Heck-Based Deferred Accrual Extends to Certain FTCA Claims Challenging Prison Discipline

1. Introduction

This decision addresses the interaction between the Federal Tort Claims Act’s filing deadlines and the rule that certain damages claims cannot accrue until the underlying conviction, sentence, or disciplinary determination has been invalidated. Donte Parrish, a federal prisoner proceeding initially without counsel, sought damages from the United States for allegedly wrongful disciplinary proceedings and nearly three years of segregated confinement.

The district court dismissed his claims as untimely or administratively unexhausted. The Fourth Circuit reversed those procedural conclusions. Applying the principles of Heck v. Humphrey, it held that Parrish’s claims did not accrue before the disciplinary record was expunged on January 25, 2017, at the earliest. His complaint, filed in April or May 2017, was therefore timely under the court’s analysis.

The decision’s central qualification is important: the court independently concluded that Heck v. Humphrey extends to at least certain FTCA claims, but its treatment of all Parrish’s claims rested on the parties’ agreement that the rule applied to them. The opinion does not establish that every tort arising from prison confinement awaits disciplinary expungement before accruing.

2. Background and Procedural History

The disciplinary proceedings and confinement

Parrish was serving a 180-month federal sentence at USP Hazelton when inmate Jimmy Lee Wilson was killed during an altercation on December 6, 2009. After reviewing video footage, a prison official issued an incident report charging Parrish with “Killing (Code 100)” and “Being in an Unauthorized Area (Code 316).” Because of the seriousness of the allegations, the Bureau of Prisons referred the matter to the FBI and the United States Attorney’s Office and suspended its internal disciplinary process.

Parrish alleged that officials nevertheless confined him in restrictive administrative detention from December 2009 until November 2012. He claimed that he could not meaningfully contest the accusations during that period and that officials subjected him to racial harassment and caused physical and psychological injury.

Federal investigators declined to pursue criminal charges in June 2015. The BOP then resumed disciplinary proceedings, and a hearing officer initially found that Parrish committed the charged offenses. On June 3, 2016, a BOP Regional Director remanded the matter for another hearing. The remand decision incorrectly described the charge as “Assisting in Killing (Code 100A),” rather than “Killing (Code 100).”

The administrative claims

On January 25, 2017, a disciplinary hearing officer reheard the original charges and found that “[n]o prohibited act was committed,” explaining that the evidence was insufficient. The officer therefore ordered the incident report expunged.

The federal action

Parrish dated his complaint April 7, 2017, and asserted that he handed it to a prison official that day. Its envelope was postmarked May 1, and the district court received it on May 3. His amended complaint asserted five tort theories:

• False imprisonment;
• Abuse of process through the allegedly punitive use of administrative detention;
• Intentional infliction of emotional distress;
• Negligence in reviewing and ending his detention; and
• Malicious prosecution.

In January 2019, the district court held that claims presented in Claim 710 were untimely. Although it accepted the relevance of Heck v. Humphrey, it incorrectly treated the June 3, 2016 remand as the date of expungement. It also rejected Parrish’s prison-mailbox argument. The court initially allowed claims associated with Claim 283 to proceed because its denial lacked the filing-deadline notice.

In March 2020, however, the district court concluded that the amended complaint’s remaining claims had not been presented in Claim 283. Having excluded Claim 710 as untimely, it dismissed those claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The appeal initially encountered a separate jurisdictional obstacle involving Parrish’s notice of appeal. After the Supreme Court resolved that issue in his favor, the Fourth Circuit returned to the limitations and exhaustion questions addressed here.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The unanimous panel reached three principal conclusions:

1. The action was timely. The parties agreed that Heck v. Humphrey governed Parrish’s tort claims. Those claims did not accrue until the disciplinary record was expunged, on January 25, 2017, at the earliest. Every possible April or May filing date fell within six months of that date.
2. The exhaustion analysis had to be reconsidered. Because Claim 710 could no longer be excluded on limitations grounds, the district court had to consider whether that broader submission exhausted the claims in the amended complaint. At least some claims were exhausted, but the appellate court left the complete claim-by-claim determination to the district court.
3. Several alternative issues did not require resolution. The court did not decide whether satisfying either of § 2401(b)’s deadlines alone would suffice, nor did it resolve the disputed prison-mailbox filing date. It declined to entertain the government’s newly raised argument that Claim 710 had been submitted prematurely.

The judgment was vacated and the case remanded. Parrish obtained an opportunity to pursue his claims, not a ruling that the United States was liable.

4. Analysis: Precedents Cited

A. The foundation: deferred accrual and favorable termination

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)

This was the opinion’s controlling conceptual authority. It holds that a § 1983 damages claim attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until that conviction or sentence has been invalidated.

The Fourth Circuit emphasized the common-law foundation of that rule. The Supreme Court drew on malicious prosecution’s favorable-termination requirement to prevent parallel litigation over guilt and probable cause and to avoid a civil judgment inconsistent with an outstanding criminal judgment. The relevant principle is therefore broader than a procedural restriction peculiar to § 1983: a civil damages action generally should not operate as an indirect means of invalidating an existing judgment.

That reasoning supported extending deferred accrual to at least some FTCA claims. For Parrish, the parties agreed that the disciplinary record had to be expunged before his claims became cognizable. The Fourth Circuit accepted that agreement while independently explaining why the underlying principle could reach tort claims against the United States.

Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)

This decision extended Heck v. Humphrey to a prisoner’s procedural challenge that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary deprivation of good-time credits. Its importance here was to demonstrate that the doctrine is not confined to direct attacks on criminal convictions or original sentences.

The analogy helped connect Parrish’s disciplinary proceedings to the favorable-termination principle. It also identifies the limiting inquiry: whether success on the damages claim would necessarily undermine the disciplinary determination, rather than merely concern events occurring in prison.

B. Authorities addressing the FTCA’s two deadlines

Page v. Comey, 137 F.4th 806 (D.C. Cir. 2025)

The court cited Judge Henderson’s opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part for support for Parrish’s textual argument. Section 2401(b) uses “or” between two clauses, each introduced by “unless.” Parrish argued that satisfying either clause should therefore prevent the claim from being barred.

The Fourth Circuit acknowledged the argument’s linguistic force. Because the cited discussion was from a separate opinion, however, it was not presented as a controlling adoption of that interpretation. The panel ultimately left the issue unresolved.

The following decisions supplied the contrary, established interpretation: an FTCA claimant ordinarily must satisfy both the administrative-presentment deadline and the post-denial filing deadline.

• Sconiers v. United States, 896 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2018): Expressly states that both statutory conditions must be satisfied to bring an FTCA claim properly.
• Sanchez v. United States, 740 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2014): Reads the disjunctive wording as establishing two deadlines, both—not merely either—of which must be met.
• Ellison v. United States, 531 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 2008): Explains the logical relationship between a statute barring claims for failure to meet either requirement and a statute requiring compliance with both. Its formulation directly addresses the grammatical problem raised by Parrish.
• Houston v. U.S. Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1987): Holds that, despite the disjunctive phrasing, the claimant must present an administrative claim within two years and sue within six months after denial.
• Dyniewicz v. United States, 742 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1984): Describes the statute as creating two hurdles, with failure at either rendering the action time-barred.
• Willis v. United States, 719 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1983): Relies on legislative history to conclude that both deadlines apply. It supports interpreting the provision as a sequential administrative-and-judicial filing scheme.
• Schuler v. United States, 628 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam): Likewise requires compliance with both deadlines, reinforcing the breadth of the established interpretation.

The panel also considered relevant Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions:

• Raplee v. United States, 842 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2016): Held a complaint untimely because it was not filed within six months of agency denial. This suggested that Fourth Circuit precedent already followed the prevailing interpretation.
• Henderson v. United States, 785 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1986): Described the statutory periods conjunctively, providing further support for treating both as applicable.
• United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015): Was cited for the Supreme Court’s description of § 2401(b) as establishing two mandatory limitations periods. The panel did not rely on equitable tolling to resolve Parrish’s appeal.

Collectively, these authorities made Parrish’s alternative textual argument difficult to accept. Nevertheless, the court expressly avoided deciding it because deferred accrual independently resolved the timeliness issue.

C. Preservation and exhaustion

Richardson v. Clarke, 52 F.4th 614 (4th Cir. 2022)

This decision states the general rule that parties may not raise new arguments on appeal that were not presented below, absent exceptional circumstances. It supplied the basis for declining to consider the government’s contention that Parrish submitted Claim 710 before his claims accrued.

The consequence was procedural, not substantive. The court did not decide whether a pre-accrual administrative submission is valid; it held that the government’s new argument was not properly before it.

Estate of Van Emburgh ex rel. Van Emburgh v. United States, 95 F.4th 795 (4th Cir. 2024)

The court cited this decision when directing a renewed exhaustion inquiry. Its role was to anchor the remand in the governing FTCA administrative-exhaustion framework. The panel did not itself comprehensively match every tort theory against the administrative submissions or announce a new presentment standard.

D. The earlier appellate proceedings

Parrish v. United States, 74 F.4th 160 (4th Cir. 2023)

The Fourth Circuit’s earlier decision held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because of the timing of Parrish’s notice of appeal. That ruling explained the procedural interruption preceding the present merits review.

Parrish v. United States, 605 U.S. 376 (2025)

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Parrish’s previously filed notice automatically related forward when the district court reopened the appeal period. That decision restored the route to appellate review; it did not resolve FTCA accrual, exhaustion, or liability.

5. Analysis: Legal Reasoning

A. The statutory framework ordinarily involves two sequential steps

Section 2401(b) addresses both administrative presentment and the commencement of litigation. It refers to presenting a written claim to the appropriate agency within two years after accrual and beginning an action within six months after the agency mails its final denial.

Parrish argued that the repeated word “unless,” coupled with “or,” meant compliance with either deadline was enough. The court acknowledged the textual point but identified extensive contrary authority and legislative history. The cited 1966 Senate report described the amendment as requiring administrative presentment within two years and a court action within six months after the final agency decision.

The opinion therefore does not authorize claimants to disregard the six-month deadline simply because their administrative submission was timely.

B. The decisive question was when the claims became legally cognizable

The government’s original position treated October 7, 2016—the date of Claim 710’s denial—as the start of the six-month period. Under that approach, the disputed April 7 mailing date would determine whether the action survived.

The court instead focused on the agreed application of Heck v. Humphrey. If Parrish could not maintain the relevant damages claims while the disciplinary determination remained outstanding, their accrual awaited its invalidation. On the parties’ accepted premise, the court held that the six-month period did not begin before expungement.

This aspect of the reasoning should be read carefully. The statute ordinarily measures the six-month period from notice of final denial, not from accrual. Here, the court accepted a deferred starting point where the agency had denied the administrative claim before the claims became cognizable under the agreed Heck v. Humphrey framework. The opinion does not supply a comprehensive rule governing every possible mismatch between agency denial and later favorable termination.

C. A remand for rehearing was not expungement

The district court’s central factual error was treating the June 3, 2016 administrative remand as the invalidating event. That decision required further proceedings; it did not finally dispose of the original incident report.

The January 25, 2017 hearing, by contrast, resulted in a finding of insufficient evidence and an order expunging the report. The government conceded that January 25 appeared to be the correct accrual date, while suggesting that actual implementation of expungement on October 18, 2017 might provide an even later date. The court did not need to settle that distinction because it accepted January 25 as the earliest relevant date.

The distinction is consequential: an intermediate procedural victory is not necessarily the favorable termination required to permit an otherwise barred damages action.

D. Deferred accrual, rather than equitable tolling, resolved timeliness

Parrish sometimes described his position in terms of tolling. The court’s reasoning, however, concerned accrual: the claims had not yet become legally actionable. That differs from excusing delay after a limitations period has already started.

Accordingly, the decision did not depend on a separate showing warranting equitable tolling. Nor did it require a factual determination about whether Parrish gave his complaint to a guard on April 7. An April or May filing was timely under the accepted January 25 starting point.

E. Correcting timeliness necessarily reopened exhaustion

The district court’s exhaustion ruling depended on excluding Claim 710. Once that exclusion fell away, the broader administrative submission had to be considered.

The court recognized that at least some claims had been exhausted through Claim 710. But it did not hold that every reference to confinement automatically exhausted every later tort theory. On remand, the district court must examine the administrative submissions against the claims actually pleaded, rather than limit its review to Claim 283.

F. Important questions remained outside the holding

• Whether either of § 2401(b)’s deadlines, standing alone, can satisfy the statute;
• Whether Parrish’s complaint was filed on April 7 under the prison mailbox rule;
• Whether Claim 710’s submission before accrual presented a valid objection;
• Whether every pleaded tort was administratively exhausted; and
• Whether Parrish can establish substantive FTCA liability or damages.

The district court’s separate treatment of the defective denial notice for Claim 283 was background to the appeal, not the source of the appellate court’s principal new rule.

6. Potential Impact

Protection against premature expiration of claims

The decision protects claimants whose damages actions necessarily challenge an outstanding disciplinary determination. Under the court’s accepted framework, an agency denial cannot cause the relevant filing period to expire before the claims become actionable through favorable termination.

A bridge between civil-rights and FTCA doctrine

The opinion confirms that the rationale of Heck v. Humphrey is not confined categorically to § 1983 litigation. Its common-law foundation can also govern certain FTCA claims. Future courts must nevertheless determine which claims actually imply the invalidity of an existing judgment or disciplinary sanction.

Greater attention to procedural milestones

The distinction between a rehearing order and final expungement may be important in later cases. Counsel and courts must identify the event that actually invalidated the challenged determination, rather than assume that an earlier successful administrative appeal was sufficient.

Careful limits on the precedent

The government’s concessions materially narrowed the controversy. Future litigants cannot assume that all claims labeled false imprisonment, negligence, emotional distress, or abuse of process necessarily receive deferred accrual. The relationship between each claim and the outstanding disciplinary determination remains critical.

Likewise, the opinion should not be read as approving pre-accrual administrative presentment. That issue was left undecided because the government failed to raise it below.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Federal Tort Claims Act

A statute permitting certain damages actions against the United States for wrongful conduct by federal employees, subject to statutory conditions and limitations. It does not guarantee recovery merely because misconduct is alleged.

Accrual

The point when a claim becomes legally actionable. Here, the accepted rule delayed that point until the disciplinary determination was invalidated.

Favorable termination

An ending to the underlying proceeding that satisfies the legal requirement for bringing a later damages claim. The court treated the disciplinary expungement as the relevant event in this case.

Expungement

Removal of the disciplinary incident report from the prisoner’s record. The hearing officer ordered it after finding insufficient evidence.

Administrative exhaustion

Giving the responsible agency the required opportunity to address a claim before pursuing it in court. It is separate from whether the lawsuit was filed on time.

Prison mailbox rule

A filing rule under which delivery to prison officials for mailing can count as filing. The appellate court did not need to resolve its disputed application here.

Vacated and remanded

The lower court’s judgment was set aside, and the case was returned for further proceedings. This is not a judgment awarding damages.

8. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit held that the deferred-accrual principles of Heck v. Humphrey extend to at least certain FTCA claims. Applying the parties’ agreement that those principles governed Parrish’s claims, it found his action timely because he sued within six months of the earliest expungement date.

The decision also requires a renewed exhaustion analysis that includes Claim 710. Its broader significance is procedural: a claimant should not lose an otherwise covered damages action through a limitations calculation that precedes the claim’s legal cognizability. Liability, complete exhaustion, and the unresolved presentment questions remain for further proceedings.