Hague Convention Grave-Risk Claims: Prospective Harm, Historical Abuse Allegations, and Expert Evidence

1. Introduction

This international child-return dispute concerns the relationship between a forward-looking legal inquiry and the historical evidence used to answer it. Under Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, a court may decline to return a wrongfully removed child when return would expose the child to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.

Sarunas Pletkus sought the return of his five-year-old daughter, E.P., to Lithuania. The child’s mother, Ana Saletis, conceded wrongful removal but asserted that returning E.P. would expose her to grave psychological harm associated with alleged sexual abuse by Pletkus. The district court rejected that defense after evaluating testimony, recordings, Lithuanian investigations, and an American psychologist’s opinion.

The central appellate question was whether the district court improperly substituted an inquiry into past sexual abuse for the required assessment of prospective harm. The Eleventh Circuit held that it had not. Historical allegations were relevant to the asserted future danger, and the district court separately considered—but gave limited weight to—the psychologist’s prospective assessment.

The opinion’s principal clarification is that a forward-looking grave-risk inquiry permits careful examination of historical abuse allegations and does not require acceptance of an expert’s risk assessment merely because no competing expert testified.

2. Background and Procedural History

The family dispute and abuse allegations

Pletkus and Saletis married in Lithuania in December 2020 and divorced in October 2023. A Lithuanian court awarded Saletis primary custody and Pletkus visitation rights. Although those arrangements distinguished custody from visitation, Saletis later stipulated that Pletkus satisfied the Convention’s requirements concerning custody rights and their exercise.

After the divorce, Saletis reported changes in E.P.’s behavior, including separation anxiety, nightmares, bedwetting, and distress associated with visits to her father. She also described physical symptoms and statements or conduct that she interpreted as indications of sexual abuse. Several recordings captured E.P. discussing naked games and other concerning behavior, although the recordings began with questions from Saletis.

Lithuanian professionals and authorities investigated. A specialist care agency and a forensic psychological evaluation could neither confirm nor exclude sexual abuse. Mediation specialists reported a close relationship between Pletkus and E.P. and identified concerns about the effect of parental conflict and Saletis’s emotional state on the child. A Lithuanian court enforced Pletkus’s visitation rights. A criminal investigation was subsequently terminated, and Saletis’s challenges to that decision were unsuccessful.

The United States proceedings

Saletis brought E.P. to the United States in June 2025 to visit relatives. The parenting arrangement prohibited a trip exceeding two weeks without the other parent’s written consent, but Saletis remained without Pletkus’s consent. She also cited a later medical restriction on commercial airline travel as a reason for staying.

Pletkus filed his return petition in April 2026 under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, or ICARA, 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011. Because Saletis conceded the elements of wrongful removal, the evidentiary hearing concerned only her Article 13(b) defense.

The district court heard both parents, Lithuanian social worker Greta Vitaite, and psychologist Dr. Christine Borelli. Vitaite described a consistently strong and relaxed father–daughter relationship. Dr. Borelli observed distress when asking E.P. benign questions about Pletkus and concluded that return would create a grave risk of psychological harm. However, she stopped the interview, made no trauma or PTSD diagnosis, and could neither confirm nor deny sexual abuse.

The district court found the defense unproven and ordered return. After temporary appellate stay proceedings, E.P. returned to Lithuania on August 20, 2026. Her return did not prevent the appeal from continuing.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on four principal grounds:

1. The district court used the correct legal standard. It considered whether return would expose E.P. to a present grave risk, rather than treating proof of previous injury as the governing test.
2. Historical evidence was relevant. Because the asserted danger was connected to alleged sexual abuse, evaluating the allegations and the investigations into them was a legitimate part of assessing future risk.
3. The expert opinion was considered, not disregarded. The district court acknowledged that Dr. Borelli’s opinion did not require a definitive finding of past abuse, but identified record-supported reasons for giving that opinion limited weight.
4. The appeal did not establish a reversible evidentiary error. Saletis principally advanced a legal challenge and did not adequately contest the district court’s factual findings under the clear-error standard.

The court also rejected the contention that Saletis had been improperly required to prove Lithuania incapable of protecting E.P. The district court’s finding about Lithuanian protection was independent of its conclusion that grave risk had not been established.

4. Legal Framework and Reasoning

A. Return proceedings identify the proper custody forum

The Convention generally seeks to restore the child to the country of habitual residence so that custody questions can be resolved there. A return proceeding is therefore not an ordinary custody contest in which the court chooses the preferable parent or living arrangement.

Under 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(1), the petitioning parent must establish wrongful removal by a preponderance of the evidence. The opinion describes the relevant elements as habitual residence, breach of custody rights under the applicable foreign law without consent, and actual exercise of those rights. Saletis stipulated to each element, leaving no need for appellate resolution of those questions.

B. Grave risk is prospective and must be clearly established

Article 13(b) asks whether return would expose the child to grave harm or an intolerable situation. The respondent must establish that exception by clear and convincing evidence under 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A).

The inquiry does not require proof that the child has already suffered harm. A sufficiently established threat of future harm can justify refusal of return. At the same time, the exception is narrowly construed so that it does not displace the Convention’s general return mechanism.

These propositions are complementary: the exception addresses serious prospective danger, but the party asserting it must supply evidence strong enough to satisfy the statutory burden. Sexual abuse can constitute an intolerable situation; the dispute here concerned the evidentiary basis for finding the asserted risk.

C. Historical allegations may inform, but do not replace, the future-risk inquiry

Saletis challenged the district court’s statement that the grave-risk analysis was “inextricably intertwined” with whether Pletkus had sexually abused E.P. The appellate court recognized the force of her distinction: psychological harm on return could theoretically exist even without conclusive proof of the alleged underlying abuse.

Nevertheless, examining past events was appropriate because those allegations supplied a substantial foundation for the claimed future danger. The district court considered their reliability, the Lithuanian investigations, observations of the father–daughter relationship, and what that evidence indicated about return.

The decision does not establish that every Article 13(b) claimant must independently prove completed abuse. Rather, it holds that the district court permissibly evaluated the historical foundation of this particular claim while also considering evidence of present psychological vulnerability.

D. The expert’s conclusion remained subject to evidentiary assessment

Dr. Borelli’s opinion was the strongest evidence supporting Saletis’s defense, but it was not conclusive. The district court identified several limitations: the interview ended early; collateral witnesses and Pletkus were not interviewed; there was no independent psychological data establishing that Pletkus posed a danger; and caregiver influence could not be excluded.

Those limitations mattered in combination with competing evidence. Lithuanian professionals had observed a close relationship, Vitaite described E.P. as relaxed around her father, and a June 2025 recording showed apparently comfortable interaction shortly before the child traveled to the United States.

The appellate court therefore treated the dispute as one about evidentiary weight, not a legal refusal to recognize psychological harm. The district court had acknowledged the prospective opinion and explained why it was insufficient to satisfy the heightened burden.

The reasoning is case-specific. It does not create a universal requirement that an expert interview every family member, diagnose PTSD, or continue an interview despite clinical concerns. Nor does it establish that older favorable observations invariably outweigh newer evidence of distress.

E. Appellate review does not ordinarily permit a second weighing of the evidence

The court reviewed legal conclusions and the ultimate mixed question of grave risk de novo, while reviewing underlying factual findings for clear error. That distinction was decisive.

Saletis repeatedly characterized her appeal as a legal challenge. Once the court determined that the district court had applied the correct prospective standard, her remaining objections largely sought a different assessment of the evidence. Her brief argument that ending the interview itself demonstrated prospective harm did not adequately develop a clear-error challenge and was treated as abandoned. The court also explained that the district court’s interpretation remained plausible on the full record.

F. Foreign protection was not an added element of the defense

The district court separately found that Lithuania could protect E.P. The Eleventh Circuit did not treat that finding as a burden requiring Saletis to prove the inadequacy of Lithuanian institutions. Nor did it treat the finding as an ameliorative measure used to neutralize an otherwise established grave risk.

The distinction matters: the court affirmed because grave risk had not been proven, not because a proven danger had been overcome by assumed foreign protection.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. The Convention’s purpose and return framework

• Hanley v. Roy, 485 F.3d 641: Supplies the Convention’s protective purpose—addressing the harmful effects of wrongful removal or retention and securing prompt return. It frames return as an international remedial mechanism rather than a merits decision about custody.
• Golan v. Saada, 596 U.S. 666, and Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1: Explain the Convention’s origins in international abductions arising from domestic disputes. Golan v. Saada also supplies the statutory return framework, the Article 13(b) language, and recognition that sexual abuse can constitute an intolerable situation. The opinion does not resolve broader questions about protective measures after a grave-risk finding.
• Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U.S. 68: Provides the foundational proposition, quoted through Silva v. Dos Santos, that custody decisions generally belong in the child’s country of habitual residence. Habitual residence itself was conceded here.
• Berenguela-Alvarado v. Castanos, 950 F.3d 1352: Supports narrow construction of the Convention’s exceptions, preventing them from swallowing the general return rule. It reinforces the structure of the analysis without eliminating the obligation to assess serious safety concerns.

B. Grave risk and the relevance of earlier abuse

• Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340: Supplies several central rules: return ordinarily follows proof of wrongful removal; the respondent bears the clear-and-convincing burden; and grave risk presents a mixed question reviewed de novo. Its treatment of prior violence and threats also demonstrates why historical conduct can establish prospective danger.
• Gomez v. Fuenmayor, 812 F.3d 1005: Is the principal authority for the distinction between previous injury and present or future risk. It also recognizes that violence and threats against a parent can endanger the child. Both parties’ positions depended on its forward-looking standard; the appellate court concluded that the district court had respected that standard.
• Seaman v. Peterson, 766 F.3d 1252: Identifies the prima facie elements of wrongful removal and illustrates that the absence of evidence of improper sexual contact or harmful influence can support rejection of a grave-risk defense. Here, it supports considering the evidentiary foundation of alleged abuse rather than assuming it.
• Silva v. Dos Santos, 68 F.4th 1247: Supports examining allegations of abuse against the other parent when evaluating danger to a child. Its remand for proper assessment of conflicting testimony underscores that relevant allegations require genuine evidentiary evaluation, not automatic acceptance or dismissal.
• Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1: Provides persuasive support for investigating whether alleged sexual abuse occurred before evaluating return to the location of that alleged abuse. Its role is to show the legitimate connection between historical fact-finding and future safety, not to impose a universal past-abuse prerequisite.
• Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594: Discusses a spectrum of abuse cases when considering undertakings, identifying credible sexual-abuse evidence among clearly grave circumstances. The citation highlights that the seriousness of the alleged conduct and the credibility of its evidentiary basis are distinct questions.
• Galaviz v. Reyes, 95 F.4th 246: Illustrates the rigor of clear-and-convincing proof where sexual abuse is alleged. Its rejection of a finding supported only by a father’s testimony about his suspicions reinforces that suspicion alone does not satisfy the statutory burden.

C. Fact-finding, expert testimony, and appellate restraint

• Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079: Supplies, through Gomez v. Fuenmayor, the rule that plausible factual findings must stand when viewed against the entire record. It anchors the deferential treatment of the district court’s evidentiary assessment.
• Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, and Hockett v. United States, 730 F.2d 709: Reserve evidentiary weight and witness credibility to the fact-finder and caution appellate courts against reweighing evidence. They explain why disagreement with the treatment of Dr. Borelli’s testimony did not itself demonstrate legal error.
• Eason v. Weaver, 484 F.2d 459, and Gregg v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 887 F.2d 1462: Establish that a fact-finder need not accept an expert opinion merely because it is offered. They directly answer Saletis’s contention that the absence of a competing 2026 psychological assessment made Dr. Borelli’s conclusion controlling.
• Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206: Explains the precedential foundation for relying on Eason v. Weaver: qualifying decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981, bind the Eleventh Circuit.
• Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins., 739 F.3d 678: Supports treating an inadequately developed appellate argument as abandoned. It applies to Saletis’s limited challenge concerning the significance of the terminated interview.
• Brnovich v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 594 U.S. 647: Confirms that an appellate court cannot overturn a plausible factual interpretation simply because it would have weighed the evidence differently. This also supports the court’s alternative rejection of the interview-related challenge.

D. Burden of proof, foreign protection, and continuing jurisdiction

• Fults v. GDCP Warden, 764 F.3d 1311, and United States v. Owens, 854 F.2d 432: Explain clear and convincing evidence as proof making the asserted proposition highly probable. They clarify why unresolved allegations and a discounted expert opinion did not necessarily satisfy Saletis’s burden.
• Bindslev v. Silva, No. 24-11896, 2025 WL 66745: Provides analogous support for distinguishing an independent finding about foreign protective capacity from a court-imposed ameliorative measure after a grave-risk determination.
• Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165: Establishes that a child’s return abroad does not itself moot the appeal. It permitted review despite E.P.’s return to Lithuania.
• Pletkus v. Saletis, No. 2:26-cv-1209, 2026 WL 2274154: Is the underlying district court decision, not an independent appellate precedent. Its unchallenged findings supplied the factual foundation for the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis.

6. Significance, Limits, and Potential Impact

Expert assessments require a reliable connection to the claimed danger

The opinion may encourage closer examination of how an expert connects observed distress to the consequences of return. Evidence of distress is relevant, but a court may assess alternative explanations, collateral information, incomplete evaluation, and contrary observations. Conversely, a well-supported prospective opinion can remain important even when historical abuse cannot conclusively be established.

Appellants must distinguish legal errors from factual disagreements

The case illustrates the risk of presenting an evidentiary dispute solely as use of the wrong legal standard. Counsel challenging a risk determination should identify any genuine legal error separately from properly developed challenges to factual findings and credibility assessments.

Inconclusive investigations are neither proof of abuse nor definitive exoneration

The decision concerns failure to satisfy a demanding burden, not a universal declaration that abuse did not occur. Several assessments expressly could neither confirm nor exclude abuse. Their significance arose from the complete record and the burden allocation, rather than from a rule equating investigative closure with safety.

Credibility findings must remain individualized

The district court considered Saletis’s delay in seeking medical examination, reporting allegations, and restricting contact when assessing credibility. Those findings should not be converted into categorical expectations about how a protective parent must react. The appellate opinion ultimately acknowledged her genuine belief in the allegations; sincerity and sufficient proof remained separate questions.

The decision has persuasive, not binding, precedential force

Because the disposition is unpublished, its principal contribution is a detailed illustration of existing principles. It does not establish new mandatory expert-evaluation procedures, make past abuse an essential element of every grave-risk defense, or resolve how courts must address protective arrangements once grave risk is actually proven.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Habitual residence

The country treated as the child’s ordinary home for Convention purposes. Lithuania’s status was undisputed here.

Wrongful removal or retention

Taking or keeping a child away in breach of relevant custody rights that were being exercised. A lawful short visit can raise Convention concerns when the child is kept beyond the permitted period.

Affirmative defense

A reason the responding parent must prove to avoid return after wrongful removal has been established.

Grave risk

A serious danger of physical or psychological harm, or an intolerable situation—not simply a preference for remaining in the current country.

Clear and convincing evidence

Evidence making the claimed danger highly probable. This is more demanding than showing that something is merely more likely than not.

De novo review

Independent appellate examination of the governing law and its application, without deference to the lower court’s legal conclusions.

Clear-error review

Deferential review of factual findings. A plausible assessment of the whole record generally stands even if appellate judges might have weighed the evidence differently.

Ameliorative measures or undertakings

Protective arrangements intended to reduce danger associated with return. This appeal did not affirm return by relying on such measures to overcome an established grave risk.

Mootness

The absence of a continuing controversy that a court can resolve. The child’s return abroad did not itself eliminate the appeal.

8. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed because the district court applied the correct prospective grave-risk standard and permissibly weighed the evidence against the clear-and-convincing burden. Historical allegations could inform that inquiry, and an unopposed expert opinion did not bind the fact-finder.

The opinion’s broader lesson is methodological: courts must genuinely evaluate future danger, but they may scrutinize the historical and clinical foundations of the evidence offered to establish it. The result ordered return to the proper custody forum; it did not finally adjudicate custody or definitively resolve whether abuse had occurred.