603 is designed to avoid litigating the onset of incapacity as a trigger for beneficiary rights to oversight information.

3) The probate division’s equity jurisdiction could not be used to “override” § 603 on these facts

The probate division had suggested it might invoke equitable powers under 14A V.S.A. § 205 if “credible facts and serious allegations” warranted intervention notwithstanding § 603. The Supreme Court’s disposition effectively limits that approach in the disclosure context: because the Legislature made a policy choice in § 603 about to whom duties are owed during revocability, a beneficiary cannot use § 813 as a vehicle to obtain the kind of administration-level transparency that § 603 withholds.

4) Trustee removal is analytically distinct from beneficiary information rights

The Court drew a key distinction: although § 603 blocks § 813-based information demands while the trust is revocable, trustee removal under § 706 is not textually limited to irrevocable trusts, and its Official Comment signals that beneficiary standing turns on whether the settlor has capacity.

Thus, petitioner’s allegations—self-loan, potential unilateral actions by one co-trustee, and inaccurate reporting—were potentially relevant to a removal petition. The error was procedural and structural: the probate division dismissed without addressing petitioner’s request to amend to plead § 706 removal grounds.

5) Remand based on failure to exercise discretion on amendment

Applying Vermont Rule of Probate Procedure 15(a) (“shall be freely given when justice so requires”) and Vermont’s liberal amendment tradition, the Court concluded the probate division had to at least consider prejudice, bad faith, or frivolousness. By not engaging those factors at all, it failed to exercise discretion, warranting reversal and remand.

C. Impact

1) Vermont aligns strongly with a privacy-and-settlor-control model during revocability

The decision cements a practical rule for Vermont trust administration: remainder beneficiaries of a revocable trust cannot leverage alleged settlor incapacity to compel administration information under § 813. Trustees, counsel, and probate courts should expect that:

• Beneficiary demands for accountings, supporting documentation, internal trustee appointment documents, or medical incapacity letters will often be non-compellable via § 813 while the settlor is alive.
• Litigation over “when incapacity began” is less likely to operate as a gateway to disclosure rights, because Vermont deliberately rejected the capacity-dependent variant of § 603.

2) Beneficiaries may reframe disputes as fiduciary-removal proceedings where incapacity is credibly alleged

While information rights are curtailed, the remand underscores an alternate path: § 706 removal. Petitioners who cannot obtain trust administration details directly may attempt to plead removal-based claims (serious breach, lack of cooperation among cotrustees, etc.), with discovery potentially occurring within that procedural posture—subject to court control and relevance limits.

3) Procedural discipline in probate: amendment requests must be addressed

The case also has a broader civil-procedure lesson for probate practice: once a party squarely requests leave to amend to assert a distinct statutory claim, a probate court must address the request under Rule 15(a) standards. Silent dismissal risks reversal.

4) Drafting and administration consequences

For planners and fiduciaries, the decision highlights:

• The importance of clear successor-trustee and agency arrangements for incapacity planning, because beneficiary oversight is limited during revocability.
• The continuing relevance of co-trustee governance and documentation of conflicted transactions (e.g., trustee loans), because removal proceedings remain an available accountability mechanism even if § 813 disclosures are not.