Hackford v. United States Department of Interior: Ute Partition Act Roll Classifications Are Final After the Statutory Appeal Window—Late Membership Challenges Fail at § 1915 Screening

1. Introduction

In Hackford v. United States Department of Interior (10th Cir. Apr. 15, 2026) (unpublished “Order and Judgment”), pro se plaintiff-appellant Richita Marie Hackford attempted to challenge her historical classification—published in the Federal Register—as a “mixed-blood” member of the Ute Indian Tribe under the Ute Partition Act (“UPA”), and the downstream consequences of federal “termination” (loss of federal Indian-status-based services and application of state law).

Ms. Hackford alleged she is instead a “Shosone Utah Indian by right of birth,” contending she was wrongfully placed on the UPA’s mixed-blood roll, which resulted in her being subjected to Utah jurisdiction and deprived of rights tied to Indian status. She sued multiple federal entities and officials, including the United States Department of Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Bureau of Land Management.

The core legal issues were straightforward despite the breadth of the allegations:

• Whether Ms. Hackford could still challenge her UPA roll classification decades after the statutory appeal process closed and the roll was finalized.
• Whether any alternative federal statute (including an 1864 Act referenced by plaintiff) supplied a private cause of action for the relief sought.
• Whether dismissal at the in forma pauperis screening stage under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) was proper.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. It held that the UPA provided a time-limited avenue to contest roll determinations by appeal to the Secretary of the Interior, but that window closed long ago, and the published final roll reflects that all such appeals were disposed of and the determination is final.

The court further agreed that, beyond the UPA’s closed process, Ms. Hackford identified no viable federal cause of action allowing her to obtain the declaratory relief she sought against the named federal defendants. The panel also noted this was not her first attempt at UPA-related litigation.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Hackford v. Utah, 827 F. App'x 808, 809 (10th Cir. 2020) (Hackford 2020)

The court used Hackford v. Utah as a framing precedent to explain the UPA’s structure and practical obscurity (“a hard-to-find federal statute”), including the statutory mechanics: preparation of mixed-blood and full-blood rolls, publication in the Federal Register, and the consequences of termination. Although nonprecedential, its prior explanation of the UPA provided continuity and context for rejecting another attempt to relitigate roll status.

2) Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 133 n.3 (1972)

Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States was cited for the court’s careful use of the UPA’s historical terminology (“full-blood” and “mixed-blood”), underscoring that the opinion’s language tracks the statute for consistency and clarity rather than endorsement of outdated classifications. This citation does not drive the holding, but it situates the court’s interpretive posture: when a statute uses specific terms, courts often mirror them to avoid ambiguity.

3) Ute Distrib. Corp. v. Sec'y of Interior of U.S., 584 F.3d 1275, 1279 (10th Cir. 2009)

Ute Distrib. Corp. v. Sec'y of Interior of U.S. supplied the historical anchor for the 1961 Termination Proclamation, confirming that the Secretary finalized termination of the mixed-blood group and that the proclamation implemented the statutory consequence: mixed-blood members would no longer receive services based on Indian status and generally would become subject to state law as other citizens. This precedent reinforced that termination was an officially completed, dated federal action, not an open-ended administrative status subject to collateral attack decades later.

4) Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007)

Kay v. Bemis provided the governing standard of review for dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii): de novo review, with dismissal appropriate when it is “obvious” the plaintiff cannot prevail on the alleged facts and amendment would be futile. This was central to affirmance: once the court concluded the UPA challenge was long time-barred/final, further pleading could not cure the defect.

5) Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. Pluralsight, Inc., 45 F.4th 1236, 1247 (10th Cir. 2022)

Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. Pluralsight, Inc. was cited for the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) lens applied at § 1915 screening: accept well-pleaded allegations and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor. Importantly, the court’s acceptance of the asserted lineage and identity claims did not matter, because the legal barrier was procedural/finality-based (the closed statutory pathway), not factual plausibility about ancestry.

6) Ford v. Pryor, 552 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2008)

Ford v. Pryor supplied the pro se interpretive principle: pleadings are construed liberally, but the court does not serve as the litigant’s advocate. This underwrote the panel’s refusal to invent alternative causes of action or theories when Ms. Hackford did not identify a viable federal vehicle for relief.

7) Vasquez Arroyo v.  Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009)

Vasquez Arroyo v.  Starks was cited for the proposition that a district court may dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint sua sponte on statute-of-limitations grounds when the time bar is clear from the face of the complaint and there are no meritorious tolling issues (or the plaintiff has been given notice and opportunity to be heard). The court analogized that principle to the UPA context: where the statutory mechanism and timing for challenging roll inclusion are long past and finality is baked into the statute, the case can be dismissed at screening without proceeding to discovery or merits litigation.

8) Hackford v. Utah, 446 F. App'x 988, 988 (10th Cir. 2011)

The panel referenced Hackford v. Utah (2011) to note litigation history: Ms. Hackford and others previously sought emergency injunctive relief alleging the UPA was fraudulently enacted and that rights were being violated; the Tenth Circuit affirmed denial of relief. While not preclusive here on its own terms, the reference contextualizes the repeated nature of UPA challenges and the judiciary’s consistent unwillingness to reopen the statutory scheme long after completion.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in a tight chain:

1. The UPA created a specific administrative process for determining—and contesting—roll status. Congress required proposed mixed-blood and full-blood rolls, publication, and allowed appeals to the Secretary. The statute provides that the Secretary’s decisions on those appeals “shall be final and conclusive” (25 U.S.C. § 677g).
2. Ms. Hackford is listed on the final mixed-blood roll published in the Federal Register. The opinion cites the publication listing “Hackford, Richita Marie” on the final roll (Mixed Blood Members and Full- Blood Members of the Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah and Ouray Reservation, Utah, 21 Fed. Reg. 2208, 2209 (Apr. 5, 1956)). The Federal Register notice also states “[d]isposition has been made of all appeals to the Secretary” contesting roll inclusion/omission. Thus, even assuming an appeal was filed, the published record reflects it was resolved, and finality attached.
3. The statutory window to challenge classification has closed, making the claim legally futile. The district court concluded Ms. Hackford had to appeal by April 4, 1955; the Tenth Circuit agreed in substance: the UPA avenue existed, but it is long expired. The panel treated the barrier as sufficiently clear to support dismissal at § 1915 screening, akin to a clear limitations bar (citing Vasquez Arroyo v.  Starks).
4. No alternate federal cause of action was identified. The court agreed with the district court that the referenced “U.S. Senate Act [of] May 5, 1864” did not create a private cause of action, and that Ms. Hackford otherwise did not point to a federal statute authorizing her suit against these federal defendants for the declaration she sought.

Notably, the court did not weigh the truth of Ms. Hackford’s ancestry assertions; it held that—even crediting her narrative—the legal system cannot supply relief when Congress has established an exclusive, time-limited mechanism that has become final by statute and official publication.

C. Impact

Although designated as nonprecedential, the decision has meaningful practical impact in three ways:

• Reinforcement of UPA finality: The order underscores that UPA roll determinations, once finalized and published and once the Secretary’s appeal process is exhausted, are not open to collateral attack decades later through generalized claims of misclassification, fraud, or historical grievance—at least absent a distinct and viable statutory cause of action.
• Screening-stage resolution of time-barred/finality-barred claims: By invoking Vasquez Arroyo v.  Starks, the panel signals that courts may dispose of clearly stale or statutorily foreclosed challenges at the § 1915 stage, preventing costly litigation where no legal pathway exists.
• Limits on “identity-status” litigation against federal agencies: Even where a plaintiff seeks a declaration of tribal identity or status, federal courts will require a cognizable cause of action and a non-final, reviewable agency decision (or another jurisdictional hook). Mere disagreement with historical Federal Register rolls—without a legally available mechanism for revision—will not suffice.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Ute Partition Act (UPA): A 1954 federal statute designed to divide certain tribal assets between “mixed-blood” and “full-blood” members of the Ute Indian Tribe and, for mixed-blood members, to terminate the federal trust/supervision relationship after distribution and proclamation.
• Federal Register roll publication: Publication functions as an official, public record of the government’s final determinations. Here, the roll listing Ms. Hackford is treated as evidence that the classification was finalized under the statutory scheme.
• “Final and conclusive” agency decision: When Congress states an agency’s decision is final and conclusive (as with 25 U.S.C. § 677g), it sharply limits later judicial revisiting of that decision—especially outside the statute’s own review/appeal process.
• Termination Proclamation: An official proclamation by the Secretary implementing termination. Under 25 U.S.C. § 677v, termination meant the person was no longer eligible for federal services based on Indian status and state law applied as to other citizens.
• § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) screening: When a litigant proceeds in forma pauperis, the court must dismiss the case if it fails to state a claim. The court applies the familiar plausibility framework, but can dismiss where the legal defect (like a clear time bar or statutory finality) makes amendment futile.
• No private cause of action: Not every statute allows individuals to sue to enforce it. If a statute does not create an enforceable private right and remedy, a plaintiff cannot use it as the basis for a federal civil action.

5. Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit’s decision affirms a firm rule for UPA-related litigation: when Congress created a specific, time-limited administrative process for roll challenges and declared the Secretary’s decisions “final and conclusive,” courts will not reopen those determinations generations later through broad federal lawsuits—particularly at the in forma pauperis screening stage. Absent a distinct statutory cause of action or a legally reviewable, non-final agency action, claims seeking to undo or recharacterize UPA roll status are subject to dismissal as futile.