Implied Public Access to an Open Attached Garage During Construction Defeats a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Case: State v. Golberg, 2026 ND 11 (N.D. Jan. 29, 2026)
Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota
Disposition: Affirmed (Jensen, J.; Crothers, J., dissenting)

1. Introduction

State v. Golberg addresses when law enforcement (and accompanying social-services personnel) may enter an attached garage to reach an interior door without a warrant, and whether evidence discovered thereafter must be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution.

The investigation began as a welfare/assault-related inquiry at the home of Christopher Golberg’s then-girlfriend, Shantel Lais. Social workers and a detective approached the residence, entered through an open overhead garage door, and knocked on an interior door leading into the home. Lais ultimately admitted them, and the detective later located conditions and items supporting criminal charges, including allegations of firearms and open alcohol within reach of a two-year-old child and the presence of drugs/paraphernalia.

Golberg moved to suppress, arguing the detective’s entry into the garage was unlawful and tainted any subsequent consent and search. After a jury trial, Golberg was convicted only of child neglect. On appeal, he challenged (1) the suppression ruling and (2) the sufficiency of evidence supporting willful child neglect.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The majority’s reasoning sits at the intersection of (i) “implied license” cases allowing officers to approach a home in the same manner as the public and (ii) garage/curtilage privacy cases recognizing heightened protection for areas intimately connected to the home.

1) Foundational search principles and suppression framework

• State v. Gothberg and State v. Terrill (quoted in Gothberg): Reaffirm that the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 8 protect against unreasonable searches and seizures.
• State v. Nguyen (quoting State v. Mittleider): A “search” occurs when the government violates a reasonable expectation of privacy; both subjective and objective reasonableness are required.
• State v. Pogue, State v. Holly, and State v. Bachmeier: Explain the exclusionary rule’s function and deterrent rationale and provide the standard of review for suppression rulings (deference to factual findings; legal questions reviewed fully).
• City of Jamestown v. Casarez and City of Fargo v. Sivertson: Allocate burdens on suppression—defendant must make a prima facie case; then the State must justify its conduct.

2) Reasonable expectation of privacy / “standing” as framed by North Dakota law

• State v. West, State v. Oien (quoting State v. Huether): A defendant generally cannot invoke a third party’s rights; “standing” is shorthand for whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
• State v. Williams: Used by the Court to illustrate that privacy expectations can terminate (hotel rental expiration), supporting the idea that context and duration matter.
• Mead v. Hatzenbeller: Appellate courts generally will not address issues not presented to the district court; used to reject the State’s newly emphasized “visitor” argument on appeal.

3) Threshold/curtilage and “impliedly open to use by the public” doctrine

• State v. Kitchen (relying on Payton v. New York): The home’s entrance is a constitutional “firm line,” but the “threshold” can be fact-specific. Officers may, in some circumstances, enter an enclosed entryway as a member of the public would if it is the only access.
• State v. Winkler (quoting State v. Crea): Police may enter certain curtilage areas “impliedly open to use by the public,” but this is highly fact dependent.

4) Garage cases and the majority’s distinguishing approach

• State v. Blumler: Suppression affirmed where an officer chose to enter a closed garage to use an interior door despite other exterior entrances, including a front door. The majority uses Blumler as the “do not do this” scenario—entering a garage when a more direct public entrance exists.
• State v. Kochel: Found an addition to be an integral part of the home; a “no hunting or trespassing” sign clarified it was private and not impliedly open to the public. The majority distinguishes Kochel because there was no express sign and because the garage here allegedly functioned as the primary access point due to construction.

5) Dissent’s garage-privacy line of cases

The dissent places decisive weight on the proposition that garages are “intimate” residential areas where privacy is ordinarily expected, citing:

• State v. Blumler (core garage privacy statement)
• Lubenow v. N.D. State Highway Comm'r and State v. Manning (cited in Blumler)
• State v. Winkler (open, unattached garage still protected)

The dissent argues the majority’s analysis effectively converts the absence of a “no trespassing” sign into an inference of public invitation, and further contends that whether the garage door is open should not itself defeat privacy (especially given Winkler).

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The Court’s core move: characterizing the garage as the “public-facing” access point

The majority frames the question as whether officers crossed into a space where a reasonable expectation of privacy existed. It accepts the district court’s factual findings that (i) the overhead garage door was open; (ii) ongoing construction eliminated an apparent front-door option; (iii) the garage “functioned as the main access point”; and (iv) alternative entrances were uncertain or would require approaching the back of the home.

On those facts, the majority treats the garage less like a private storage/residential area and more like an enclosed entryway—akin to the enclosed access path in State v. Kitchen—and concludes officers “entered the home as any member of the public would enter.”

2) Procedural discipline: rejecting a newly sharpened “standing” claim on appeal

Although the State argued on appeal that Golberg lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy because he was a visitor and claimed at trial he did not live there, the Court declined to decide that issue because the suppression-hearing record was not developed on the point and the issue was not raised in the district court during suppression proceedings, citing Mead v. Hatzenbeller.

3) The dissent’s counter-move: garages are categorically intimate; the State must overcome that presumption

The dissent asserts the majority misidentifies the relevant “threshold” inquiry. In the dissent’s view, North Dakota precedent already answers the key question: an attached garage is part of the protected home area (State v. Blumler), and even an open unattached garage can be protected (State v. Winkler). Therefore, the State should have been required to produce specific facts showing the garage was actually or impliedly open to the public by the occupant’s conduct—not by prior entry by social workers.

The dissent would not treat the absence of a “no trespassing” sign as evidence of invitation and warns the majority’s approach risks shifting the burden onto residents to post signs or otherwise affirmatively preserve privacy in intimate residential spaces.

4) Sufficiency of evidence: willfulness inferred from presence and duration

Applying the deferential sufficiency standard from State v. Guthmiller (quoting State v. Noble), the Court held the jury could reasonably infer willfulness from Golberg’s admission he was present in the home for several hours, notwithstanding his testimony that he did not notice the home’s condition.

C. Impact

1) Practical rule emerging from the majority’s approach

The decision signals that an attached garage may be treated, in narrow circumstances, like a publicly implied access route when:

• the overhead door is open;
• construction or layout makes the garage appear to be the “main access point” (or the only apparent route to contact occupants); and
• officers approach for legitimate business and proceed in a manner consistent with how an ordinary visitor would attempt contact.

This is not a broad holding that “open garage = no privacy,” but it meaningfully expands the set of facts under which entry into an attached garage can be upheld as non-search conduct (or at least as not violating a reasonable expectation of privacy).

2) Litigation consequences: fact development at suppression hearings becomes critical

• For defendants: The case underscores the importance of building a suppression record about home layout, available doors, signage, customary visitor routes, and whether the public is in fact invited to use the garage.
• For the State: The Court’s refusal to entertain an undeveloped expectation-of-privacy/“standing” theory on appeal encourages prosecutors to raise and litigate that issue at the suppression stage, not later.

3) Doctrinal tension: garage privacy vs. implied license

The dissent highlights a fault line likely to recur: whether the “impliedly open to use by the public” framework (porches/vestibules/entryways) can be extended to garages without collapsing the garage-privacy principle recognized in State v. Blumler and State v. Winkler. Future cases may turn on:

• how “primary entrance” is proven (objective visitor patterns vs. state-actor habits);
• whether other entrances exist and are reasonably accessible;
• whether the garage is configured as a pass-through entry (e.g., mudroom-style) versus storage;
• whether occupants manifested privacy expectations (signage, closed doors, barriers, fencing, or explicit directions).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Reasonable expectation of privacy: A person must actually expect privacy, and society must view that expectation as reasonable. If either fails, government intrusion may not count as a “search.”
• Curtilage: The area immediately around the home associated with domestic life (yards, porches, sometimes attached structures). It often receives home-like Fourth Amendment protection.
• Implied license / “impliedly open to use by the public”: Officers (like any visitor) may approach a home by the normal route to contact occupants (e.g., walkway, front steps). The fight is over what counts as the “normal route” on particular property.
• Exclusionary rule: A remedy suppressing illegally obtained evidence to deter police misconduct; not itself a personal constitutional “right,” but a judicially created sanction.
• Fruit of the poisonous tree: If an initial illegality occurs (the “poisonous tree”), later evidence derived from it (the “fruit”) may be suppressed—unless the connection is sufficiently attenuated or an exception applies.
• Rule 29 motion (N.D.R.Crim.P. 29): A request for judgment of acquittal arguing the evidence is legally insufficient for a conviction.
• Standards of review: Appellate courts defer to factual findings if supported by competent evidence, but review legal conclusions (like whether facts amount to a Fourth Amendment violation) independently.

5. Conclusion

State v. Golberg affirms a child neglect conviction while providing a consequential Fourth Amendment/Article I, section 8 clarification: an attached garage may be treated as a public-facing access route—and thus outside a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy—when the garage is open and functionally serves as the home’s main entrance under the circumstances (here, due to ongoing construction and apparent lack of a front door).

The majority’s decision strengthens the “implied access” rationale in unusual residential layouts, while the dissent warns this approach risks eroding the traditional protection for garages recognized in State v. Blumler and State v. Winkler. The decision’s lasting significance will likely be in future suppression disputes where garages, mudrooms, and nontraditional entry configurations blur the “threshold” line and where courts must decide whether police conduct truly mirrored ordinary public access—or instead intruded into a protected intimate residential space.