Futility of Reporting and Ignored Evidence: The Fourth Circuit Strengthens “Unable or Unwilling” and CAT Acquiescence Standards in Ramos Marquez v. Bondi

Futility of Reporting and Ignored Evidence: The Fourth Circuit Strengthens “Unable or Unwilling” and CAT Acquiescence Standards in Ramos Marquez v. Bondi

I. Introduction

In Carlos Andres Ramos Marquez v. Pamela Jo Bondi, No. 24‑1842 (4th Cir. Nov. 19, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted a Honduran petitioner’s challenge to the denial of withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Writing for the majority, Judge Thacker (joined by Chief Judge Gregory) vacated the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision and remanded, holding that the Immigration Judge (IJ) and the BIA:

  • Ignored or minimized credible, unrebutted, legally significant evidence without explanation; and
  • Misapplied key doctrines governing:
    • the “unable or unwilling to control” requirement for persecution by private actors;
    • the burden of proof on internal relocation in withholding cases; and
    • the “consent or acquiescence” element in CAT protection, especially in light of country-conditions evidence of systemic corruption and gang collusion.

Judge Wilkinson dissented, sharply criticizing the majority for (a) undercutting the statutory substantial-evidence standard, (b) overusing “abuse of discretion” review to reweigh facts, and (c) effectively “giving up” on the capacity of Honduran authorities to investigate and control criminal gangs.

The case arises from the plight of Carlos Ramos Marquez, a Honduran national who suffered repeated threats and assaults from MS‑13 gang members, following earlier torture and killings of his brothers, one of whom, Jose Santos Marquez (“Marquez”), had resisted gang extortion. After fleeing Honduras in 2019 and entering the United States without inspection, Ramos Marquez sought:

  • Withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); and
  • CAT protection under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–18.

The IJ found him credible and recognized that he had suffered persecution on account of membership in a particular social group (immediate family of Marquez). Yet the IJ denied relief, principally because:

  • Ramos Marquez did not personally report the MS‑13 attacks to police;
  • Police did respond to the murder scenes of his brothers and to his sister’s complaint; and
  • Honduras had adopted a “state of exception” against gangs, which had produced some arrests and supposedly demonstrated governmental will to combat gang violence.

On appeal, the BIA summarily endorsed the IJ’s analysis. The Fourth Circuit majority, however, concluded that the agency:

  • Arbitrarily disregarded unchallenged testimony and documentary evidence indicating that:
    • reporting to the Honduran police would have been futile; and
    • reporting would likely have exposed the petitioner and his family to further danger, due to police corruption and gang collusion;
  • Misallocated the burden of proof on internal relocation; and
  • Failed to engage meaningfully with country-conditions evidence showing systemic governmental acquiescence to gang violence and torture.

The decision thus both reaffirms and intensifies existing Fourth Circuit doctrine on:

  • How immigration adjudicators must treat credible, unrebutted evidence;
  • When non-reporting to police may be excused as futile or dangerous in “unable or unwilling” and CAT analyses; and
  • The necessity of substantive engagement with country-conditions reports in gang‑related protection claims from Central America.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Case Background

The record reflects a pattern of MS‑13 violence against the petitioner’s family:

  • A brother, Jose Guzman, was tortured and killed by MS‑13 members in 2014 or 2015. Police came to the murder scene, but no arrests followed.
  • Another brother, Jose Santos Marquez (“Marquez”), operated a produce business in Cortes. MS‑13 began extorting him (~600 lempiras). Rather than pay, Marquez closed shop and relocated, which shifted gang attention to Ramos Marquez.
  • MS‑13 gang members:
    • Physically assaulted Ramos Marquez at a street fair after he refused to work for them to repay his brother’s “debt,” injuring his face;
    • Later approached him while he worked as a security guard, proposing a staged robbery so they could seize his weapon; and
    • Eventually threatened him at gunpoint, forcing him to kneel and stating they “governed” all Honduras and would find and kill him and Marquez anywhere in the country.
  • In 2019, Ramos Marquez fled Honduras. He testified that he did not report any of these attacks to police because:
    • the government was corrupt;
    • gangs learn when complaints are filed; and
    • reporting would expose him to retaliation.
  • From the United States, he continued receiving threatening Facebook messages from gang members.
  • In 2021, Marquez opened a new business in another Honduran city (Choloma) and was murdered by MS‑13. Police again responded, took statements and photos, but made no arrests.
  • In 2022, the petitioner’s sister filed a police complaint after MS‑13 came to her house looking for him and threatening her. She reported that gang members said they would be “always waiting” for him. She then fled to the United States.

Country reports submitted by the petitioner painted a picture of:

  • Deeply entrenched corruption in Honduran police, military, and judiciary;
  • Gang collusion with elements of the state, including “death squads” and extrajudicial killings;
  • Documented instances of police working directly for gangs (including MS‑13); and
  • Doubts about the effectiveness of the 2022 “state of exception” anti‑gang crackdown.

B. Agency Decisions

The IJ:

  • Found the petitioner credible and acknowledged that the MS‑13 attacks rose to the level of “persecution” and were on account of his membership in a particular social group (the immediate family of Marquez).
  • Nevertheless concluded that:
    • He had not established “past persecution” for withholding purposes because he had not shown the Honduran government was “unable or unwilling” to control MS‑13;
    • He had not shown he could not reasonably relocate within Honduras; and
    • He failed to prove it was “more likely than not” he would be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of Honduran authorities for CAT purposes.

The BIA:

  • Adopted the IJ’s core factual findings and legal conclusions;
  • Held there was no clear error in the IJ’s determination that Honduras was willing and able to control MS‑13, relying primarily on:
    • Police responses to the brothers’ murders and the sister’s complaint; and
    • Evidence that Honduras had taken steps to fight gangs, including the “state of exception.”
  • Affirmed the IJ’s relocation analysis, treating the burden as resting on the petitioner;
  • Affirmed the denial of CAT relief on the ground that the petitioner had not shown governmental acquiescence to any future torture.

C. The Fourth Circuit’s Holding

The majority granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded. Its key holdings are:

  1. “Unable or unwilling” satisfied and record compels that conclusion. The court held that the IJ and BIA:
    • Abused their discretion by ignoring or failing to explain their rejection of credible, unrebutted, and legally significant evidence that:
      • Reporting to Honduran authorities would have been futile (given prior non‑enforcement and “token” responses), and
      • Reporting would likely have exposed the petitioner to further harm, given police corruption and gang infiltration.
    • The court further concluded that the record compels the opposite finding: Honduras is indeed unable or unwilling to control MS‑13 in this case.
  2. Burden on relocation misallocated; evidence compels non‑viability of relocation on current record. Because the petitioner proved past persecution by a private actor whom the government cannot or will not control, he is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution. The court held:
    • The BIA erred in placing the burden on the petitioner to show relocation is unreasonable; the burden lies on the Government once past persecution is established; and
    • On this record, the evidence compels the conclusion that the petitioner could not safely avoid MS‑13 persecution by relocating within Honduras.
  3. CAT acquiescence analysis defective; failure to grapple with country conditions was an abuse of discretion. As to CAT, the court:
    • Did not resolve whether the petitioner had yet shown a probability of torture itself;
    • But held that the agency abused its discretion by failing to meaningfully engage with extensive country-conditions evidence of:
      • Police corruption;
      • Police and security-force collusion with gangs;
      • Extrajudicial killings by state agents; and
      • Ineffectiveness or pretextual nature of the “state of exception.”
    • Accordingly, the CAT claim was remanded for proper consideration of acquiescence in light of that evidence.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Doctrinal Context

1. Review of IJ and BIA Decisions

The majority begins by reaffirming Fourth Circuit practice when the BIA issues its own opinion but also relies on the IJ:

  • Garcia Hernandez v. Garland, 27 F.4th 263 (4th Cir. 2022) and Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2018) confirm that the court reviews both the IJ and BIA decisions when the BIA adopts or relies on the IJ’s reasoning, while being limited to the grounds actually invoked by the BIA (the Chenery principle).
  • SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) is cited to emphasize that a court may not affirm on a ground the agency did not rely on.

On standards of review, the court repeats familiar formulations:

  • Legal questions are reviewed de novo.
  • Factual findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard: the court must uphold the agency unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Tang v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2016).

However, the majority overlays this with a robust “abuse of discretion” doctrine where the agency ignores or distorts evidence:

  • Hernandez‑Cartagena v. Barr, 977 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2020) and Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710 (4th Cir. 2011) hold that it is reversible error for the IJ or BIA to:
    • “arbitrarily ignore” unrebutted, legally significant evidence; or
    • base decisions on “isolated snippets of the record while disregarding the rest.”
  • Hernandez‑Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944 (4th Cir. 2015) emphasizes that an IJ may not ignore an applicant’s testimony in making critical factual findings.
  • Orellana v. Barr, 925 F.3d 145 (4th Cir. 2019) and Portillo Flores v. Garland, 3 F.4th 615 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc) reinforce that:
    • “Token” or empty assistance from police cannot suffice to show governmental will and ability to protect; and
    • Adjudicators must offer “specific, cogent reasons” if they choose to discount the applicant’s credible, material evidence.
  • Orellana in particular frames the non‑reporting exception: applicants are not required to persist in seeking police help when doing so would be “futile or [would] have subjected [them] to further abuse.”

The majority explicitly acknowledges that the dissent disputes this combined use of substantial-evidence and abuse-of-discretion review, but observes that prior panel decisions bind the court under McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2004).

2. “Unable or Unwilling to Control” and Non‑Reporting

The governing rule for persecution by private actors comes from the Fourth Circuit’s own precedent:

  • Orellana v. Barr, 925 F.3d 145 (4th Cir. 2019) and Hernandez‑Avalos: where persecution is by non‑state actors (e.g., gangs), an applicant must show that the government is “unable or unwilling to control” the persecutors.
  • Orellana and Portillo Flores also stress that there is no per se requirement that victims report their persecution to the police. Instead:
    • Non‑reporting can be excused where it would be futile or would likely result in additional harm; and
    • Evidence of empty or token police actions does not prove governmental protection.

3. Internal Relocation and Burdens of Proof

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b), the legal framework is:

  • Past persecution on a protected ground creates a:
    • Rebuttable presumption that the applicant’s “life or freedom would be threatened” on return (for withholding);
    • With the burden shifting to the Government to show, by a preponderance of the evidence:
      • A fundamental change in circumstances, or
      • That the applicant can avoid future persecution by relocating and that relocation would be reasonable.
  • Without past persecution, the applicant bears the burden to show that relocation is not a reasonable option.

The majority applies this regulation straightforwardly: because the IJ accepted that the petitioner had suffered harm rising to persecution, and the appellate court now finds that Honduras is unable or unwilling to control MS‑13, the Government, not the petitioner, must carry the relocation burden on remand.

4. CAT “Acquiescence” and Country Conditions

CAT relief is governed by 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18(a). Key interpretive precedents include:

  • Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2011) and Cabrera Vasquez v. Barr, 919 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2019):
    • Define “acquiescence” as requiring that the official, before the torture, has awareness of the likely harm and then breaches a legal duty to intervene;
    • Clarify that officials need not have “actual knowledge”; turning a blind eye can suffice.
  • Rodriguez‑Arias v. Whitaker, 915 F.3d 968 (4th Cir. 2019) and Ai Hua Chen v. Holder, 742 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2014):
    • Hold that the IJ and BIA may not arbitrarily ignore relevant country-conditions evidence in CAT cases;
    • Emphasize that country conditions can be decisive in CAT determinations.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. “Unable or Unwilling” and the Futility/Danger of Reporting

The majority’s core holding is that the IJ and BIA:

  • Misapplied the non‑reporting doctrine by effectively penalizing the petitioner for not reporting his gang persecution; and
  • Failed to acknowledge that his non‑reporting was justified under Orellana and Portillo Flores because the record showed both futility and probable retaliatory harm if he did so.

The court’s analysis proceeds in two steps.

a. The agency’s incomplete and selective use of the record

The IJ and BIA emphasized that:

  • The petitioner himself never reported his gang encounters;
  • Police did respond to the murders of both brothers and to the sister’s complaint; and
  • Honduras had declared a “state of exception” to combat gangs, which had produced “some arrests” and made gangs “keep a lower profile.”

From this, the agency concluded that:

  • The government was willing and able to control MS‑13; and
  • The petitioner had not shown a “good reason” for failing to seek authorities’ protection.

The majority faults this method because it:

  • Ignores critical testimony:
    • The petitioner explained in detail that he did not report because:
      • “the government is corrupt”; and
      • gangs “learn somehow when you file a report,” putting complainants at risk.
    • His sister’s affidavit corroborated that when she filed a report, gang members said they would always be “waiting” for him.
  • Fails to grapple with supporting country reports documenting:
    • Widespread police, military, and judicial corruption;
    • State‑tolerated or state‑run “death squads” and extrajudicial killings; and
    • Police officers working directly for MS‑13, and official acknowledgment by regional governments that they are unable to control gangs.
  • Over‑credits token police actions:
    • Police appeared at the scene of both brothers’ murders, but:
    • No one was arrested; there was no effective investigation; and
    • This is the very definition of “empty or token assistance” under Orellana.

Under Portillo Flores and Orellana, such selective reliance on police presence at scenes after the fact does not suffice to show real governmental protection, particularly when there is no evidence of effective investigation or deterrence and strong evidence that gangs operate with impunity.

b. Record compels finding of governmental inability/unwillingness

Having found that the agency abused its discretion by ignoring key evidence, the majority also reaches the more aggressive conclusion that the record compels the opposite finding under the substantial-evidence standard:

  • Futility: The only police activity in the record—responses to murders and threats—resulted in no progress, no arrests, and no apparent disruption of MS‑13’s operations. Under Orellana, such inaction, especially in the face of serious offenses, reasonably demonstrates that reporting would have been futile.
  • Heightened risk from reporting: The petitioner and his sister credibly attested that:
    • Gangs discover who files complaints;
    • Gangs threatened the sister even after she reported; and
    • Gangs declared they controlled the “entire country” and would find the petitioner wherever he went.
    Country reports corroborate the risk of retaliation and the reach of MS‑13 throughout Honduras.

This combination, in the majority’s view, satisfies both prongs of Orellana: reporting would be both futile and dangerous. Because the IJ explicitly found the petitioner credible and the Government did not rebut this testimony, there was no evidentiary basis to discount it.

Thus, under existing Fourth Circuit law, non‑reporting cannot be used to defeat the “unable or unwilling” requirement. Instead, the evidence requires a finding that Honduras is unable or unwilling to control MS‑13 in this petitioner’s case.

2. Internal Relocation and Burden-Shifting

The IJ acknowledged that the harm suffered constituted persecution, but because she found Honduras willing and able to protect the petitioner, she declined to treat this as “past persecution” for withholding purposes. The BIA agreed and accordingly placed the relocation burden on the petitioner.

Once the circuit court holds:

  • that the petitioner suffered past persecution; and
  • that Honduras is unable or unwilling to control his persecutors,

then under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1):

  • The petitioner is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution; and
  • The Government must show either:
    • a fundamental change in country circumstances; or
    • a realistic, reasonable internal relocation alternative.

The majority holds explicitly that:

  • The BIA’s allocation of the relocation burden to the petitioner was legal error; and
  • On the existing record, the evidence compels a finding that relocation would not protect the petitioner from MS‑13.

Key evidence on relocation that the IJ/BIA did not meaningfully address includes:

  • Gang statements that they governed the entire country and would find the petitioner and his brother “wherever” they went;
  • The fact that, after the petitioner moved to his sister’s house in a different area, MS‑13 still located him; and
  • MS‑13’s ongoing ability to track both him (via online messages) and his brother, whom they eventually murdered in another city three years after he moved.

The petitioner’s country-conditions evidence reinforces that MS‑13 is a nationwide organization in Honduras, rendering “internal flight” often illusory.

Although the majority remands for proper application of the relocation framework, it effectively removes relocation as a viable rebuttal argument on the current record, leaving the Government only the possibility of demonstrating a fundamental change in circumstances if it can produce such evidence.

3. CAT Protection and Governmental “Acquiescence”

The CAT analysis focuses specifically on whether any likely torture would be:

  • “by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).

The IJ and BIA concluded there was no acquiescence, relying mainly on:

  • The formal legal prohibition of torture and corruption in Honduras;
  • The police responses (albeit ineffective) to the murders and the sister’s complaint; and
  • The existence of the “state of exception” and reported anti‑gang initiatives.

The majority finds this analysis legally insufficient.

a. Formal law vs. practical reality

The IJ noted that torture and corruption are illegal under Honduran law and that the government has formally taken steps to combat gangs. The majority, however, emphasizes that:

  • Formal legal prohibitions do not answer whether state actors in reality turn a blind eye to torture or even participate in it; and
  • Country reports must be assessed for their description of actual practice, not just legal frameworks.
b. Overlooking extensive country‑conditions evidence

The petitioner’s documentation (including U.S. State Department reports and human‑rights organizations’ findings) indicated:

  • Unlawful killings and torture by police and security forces;
  • State‑tolerated “death squads” and “social cleansing” operations;
  • Specific investigations revealing that dozens of police officers worked for MS‑13, including involvement in massacres;
  • Pervasive impunity for crimes by gangs and state officials alike; and
  • The limited and contested effectiveness of the post‑2022 “state of exception.”

The majority holds that:

  • The agency’s failure to substantively engage with this evidence amounts to an abuse of discretion under Rodriguez‑Arias and Ai Hua Chen;
  • Simply asserting that the IJ “considered” country conditions, while citing only those aspects favorable to the Government, is insufficient where other segments strongly support a finding of state acquiescence.

Because the BIA affirmed solely on the acquiescence element (without revisiting the probability of torture), the court vacates and remands that component of the CAT analysis for a fresh, holistic review of the record.

C. The Dissent’s Critique

Judge Wilkinson’s dissent raises three principal concerns.

1. Erosion of the Substantial-Evidence Standard

The dissent emphasizes that factual findings in immigration cases are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary” (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)) and characterizes this as a “highly deferential” standard, citing Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683 (2020).

From the dissent’s perspective, the majority:

  • Pays lip service to substantial evidence, then effectively reweighs facts and substitutes its judgment for that of the IJ and BIA;
  • Chooses to see three unsuccessful investigations as evidence of “empty or token” assistance, rather than simply reflecting the inherent difficulties of solving violent crimes, especially in countries with limited resources;
  • Makes insufficient allowance for the reality that many crimes, even in developed countries, go unsolved despite robust policing.

2. Overuse of “Abuse-of-Discretion” Review

The dissent questions the doctrinal basis for subjecting withholding and CAT cases to a robust abuse-of-discretion overlay:

  • He notes that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D), which speaks of “abuse of discretion,” explicitly addresses the Attorney General’s discretion in asylum cases—and asylum is discretionary relief.
  • By contrast, withholding and CAT protection are mandatory once their elements are satisfied; thus, the “discretion” reference does not obviously apply.
  • He criticizes the majority for using “abuse of discretion” to demand fuller engagement with every segment of the record and every argument the court deems important, in tension with precedents like Casalena v. INS, 984 F.2d 105 (4th Cir. 1993), which hold that agency adjudicators need not write “an exegesis on every contention.”

In short, the dissent reads the majority’s approach as raising the bar for IJ/BIA decision‑writing, encouraging remands whenever the circuit panel believes some piece of evidence could have been handled more explicitly.

3. The Role of Victim Cooperation with Law Enforcement

Judge Wilkinson also stresses the “inherently collaborative” nature of criminal investigations:

  • He notes that whenever relatives did report crimes to Honduran authorities, the police responded and recorded reports;
  • In his view, the lack of arrests is not strong evidence of governmental unwillingness; rather, the investigations were hampered by:
    • Masked perpetrators;
    • Lack of witnesses able to identify attackers; and
    • Other evidentiary constraints.
  • By contrast, he emphasizes that the petitioner, who could identify assailants by appearance, never approached the police, depriving authorities of crucial information.

The dissent fears that the majority’s approach will:

  • “Disincentivize” cooperation with domestic law enforcement;
  • Functionally reward petitioners’ non-reporting by treating it as presumptively justified whenever country reports show corruption or gang presence; and
  • Undermine the sovereignty and reform efforts of countries like Honduras by declaring them incapable of providing meaningful protection based on limited but unsuccessful investigations.

IV. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Withholding of Removal vs. Asylum vs. CAT Protection

  • Asylum (not at issue here):
    • Discretionary form of relief; lower standard (“well-founded fear” of persecution).
    • If granted, often leads to permanent residence and family reunification rights.
  • Withholding of removal:
    • Mandatory if the applicant proves a “clear probability” that their life or freedom would be threatened on account of a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group).
    • Higher standard than asylum; but if met, the Government cannot remove the person to the country of persecution.
    • Does not necessarily confer a pathway to permanent status.
  • CAT protection:
    • Based on international obligation not to return anyone to a country where they face a likelihood of torture.
    • No requirement of a protected ground (political, religious, etc.); the focus is on the severity of harm and state involvement or acquiescence.
    • Relief can be withholding of removal or deferral of removal; both are mandatory if CAT standard is met.

2. “Persecution” and “Unable or Unwilling to Control”

Persecution is a serious form of harm—such as death threats, severe physical violence, or repeated serious abuse—on account of a protected ground. When the persecutors are private actors (like gangs or militias), the applicant must also show that the home government is:

  • Unable to protect them (e.g., because of weak institutions or chaos); or
  • Unwilling to protect them (e.g., because of corruption, collusion, or discriminatory indifference).

This is why evidence of police inaction, token responses, or outright collusion with criminals is central in these cases.

3. Non‑Reporting to Police: Futility and Danger

There is no absolute rule that victims must report abuse to the police before they can seek protection under U.S. immigration law. Courts recognize that in many countries:

  • Police may be corrupt;
  • Police may be afraid of gangs or complicit with them; and
  • Victims who complain may be targeted for retaliation.

So non‑reporting is excused when:

  • It would be futile (because previous reports led to no meaningful action or country conditions show police cannot help); or
  • It would likely lead to further harm (e.g., gangs routinely learn who complained and punish them).

4. Internal Relocation

Even if the applicant faces persecution in one region of their country, relief may be denied if they can safely and reasonably move to another region. However:

  • After proof of past persecution, the Government must show that internal relocation is both:
    • Safe (the persecutor cannot easily reach the applicant); and
    • Reasonable under all the circumstances (considering family ties, language, economic opportunities, etc.).

For transnational gangs like MS‑13, evidence often shows that their reach and networks span entire countries, making internal relocation ineffective in many instances.

5. CAT “Acquiescence”

For CAT, it is not enough that the applicant fears torture from private criminals; they must show some level of state complicity or deliberate indifference. “Acquiescence” means:

  • Officials know (or should know) that torture will likely occur; and
  • They fail to take reasonable steps to prevent it, in breach of their legal duty.

This can be shown by:

  • Direct evidence that police or officials cooperate with gangs;
  • Patterns of impunity where officials routinely ignore or cover up torture; or
  • Country‑conditions evidence documenting systemic state failures to protect against torture.

V. Impact and Significance

A. Practical Implications for Immigration Practitioners

For attorneys representing asylum, withholding, or CAT applicants—especially those fleeing Central American gangs—Ramos Marquez has several important implications:

  1. Build robust records on futility and danger of reporting. The decision strongly validates using:
    • Applicant testimony about anticipated retaliation from gangs if they report;
    • Affidavits from family and community members; and
    • Country-conditions reports describing corruption, collusion, and impunity
    to show that non‑reporting is justified and that the state is “unable or unwilling” to control persecutors.
  2. Forceful use of country-conditions evidence in CAT claims. The decision underscores that:
    • Country-conditions evidence can be decisive for CAT acquiescence;
    • IJ and BIA decisions are vulnerable on appeal if they:
      • Simply recite the existence of anti‑gang initiatives or formal legal protections; while
      • Ignoring or downplaying detailed evidence of police participation in killings, gang collusion, or systematic impunity.
  3. Clarification on relocation burdens. Once past persecution is established and the “unable or unwilling” prong is satisfied:
    • The Government bears the burden to show safe, reasonable internal relocation; and
    • Attorneys should vigorously challenge any IJ/BIA analysis that shifts that burden to the applicant.
  4. Appellate strategy: highlight ignored evidence to invoke abuse-of-discretion review. Practitioners should:
    • Pinpoint specific testimony and documentary evidence that the IJ or BIA failed to discuss or mischaracterized; and
    • Argue that such omissions amount to an abuse of discretion under Tassi, Hernandez‑Cartagena, and now Ramos Marquez.

B. Doctrinal Impact within the Fourth Circuit

Doctrinally, Ramos Marquez marks a further entrenchment of several Fourth Circuit trends:

  • Strong policing of evidentiary “cherry-picking.” The majority doubles down on prior warnings to the BIA and IJs not to:
    • Base decisions on narrow slices of the record; or
    • Ignore credible, material testimony and supportive country evidence.
  • No per se reporting requirement—now backed by a finding that the record “compels” excusal of non-reporting. Whereas prior cases allowed for non‑reporting under certain conditions, Ramos Marquez goes further by:
    • Finding an abuse of discretion in the agency’s failure to accept the petitioner’s futility/danger rationale; and
    • Concluding that the record compels that reporting was futile and dangerous.
  • Expanded role of abuse-of-discretion review. The case continues the Fourth Circuit’s distinctive practice of:
    • Overlaying an abuse-of-discretion check (for ignoring or distorting evidence) on top of substantial-evidence review of factual determinations; and
    • Extending that framework beyond asylum to withholding and CAT, over the dissent’s objection.

This doctrinal stance may prompt further debate, possibly at the en banc or Supreme Court level, over the interplay between § 1252(b)(4)(B)’s deference command and the court’s insistence that adjudicators provide reasoned engagement with the record.

C. Broader Policy and Comparative-Law Implications

Finally, the case touches on deeper tensions in U.S. protection law:

  • Domestic sovereignty vs. international protection. The majority, by emphasizing governmental “inability or unwillingness” in Honduras, implicitly critiques the effectiveness of that state’s justice system. The dissent perceives this as an unfair “write‑off” of Honduras’s efforts to combat gangs. The conflict illustrates the difficulty of:
    • Respecting foreign sovereignty and developmental realities, while
    • Upholding international norms that forbid returning individuals to persecution or torture.
  • Transnational gangs and internal relocation. Where gangs like MS‑13 have nationwide and cross‑border reach, internal relocation as a doctrinal escape valve becomes increasingly tenuous. Ramos Marquez continues a line of cases recognizing that, in such contexts, “go somewhere else in the country” may be more theoretical than real.

VI. Conclusion

Ramos Marquez v. Bondi is a significant Fourth Circuit decision in the law of withholding of removal and CAT protection, especially in gang‑related claims from corrupt or fragile states. Its key contributions are:

  • Reaffirming and strengthening the rule that there is no per se requirement to report persecution to the police, and that credible evidence of futility or danger in reporting must be carefully weighed;
  • Holding that token or merely procedural police actions do not, without more, prove a state is “willing and able” to protect victims from powerful gangs;
  • Clarifying that, once past persecution by a non‑state actor whom the government cannot control is established, the burden shifts to the Government to rebut the presumption of future persecution, including on the issue of internal relocation;
  • Insisting that the IJ and BIA must meaningfully engage with country-conditions evidence, especially in CAT cases where such evidence can be dispositive of governmental acquiescence; and
  • Confirming that the court will treat unexplained disregard of credible, unrebutted, legally significant evidence as an abuse of discretion, even under a highly deferential substantial-evidence regime.

The dissent’s concerns about judicial overreach and diminished deference highlight ongoing tensions in immigration adjudication. Nonetheless, unless and until revisited en banc or by the Supreme Court, Ramos Marquez cements, within the Fourth Circuit, a robust obligation on immigration adjudicators to confront the full evidentiary record—and not to treat formal legal structures or isolated police responses as conclusive proof of effective state protection in the face of systemic corruption and gang violence.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Comments