Harmless Legal Misstatements at Revocation: Factual Finding of Two-Week Cohabitation Establishes Tennessee Sex-Offender “Primary Residence” Non-Registration

Case: United States v. Christopher Clough (6th Cir. July 28, 2026) (not recommended for publication)

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from the revocation of Christopher M. Clough’s supervised release after the district court found that he violated Tennessee’s sex-offender residence-registration requirements while on federal supervision for a prior federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) offense, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).

The key factual dispute was whether Clough was truly “homeless” as reported to probation, or whether he was living at Mark Phipps’s apartment for roughly two weeks without registering that address as required by Tennessee law. The key legal dispute was whether confusion at the revocation hearing about the details of Tennessee’s statutory definitions undermined the revocation decision.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that any misunderstanding of Tennessee law was harmless because the district court’s factual finding—that Clough lived at the apartment for “two weeks”—necessarily established a violation under the correct statutory framework, and the record amply supported that finding.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court upheld revocation under the abuse-of-discretion framework applicable to supervised-release revocations, concluding:

  • Harmless legal error: Even if the parties misstated aspects of Tennessee’s registration scheme at the revocation hearing, the district court’s core factual finding that Clough lived at Phipps’s apartment for two weeks made the legal mistake immaterial.
  • Sufficient evidence: The district court did not clearly err in finding Clough lived there for two weeks, relying primarily on Phipps’s recorded and written statements, corroborated by physical evidence (bags, notebook), police encounters at the apartment at 1:00 a.m., and Clough’s own texts admitting he kept “stuff” there and stayed at least some nights.
  • No “magic words” requirement: The district court’s use of “staying” was adequate; it conveyed the statutory concept of “abides, lodges, resides or establishes any other living accommodations.”
  • Knowledge: The court found no clear error in the inference that Clough “knowingly” failed to timely register, given his history of registration violations and evidence suggesting concealment (minimizing the number of nights, inconsistent explanations).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Standards of review in revocation cases

United States v. Kontrol, 554 F.3d 1089 (6th Cir. 2009), supplied the governing review structure: revocation is reviewed for abuse of discretion, while underlying legal conclusions are reviewed de novo and factual findings for clear error. This framework matters because Clough tried to reframe the dispute as a legal misapprehension; the panel treated the dispositive issue as a factual finding (two-week residency) subject to clear-error deference.

Harmless error in appellate review

United States v. Agrawal, 97 F.4th 421 (6th Cir. 2024), was used for the proposition that an error is harmless when it would not affect the outcome. The panel applied this to the parties’ muddled descriptions of Tennessee law and to the district court’s minor misrecollection about a woman “confirming” Clough’s stay—both deemed non-dispositive because the remaining evidence independently established the violation.

Clear-error deference and “plausible reading” of the record

United States v. Estrada-Gonzalez, 32 F.4th 607 (6th Cir. 2022), provided the articulation that factual findings survive if they are a “plausible” reading of the record. The panel repeatedly relied on this “plausibility” lens to uphold the district court’s two-week-residency finding.

Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285 (2017), reinforced that reversal on factfinding requires a “definite and firm conviction” of mistake and, critically, that where there are “two permissible” (i.e., plausible) views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice controls. The panel invoked this principle when addressing Clough’s “knowingly” argument: even if some evidence cut in Clough’s favor (calling police from the apartment, voluntary check-in), the contrary inference of concealment remained plausible.

The Tennessee Supreme Court decision invoked by Clough

Clough relied on State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436 (Tenn. 2010), to argue that terms like “stayed” or “living at” are insufficient to prove a registrable residence. The Sixth Circuit narrowed Phelps to its procedural context: it addressed whether a guilty plea should be withdrawn because the defendant may not have understood the nature of the charge due to an “imprecise and abbreviated explanation” of the statute and the defendant’s expressed confusion. The panel held Phelps did not create an evidentiary “magic words” rule for proving residence in a contested hearing, and contrasted Phelps’s “visiting” scenario with Clough’s evidence of actual lodging and domestic living arrangements.

“Knowingly” as a factual issue under Tennessee law

State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180 (Tenn. 2013), was cited for the proposition that whether a defendant acted “knowingly” is a factual question. That citation supported applying clear-error review to the knowledge determination in the revocation context.

Knowledge inferred from concealment

United States v. Davis, 490 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2007), was used for the proposition that “efforts to conceal” can support an inference of knowledge. The panel applied Davis to Clough’s minimizing texts (“only stayed like 2 nights”) as indicative of consciousness of wrongdoing.

Prior registration history as evidence of awareness

The opinion also referenced United States v. Stock, 685 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2012), in discussing evidence that Clough understood general reporting obligations. The court relied on Clough’s prior admissions and violations (including acknowledgments of 48-hour reporting rules in earlier proceedings) to support the inference that any noncompliance here was not an innocent misunderstanding.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) The controlling Tennessee statutory structure

The panel carefully anchored its analysis in the actual statutory text:

  • A sex offender must register in person within 48 hours of establishing or changing a primary or secondary residence: Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-203(a)(1).
  • “Primary residence” requires five consecutive days of living accommodations: Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-202(12).
  • “Secondary residence” can be triggered by recurring shorter patterns (e.g., 14+ days/year or 4+ days/month): Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-202(18).
  • The 48-hour clock excludes weekends and holidays: Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-202(32).

(B) Why the hearing’s misstatements were harmless

The panel agreed the parties did “a poor job” describing Tennessee law (e.g., suggesting a “48 hours” rule for establishing a residence, rather than the statute’s five-day primary-residence threshold). But it treated the error as non-prejudicial because the district court did not revoke based on a “two-day” theory; it revoked based on a factual finding of two weeks of living at the apartment.

Under the correct statute, two weeks necessarily surpasses the five-day “primary residence” threshold. The court then reasoned that Clough had, at most, about nine days from initial occupancy to deadline (five days to trigger primary-residence status plus up to four days to report depending on the weekday/weekend exclusions), and two weeks without registration therefore constituted a clear violation.

This is the opinion’s core doctrinal contribution: in revocation proceedings involving state-law predicates, appellate courts will treat misstatements of the legal standard as harmless when the district court’s factual findings independently satisfy the correct legal elements.

(C) Evidentiary sufficiency and the “stayed” terminology

On the factual question, the panel emphasized corroboration:

  • Phipps’s contemporaneous recorded statement and signed written statement that Clough had been living there a “couple weeks.”
  • Police body-camera evidence placing Clough inside the apartment at around 1:50 a.m. following a 1:00 a.m. call.
  • Physical indicators of someone else living there (bags by the bed; notebook referencing Clough-linked cities).
  • Clough’s own texts acknowledging “stuff” at the apartment and that police searched it while he was at an appointment.

The panel also rejected a linguistic formalism argument. It reasoned that “stay” is functionally synonymous with statutory terms like “abide,” “lodge,” and “reside,” and it further noted the district court also used “living,” matching the statutory concept of “living accommodations.”

(D) Knowledge

The panel assumed arguendo that Tennessee’s “knowingly” requirement would demand awareness of the reporting obligation as applied to the situation, but upheld the knowledge finding as plausible. It relied on:

  • Clough’s history of registration failures and prior acknowledgments of reporting duties.
  • Evidence consistent with concealment or minimization (claiming only two nonconsecutive nights versus Phipps’s two-week account), supporting an inference of knowledge under Davis.

Competing innocent explanations did not warrant reversal under clear-error review given the district court’s permissible inference choice under Cooper v. Harris.

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished, the opinion is likely to be persuasive in three recurring supervised-release contexts:

  • Harmless-error framing in revocation hearings: Where the record supports a factual finding that necessarily satisfies the correct statutory threshold (here, two weeks vs. a five-day trigger), appellate courts may affirm even if the hearing colloquy reflected legal confusion.
  • Residence proof without “magic words”: Factfinders may describe residence using ordinary language (“staying,” “living”) so long as the finding captures the statutory substance and is supported by evidence of lodging and living arrangements.
  • Knowledge inferred from conduct: Prior registration history and attempts to minimize or conceal living arrangements can support a “knowing” failure-to-register finding in revocation proceedings, especially under deferential review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Supervised release revocation (federal): A post-prison supervision term. A court may revoke it and impose prison if it finds, by a preponderance of evidence, that conditions were violated.
  • Clear error: A highly deferential appellate standard for factual findings. The appellate court does not reweigh evidence; it reverses only when firmly convinced the trial court made a mistake.
  • Harmless error: Even if a mistake occurred (legal or factual), an appellate court will affirm if the mistake did not change the outcome.
  • Primary vs. secondary residence (Tennessee registry law): A “primary residence” is triggered by five consecutive days of lodging; a “secondary residence” can be triggered by repeated shorter stays (e.g., four or more days in a month), even if it is not the primary home.
  • “Knowingly”: Typically refers to awareness of conduct and circumstances. Here, the court treated knowledge as inferable from surrounding facts (including concealment and prior familiarity with obligations).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Christopher Clough affirms a practical rule for revocation litigation: even when the parties misdescribe a state-law reporting regime, revocation will stand if the district court makes a supported factual finding that necessarily satisfies the statute as properly understood. The Sixth Circuit further signaled that ordinary language (“staying,” “living”) can adequately capture statutory residence concepts, and that knowledge may be inferred from a supervisee’s conduct, history, and efforts to minimize or conceal living arrangements under deferential appellate review.