Harmless Error in Denying Rule 15(d) Supplements; Whitley/Martin Reaffirmed in OC-Spray and Prison Retaliation Claims

Introduction

In this unpublished per curiam decision, the Fourth Circuit affirmed judgment for Virginia Department of Corrections officials in a § 1983 suit brought by inmate Kevin Snodgrass, Jr. The case arises from a September 2015 incident at Red Onion State Prison (ROSP) in which Officer Christopher Gilbert used oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray to secure Snodgrass’s compliance with an order to cuff-up for transport after a contraband-related charge. The appeal also challenged alleged First Amendment retaliation—namely, a conspiracy by multiple officials to delay Snodgrass’s progression through Virginia’s “step-down” program—and the district court’s refusal to allow Snodgrass to file a supplemental complaint.

The court addressed three principal issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion by denying leave to file a Rule 15(d) supplemental complaint; (2) whether Officer Gilbert was entitled to qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim based on the use of OC spray; and (3) whether Snodgrass proved causation for his First Amendment retaliation claims under the “same-decision” test adopted for prisoner cases in Martin v. Duffy.

The Fourth Circuit held the district court erred in its rationale for denying supplementation but deemed the error harmless. It further concluded that three timed OC bursts to quell continuing noncompliance with a cuff-up order did not present a triable issue of malicious or wanton force, and that Snodgrass failed to establish causation on his retaliation theory, both at the prima facie stage (lack of awareness) and under the same-decision defense (failure to meet behavioral criteria).

Summary of the Opinion

Rule 15(d) supplementation: The district court erroneously denied leave on the ground that the proposed supplemental complaint involved new claims and defendants not arising from the same “sequence of events.” Under Rule 15(d) and longstanding Fourth Circuit authority, that is not a valid reason to deny supplementation. Nonetheless, the error was harmless because the material facts in the proposed supplement were in the record and were considered across summary judgment and two bench trials.
Eighth Amendment excessive force: Assuming, without deciding, that three OC bursts to the face are more than de minimis force, the court found no genuine dispute as to the subjective Whitley/Hudson standard. The timed, incremental OC deployments followed a 30-minute attempt to gain compliance and were proportionate to an undisputed refusal to submit to restraints for transport to pre-hearing detention. Decontamination and medical checks followed. Qualified immunity was therefore appropriate.
First Amendment retaliation: Applying the Martin v. Duffy same-decision framework, the court held Snodgrass failed to show causation. For the first alleged period of delay, there was no showing that decisionmakers knew of protected activity. For the second period, defendants proved they would have taken the same step-down decisions anyway: evidence credited after two bench trials showed Snodgrass’s failure to meet “respect” and other behavioral goals (including persistent profanity) required for advancement.
“Snitch” labeling: A discrete claim based on alleged “snitch” comments was not preserved or pursued as a separate theory, and, in any event, the factfinder found those statements did not occur.
Disposition: Affirmed in all respects.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion engages several strands of Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court doctrine:

Rule 15(d) supplementation: The panel relies on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 28–29 (4th Cir. 1963), and Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 198 n.15 (4th Cir. 2002), to reiterate that courts “may” permit supplemental pleading to add post-complaint events and that such motions should be “freely granted” absent good reason (e.g., prejudice). Hodges v. Meletis, 109 F.4th 252, 263 n.17 (4th Cir. 2024), provided the harmless-error lens: even an abuse of discretion can be harmless if it does not affect substantial rights.
Qualified immunity and excessive force: The court frames qualified immunity under Caraway v. City of Pineville, 111 F.4th 369, 381 (4th Cir. 2024), and Aleman v. City of Charlotte, 80 F.4th 264, 284 (4th Cir. 2023), and restates that it is immunity from suit (Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 2013); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)). For the Eighth Amendment standard, it applies Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), and Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), through Fourth Circuit applications like Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2008), and Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 2019). The opinion contrasts facts here with Iko’s misuse-of-pepper-spray scenario.
Prisoner retaliation causation: The court implements Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 2020), and Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121 (4th Cir. 2023), adopting the employment-law “same-decision” causation framework and Constantine v. GMU, 411 F.3d 474 (4th Cir. 2005), for awareness and temporal proximity in the prima facie case. It also notes Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrections, 855 F.3d 533 (4th Cir. 2017), which established that filing prison grievances is protected First Amendment activity. The panel highlights, without deciding, uncertainty about whether assisting others’ litigation is “clearly established” protected activity (citing Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011); Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379 (2011); ACLU of Md. v. Wicomico Cnty., 999 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1993); and Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Standards of review: Bench-trial findings are reviewed for clear error, legal conclusions de novo (United States v. Kuehner, 126 F.4th 319, 328 (4th Cir. 2025)); pro se pleadings get liberal construction (Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d at 298).

Legal Reasoning

1) Rule 15(d) Supplemental Complaint: Error, but Harmless

The district court denied Snodgrass’s motion to file a supplemental complaint on the ground that the proposed allegations did not arise from the same “sequence of events” as the original complaint and included new defendants and theories. The Fourth Circuit says that rationale misapplies Rule 15(d). Supplemental pleading exists precisely to add post-filing events, and it may include new parties and claims; the touchstone is “just terms,” with prejudice as the principal limiting concern. This reiterates Waller’s and Franks’s liberal supplementation policy.

Still, the panel held the error harmless: the allegedly omitted facts—such as a derogatory comment Snodgrass attributed to Gilbert—were considered in summary judgment briefing and in the bench trials. Other new theories duplicated claims already litigated. Under Hodges, because the court’s refusal did not affect Snodgrass’s substantial rights, reversal was unwarranted.

2) Eighth Amendment Excessive Force: OC Spray to Enforce a Lawful Cuff-Up Order

The court assumed the objective prong was satisfied (three OC bursts are more than de minimis) and resolved the case on the subjective prong—whether the force was applied “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Applying Whitley’s four factors:

Need for force: It was undisputed that Snodgrass repeatedly refused orders to submit to restraints for transport to pre-hearing detention. His contrary view of SL6 restraint policy was immaterial; inmates cannot self-exempt from orders based on their own policy interpretations. Refusal to cuff-up presented a legitimate need to use force to restore order and ensure safe movement.
Relationship between need and amount of force: The record showed three timed OC bursts at 5:40, 5:42, and 5:45 p.m., with the first two deemed ineffective and the third securing compliance. The court found no evidence that Snodgrass tried to comply after the first spray; to the contrary, he complied only after the third. On these uncontroverted facts, amount matched need.
Perceived threat: Even if Snodgrass denied making threats, his continued noncompliance during a custodial movement—combined with the setting (supermax) and the nature of the violation (contraband consistent with brewing), and his argumentative behavior—supported a reasonable perception of ongoing risk that warranted chemical force.
Efforts to temper: Officer Gilbert negotiated for approximately 30 minutes before any spray and spaced deployments by several minutes. After compliance, officers provided a decontamination shower and medical check. Unlike Iko, there was no evidence of punitive continuation of spray after submission or wholesale denial of decontamination and care.

The court therefore found no triable evidence of wantonness or malice and affirmed qualified immunity. Because the panel concluded there was no constitutional violation on these facts, it did not need to reach the “clearly established” prong.

3) First Amendment Retaliation: Failure of Causation Under Martin’s Same-Decision Test

The court accepted, for purposes of this appeal, that Snodgrass engaged in protected activity by filing lawsuits and grievances and by testifying in another inmate’s case (reserving whether the latter was “clearly established” protected conduct for qualified-immunity purposes).

It focused on causation across two alleged “delay” periods in the VDOC step-down program:

SM0 (Oct. 2015–Mar. 2016): The court held Snodgrass failed to make a prima facie showing because he did not prove the relevant decisionmakers were aware of his protected activity during this period. Awareness is indispensable to causal inference; temporal proximity cannot substitute for knowledge.
SM1 (Mar. 2016–Apr. 2017): Even assuming awareness (e.g., of his lawsuit filed March 2, 2016), defendants carried their same-decision burden. Credited testimony from Gilbert and counselors Duncan and Gallihar, corroborated by Snodgrass’s own admissions, showed he had not met behavioral goals—particularly the “respect” criterion, given repeated profanity. Under Martin/Shaw, the court found it more likely than not that step-down decisions would have been the same absent any protected activity.

The panel also declined to treat a “snitch” labeling allegation as a separate retaliation claim; it was not preserved or pursued as an independent theory, and the bench-trial findings rejected the factual premise.

Impact

Although unpublished and nonprecedential within the circuit, the decision offers several practical and doctrinal guideposts:

Rule 15(d) practice: District courts should not deny supplementation merely because it adds post-complaint events, new claims, or new defendants. Parties opposing supplementation should focus on concrete prejudice. Plaintiffs should, where possible, ensure that key supplemental facts are introduced into the record through other means in case leave is denied—this opinion shows appellate courts may treat a denial as harmless if the material was already considered.
OC spray and cuff-up noncompliance: The court’s application of Whitley and Brooks reinforces substantial deference to corrections officers who use incremental chemical force to obtain compliance with restraint orders for secure transport. Documentation matters: timed deployments, contemporaneous notation of “ineffective” first bursts, pre-force negotiation, and prompt decontamination all weighed heavily for the defense.
Retaliation causation in prison cases: Martin’s same-decision framework is decisive. Plaintiffs must prove decisionmaker awareness of protected conduct and cannot rely on temporal proximity alone. Defendants should marshal specific, behavior-based reasons tied to objective program criteria (here, “respect” and other step-down goals), as well as witness credibility developed at bench trials, to satisfy the same-decision burden.
Protected activity nuance: The panel flagged, without resolving, whether assisting others’ litigation is a clearly established protected activity for qualified immunity purposes. Future cases may sharpen this boundary, particularly in distinguishing First Amendment speech versus petition rights and the scope of inmate “jailhouse lawyer” protections.
Evidentiary practice in bench trials: Credibility determinations after live testimony carried the day on retaliation. Inmate-plaintiffs should preserve documentary and testimonial proof of awareness by named defendants and contemporaneous compliance with program criteria.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified immunity: A legal protection for government officials sued under § 1983. Even if an official violated the Constitution, they cannot be sued for damages unless the right was clearly established and the official’s conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law.
Eighth Amendment excessive force: Two-part test: (a) Objective—was the force more than de minimis; and (b) Subjective—was the force applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm? Courts apply Whitley’s four factors: need; proportionality; threat reasonably perceived; and efforts to temper.
OC spray (pepper spray): A chemical irritant used by corrections officers as a less-lethal method to gain compliance. Its lawful use depends on context, proportionality, and post-use decontamination/medical care.
Rule 15(d) supplemental complaint: A mechanism to add allegations about events occurring after the original complaint was filed. It can include new parties and claims and does not replace the original complaint. Courts should freely allow supplementation absent prejudice.
VDOC step-down program: A structured progression for inmates in segregation (SLS) through Special Management levels SM0, SM1, SM2, then to SL6 phases and onward to lower security levels. Advancement requires meeting behavioral goals and completing programming; reviews occur at least every 90 days.
First Amendment retaliation in prison: The plaintiff must show protected activity, adverse action, and causation. Causation follows the “same-decision test”: plaintiff must show protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor; then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove it would have made the same decision absent that activity.

Conclusion

Snodgrass v. Gilbert underscores three practical points in prisoner civil rights litigation. First, while Rule 15(d) is liberally applied, an erroneous denial may be deemed harmless if the material facts reached the record by other routes—a reminder to litigants to ensure that all critical narrative makes it into the evidentiary mix. Second, in the use-of-force context, the Fourth Circuit continues to give “wide-ranging deference” to measured, documented uses of OC spray to secure compliance with restraint orders, especially after prolonged negotiation and with prompt decontamination and medical attention. Third, Martin’s same-decision framework is now the operative causation tool in prisoner retaliation cases: plaintiffs must prove awareness and cannot rely on proximity alone, and officials can prevail by credibly tying decisions to objective program criteria and behavior.

Although unpublished, the decision offers a detailed application of Whitley/Hudson and Martin to common prison-context disputes and signals how carefully developed records—both in contemporaneous incident reporting and at bench trials—can be outcome-determinative.