Henry v. Carrara: Clarifying the Obligation to Classify Nominal Spousal Maintenance as Rehabilitative or Permanent

I. Introduction

The Vermont Supreme Court’s entry order in Kara Henry v. Jason Carrara, No. 25-AP-155 (Dec. Term 2025), arises from a divorce following the husband’s criminal conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct with his step‑daughter. Although issued by a three‑justice panel and expressly designated as non‑precedential, the decision provides a useful synthesis and application of Vermont law in two areas:

• Equitable distribution of marital property where nearly all significant assets are titled to one spouse and that spouse has committed serious misconduct against a child in the household; and
• Spousal maintenance practice, particularly the requirement that trial courts clearly specify whether a maintenance award—even a nominal one—is rehabilitative or permanent, and, if rehabilitative, impose a definite time limit.

The appeal was brought by the husband, who challenged (1) the award to the wife of a parcel of real property (the “Route 103 property”) used for his trucking business and acquired before the marriage, and (2) the structure of the spousal maintenance award. The Supreme Court:

• Affirmed the property division, including the transfer of the Route 103 property to the wife; and
• Affirmed the wife’s entitlement to maintenance and the use of a nominal award, but remanded for the family division to clarify whether the maintenance is rehabilitative or permanent and, if rehabilitative, to set a time limit.

The result highlights the breadth of judicial discretion in Vermont property division and, more importantly, reinforces and refines earlier maintenance jurisprudence by insisting on clear classification of the nature and duration of alimony, even where only a token amount is ordered initially.

II. Overview of Facts and Procedural Background

A. The Marriage and Family

• Wife (Kara Henry) was 34; husband (Jason Carrara) was 41 at the time of divorce.
• The parties married in 2018.
• They have one joint child, A.C., born 2018.
• Husband adopted L.C., wife’s child from a prior relationship, born December 2014.

The parties “lived comfortably” during the marriage. Husband operated a trucking company and was the primary wage earner, with adjusted gross income between approximately $207,000 and $229,000 for 2022–2024. Wife worked as a medical assistant at Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center, earning about $47,648 annually.

B. Husband’s Criminal Conduct and Its Consequences

In 2023, husband was charged with lewd and lascivious conduct with a child for touching L.C.’s vagina. He pled guilty in September 2024 and received a 7–12 year sentence, all suspended except for two years’ incarceration.

Wife filed for divorce after the criminal charges were filed. During husband’s incarceration, his parents operated his trucking business for him without pay. His ongoing monthly expenses of about $452 for property maintenance were paid by the business, while wife’s monthly personal expenses were about $4,799 plus $1,350 for the children.

C. The Marital Estate

The marital estate consisted largely of real property and business-related assets held in husband’s name:

• Marital home in Chester, Vermont
  • Value: $281,900
  • Mortgage: $124,287
  • Titled to husband
• Upper Bartonsville Road property (Rockingham)
  • Approx. 9 acres, log cabin (where husband’s parents live), and a garage used for truck maintenance
  • Value: $365,500
  • Husband’s parents hold a leasehold interest in exchange for advancing $170,000 toward the purchase price
• Route 103 property
  • Approx. 6 acres with a shed
  • Used for storage for husband’s trucking business
  • Value: $40,200
  • Acquired by husband before the marriage
• Retirement accounts
  • Wife: $43,300
  • Husband: $13,673
• Business equipment
  • Various large items of trucking equipment
  • Each encumbered by debt equal to its full value (i.e., no net equity)

There was no evidence introduced at trial of the value of husband’s trucking business as an ongoing enterprise. This left the real estate and retirement assets as the principal sources of divisible net value.

D. Trial Court’s Property Division

Applying the factors in 15 V.S.A. § 751(b), the family division awarded:

• To wife – total of approximately $163,990.81, including:
  • The Route 103 property ($40,200),
  • $50,000 equity interest in the marital home (husband retains title but owes wife $50,000),
  • Her own retirement account ($43,300), and
  • Some personal property.
• To husband:
  • The marital home, subject to wife’s $50,000 interest,
  • The Upper Bartonsville Road property,
  • Proceeds from a Jeep he sold after separation,
  • His checking and retirement accounts, and
  • Property owned by his business, including the encumbered equipment.

Husband was made solely responsible for the mortgage on the marital home and his personal and business debts.

E. Trial Court’s Spousal Maintenance Award

The family division found that wife met the criteria for spousal maintenance under 15 V.S.A. § 752(a) because:

• Her income was “barely sufficient” to meet her own and the children’s needs.
• She could not maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.
• She was the primary custodian of the children.

However, husband’s incarceration rendered him currently unable to pay meaningful maintenance. To address this tension, the court ordered:

• Spousal maintenance of $1.00 per month, starting May 1, 2025.
• Expressly noted that wife could move to modify maintenance upon husband’s release from prison.

Husband appealed the property division (focusing on the Route 103 property) and the maintenance award, specifically arguing that the court erred by not stating whether the maintenance was rehabilitative or permanent.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Vermont Supreme Court resolved the appeal as follows:

• Property division:
  • Held that the family division did not abuse its discretion in awarding the Route 103 property to wife, even though it was acquired before the marriage, used solely for husband’s business, and allegedly not desired by wife.
  • Emphasized the wide discretion afforded under 15 V.S.A. § 751 and the reasonableness of awarding wife roughly one-quarter of the net marital estate given the nature of the assets and husband’s serious abuse of the parties’ child.
• Spousal maintenance:
  • Affirmed that wife was entitled to maintenance under § 752(a).
  • Affirmed the use of a nominal $1/month award to preserve the court’s authority to modify maintenance in the future, per existing precedent.
  • Agreed with husband that the trial court erred by not specifying whether the award was rehabilitative or permanent.
  • Remanded for the family division to:
    • State clearly whether maintenance is rehabilitative or permanent; and
    • If rehabilitative, set a definite time limit for the award.

In all other respects, the divorce judgment was affirmed.

IV. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. Property Division Under 15 V.S.A. § 751

1. Legal Framework and Standard of Review

Vermont follows an equitable distribution regime, governed by 15 V.S.A. § 751. The statute requires the court to:

“equitably divide and assign the property” of the parties, considering twelve listed factors.

The key features of this framework are:

• All property is in the pot. Vermont treats virtually all property owned by either spouse at the time of divorce—including premarital and individually titled assets—as available for distribution.
• No presumption of equal division. The mandate is for an equitable, not necessarily equal, allocation.
• Wide trial court discretion. The Supreme Court reiterated its deferential standard, citing Jakab v. Jakab, 163 Vt. 575, 585 (1995):

  “The trial court has wide discretion in considering these factors, and its decision will be upheld unless its discretion was abused, withheld, or exercised on clearly untenable grounds.”

• Limited explanation requirement. Also from Jakab:

  “The court need not specify the weight given to each factor, but is required only to provide a clear statement as to what was decided and why.”

This framework leaves room for case-specific equity, including consideration of marital misconduct where it meaningfully affects the fairness of the division.

2. Application to the Route 103 Property

Husband argued that awarding wife the Route 103 property was an abuse of discretion because:

• He acquired it before the marriage;
• It was used exclusively for his trucking business (for storage); and
• Wife allegedly did not want the property.

The Supreme Court rejected this challenge, emphasizing several points:

• Premarital property is not immune from division. Under Vermont law, premarital property is part of the marital estate and can be assigned to the other spouse when equitable.
• Use as business property does not preclude transfer. The fact that the parcel functioned as a business storage site did not bar its allocation to wife:
  • The court noted that the Route 103 land had an assessed value of $40,200 and could be sold if wife needed funds.
  • Wife’s lack of “use” for the property was not determinative; what mattered was achieving an equitable share of net marital value.
• Need to give wife some real property. Because the “marital estate consisted primarily of real property and the equipment used in husband’s business,” and all such property was titled to husband, the court had to assign some of that property to wife to reach a fair distribution.
• Proportionate share. The $163,990 award to wife represented about 25% of the net marital assets. In light of the composition of the estate and the parties’ relative roles and circumstances, the Court found that ratio reasonable.

3. Role of Husband’s Criminal Abuse in the Equitable Analysis

A particularly significant aspect of the opinion is the explicit mention that, in weighing the statutory factors, the family division considered:

• That husband was the spouse “through whom all real property had been acquired,” and
• That he had abused the parties’ child.

While § 751(b) does not label “fault” as a stand‑alone factor, several of its criteria—such as the parties’ respective contributions, their economic circumstances, and any waste or dissipation of marital assets—allow the court to consider conduct that bears on fairness. Here, the husband’s criminal sexual conduct toward his minor step‑daughter (whom he had adopted) has at least two implications:

• Economic consequences. His incarceration materially affects the family’s finances, including wife’s need to support the children without his day‑to‑day presence and income.
• Equitable consequences. Serious abuse of a child in the marital household can weigh heavily in favor of awarding the non‑offending spouse a more secure property position, especially when that spouse is the primary caregiver tasked with long‑term protection and stability for the children.

By upholding the division, the Supreme Court effectively endorsed—and signaled its acceptance of—the trial court’s use of husband’s criminal abuse as part of the overall equity calculus under § 751(b).

B. Spousal Maintenance Under 15 V.S.A. § 752

1. Entitlement to Maintenance and Standard of Review

Section 752(a) allows the court to award maintenance, “either rehabilitative or long term in nature,” when two threshold criteria are met:

1. The spouse seeking maintenance lacks sufficient income or property to provide for reasonable needs; and
2. That spouse is unable to support herself or himself “through appropriate employment at the standard of living established during the civil marriage.”

Once those thresholds are satisfied, the court considers the factors in § 752(b) to set the amount and duration of maintenance. The Supreme Court reiterated the deferential standard of review, citing Gravel v. Gravel, 2009 VT 77, ¶ 23, 186 Vt. 250:

“The family court has considerable discretion in determining the amount and duration of maintenance once grounds for the award are established under the statutory criteria, and a maintenance award will be set aside only if there is no reasonable basis to support it.”

In this appeal, husband did not challenge:

• The finding that wife met the § 752(a) threshold; or
• The court’s authority to award nominal maintenance to preserve future modification power.

The dispute centered instead on the classification and structure of the nominal award.

2. Nominal Maintenance Awards and Arbuckle v. Ciccotelli

The trial court ordered maintenance of $1 per month, to begin May 1, 2025, and noted that wife could later seek modification. Husband accepted that Vermont law permits nominal maintenance as a jurisdiction-preserving device, consistent with Arbuckle v. Ciccotelli, 2004 VT 68, ¶ 8, 177 Vt. 104:

The court has authority to “award maintenance in a nominal amount, to preserve the court’s ability to modify the award later in the event of a ‘real, substantial, and unanticipated change in circumstances.’”

The rationale, as underscored by Arbuckle and followed here, is:

• Without any maintenance order, the court is generally divested of jurisdiction to grant maintenance after the divorce becomes final.
• A nominal order satisfies the statutory requirement that maintenance be awarded, allowing either party to seek increased or decreased maintenance upon an appropriate showing of changed circumstances under modification law.

In Henry v. Carrara, the combination of:

• Wife’s clear need for support;
• Husband’s current inability to pay due to incarceration; and
• The expectation that husband would have significant earning capacity upon release

made a nominal award a particularly apt tool to balance immediacy of need with present financial reality.

3. Rehabilitative vs Permanent Maintenance: Weaver, Justis, Cleverly, and Boisclair

The crucial legal issue—and the one that prompted remand—was the nature of the maintenance award. Vermont law, as summarized by the Court, recognizes three possibilities:

1. Rehabilitative maintenance – designed to help the recipient become self‑supporting, and time‑limited.
2. Permanent maintenance – an indefinite award, typically ending only upon:
   • Death of either spouse; or
   • Remarriage of the recipient.
3. Blended awards – combining elements of rehabilitative and permanent support where appropriate.

The Court’s synthesis rests on several key precedents:

• Weaver v. Weaver, 2017 VT 58, ¶ 15, 205 Vt. 66:

  “In a case where maintenance is appropriate, the court may award rehabilitative maintenance, permanent maintenance, or a blend of the two, as the circumstances of the case warrant.”

  “Rehabilitative maintenance is intended to assist the recipient spouse in becoming self-supporting… and is therefore limited in duration.” (¶ 16)

  Permanent maintenance may be appropriate “where the evidence does not support a finding that the recipient of rehabilitative maintenance will be able to support him or herself at the standard of living established during the marriage.” (¶ 17)

• Justis v. Rist, 159 Vt. 240, 242 (1992):

  Describes permanent maintenance as an indefinite award that ends upon death or the recipient’s remarriage.

• Cleverly v. Cleverly, 147 Vt. 154, 159 (1986):

  “[W]hen rehabilitative maintenance is appropriate in light of the circumstances and the factors listed in § 752(b), the court must impose a time limit.”

• Boisclair v. Boisclair, 2004 VT 43, ¶ 8 n.1, 176 Vt. 646 (mem.), overruled in part on other grounds by Pouech v. Pouech, 2006 VT 40, 180 Vt. 1:

  The Supreme Court will remand for clarification if there is uncertainty as to whether a maintenance award is permanent or rehabilitative.

4. The Problem in Henry v. Carrara: Implicitly Rehabilitative but Indefinite

The family division made statements that suggestedrehabilitative

• It observed that a maintenance award would “likely be short term,” citing statutory guidelines suggesting a duration of one to five years for a marriage of less than ten years.
• It found that after husband’s release from prison, he “would be able to meet his reasonable needs while also meeting the needs of [wife] and the children for some duration of time.”

These comments strongly imply a vision of maintenance as temporary support

Yet, critically, the court:

• Did not set any time limit on the maintenance award; and
• Did not explicitly state whether the maintenance was rehabilitative or permanent.

Under Cleverly and Boisclair, this is a defect:

• If the award is rehabilitative, the court must fix a termination date.
• If the decree is silent and the structure is ambiguous, the Supreme Court will remand for clarification.

Applying these rules, the Supreme Court held:

“We therefore remand the decision to the family division for it to specify whether the maintenance award is rehabilitative or permanent and, if rehabilitative, to set a time limit on the award.”

Notably, this insistence on clarity applies even where the current payment obligation is only $1 per month. The Court thus extends the Cleverly/Boisclair requirement to the context of nominal maintenance awards.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Property Division: Business and Premarital Assets in the Shadow of Criminal Conduct

Although this is a non‑precedential entry order, it reinforces several practical points for divorce practitioners in Vermont:

• Premarital and business-use property remain fully subject to equitable division.
  • A spouse cannot shield assets from distribution solely because they were acquired before marriage or used exclusively for a closely held business.
  • Where virtually all significant property is titled in one spouse’s name, courts may—and often must—assign some of those assets outright to the other spouse to achieve a fair share of the net estate.
• Serious marital misconduct affecting children can influence property outcomes.
  • The Court’s express acknowledgment that husband’s abuse of the parties’ child was a factor in the trial court’s analysis supports the view that such conduct may justifiably tilt the equities.
  • It does not mean that an abusive spouse automatically forfeits all property rights; rather, it confirms that the misconduct is a legitimate component of the nuanced equity assessment.
• Quarter-share awards can be upheld in short-to-moderate marriages.
  • Here, wife received roughly 25% of the net marital estate in a marriage of about seven years, with husband as the primary earner and property accumulator.
  • The Supreme Court readily affirmed this distribution, underscoring the broad range of possible “equitable” apportionments depending on the facts.

2. Maintenance: Stronger Expectations of Structural Clarity

On maintenance, the decision’s most important contribution is sharpening the obligation of trial courts to structure and label their awards clearly:

• Even nominal awards must be classified.
  • Courts cannot simply award “$1/month indefinite maintenance” without identifying whether it is rehabilitative or permanent.
  • Ambiguity will trigger remand, adding time and expense for the parties and the judicial system.
• Rehabilitative maintenance requires a clear end date.
  • If the circumstances—short marriage, younger recipients, realistic earning capacity—inherently point toward rehabilitation, the decree must state how long maintenance will last (subject to modification law).
  • This promotes predictability and reduces future litigation over the nature of the award.
• Incarceration does not eliminate future maintenance exposure.
  • The Court accepted that husband could not pay now, but endorsed the plan to allow wife to seek an increased award when husband is released and resumes his business activity.
  • Practically, payors should recognize that a period of incarceration may defer, but not necessarily extinguish, future maintenance obligations where the other spouse has unmet needs.

For family division judges, Henry v. Carrara serves as a reminder that:

• When issuing a maintenance order, they should:
  • Expressly state “rehabilitative,” “permanent,” or “a blend”; and
  • If rehabilitative in whole or part, specify the duration (e.g., “for five years”).
• These requirements apply regardless of whether the initial monthly amount is substantial or nominal.

V. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

1. Equitable Distribution vs. Equal Distribution

• Equitable distribution means the court divides property in a way that is fair, which may or may not be 50/50.
• Factors include length of marriage, contributions of each spouse (financial and non‑financial), economic circumstances, age and health, and sometimes conduct that affects fairness.
• Vermont does not have a rigid formula; judges exercise judgment within statutory guidelines.

2. Marital vs. Premarital Property in Vermont

• In some states, “marital property” includes only what is acquired during the marriage, while “separate property” (premarital, inherited, or gifted) is generally excluded from division.
• Vermont is different: virtually all property owned by either spouse at divorce—whenever and however acquired—can be divided.
• Premarital and individually titled property might be treated differently in the equity analysis, but they are not automatically protected from transfer to the other spouse.

3. Rehabilitative vs. Permanent Maintenance

• Rehabilitative maintenance:
  • Shorter term support.
  • Goal: allow the recipient to get education, training, or career progression needed to become self‑supporting at or near the marital standard of living.
  • Must have a defined end date, subject to modification based on changed circumstances.
• Permanent maintenance:
  • Indefinite support obligation.
  • Typically ends only on:
    • The death of either party, or
    • The recipient’s remarriage (unless the order states otherwise).
  • Appropriate when the recipient is unlikely ever to attain self-sufficiency near the marital standard of living (e.g., due to age, disability, or very long-term homemaker role).

4. Nominal Maintenance

• A nominal maintenance award is a very small payment (here, $1 per month) awarded not for its financial value but to:
  • Preserve the court’s jurisdiction to later increase or decrease maintenance if circumstances change significantly.
• Without any maintenance order, the court usually cannot award maintenance for the first time after the divorce is final.
• Nominal maintenance is therefore a way to “keep the door open” where:
  • The recipient clearly qualifies for maintenance;
  • The payor currently cannot pay; but
  • There is a reasonable expectation the payor’s capacity will improve.

5. “Real, Substantial, and Unanticipated Change in Circumstances”

• This is the standard for modifying an existing maintenance order.
• Examples may include:
  • Significant increase or decrease in either party’s income;
  • Serious health changes affecting earning capacity;
  • Unexpected job loss or windfall (like a large inheritance).
• Minor or expected changes generally do not suffice.

6. Non-Precedential Three-Justice Panel Decisions

• Vermont often resolves appeals via three‑justice panels, issuing “entry orders.”
• By court rule, such decisions are not binding precedent “before any tribunal.”
• Nonetheless, these decisions:
  • Regularly apply and clarify existing published precedent; and
  • Provide persuasive guidance to trial courts and practitioners about how the Supreme Court is likely to view similar issues.

VI. Conclusion

Henry v. Carrara sits at the intersection of family law, criminal conduct, and post‑incarceration economic realities. The Vermont Supreme Court’s entry order, while non‑precedential, underscores several important themes in contemporary Vermont divorce jurisprudence:

• Broad equitable powers in property division. The Court reaffirmed the family division’s wide latitude to assign premarital and business‑use property to the non‑titled spouse where necessary to achieve fairness, particularly when the other spouse’s severe misconduct has destabilized the family.
• Recognition of child abuse as an equity factor. The husband’s lewd and lascivious conduct toward his step‑daughter properly influenced the property division, reflecting the court’s concern with the welfare and stability of the custodial household.
• Clear structuring of maintenance awards. Building on Weaver, Cleverly, and Boisclair, the Court made plain that:
  • Every maintenance order must be explicitly identified as rehabilitative, permanent, or a blend; and
  • When rehabilitative maintenance is appropriate, a definite time limit must be included—even where the present payment is only nominal.
• Continued approval of nominal maintenance. The decision reaffirms that nominal awards, authorized by Arbuckle, are an appropriate and important tool when present ability to pay is lacking but future modification is foreseeable.

In sum, Henry v. Carrara illustrates the Vermont Supreme Court’s continued insistence on well‑reasoned, transparent family division orders, particularly in the structuring of spousal maintenance. For litigants and counsel, the case is a practical reminder: property and maintenance outcomes will be deeply fact‑specific, but the decrees must be drafted with precision as to both the nature and the temporal scope of any support obligations.