In re M.F.: Unworkable Joint Custody Must Yield to Stable Sole Placement Despite the Grandparent Preference

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Decision date: November 9, 2026
Case numbers: 25-720 and 25-725
Disposition: Reversed and remanded with directions; Chief Justice Bunn concurred in part and dissented in part.

1. Introduction

In re M.F. concerns permanent placement following a family tragedy: the child’s father, M.F.II, fatally stabbed the child’s mother. The resulting abuse and neglect proceeding required the courts to determine who should raise their son, M.F.III, after the father’s parental rights were terminated. Although portions of the testimony described the killing as murder, the majority identifies the father’s conviction as voluntary manslaughter.

The child was approximately five months old when he entered the care of his maternal aunt, S.M., in May 2021. She became his principal caregiver and mother-figure. He called her “mom,” regarded her similarly aged biological child as his “twin,” and received substantial support from maternal relatives, including his maternal grandmother, E.M. Evidence also described behavioral difficulties, developmental needs, and the importance of consistency in his daily life.

The paternal grandparents, M.F.I and J.F., sought involvement and ultimately adoption. Earlier proceedings culminated in an appellate remand requiring a home study and a best-interests assessment. The grandparents satisfactorily completed the study, but significant concerns remained about their continuing support for the father and their ability to comply with an order prohibiting contact between him and the child.

The circuit court attempted to preserve both family relationships through joint legal and physical custody shared by S.M. and the paternal grandparents. When mediation failed to produce an agreement, the court imposed a parenting plan. It alternated the designated legal custodian between odd and even years, required shared decisions on major matters, and provided for communication through a mobile application, mediation, and counseling.

The Supreme Court rejected that solution. Its central conclusion was that a permanent placement cannot serve a child’s best interests merely by distributing custodial authority among competing relatives when their conflict makes shared parenting unstable. Applying established best-interests principles, the majority directed sole legal and physical custody to S.M., while preserving appropriate visitation with the paternal grandparents.

This was a memorandum decision under Rule 21(d), not a categorical prohibition against every joint placement following abuse and neglect. Its significance lies principally in its fact-specific application of existing permanency, grandparent-preference, and appellate-standing doctrines.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Participation objections were not timely preserved through appeal. S.M. and E.M. could not use the permanent-placement appeal to reopen the earlier denials of their motions to intervene.
  • The custody order nevertheless created an appealable interest. Because the order granted custodial rights to S.M. and the paternal grandparents, they could challenge its joint-custody provisions despite their lack of intervenor status.
  • Joint custody was an abuse of discretion. The families’ conflict, the circumstances of the mother’s death, and the likelihood of continuing disputes made shared custody incompatible with the child’s need for stability.
  • The grandparent preference was not controlling. A satisfactory home study did not eliminate the requirement to evaluate the entire record and the child’s particular interests.
  • S.M. was the appropriate permanent custodian. The majority relied on the child’s established attachment to her, the anticipated trauma of removal, and concerns about the paternal grandparents’ ability to protect him from prohibited contact and address his family history appropriately.
  • Visitation remained important. The circuit court was directed to establish appropriate grandparent visitation consistent with the father-child no-contact order.

Chief Justice Bunn agreed that joint custody was improper but would have allowed the circuit court—not the appellate court—to select the sole permanent custodian on remand.

3. Analysis: Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Appellate review, intervention, and standing

In re K.S. supplied the governing standards of appellate review. Substantive decisions in abuse and neglect proceedings receive abuse-of-discretion review; supporting factual findings receive clear-error review; and legal questions, including statutory interpretation, receive de novo review. This framework matters because the Court could correct an unreasonable custodial disposition without treating every factual assessment as an issue for independent appellate determination. It also frames the disagreement with the dissent over how far the majority could go in selecting the ultimate placement.

In re H.W. established the limited appellate position of persons denied intervention. Their challenge ordinarily concerns their unsuccessful request to participate as parties, rather than the merits of the underlying placement proceeding. The Court used this principle to distinguish objections to procedural participation from objections arising from subsequently awarded custodial rights.

In re G.S. expressly held that denial of intervention in an abuse and neglect matter is a final, appealable order as to the applicant. In re P.F. provided additional support for that procedural rule. Together, these authorities meant that S.M. and E.M. needed to appeal the intervention denials when entered. Their later dissatisfaction with the extent of their participation did not revive that opportunity.

The Court also observed that, although counsel for the paternal grandparents appeared more active, S.M. and E.M. identified no occasion when they requested and were refused a participatory opportunity afforded to the grandparents. Moreover, the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) and the guardian ad litem had consistently advocated placement with S.M. and developed a substantial record supporting that position. These observations reinforced the Court’s refusal to revisit the procedural complaints, although untimeliness remained the central obstacle.

In re O.D. illustrated the usual rule that nonparties lack standing to challenge permanent placement. There, foster parents’ placement challenge was dismissed. The Court distinguished that situation because the present custody order itself granted S.M. and the paternal grandparents enforceable interests in the child’s custody.

Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. supplied the definition of standing as the right to assert a legal claim or seek enforcement of a duty or right. Applying that definition, the majority concluded that the joint custodians possessed legally protected interests sufficient to challenge the order creating those interests. This was a narrow route to merits review, not a ruling that their denied intervention motions had somehow become effective.

E.M. did not receive a comparable independent merits determination. The Court considered her support for S.M. adequately represented through S.M.’s arguments and expressly reserved whether the grandparent-preference statute could confer independently enforceable standing on a nonparty grandmother.

B. Prior proceedings involving this child

In re M.F.-1 affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights. Its role here was foundational: the litigation concerned permanent placement after termination, rather than a contest involving an intact parental right. The present Court also had to respect the existing order prohibiting contact between the father and child.

In re M.F., 250 W. Va. 338, 902 S.E.2d 887 (2024), was the earlier placement-related appeal. Although it upheld denial of the paternal grandparents’ intervention requests, it required DHS to investigate their suitability through a home study and directed the circuit court to conduct a best-interests analysis afterward.

That earlier decision did not promise placement to the grandparents upon completion of the study. Its significance was procedural and evaluative: the grandparents were entitled to proper consideration, but permanent placement still depended on the child’s welfare. The present opinion also relied on the earlier decision’s account that the grandparents initially conditioned their involvement on paternity confirmation and expressed an interest in adoption later.

C. Permanency and the preference for adoption

In re J.P. appeared in two distinct roles. First, its observation that only one competing family could prevail supported the ordinary expectation of a single permanent placement. Second, it was the paternal grandparents’ principal authority for enforcing the statutory preference over an alternative caregiver.

The majority distinguished that decision rather than rejecting it. In In re J.P., the competing placement was a foster family, and the circuit court had failed to give proper effect to the grandparent preference. Here, S.M. was a close relative, not a familial stranger; the circuit court had extensively considered the preference; and the record contained substantial child-specific concerns about placement with the paternal grandparents.

In re Clifford K. appeared through language quoted in In re J.P. about placement litigation arising because many people love a child. Its contribution was a caution about perspective: the existence of multiple loving households does not remove the need for a legally sound placement choice. Adult affection cannot itself justify a divided arrangement that undermines the child’s stability.

In re Isaiah A. supplied the principle that children are entitled to permanency to the greatest degree possible. That principle weighed against a structure requiring recurring negotiation among antagonistic custodians and repeated court involvement when disagreements arose.

State v. Michael M. established adoption as the preferred permanent out-of-home placement after termination of parental rights when removal is necessary. The majority invoked that preference because adoption generally offers durable security after the upheaval of abuse and neglect proceedings. The present mandate, however, directed a permanent custody order; it did not itself enter an adoption decree.

D. Joint custody after one parent kills the other

Kenneth B. v. Elmer Jimmy S. was the closest factual precedent. There, as here, the child’s father killed the mother, and the circuit court attempted to resolve competing family claims through joint custody. The earlier decision found that arrangement erroneous because families “scarred by the tragedy” could not cooperate effectively. Interference with visitation and ensuing contempt proceedings illustrated the arrangement’s practical failure.

The present Court acknowledged a meaningful factual difference: these relatives expressed greater willingness to permit relationships with the other household. Nevertheless, it concluded that their somewhat better relationship did not make shared custody workable. The relevant lesson was not that homicide automatically disqualifies one side of a family. It was that courts must realistically assess whether unresolved hostility permits dependable joint decision-making.

The precedent therefore supported preventive intervention. The Court did not require the child to experience years of failed exchanges, contempt litigation, or conflicting decisions before recognizing that the imposed arrangement was likely to be harmful.

E. The grandparent preference is presumptive, not absolute

Napoleon S. v. Walker supplied the central formulation of the grandparent preference. The statute presumes that suitable grandparent placement serves the child’s interests, but that preference may be overcome when the entire record establishes that such placement is not in the child’s best interests. Importantly, suitability incorporates a welfare inquiry; it is not limited to the physical adequacy of the residence.

In re Elizabeth F. explained the consequence of that limitation: a circuit court need not prefer grandparent adoption when a thorough review demonstrates that it would not serve the child’s interests and another placement would. This authority supported the legal availability of permanent placement with S.M., notwithstanding her lack of a statutory preference.

In re K.E. stated the controlling qualification directly: the preference is “not absolute,” and the child’s best interests remain paramount. It answered the paternal grandparents’ contention that passing the home study effectively resolved the placement question in their favor.

In re Hunter H., quoting In re Katie S., connected the preference to the broader rule that the primary goal of abuse and neglect proceedings is the child’s health and welfare. These authorities prevented the statute from operating as an adult entitlement detached from the circumstances of the particular child.

The Court’s treatment of these cases did not eliminate the preference. Rather, it distinguished giving grandparents meaningful priority and consideration from guaranteeing them custody despite contrary evidence. A suitable physical home was relevant, but not conclusive, where emotional security, protective judgment, and compliance with a no-contact order were contested.

F. Delay, attachment, and continuity

Dep't. of Hum. Servs. v. La Rea Ann C.L. supplied the observation that, regardless of responsibility for delay, the child is its unfortunate victim. This principle answered the suggestion that the bond with S.M. should be discounted because DHS had delayed investigating the grandparents.

The Court did not excuse the earlier failure to conduct a timely home study. Instead, it refused to remedy that failure by treating the child’s actual attachments as legally irrelevant. The placement decision had to address present welfare, not reconstruct the circumstances that might have existed had the proceedings unfolded differently.

State ex rel. Treadway v. McCoy emphasized continuity of relationships and surroundings during early childhood and preservation of important relationships where feasible. In re G.G. carried those principles into the Court’s more recent jurisprudence and served as the immediate source of the quoted discussion.

Those cases supported preserving the child’s relationship with the person who had raised him since infancy. Although the child was beyond his first three years by the challenged order, the Court reasoned that disrupting a relationship lasting approximately four and a half years could be especially harmful under these circumstances.

In re R.S. reinforced the ultimate priority: a preferential placement must yield when it does not promote the child’s best interests. That authority linked the attachment evidence to the statutory analysis rather than treating continuity as merely an additional equitable consideration.

Honaker v. Burnside supported continued visitation. Its child-centered account of visitation recognizes that severing important relationships may create instability rather than cure it. The Court consequently separated custodial authority from relational value: the paternal grandparents could remain important figures without becoming joint custodians.

G. Authorities supporting the separate opinion

Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C. states that appellate courts cannot assess witness credibility from a written record as effectively as the trial judge who observed the testimony. Chief Justice Bunn invoked that institutional limitation because the grandparents’ assurances, attitudes, and likely compliance were central to the placement assessment.

In re A.F. required detailed factual findings and legal conclusions supporting a determination that the child’s best interests overcome the grandparent preference. The dissent relied on that requirement to question the majority’s inference that the circuit court had already rejected sole grandparent placement. These authorities supported remand for an express placement determination rather than appellate selection of S.M.

4. The Majority’s Legal Reasoning

A. Permanent placement is not a compromise between adult claims

The circuit court recognized that removing the child from S.M. would be traumatic but also believed he would benefit from a stronger relationship with his paternal grandparents. Its solution attempted to accommodate both concerns through shared custody.

The Supreme Court found that accommodation insufficiently attentive to how the arrangement would function. Major decisions concerning education, medical treatment, religion, childcare, and activities would require cooperation among people divided by the mother’s death and conflicting views of the father. Alternating custodial designation did not eliminate those disagreements. Nor did communication software, mediation, or counseling establish that the parties could exercise parental authority together without repeatedly involving the child in their conflict.

The governing question was therefore not whether both households loved the child or offered appropriate physical accommodation. It was whether this particular allocation of authority would provide a stable upbringing. The majority concluded that it would not.

B. Protective capacity required more than a satisfactory home study

The Court carefully distinguished the father’s wrongdoing from the grandparents’ own suitability. They were not personally responsible for the killing. Their continuing relationship with their son was also not, by itself, declared disqualifying.

The concern arose from the combination of circumstances: near-daily contact with him; plans to house him after release, including a period when the grandfather would live with him; disclosures of confidential custody information and photographs; and testimony minimizing his responsibility or emphasizing his supposed reliability as a rule-follower.

These facts bore on two protective tasks. First, the grandparents would have to maintain the court-ordered separation between father and child. Second, they would have to help the child understand and process the loss of his mother without minimizing the father’s conduct. A physically appropriate home did not answer either concern.

C. Imprisonment did not resolve the long-term risk

The circuit court had discounted prohibited-contact concerns because the father was incarcerated. It regarded post-release problems as too speculative and remote to outweigh the immediate benefits of increased grandparent involvement.

The majority rejected that approach to permanent placement. The father’s release was approaching, and the grandparents’ plans for supporting him were concrete. Their ability to exclude him from the child’s life could not realistically be assessed solely during a period when imprisonment already prevented physical access.

Moreover, the circuit court had partly relied on the protection supplied by having a second custodian. Once joint custody was rejected, that safeguard disappeared. The majority therefore concluded that the record did not support placing sole responsibility with the paternal grandparents.

D. The majority inferred that the preference had already been overcome

A pivotal step was the majority’s interpretation of the circuit court’s own findings. Because the circuit court understood the grandparent preference yet preserved substantial custody for S.M., the majority reasoned that it had implicitly found exclusive grandparent placement contrary to the child’s interests.

The majority combined that inference with the express finding that removal from S.M. would be traumatic. It regarded S.M.’s long-standing parental role, the child’s need for consistency, and the concerns about the grandparents as sufficient to direct sole placement without another evidentiary determination.

This reasoning is significant but contestable. A decision to share custody does not necessarily express a definitive choice between two sole-custody alternatives; it may instead reflect the trial court’s belief that neither exclusive arrangement is preferable. That gap between an implicit conclusion and an express finding is the central point of disagreement with Chief Justice Bunn.

E. Visitation preserved connection without dividing authority

The majority did not treat sole custody as requiring exclusion of the paternal family. The record showed that those relationships had value, and neither S.M., DHS, nor the guardian ad litem opposed continued grandparent visitation in principle.

The remedy therefore separated two questions: who should make parental decisions, and which relationships should continue. Sole custody supplied a stable decision-making structure; visitation maintained beneficial family connections. The circuit court retained discretion over visitation’s kind and frequency, subject to the no-contact order. The Supreme Court did not prescribe a particular schedule or make a universal ruling about supervision.

5. The Separate Opinion: Who Should Choose the Sole Custodian?

Chief Justice Bunn agreed with the majority’s rejection of joint custody. The disagreement concerned the next procedural step, not whether the imposed arrangement was workable.

Her preferred disposition was a remand directing the circuit court to decide between S.M. and the paternal grandparents. She acknowledged that immediately resolving placement would avoid delay and give the child permanency sooner. Nevertheless, she considered the majority’s direct selection an intrusion into the trial court’s role.

The dissent’s concern was particularly strong because the outcome depended partly on credibility: whether the grandparents sincerely appreciated the father’s conduct, would honor the no-contact order, and could meet the child’s emotional needs. It also questioned the adequacy of inferring that the statutory preference had been overcome when precedent required detailed findings.

The divide exposes a recurring tension in child-welfare appeals. Prompt permanency favors final resolution; appellate restraint favors returning unresolved factual and credibility questions to the trial court. The majority believed the established record and existing findings resolved the placement question. The dissent believed the record justified rejecting joint custody but not independently choosing its replacement.

6. Potential Impact

A. More realistic scrutiny of imposed joint placements

Trial courts should assess actual capacity for cooperation rather than assume that formal parenting mechanisms will overcome profound conflict. The decision is especially instructive when competing relatives’ disagreements arise from the very trauma that brought the child into protective proceedings.

B. Home studies remain necessary evidence, not automatic placement awards

Future courts may distinguish physical household suitability from broader protective and emotional suitability. A favorable study remains important, but the entire record must inform whether grandparent adoption serves the individual child’s interests.

C. Agency delay does not erase established attachments

The opinion reinforces the obligation to investigate grandparents promptly while rejecting a remedy that disregards a child’s existing psychological family. It does not establish that attachment always defeats the grandparent preference; the conclusion depended on attachment together with the other welfare concerns.

D. Clear findings will matter increasingly

The separate opinion highlights the practical need for explicit findings addressing the preference, protective capacity, attachment, and the comparative merits of available placements. Such findings reduce uncertainty about whether an appellate court is reviewing a completed determination or supplying one.

E. Intervention deadlines remain consequential

Prospective caregivers cannot ordinarily postpone an appeal from denial of intervention until permanent placement is decided. At the same time, an order that actually grants them custodial rights may create a distinct legal interest supporting a challenge to that order. The decision leaves unresolved the independent standing of a nonparty grandparent relying solely on the statutory preference.

F. Custody and continuing family relationships need not rise or fall together

The remedy offers an important alternative to either divided parental authority or complete relational exclusion. A single permanent custodian may coexist with meaningful grandparent visitation, provided the arrangement remains safe and child-centered.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Intervention
A request by someone outside the lawsuit to become a formal party. Being heard as a relative or potential caregiver does not necessarily confer that status.
Standing
A legally sufficient interest permitting someone to bring a particular challenge. Here, the custody award itself supplied that interest for the people awarded custody.
Grandparent preference
A statutory priority favoring suitable grandparents for adoptive placement. It carries real weight but can be overcome by evidence that the placement would not serve the child’s interests.
Legal custody and physical custody
Legal custody concerns authority to make important decisions; physical custody concerns the child’s care and living arrangements. The challenged order divided both.
Permanency
A durable, dependable family arrangement—not simply an order labeled “permanent” while exposing the child to continuing instability.
Abuse of discretion
A decision outside the range of reasonable choices allowed by the law and evidence. It does not mean that the trial judge acted dishonestly.
Clear error and de novo review
Clear-error review generally respects supported trial-level factual findings. De novo review means the appellate court independently decides legal questions.
No-contact order
The specific judicial prohibition against contact between this father and child. Any grandparent visitation arrangement must comply with it.

8. Conclusion

In re M.F. rejects permanent custody as an exercise in balancing competing adults’ claims. The majority required an arrangement capable of giving this child consistent care, effective protection, and dependable decision-making.

The grandparent preference remained meaningful but yielded to the full best-interests record. Sole custody with S.M., coupled with appropriate paternal-grandparent visitation, preserved both stability and valuable relationships. The separate opinion supplies an important qualification: even when the correct placement appears compelling, appellate finality must be weighed against the trial court’s responsibility to assess credibility and make explicit findings.

Statutory citation note: The opinion principally identifies the grandparent-preference provision as West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3), but footnote 8 labels it § 49-4-113(a)(3) and quotes additional home-study language. This commentary follows the principal citation; that textual inconsistency is not treated as a separate statutory holding.