In re F.L.: Domestic Violence (Including a Single “Occurrence”) Can Support Abuse/Neglect Adjudication; Broad Trial-Court Discretion Over Relevance at Adjudication

1. Introduction

Case: In re F.L., No. 25-492 (Mason County CC-26-2024-JA-33) (W. Va. June 1, 2026) (memorandum decision).
Parties: Petitioner Father (M.L.) appealed; the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) and the child’s Guardian ad Litem opposed.
Posture: Father appealed a July 8, 2025 dispositional order terminating his parental rights, challenging (1) evidentiary limitations at adjudication and (2) the resulting adjudication that he was an “abusing parent.”

Background allegations: DHS filed a June 2024 abuse and neglect petition alleging (a) domestic violence between the parents threatening the child with substantial emotional injury, (b) parental substance abuse impairing parenting, and (c) father’s failure to protect the child from mother’s drug use. A DV protective order (“DVPO”) had been entered in favor of the mother.

Key issues on appeal: (1) whether the circuit court abused its discretion by restricting cross-examination and excluding text messages as irrelevant at adjudication; (2) whether the evidence supported adjudication based on domestic violence (including whether a “single incident” can suffice); and (3) whether findings concerning father’s substance use and failure to protect were clearly erroneous given the requirement that adjudication rest on conditions at the time the petition was filed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed. It held that the circuit court did not abuse its “significant discretion” in evidentiary rulings at adjudication—specifically, excluding as irrelevant text messages between the mother and paternal grandmother and limiting additional cross-examination about discrepancies between the mother’s testimony and domestic-violence-court filings, where those filings were already admitted and considered.

On the merits of adjudication, the Court concluded the evidence supported findings that domestic violence occurred in the child’s presence and that the father was an “abusing parent” under the statutory framework. The Court rejected the father’s reading of In re Lilith H. and emphasized that West Virginia’s domestic-violence definition encompasses “the occurrence of one or more” acts, including threatening and psychological abuse that creates fear of physical harm.

The Court also upheld adjudicatory findings related to father’s substance-use history and failure to protect, finding no clear error under the deferential standard of review, particularly given testimony that mother offered drugs during the relevant period and father left the child in mother’s care without seeking custody or challenging the DVPO custody award.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re K.S.

The Court grounded its review framework in Syllabus Point 1 of In re K.S., which states that in abuse and neglect appeals: (1) substantive rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, (2) factual findings for clear error, and (3) legal questions de novo. This tripartite standard shaped the outcome: the evidentiary complaints were evaluated deferentially (abuse of discretion), while adjudicatory findings were shielded unless clearly erroneous.

In re D.H. (quoting In re J.S.)

Relying on Syllabus Point 3 (in part) of In re D.H. (which quotes Syllabus Point 3 of In re J.S.), the Court reiterated that the West Virginia Rules of Evidence “allocate significant discretion to the trial court” in evidentiary rulings. This principle was dispositive of the father’s relevance-based challenges: the Supreme Court treated the circuit court as the proper gatekeeper for relevance and efficiency during adjudication.

Thomas v. Morris

The Court used Syllabus Point 6 (in part) of Thomas v. Morris to interpret the statutory concept of domestic violence as including conduct that creates “fear of physical harm,” which can be established through harassment, psychological abuse, or threatening acts. This authority supported treating threats and intimidation—without necessarily proving physical injury—as domestic violence.

In re Emily

Citing In re Emily, the Court emphasized the circuit court’s role as the finder of fact “charged with weighing the credibility of witnesses.” This undercut the father’s attempt to re-litigate witness credibility on appeal. Once the circuit court found the father “not credible” on whether domestic violence occurred, appellate intervention was unlikely absent clear error.

In re Lilith H.

The father argued In re Lilith H. stands for a rule that a single domestic-violence incident cannot support adjudication. The Court explicitly rejected that characterization, explaining that Lilith H. addressed an “unexpected and isolated” altercation and found the facts “too attenuated” from household domestic violence that can ground an abuse/neglect adjudication. In In re F.L., by contrast, evidence included repeated fighting in the child’s presence and specific acts (throwing liquid, spitting, threats to burn the home), making the domestic violence neither merely “unexpected” nor “attenuated.”

In re F.S.

The Court invoked In re F.S. to articulate the meaning of “clear and convincing” evidence—proof producing a “firm belief or conviction” in the factfinder. The decision uses this standard to frame (but ultimately uphold) the adjudicatory findings about substance use and failure to protect.

In re Tiffany Marie S.

Syllabus Point 1 (in part) of In re Tiffany Marie S. supplied the “clearly erroneous” test for reviewing factual findings. The Court quoted the classic formulation: even if there is supporting evidence, a finding is clearly erroneous only when the reviewing court has a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” That high bar was not met on this record.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Evidentiary rulings: relevance, efficiency, and the trial court’s gatekeeping role

The father’s principal procedural argument was that he was prevented from developing impeachment evidence: “amicable” text messages between mother and paternal grandmother (to suggest the visit was not characterized by constant conflict) and additional exploration of alleged inconsistencies between mother’s adjudicatory testimony and the domestic-violence-court filings (petition/DVPO).

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two steps:

1. Texts to a third party were not clearly of consequence to the core adjudicatory fact: whether domestic violence occurred “between the mother and the petitioner.” Even assuming cordial messages existed, the circuit court could reasonably find they did not materially illuminate whether threatening, intimidating, or abusive conduct occurred between the parents.
2. Cumulative or marginal impeachment may be curtailed when the key documents are already admitted: because the DV petition and DVPO were admitted into evidence and “considered,” the circuit court could weigh any discrepancies without extended cross-examination or reading passages into the record. The Supreme Court treated this as a permissible exercise of discretion to manage proceedings and avoid needless cumulative development.

Although the opinion references Rules 401–403 in a footnote (relevance and discretionary exclusion of even relevant evidence), its holding is practical: adjudication is not a free-ranging impeachment trial; the circuit court may confine evidence to what meaningfully bears on statutory abuse/neglect elements.

B. Domestic violence as statutory child abuse: “one or more” acts and fear-based harm

The opinion’s core substantive move is its statutory integration:

• W. Va. Code § 49-1-201 defines an “abused child” to include a child whose welfare is harmed or threatened by “domestic violence” as defined in § 48-27-202.
• W. Va. Code § 48-27-202(3) defines “domestic violence” as “the occurrence of one or more” enumerated acts between family/household members, including creating fear of physical harm by harassment, psychological abuse, or threatening acts.
• W. Va. Code § 48-27 -204(6) expands “family or household members” to include persons who have a child in common, regardless of marriage or cohabitation—important here because father lived out of state and did not reside with mother and child.

The Court then applied those definitions to credited testimony: frequent arguing in the child’s presence, derogatory name-calling, intimidation (“standing over” mother), throwing liquid, refusing to relinquish the child, spitting, and a threat to burn down the house if law enforcement were called. Under the statutory definition (and Thomas v. Morris), such threats and psychologically abusive behavior can constitute domestic violence because they create fear of physical harm.

Importantly, the Court rejected the father’s proposed rule that a “single incident” cannot support adjudication. The statutory language (“one or more”) and the Court’s treatment of In re Lilith H. indicate the legal inquiry is fact-sensitive: whether the incident(s) demonstrate domestic violence threatening the child’s welfare—not how many incidents can be counted.

C. Substance use and “conditions at filing”: clear-and-convincing evidence with deferential review

The father correctly invoked W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i), which requires adjudicatory findings be based on “conditions existing at the time of the filing of the petition” and proved by clear and convincing evidence. The Court accepted the legal premise but found no clear error in the circuit court’s application.

The evidentiary basis the Supreme Court highlighted was not a laboratory-confirmed drug screen at filing, but (1) mother’s testimony about past use and suspicion of use during the relevant March 2024 visit (sleeping excessively), (2) father’s own testimony that mother displayed drugs and invited him to use them, and (3) father’s subsequent choices relevant to protection—he did not seek custody in his DV petition, did not contest/appeal the DVPO granting mother temporary custody, and left the child with mother when he returned out of state.

This reasoning reflects a broader doctrinal point: in abuse/neglect adjudication, “failure to protect” can be inferred not only from direct evidence of drug use, but from a parent’s knowledge of risk and the parent’s response (or lack of response) to that risk, evaluated through credibility findings and surrounding conduct.

3.3. Impact

• Domestic violence as a stand-alone adjudicatory basis is reinforced: By tying § 49-1-201 directly to § 48-27-202 and emphasizing “one or more” acts, the decision supports adjudication where domestic violence (including threats/psychological abuse) threatens a child’s welfare—even without proof of repeated physical assaults.
• In re Lilith H. is narrowed as a fact-bound attenuation case: Litigants may continue to cite Lilith H., but In re F.L. clarifies it does not create a numerical “single incident” bar. Future disputes will likely focus on whether the violence was truly “unexpected and isolated” and “too attenuated,” not on counting incidents.
• Trial courts retain wide leeway to manage adjudicatory evidence: The opinion validates excluding marginal impeachment (e.g., third-party texts) and limiting cumulative cross-examination where the underlying documents are already admitted. Practically, this may encourage tighter, element-focused adjudications and discourage satellite credibility contests.
• Out-of-state/nonresident parenting does not insulate from “family or household member” status: The statutory definition covering people who have a child in common—regardless of cohabitation—supports jurisdictional and substantive reach in DV-based abuse/neglect theories involving nonresident parents.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Adjudication vs. disposition: “Adjudication” answers whether the child is abused/neglected and whether a parent is an abusing/neglecting parent. “Disposition” decides the remedy (e.g., improvement period, termination). Father attacked adjudication rulings while appealing from the termination order.
• “Abusing parent”: Not a label for bad behavior in general; it is a statutory status (W. Va. Code § 49-1-201) assigned after the court adjudicates that the parent’s conduct constitutes abuse/neglect as alleged in the petition.
• Domestic violence includes threats and psychological abuse: Under W. Va. Code § 48-27-202(3), domestic violence is not limited to physical injury. Creating fear of physical harm through harassment, psychological abuse, or threats can qualify.
• Relevance (Rules 401 and 403): Evidence must make a consequential fact more or less probable (Rule 401). Even relevant evidence can be excluded if it wastes time or is needlessly cumulative (Rule 403). The opinion treats the excluded/limited evidence as not sufficiently consequential (or sufficiently necessary) to warrant expanded development.
• Standards of proof and review: “Clear and convincing” is the burden at adjudication; “clearly erroneous” is the deferential appellate standard for factual findings. Thus, a parent can lose on appeal even with competing evidence if the circuit court’s account is plausible and credibility-based.

5. Conclusion

In re F.L. affirms three practical rules in West Virginia abuse-and-neglect litigation: (1) circuit courts have broad discretion to limit marginal or cumulative evidence at adjudication, especially where documents are admitted and the factfinder can weigh inconsistencies without extended examination; (2) domestic violence—as statutorily defined to include threats and psychological abuse creating fear of harm—can support an abuse/neglect adjudication, and the law does not impose a categorical “single incident” bar; and (3) adjudicatory findings about risk, substance use, and failure to protect will rarely be overturned when supported by testimony and credibility determinations, given the clearly-erroneous standard.

The decision’s broader significance lies in its integrated reading of the child welfare statutes and domestic violence statutes: conduct that constitutes domestic violence between co-parents, even absent cohabitation and even where the primary harm is fear-based and emotional, may threaten a child’s welfare and justify adjudication—and, if unremedied, termination.