Immigration Reopening: The BIA Must Address Equitable Tolling and Distinguish Waivers from U Visas

Case: Robert Panton v. Todd W. Blanche
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Docket: No. 25-2528
Decided: November 10, 2026
Opinion: Judge Easterbrook, joined by Judges Scudder and Lee

1. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision concerns the obligation of an immigration agency to address the relief actually requested and explain its decision on legally relevant grounds. The court held that the Board of Immigration Appeals could not reject an untimely reopening motion while overlooking an express request for equitable tolling, confuse a request for an inadmissibility waiver with an application for a U visa, and leave a separate request for discretionary closure unanswered. Government counsel’s subsequent arguments could not substitute for the Board’s missing analysis.

Robert Savio Panton entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1970, when he was four years old. A 1992 conviction for participation in a large-scale drug conspiracy resulted in a life sentence. After a district court granted compassionate release in 2020, immigration officials initiated removal proceedings. Panton unsuccessfully sought protection based on the Convention Against Torture, and the Seventh Circuit previously denied review of his removal order.

The present proceedings concerned another possible avenue of immigration relief: a U visa for qualifying crime victims who assist law enforcement. Panton had survived a shooting after others suspected that he had informed on his criminal associates. He sought a U visa, together with relief from the inadmissibility barriers that would otherwise prevent him from benefiting from it.

The decision does not establish that Panton must receive a visa, a waiver, or reopening. Its precedential significance lies in enforcing reasoned agency decision-making and preserving the distinction between statutory eligibility, discretionary relief, and the procedures through which those questions must be considered.

2. Background and Procedural History

  1. Removal proceedings: Following compassionate release, Panton was ordered removed to Jamaica. His pending U-visa application did not prevent issuance of that order under 8 C.F.R. §214.14(c)(1)(ii).
  2. Earlier judicial review: The Seventh Circuit rejected his challenge to the removal order in a nonprecedential disposition issued on June 15, 2023.
  3. Requests for inadmissibility relief: Because the opinion treated his conviction and removal order as barriers to admission, Panton sought waivers through both the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice.
  4. Delayed certification: After approximately three years, the New York Police Department issued a certification on December 11, 2023, confirming that Panton had been the target of attempted murder, had assisted the investigation, and had positive equities.
  5. Motion to reopen: Panton asked the Board to reopen proceedings and remand so that an Immigration Judge could consider the new information in connection with a waiver. Because the ordinary 90-day filing period had expired, he expressly requested equitable tolling based on the certification delay.
  6. Alternative procedural relief: Panton also sought discretionary closure of the removal proceedings while Homeland Security considered his U-visa application.
  7. Board decision and judicial review: The Board denied reopening. Panton petitioned for review, and the government acknowledged substantial errors in the Board’s reasoning while arguing that those errors were harmless.

By the time of this decision, Panton had been removed to Jamaica. His U-visa application remained pending. His location outside the United States became relevant to whether a requested waiver could operate prospectively to permit his return.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded to the Board. It identified three central defects:

  • Failure to consider equitable tolling: The Board incorrectly stated that Panton had not claimed an exception to the 90-day deadline and treated reopening on its own initiative as the only remaining possibility.
  • Confusion between different forms of relief: The Board relied on USCIS’s exclusive authority to issue U visas, although Panton was asking an Immigration Judge for a waiver of inadmissibility, not for issuance of the visa itself.
  • Failure to address alternative relief: The Board did not mention his request for discretionary closure.

The government proposed alternative statutory reasons why Panton might be ineligible for a Justice Department waiver. Those arguments raised unresolved questions about waiver authority and the meaning of “seeking admission.” Because the Board had not addressed those questions, the court declined to resolve them as a basis for affirmance.

On remand, the Board must address Panton’s arguments and the government’s responses. It need not reconsider reopening sua sponte, which it had already declined and which the court described as unreviewable.

4. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Visa Issuance and Inadmissibility Waivers Are Separate Decisions

The Board’s principal conceptual error was to treat authority over the ultimate immigration benefit as equivalent to authority over a preliminary obstacle to that benefit.

A U visa is available under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(U) to qualifying victims of crime who assist law enforcement. USCIS, within Homeland Security, decides whether to issue that visa. But an applicant may also need a waiver of inadmissibility. The opinion identifies separate waiver provisions associated with Homeland Security, 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(14), and the Attorney General, 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(3)(A).

Existing Seventh Circuit decisions recognize waiver authority within the Justice Department, including authority exercised by Immigration Judges. The precise boundaries of that authority remain disputed, but those disputes cannot be resolved simply by observing that Immigration Judges do not issue U visas.

The distinction also has procedural importance. The opinion contrasts the review available for adverse Immigration Judge decisions with the regulatory finality of Homeland Security waiver denials under 8 C.F.R. §212.17(b)(3). That difference explains why Panton pursued both routes rather than relying exclusively on his pending Homeland Security application.

B. The Filing Deadline Did Not Eliminate the Tolling Question

Under 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), a motion to reopen ordinarily must be filed within 90 days of the Board’s original decision. But the court emphasized that this deadline is not jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled.

Those propositions did not establish that Panton deserved tolling. They established that the Board had to consider his express request instead of treating lateness as automatically dispositive. His explanation—that delayed action by New York officials prevented him from presenting the certification earlier—required evaluation rather than denial by omission.

The court carefully left the merits open. The Board might conclude that the certification was not as necessary as Panton claimed or that discretionary relief was unwarranted. What it could not do was falsely state that he had never requested an exception to the deadline.

C. The Chenery Principle Prevented Affirmance on Counsel’s New Rationale

The decisive administrative-law principle was that an agency decision must ordinarily stand or fall on the reasons the agency itself supplied. A reviewing court does not replace defective agency reasoning with a new theory developed by government counsel during litigation.

Here, counsel’s harmless-error argument required consideration of statutory questions the Board had never addressed: whether Panton was “seeking admission,” whether his waiver request was prospective or retroactive, and whether the Attorney General retained the relevant authority after immigration responsibilities were transferred to Homeland Security.

These were not minor explanatory additions to a sound decision. They were possible alternative grounds for denying relief. Because they remained unresolved and potentially consequential, the court followed the ordinary course of remanding for agency consideration.

The opinion does not abolish harmless-error review in immigration cases. It rejects its use here, where affirmance would have required the court to supply a materially different rationale and decide unsettled questions in the first instance.

D. Panton’s Removal Complicated the Government’s Eligibility Argument

The government principally argued that someone lawfully admitted decades earlier, who later becomes inadmissible, is not “seeking admission” within 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(3)(A)(ii). On that theory, the Attorney General’s waiver provision would not apply.

The court identified two difficulties. First, the argument sat uneasily with the government’s position in other litigation concerning inadmissible people already inside the country. Second, Panton was no longer inside the United States. Having been removed to Jamaica, he could argue that he sought a prospective waiver to return, rather than a retroactive cure for his earlier presence.

The court did not accept that argument on the merits. It explained why the government had not shown that the Board’s errors necessarily made no difference.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. The Earlier Removal Decision

Panton v. Garland, No. 21-2346 (7th Cir. June 15, 2023), was the nonprecedential disposition denying review of Panton’s removal order. It supplies procedural background rather than the governing rule for this petition. The current case concerns the later denial of reopening, not a renewed merits decision on his Convention Against Torture claim.

B. Equitable Tolling and Nonjurisdictional Deadlines

Mejia-Padilla v. Garland, 2 F.4th 1026, 1034 (7th Cir. 2021), establishes that the reopening deadline can be extended on equitable grounds. It directly undermined the Board’s assumption that expiration of 90 days left only reopening on the Board’s own initiative.

Ramos-Braga v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 871, 876 (7th Cir. 2018), supports the related conclusion that the deadline is not jurisdictional. This matters because a nonjurisdictional limitation does not necessarily foreclose consideration of a recognized equitable exception.

Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025), concerned the separate judicial-review deadline in 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(1). The court cited it by analogy: its holding that this deadline is nonjurisdictional reinforces a broader caution against automatically treating immigration filing periods as limits on adjudicatory power. The opinion’s suggestion that similar reasoning may apply to other Title 8 deadlines is broader commentary, not a holding resolving every such deadline.

C. Justice Department Authority to Waive Inadmissibility

L.D.G. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2014), is foundational to the court’s recognition that Immigration Judges and other Justice Department officials can grant inadmissibility waivers. It also preserved a question concerning retroactive relief. In Panton’s case, it supplied both an established basis for rejecting the Board’s categorical confusion and a possible analogy for a prospective waiver permitting reentry.

Baez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 2017), reinforced the circuit’s waiver-authority precedent. It nevertheless left open whether all relevant Attorney General authority had passed to Homeland Security. The present opinion treated that institutional question as unresolved rather than silently deciding it against Panton.

Baez-Sanchez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1033 (2020), is cited as enforcing the earlier Baez-Sanchez v. Sessions decision. Its inclusion underscores that the circuit’s recognition of waiver authority was an operative precedent the agency could not disregard.

Jimenez-Rodriguez v. Garland, 996 F.3d 190 (4th Cir. 2021), and Meridor v. Attorney General, 891 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2018), are cited as agreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s recognition of Justice Department waiver authority. They show that the distinction between visa issuance and waiver adjudication is supported beyond this circuit, although they do not resolve every question concerning Panton’s eligibility.

Sunday v. Attorney General, 832 F.3d 211, 214 (3d Cir. 2016), supplied a possible limitation: only Homeland Security may be able to provide a retroactive waiver to someone who sought relief after becoming inadmissible while inside the country. The court discussed this as a potentially relevant distinction, not as a rule conclusively disposing of Panton’s case.

D. The Meaning of “Seeking Admission”

Cirrus Rojas v. Olson, 183 F.4th 909 (7th Cir. 2026), held that inadmissible individuals detained inside the United States, rather than at the border, could not be treated as seeking admission for mandatory-detention purposes under 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(2)(A). The government’s waiver argument suggested a possible parallel application of that reasoning.

But that analogy created tension with earlier waiver decisions involving individuals apprehended after entering the country. The government’s position in this case also differed from its position in the detention litigation. The court highlighted the inconsistency without deciding how the statutory provisions should ultimately be reconciled.

Roney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104, was pending before the Supreme Court, with certiorari granted on October 1, 2026, according to the opinion. It was cited as a proceeding that might clarify the correctness of the rule in Cirrus Rojas v. Olson. Because no merits ruling was identified, it supplied context for uncertainty rather than controlling law. The court also noted that clarification might not determine Panton’s situation because he was already abroad.

E. Agency Reasons and the Ordinary Remand Rule

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943), and SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196–97 (1947), provide the central rule: the validity of administrative action depends on the grounds invoked by the agency, not substitute reasons offered by counsel. These decisions explain why the government’s new statutory arguments could not rescue the Board’s nonresponsive decision.

FDA v. Wages & White Lion Investments, L.L.C., 604 U.S. 542, 586–91 (2025), supplies recent Supreme Court support for both the agency-reasons requirement and the ordinary practice of remanding when the stated rationale is deficient. Its role was to confirm that the court should return unresolved matters to the responsible agency rather than construct an alternative decision.

Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009), Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006), and INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002), reinforce that remand approach in the immigration setting. As used here, they support allocating first-instance consideration to the agency rather than having the reviewing court decide issues the agency failed to address.

F. Reopening on the Board’s Own Initiative

Anaya-Aguilar v. Holder, 683 F.3d 369, 371–73 (7th Cir. 2012), supports the court’s statement that the Board’s refusal to reopen sua sponte is not judicially reviewable. It therefore limits the remand: the Board must address the overlooked motion-based arguments but need not revisit its refusal to act on its own initiative.

Shah v. Holder, 736 F.3d 1125, 1126 (7th Cir. 2013), explains the linguistic problem with a “request to reopen sua sponte.” Action taken in response to a litigant’s request is not, literally, action on the tribunal’s own initiative.

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 553–54 (1998), offers an analogous observation concerning a motion to recall an appellate mandate sua sponte. Its relevance is to the distinction between party-requested action and genuinely self-initiated action, not to U-visa eligibility.

6. Potential Impact and Limits

Reasoned Treatment of Reopening Motions

The decision gives applicants a clear basis to challenge Board decisions that treat an untimely motion as necessarily dependent on unreviewable, self-initiated reopening despite an express tolling argument. The Board must distinguish between rejecting an equitable argument and failing to recognize that it was made.

More Precise Treatment of Related Immigration Remedies

The opinion reinforces that a visa application, an inadmissibility waiver, and discretionary closure are distinct requests. An agency’s lack of authority over one does not itself answer whether it may grant another. Future decisions must identify the particular remedy and the statutory authority governing it.

Limits on Litigation-Based Repair of Agency Decisions

The ruling discourages reliance on appellate counsel to reconstruct an inadequate administrative decision. Particularly where proposed alternative grounds involve unresolved statutory interpretation, the agency must ordinarily consider and explain those grounds itself.

Substantive Waiver Questions Remain Open

The decision does not settle whether Panton qualifies as someone seeking admission, whether his requested waiver is properly prospective, or the full extent of the Attorney General’s remaining waiver powers. It likewise does not require a favorable exercise of discretion.

Nor does it establish that delayed law-enforcement certification always warrants tolling, that a pending U-visa application prevents removal, or that certification guarantees a visa. The immediate result is a renewed administrative decision-making process, not immigration relief itself.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

U visa
An immigration classification for certain crime victims who satisfy statutory requirements, including qualifying assistance to law enforcement. Certification supports the application but is not itself a visa.
Inadmissibility waiver
Permission to overcome a legal barrier to admission or an immigration benefit. Removing that barrier does not automatically grant the underlying benefit.
Motion to reopen
A request to return to an already decided immigration case so that additional material or arguments can be considered.
Equitable tolling
A doctrine that may permit consideration of an otherwise late filing because of qualifying circumstances. Panton’s entitlement to it remained undecided.
Nonjurisdictional deadline
A filing limit that does not itself define the tribunal’s basic power to hear the matter. It remains enforceable but may accommodate recognized exceptions.
Chenery principle
A reviewing court ordinarily evaluates an agency decision using the agency’s stated reasons, not a new justification supplied by its lawyers.
Harmless error
An error that does not affect the outcome. The government could not establish harmlessness here without relying on unresolved issues the Board had not considered.
Prospective and retroactive waivers
A prospective waiver concerns a future admission or benefit; a retroactive waiver seeks to cure an earlier problem. Panton’s removal made the prospective characterization potentially important.
Discretionary closure
A procedural means of putting proceedings aside rather than deciding the underlying immigration benefit. It is not itself permission to remain or return.
Sua sponte
Latin for action taken on a tribunal’s own initiative, rather than in response to a party’s motion.

8. Conclusion

Robert Panton v. Todd W. Blanche principally reaffirms established administrative-law safeguards in the immigration-reopening context. The Board must address an expressly raised tolling argument, distinguish a waiver request from a visa application, and consider separately requested procedural relief.

The Seventh Circuit required a reasoned agency decision, not a favorable outcome for Panton. Its broader significance is that administrative discretion remains accountable to accurate characterization of the record, consideration of material arguments, and explanations supplied by the agency itself.