In re A.O. and J.O.: Guilty-Plea Admissions and Statutory Imputation Permit Adjudication of Siblings (Including After-Born Children) Without Creating a Jurisdictional Defect

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (Memorandum Decision) — Issued January 29, 2026

1. Introduction

In re A.O. and J.O. arises from an abuse and neglect proceeding in Marshall County involving Petitioner Mother J.N. The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) filed an abuse and neglect petition after allegations that the mother used excessive corporal punishment against her stepchild, M.O., causing extensive bruising across the child’s body. At the time of the abuse, the mother’s biological child A.O. lived in the home; during the mother’s incarceration for the abuse, she gave birth to J.O.

The key appellate issues were whether the circuit court erred by: (1) adjudicating A.O. and J.O. as abused and/or neglected when A.O. was not the direct victim and J.O. had not yet been born; (2) denying a post-dispositional improvement period; and (3) terminating parental rights based on “no reasonable likelihood” of correction in the near future.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the termination of the mother’s parental rights to A.O. and J.O. The Court held that:

  • The circuit court’s alleged failure to make child-specific findings at adjudication did not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
  • The mother’s guilty plea to child abuse and the sentencing court’s finding under West Virginia Code § 61-8D-9 supported adjudication of A.O. and J.O., even though they were not the direct victim and even though one child was born after the abuse.
  • The denial of a post-dispositional improvement period was proper because the mother failed to acknowledge the problem and continued to minimize and externalize blame.
  • Termination was proper under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) because there was no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future and termination was necessary for the children’s welfare.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)

The Court invoked In re Cecil T. (Syl. Pt. 1) for the governing appellate standard of review in abuse and neglect cases: factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. This framework mattered because the mother’s appeal largely challenged how the circuit court drew inferences from the guilty plea, the statutory scheme, and the mother’s credibility at disposition.

Syl. Pt. 4, in part, In re R.M., -- W. Va. --, 923 S.E.2d 352 (2025)

In re R.M. supplied the Court’s answer to the mother’s “jurisdiction” argument. The mother framed the absence of child-specific adjudicatory findings as a subject matter jurisdiction defect. Relying on Syl. Pt. 4 (in part), the Court clarified that although specific findings explaining how each child is harmed or threatened are a statutory prerequisite to move forward to disposition, they are not a requirement for establishing or maintaining subject matter jurisdiction.

In practical terms, In re R.M. separates (a) procedural/statutory sufficiency at adjudication from (b) the court’s power to hear the case at all. That distinction foreclosed the mother’s attempt to convert an alleged findings deficiency into a jurisdictional “void” argument.

In re H.B., -- W. Va. --, 922 S.E.2d 350 (2025)

In re H.B. strongly influenced the Court’s treatment of sibling risk and “imputed” abuse. The opinion quotes In re H.B. for the proposition that the statutory definition of an abused child allows abuse to “be automatically imputed from one child to others in the home.” That proposition is anchored in West Virginia Code § 49-1-201(1)(A), which includes within “abused child” a child whose welfare is threatened by a parent who inflicts physical injury “upon the child or another child in the home.”

Applying In re H.B., the Court held A.O. was threatened because she resided in the home where M.O. was physically abused. Further, the Court extended the “threatened welfare” logic to J.O. despite his being born after the abusive incident, emphasizing that the severity and repeated nature of abuse, coupled with lack of accountability, creates an ongoing risk profile to any child in the parent’s care.

In re H.B., No. 11-0651, 2011 WL 8193595 (W. Va. Sept. 13, 2011) (memorandum decision)

The Court cited this earlier memorandum decision to reinforce that adjudication may be proper as to an after-born child when there is severe abuse of a sibling, a guilty plea to such abuse, and continued denial of culpability—because “the risk ... was too great.” The citation functions as a fact-pattern analogue: it normalizes the inference of risk to infants and after-born children in light of demonstrated violent parenting and lack of insight.

In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013) (quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004))

These cases supplied the controlling improvement-period principle: a parent must acknowledge the underlying problem; otherwise the problem is “untreatable,” making an improvement period futile “at the child’s expense.” The Court used this precedent to uphold the denial of a post-dispositional improvement period where the mother minimized her conduct and blamed a young child for “caus[ing] her to ‘snap.’”

In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (2002)

The Court cited In re Tonjia M. for the circuit court’s discretion to refuse an improvement period when “no improvement is likely.” Here, the discretion was justified by evidence that the mother, despite services and claimed mental-health progress, lacked the insight and accountability necessary for safety-based reunification.

Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 201 W. Va. 381, 497 S.E.2d 531 (1997)

This case anchored the appellate deference afforded to trial courts on credibility. The mother’s narrative relied on framing the abuse as isolated and externally provoked. The circuit court rejected that account based on injury evidence and text messages; Michael D.C. supported the Supreme Court’s refusal to “second guess” credibility determinations.

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980))

These cases supplied the termination rule: termination may occur “without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives” when there is “no reasonable likelihood” that conditions can be substantially corrected. The Court used that principle to affirm termination where the mother’s failure to accept responsibility made remediation unlikely and the children’s welfare would be threatened by return.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Jurisdiction vs. statutory findings

The mother’s principal procedural argument attempted to reframe an alleged deficiency in child-specific findings as a subject matter jurisdiction flaw. The Court rejected this by applying Syl. Pt. 4 (in part) of In re R.M.: even if specific findings are a statutory prerequisite to proceed, they do not control the existence of the circuit court’s jurisdiction. Thus, the pathway to relief required showing substantive adjudicatory error, not a jurisdictional collapse.

(b) Guilty plea and the statutory “abusing parent” finding

The adjudication and disposition were substantially driven by the mother’s criminal case: she pled guilty to three counts of child abuse resulting in injury under West Virginia Code § 61-8D-3(a). Under West Virginia Code § 61-8D-9, the sentencing court found she was “deemed to be an abusive custodian and/ or parent” within the meaning of § 49-4-601 through § 49-4-610 as to M.O., A.O., and J.O.

In the abuse and neglect case, the circuit court treated the guilty plea as triggering an admission: the mother “accepted a plea offer ... trigger[ing] an admission in this case.” The Supreme Court approved this approach, effectively recognizing that a plea-based finding under § 61-8D-9 can supply (and strongly corroborate) adjudicatory facts and risk findings in the parallel civil child-welfare proceeding.

(c) Imputation of abuse/risk to siblings, including an after-born child

The Court’s sibling adjudication analysis had two reinforcing pillars:

  • Statutory definition of “abused child” (W. Va. Code § 49-1-201(1)(A)): a child is abused if their welfare is harmed or threatened by a parent who inflicts physical injury upon “the child or another child in the home.” This supports imputing risk from the injured child to other children affected by the same caregiver environment.
  • Case law on imputation and risk assessment: In re H.B. recognizes “automatic” imputation; the 2011 In re H.B. memorandum decision demonstrates that an after-born child may be adjudicated when the parent’s severe abuse history and denial indicate enduring danger.

On these facts, A.O. was in the home during the abuse, making the “threatened welfare” inference direct. For J.O., the Court treated the abuse history plus continued minimization/blame as demonstrating a present and forward-looking risk, not merely a past wrong tied to a single victim.

(d) Improvement period denial: accountability as the gatekeeping requirement

The Court affirmed denial of a post-dispositional improvement period because, under In re Timber M. (quoting In re Charity H.), acknowledgment is foundational to treatability. The mother’s testimony—minimizing, rationalizing, and blaming the child—allowed the circuit court to find that the core issue (violent/abusive response to child behavior) was not meaningfully engaged. Under In re Tonjia M., the court had discretion to deny an improvement period where likely benefit was lacking.

(e) Termination: “no reasonable likelihood” and necessity for welfare

The Court applied West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d) (defining “no reasonable likelihood”) and § 49-4-604(c)(6) (authorizing termination when no reasonable likelihood exists and termination is necessary for welfare). It emphasized the mother’s inadequate capacity to solve the abuse problem even with help, as evidenced by continued denial/minimization. It then relied on In re Kristin Y. (quoting In re R.J.M.) for the proposition that less restrictive alternatives need not be used when the statutory termination criteria are met.

3.3. Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision, the opinion has practical doctrinal and litigation impact in West Virginia abuse and neglect practice:

  • Clarifies litigation framing after In re R.M.: parties should not expect “missing findings” arguments to succeed as jurisdictional attacks; instead, they must be litigated as statutory compliance/substantive adjudication issues.
  • Reinforces criminal-civil linkage under § 61-8D-9: a plea and the sentencing court’s “abusing parent” finding can serve as powerful, sometimes dispositive, evidence in the abuse and neglect adjudication/risk analysis.
  • Expands confidence in sibling/after-born adjudications: the decision underscores that risk-based adjudication is forward-looking; a child need not be a direct victim, nor even alive at the time of the predicate abuse, if the abusive conduct and lack of accountability demonstrate enduring danger.
  • Signals strict accountability expectations for improvement periods: the decision reiterates that services and diagnoses (e.g., depression/postpartum depression) do not substitute for accepting responsibility when abuse is severe.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjudication vs. disposition: Adjudication answers “Did abuse/neglect occur (or is the child threatened)?” Disposition answers “What should the court do now (services, placement, termination)?”
  • Subject matter jurisdiction: The court’s basic power to hear a type of case. Even if a court makes an error in required findings, that usually does not mean it lacked jurisdiction to act at all.
  • “Imputed” abuse / threatened welfare: West Virginia law allows a court to find a child abused when a parent injured “another child in the home,” because the non-injured child’s safety is still threatened by the same caregiver.
  • Improvement period: A court-supervised chance for a parent to correct problems. Courts commonly require the parent to acknowledge the problem; without that, treatment is unlikely to work.
  • “No reasonable likelihood”: A legal conclusion that the parent likely cannot fix the abuse/neglect conditions soon enough to meet the child’s safety and permanency needs, even with help.

5. Conclusion

In re A.O. and J.O. affirms a termination of parental rights grounded in severe physical abuse of one child, the mother’s guilty plea and sentencing findings under West Virginia Code § 61-8D-9, and the statutory/case-law framework permitting sibling risk to be inferred—even as to an after-born child. The decision also reinforces that child-specific findings issues do not equate to subject matter jurisdiction defects, and that meaningful accountability is a prerequisite to improvement periods and a central predictor in “no reasonable likelihood” determinations.