Hughes v. Stancil: Military Ineligibility Triggered by Federal Policy Is Not “Custody Pursuant to” a State Judgment Under § 2254

1. Introduction

In Hughes v. Stancil (10th Cir. July 23, 2026), petitioner Marshall Hughes sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after a Colorado conviction for felony criminal mischief involving an act of domestic violence. Hughes alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), asserting that trial counsel failed to investigate and present testimony from the bar’s head of security—evidence Hughes believed would have undermined the complainant’s credibility and supported an alternative theory that the complainant caused the hotel-room damage.

The district court dismissed the petition on jurisdictional grounds, concluding Hughes was not “in custody” as § 2254 requires. On appeal, Hughes argued that—although he was not physically restrained—his conviction effectively barred him from future military service and therefore imposed a qualifying restraint. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but on a narrower, decisive statutory ground: even if the military bar were “custody,” it was not custody “pursuant to the judgment of a State court,” because it flowed from Army policy, not from the Colorado judgment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit held that federal habeas jurisdiction under § 2254 requires not only “custody,” but custody that is imposed pursuant to the state court judgment being challenged. Hughes’s asserted harm—future ineligibility to serve in the military—derived from an Army regulation/policy, and the Colorado judgment did not impose or even contemplate that consequence. Therefore, the petition did not satisfy § 2254(a), and federal courts lacked statutory authority to consider the IAC claim on the merits.

The court treated the dismissal as one for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and reviewed de novo. It affirmed the dismissal and explicitly declined to address the merits of Hughes’s IAC allegations.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) The “in custody” requirement and its timing

  • Erlandson v. Northglenn Mun. Ct., 528 F.3d 785 (10th Cir. 2008): The court relied on Erlandson for the proposition that § 2254 “requires habeas petitioners to be ‘in custody’ under the conviction or sentence under attack when they file the petition,” and for the procedural treatment of such dismissals as Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional dismissals subject to de novo review. Erlandson also supplied the appellate principle that the court may affirm on any ground supported by a sufficient record.
  • Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2004): Quoted (via Erlandson) for the timing/relationship rule (“in custody” under the conviction attacked). More importantly, Broomes informed the “pursuant to” analysis by distinguishing restraints imposed by the challenged judgment from consequences “beyond the control and responsibility” of the convicting court—i.e., truly collateral consequences. (The opinion notes Broomes was “abrogated on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010),” leaving its relevant custody analysis intact.)

2) “Pursuant to the judgment of a State court” is narrower than “but-for” causation

  • Walck v. Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2007): Cited for the construction that “judgment of a State Court” in § 2254 refers to the conviction and sentence. This framed the court’s central inquiry: whether the complained-of restraint was part of, or imposed by, the state conviction/sentence.
  • Carthen v. Workman, 121 F. App'x 344 (10th Cir. 2005): Used persuasively to support the same statutory requirement that custody be “pursuant to” the challenged state judgment.
  • United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000): Quoted through Broomes for the principle that consequences “beyond the control and responsibility” of the convicting court are collateral and do not establish § 2254 jurisdiction.

3) Comparative authority distinguishing “direct” judgment-imposed restraints from collateral consequences

  • Piasecki v. Court of Common Pleas, 917 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2019): The court treated Piasecki as instructive because it emphasizes the jurisdictional significance of whether the restraint is included in or imposed pursuant to the judgment. In Piasecki, sex-offender registration was jurisdictionally salient because the written judgment stated that the petitioner “would be required to register,” making registration a “direct consequence” imposed “pursuant to—and included in—the judgment.” The Tenth Circuit contrasted that with Hughes’s situation, where the Colorado judgment did not include any term about military eligibility.
  • Wright v. State, 47 F.4th 954 (9th Cir. 2022): Cited for the crisp rule that “mere but-for causation is not enough to establish custody ‘pursuant to’ a state court judgment.” This bolstered the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that even if the conviction is a factual trigger for federal consequences, that does not satisfy § 2254(a).

4) Supreme Court anchor: collateral consequences do not create § 2254 custody

  • Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989): The opinion invoked Maleng for the foundational teaching that collateral consequences of a conviction do not create statutory habeas jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit used Maleng to reject an expansive reading of “custody” and “pursuant to” that would sweep in downstream regulatory effects.

5) Tenth Circuit applications emphasizing causation is insufficient

  • United States v. Reymundo-Lima, 643 F. App'x 668 (10th Cir. 2016): Cited for the proposition (tracking Maleng) that a “causal relationship” between a conviction and an adverse consequence does not mean the person is “in custody” on that conviction for habeas jurisdiction.
  • Chiwanga v. Drummond, No. 23-5136, 2024 WL 2723273 (10th Cir. May 28, 2024): Cited as consistent, persuasive support reinforcing the same causation-insufficiency point.

6) Standard of review and affirmance on alternative grounds

  • Calhoun v. Att'y Gen. of Colorado, 745 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014): Cited for de novo review of jurisdictional dismissals and (via briefing) as a reference point for “collateral consequences.”
  • Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2007): Cited (through Erlandson) for the rule that the appellate court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record, even if not relied upon below.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in a tightly statutory sequence grounded in § 2254(a):

  1. § 2254 requires custody and a specific source of custody. The statute reaches only an application by a person “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” The court treated this as a two-part requirement: (i) some qualifying “custody,” and (ii) that custody must be attributable to the state judgment under attack (the conviction/sentence).
  2. The court assumed (without deciding) the contested “custody” question. Hughes argued that military ineligibility is a sufficient restraint to qualify as custody. The Tenth Circuit did not resolve whether that restraint meets the “custody” threshold, because it found the petition failed the independent “pursuant to” requirement.
  3. “Pursuant to” demands more than factual linkage. The court rejected Hughes’s “direct effect” characterization as essentially a but-for causation theory. Relying on Wright v. State and the logic of Maleng v. Cook, it held that even if the conviction is a necessary factual predicate for the Army’s rule to apply, that does not make the consequence imposed pursuant to the state judgment.
  4. The decisive factual/legal distinction: who imposed the restraint? The record contained “no indication” that the Colorado sentence contemplated any effect on Hughes’s military eligibility, and Hughes did not dispute that the prohibition on future service “was rendered by Army policy, not the state court.” That concession made the restraint quintessentially collateral—outside the convicting court’s judgment, control, and responsibility (as framed by Broomes and Gonzalez).
  5. Contrast with Piasecki’s judgment-incorporated regime. In Piasecki, the registration requirement was included in the judgment itself; therefore, it was imposed “pursuant to” the judgment. Hughes lacked that judgment-level hook.

C. Impact

Although designated as a nonprecedential “Order and Judgment,” the decision is likely to be influential in § 2254 litigation within the Tenth Circuit for its clear, practical framing of the “pursuant to” requirement:

  • Constraining habeas jurisdiction where the complained-of restraint is imposed by non-state actors. Petitioners who identify severe post-conviction consequences—professional bars, licensing restrictions, federal employment ineligibility, military consequences, or other regulatory disabilities—must show those restraints are imposed by, incorporated into, or legally attributable to the state judgment, not merely triggered by it.
  • Encouraging a record-focused inquiry into the judgment and sentence. The opinion implicitly instructs litigants and courts to scrutinize the written judgment and sentence (and any mandatory, judgment-attached obligations) to determine whether the challenged restraint is a “direct” judgment-imposed condition (as in Piasecki) rather than a collateral, third-party consequence.
  • Channeling some claims toward non-habeas remedies. Where the operative restraint is federal or administrative policy (here, Army policy), litigants may need to pursue relief through administrative processes or separate civil actions directed at the policy-maker—because § 2254 is not a general vehicle for redressing downstream regulatory harms tied to a conviction.
  • Preserving the merits/innocence questions for other forums. Even potentially substantial IAC allegations may never be reached if the petitioner cannot satisfy the custody and “pursuant to” gateways. This emphasizes that habeas doctrine can be dispositive independent of constitutional merits.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “In custody” (habeas): Not limited to being in jail. It can include certain legal restraints (e.g., parole/probation) that significantly restrict liberty. But not every negative consequence of a conviction qualifies.
  • “Collateral consequence”: A side effect of a conviction imposed by operation of law or policy outside the criminal judgment itself—such as some employment bars, immigration effects, or other regulatory disabilities. Collateral consequences generally do not create § 2254 jurisdiction.
  • “Pursuant to the judgment of a State court”: A source-of-authority requirement. The restraint must be imposed as part of (or by force of) the state conviction and sentence being challenged—not merely something that happened because the conviction exists.
  • But-for causation vs. legal imposition: “This wouldn’t have happened but for my conviction” is often true for many downstream harms. Habeas jurisdiction, however, requires that the challenged restraint be imposed by the judgment itself (or directly required by it), not simply triggered by it.
  • Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal: A case can be dismissed at the threshold if the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning it has no legal power to decide the dispute—even if the claim might otherwise be persuasive.

5. Conclusion

Hughes v. Stancil reinforces a jurisdictional boundary in federal habeas practice: § 2254 does not authorize federal courts to review state convictions where the petitioner’s asserted restraint stems from third-party policy rather than from the state judgment and sentence. By treating military ineligibility as a consequence imposed by Army policy—and not “pursuant to” the Colorado judgment—the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal without reaching the merits of Hughes’s ineffective-assistance claim. The decision’s key takeaway is doctrinally simple but practically decisive: to invoke § 2254, a petitioner must tie the complained-of custody to the state court judgment itself, not merely to the conviction as a factual trigger.