1. Introduction
In In re A.C., the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia rejected an informal circuit court policy requiring parents subject to certain abuse-and-neglect dispositions to return after one year for potential modification. That policy could not substitute for the statutory requirements governing modification or shift the burden onto a parent to demonstrate rehabilitation.
The petitioner, M.D., challenged an order terminating her parental rights to A.C. The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) had sought termination after an earlier disposition left the child with her nonabusing father while preserving the mother’s parental rights. Although DHS initially pursued termination, it conceded on appeal that the evidence did not establish a material change of circumstances or that termination served the child’s best interests. The guardian ad litem also supported reversal.
The decision establishes three connected points: modification requires clear and convincing evidence of both materially changed circumstances and the child’s best interests; placement with a nonabusing parent cannot be treated as a temporary placement under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(5); and any post-termination visitation order must address the child’s rights rather than leave visitation entirely to the other parent’s discretion.
2. Background and Procedural History
The original abuse-and-neglect proceeding
DHS filed its petition in August 2023 after M.D. failed to comply with a safety plan. The plan followed an incident in which she recorded a video threatening self-harm while A.C. was present. M.D. stipulated that mental-health and substance-abuse problems impaired her parenting and judgment. She was adjudicated an abusing parent and received a post-adjudicatory improvement period.
The incorrectly labeled initial disposition
In February 2024, M.D. submitted a document titled “Disposition 5 Agreement,” acknowledging that she was then unable to provide adequately for A.C. Although described as an agreement, the document bore only her signature; the dispositional order nevertheless recorded that all parties agreed to the disposition.
After determining that M.D. knowingly and voluntarily waived a contested dispositional hearing, the circuit court purported to proceed under § 49-4-604(c)(5). It preserved her parental rights but left full legal, physical, and residential custody with A.C.’s nonabusing father. The court also ordered the parties to return in one year to address modification and scheduled a hearing on an anticipated modification motion.
The modification proceeding
DHS subsequently moved to terminate M.D.’s parental rights, principally alleging that she had not remedied the original problems or demonstrated consistent treatment. At the April 2025 hearing, the mother and guardian sought continuation of the existing arrangement. The father was also amenable to continuation, while requesting treatment and drug testing.
The evidence included the father’s discovery of a straw in M.D.’s purse during the preceding summer. He perceived it as drug paraphernalia. M.D. said she had confiscated it from someone at a Narcotics Anonymous meeting to prevent that person from using drugs. The father stopped overnight visits but later permitted other visits. He testified that he had never suspected M.D. was under the influence when she arrived to see A.C.
M.D. denied using substances during the intervening year. Crucially, the assigned child protective services worker testified that “nothing ha[d] changed” and that M.D. had “continued to stay the same.” The worker also confirmed that DHS filed its motion to comply with the circuit court’s one-year policy.
Nevertheless, the circuit court found a material change, relying on purported possession of methamphetamine and paraphernalia, treatment deficiencies, and failures to provide negative drug screens. Its May 8, 2025, order terminated M.D.’s parental rights.
4. Analysis
A. The statutory framework
| Provision |
Function in the decision |
| West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(5) |
Authorizes temporary placement when a parent is presently unwilling or unable to meet the child’s needs. It does not encompass the placement with a nonabusing parent involved here. |
| West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) |
Governs the intended termination of the mother’s custodial rights. The Court also emphasized its requirement concerning the absence of a reasonable likelihood that abuse or neglect conditions can be substantially corrected in the near future. |
| West Virginia Code § 49-4-606(a) |
Permits modification upon clear and convincing evidence of a material change of circumstances and that modification is in the child’s best interests. |
| Rule 46, West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Abuse and Neglect Proceedings |
Allows a motion to modify or supplement a disposition “at any time,” subject to limited exceptions; it does not impose the circuit court’s automatic one-year requirement. |
B. Precedents cited and their influence
In re K.S., 253 W. Va. 154, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026)
Syllabus Point 1 supplied the three-part standard of appellate review. Substantive abuse-and-neglect rulings, including termination decisions, receive abuse-of-discretion review; supporting factual findings receive clear-error review; and legal questions and statutory interpretation receive de novo review.
This framework distinguished the circuit court’s discretion over disposition from its obligation to follow the governing law and make evidence-supported findings. Discretion did not permit the court to dispense with § 49-4-606(a), and factual deference did not require acceptance of findings contradicted by the record.
In re H.B., 252 W. Va. 350, 922 S.E.2d 350 (2025)
The Court relied on the explanation at 252 W. Va. 362 n.18, 922 S.E.2d 362 n.18, that subsection (c)(5) does not encompass placement with a nonoffending parent. Its significance was foundational: before considering modification, the Court had to identify what disposition the original order actually accomplished.
Because A.C. remained in her father’s sole custody, the “Disposition 5” label could not control. The intended arrangement instead involved termination of M.D.’s custodial rights under subsection (c)(6).
In re R.G., No. 20-0509, 2021 WL 2366886 (W. Va. June 9, 2021) (memorandum decision)
This memorandum decision reinforced the same distinction. At *1 n.4, it explained that an arrangement labeled a section 5 disposition appeared actually to terminate the mother’s custodial rights under subsection (c)(6), because the child was placed with a nonabusing father rather than in a guardianship.
The Court used this closely analogous treatment to support looking beyond terminology to the legal substance of the placement. The parties’ agreement on a label could not make an inapplicable statutory provision govern.
Freeland v. Marshall, 249 W. Va. 151, 895 S.E.2d 6 (2023)
At 249 W. Va. 160, 895 S.E.2d 15, this decision recognizes the judiciary’s obligation to independently examine a confession of error. DHS’s appellate concession therefore did not itself require reversal.
The Court reviewed the evidence and statutory prerequisites before accepting the concession as meritorious. This preserved the distinction between a party’s changed litigation position and the court’s own determination that reversible error occurred.
In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001)
Syllabus Point 5 requires a disposition to be vacated and the case remanded when the statutory and rule-based process for abuse-and-neglect dispositions has been substantially disregarded or frustrated.
This precedent supplied the principal remedial rule. The one-year policy did more than introduce an administrative irregularity: it prompted a modification motion without the necessary changed circumstances and effectively displaced the statutory allocation of proof. The resulting disposition therefore could not stand.
In re K.S., 246 W. Va. 517, 874 S.E.2d 319 (2022)
This earlier decision, distinct from the 2026 case bearing the same name, governed visitation on remand. At 246 W. Va. 530–31, 874 S.E.2d 332–33, it identifies post-termination visitation as the child’s right and rejects an order leaving visitation to the nonoffending parent’s discretion.
The Court applied that principle to the appealed order’s provision placing visitation in the father’s sole discretion. The amended order had to properly delineate visitation. The opinion did not itself prescribe a schedule or direct unrestricted contact.
C. Legal reasoning
1. The original disposition mattered more than its label
The Court first corrected the premise that M.D. had received a valid subsection (c)(5) disposition. The distinction mattered because that subsection concerns temporary placement outside a parent’s custody, whereas A.C. was already living with her nonabusing father.
Recognizing the arrangement as a termination of custodial rights under subsection (c)(6) preserved the intended separation between custody and broader parental status. It also prevented the inaccurate “Disposition 5” label from supporting a later, legally unfounded route to full termination.
2. Continuing problems were not proof of a material change
DHS’s original theory emphasized that M.D. had not corrected the conditions underlying the abuse-and-neglect case. But a modification proceeding requires a comparison with circumstances at the prior disposition. A showing that concerns persist is not necessarily a showing that circumstances have materially changed.
The record sharply illustrated that distinction. DHS’s counsel said the agency could not see a material change in M.D., and the CPS worker testified that nothing had changed. Those statements undermined the very prerequisite DHS needed to establish.
The Court did not hold that an additional year of parental conduct can never be material. It held that this record failed to establish the required change.
3. Suspicion could not sustain the circuit court’s findings
The circuit court treated the straw incident as evidence of methamphetamine possession and possible continued use. The Supreme Court found the supporting testimony insufficient for those findings. The father’s concern was relevant, but he also testified that he had not suspected intoxication during visits.
Likewise, concerns about treatment records and testing did not relieve DHS of proving a material change. The decision did not require the Court to find M.D.’s explanation persuasive in every respect; it required the Court to determine whether DHS had established the statutory grounds for modification. It had not.
4. Best interests remained a separate requirement
Section 49-4-606(a) requires both materially changed circumstances and a modification serving the child’s best interests. DHS conceded that “no evidence” established that the requested modification and termination served A.C.’s best interests, and the Court accepted its confession after independent review.
This requirement could not be replaced by general concerns about M.D.’s progress or an abstract appeal to permanency. Nor did A.C.’s secure placement with her father automatically establish that ending the mother’s remaining parental rights would benefit the child.
5. The one-year policy improperly altered the statutory process
The policy effectively placed affected parents on an unsupervised, year-long improvement period after disposition. At its end, they were expected to demonstrate that they had resolved the original concerns, even though the modification statute placed the relevant evidentiary burden on the party seeking modification.
The Court also identified a structural flaw: scheduling a hearing on an anticipated modification motion presumed that someone would file such a motion regardless of whether legal grounds later existed. DHS’s acknowledgment that it filed in good faith to comply with the policy demonstrated that risk.
The holding does not categorically prohibit a hearing occurring one year after disposition. It rejects an automatic modification requirement that overrides statutory prerequisites or shifts the burden of proof.
D. Potential impact
- More disciplined modification practice: Parties seeking modification must identify evidence of changed circumstances and explain why the proposed change benefits the child, rather than rely on elapsed time or unresolved historical concerns alone.
- Limits on local procedural policies: Trial courts cannot use informal case-management practices to create substantive deadlines or burdens absent from statewide statutes and rules.
- More accurate dispositional orders: Courts and counsel must distinguish temporary placements under subsection (c)(5) from termination of custodial rights under subsection (c)(6), particularly when a nonabusing parent retains custody.
- Preservation of statutory safeguards: A parent’s failure to prove rehabilitation cannot automatically become affirmative proof that full termination is warranted.
- Child-centered visitation orders: Courts must address visitation judicially rather than delegate the entire decision to the custodial parent.
The decision does not immunize an existing disposition from later modification. A properly supported motion remains available under the governing law. Its central limitation is that modification must rest on evidence and statutory findings, not an automatic anniversary review.