Fundamental Fairness Requires a Reliability Foundation Before Lab-Result Letters Alone Can Prove an Equine Drug Threshold Violation

1. Introduction

Matter of Pletcher v New York State Gaming Commission (2026 NY Slip Op 01435 [3d Dept Mar. 12, 2026]) arises from a postrace drug test of Capensis, a thoroughbred trained by petitioner Todd A. Pletcher, following a July 30, 2022 race at Saratoga Race Course. A blood sample tested positive for phenylbutazone (“bute”), a lawful medication subject to a strict concentration threshold of 0.3 mcg/ml in plasma (9 NYCRR 4043.3 [a] [26]). The New York laboratory reported 1.56 mcg/ml; a split sample tested in California reported 1.8 mcg/ml.

The New York State Gaming Commission (through the state steward) imposed a 14-day suspension and a $2,000 fine, and the Hearing Officer also recommended disqualification of the horse. In this CPLR article 78 proceeding (transferred under CPLR 7804 [g]), the core issue became not whether hearsay is admissible in administrative hearings, but whether the Commission could establish the violation solely through laboratory “result letters that did not demonstrate the reliability and acceptance of the testing methods, consistent with substantial evidence review and fundamental fairness.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department annulled the Commission’s determination and remitted for a new hearing. Although petitioner did not preserve a direct attack on the scientific methodology (because he did not specifically challenge chain of custody or testing methodology), the Court held that the hearing was nonetheless fundamentally unfair because the Commission’s only proof of the overage consisted of letters from two laboratories that did not supply a sufficient foundation showing the tests’ reliability or general acceptance.

The Court rejected (as unpreserved) petitioner’s newly framed State Administrative Procedure Act challenge based on failure to file a notice of adoption for publication in the State Register, because his petition had instead focused on lack of a public hearing. Remaining arguments (bias, adverse inference, penalty) were deemed academic in light of remittal.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Preservation and the limits of appellate review in administrative hearings

  • Matter of Monje v Geoghegan, 108 AD3d 957 (3d Dept 2013) and Matter of Ortiz v Fischer, 64 AD3d 1111 (3d Dept 2009): The Court used these to support the proposition that objections must be specific to preserve challenges—here, petitioner objected to admission of the letters through a witness lacking personal knowledge, but did not specifically challenge the chain of custody or the methodology used by either laboratory. That failure rendered a direct methodological challenge “unpreserved.”
  • Footnote context distinguishing non-concession: The Court noted petitioner did not concede results and objected to stipulations, contrasting with Matter of Guarino v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 45 AD3d 1096 (3d Dept 2007) and Matter of Zito v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 300 AD2d 805 (3d Dept 2002), but also emphasized petitioner conceded he was not challenging chain of custody.

B. Hearsay in administrative adjudication vs. “substantial evidence” and judicial scrutiny

  • Matter of 670 Riv. Realty Corp. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 242 AD3d 543 (1st Dept 2025) and Matter of ExceedLLC, LLC v Department of State Div. of Licensing Servs., 233 AD3d 1392 (3d Dept 2024): These reflect the familiar rule that hearsay can support an administrative determination and can be substantial evidence if sufficiently probative—sometimes even standing alone. The Court accepted that baseline rule, but treated it as a starting point, not the finish line.
  • 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176 (1978) and Matter of Diotte v Fahey, 97 AD2d 653 (3d Dept 1983): The Court leaned on these to emphasize that substantial-evidence review is a “genuine judicial function.” An agency’s finding is not automatically confirmed; courts must evaluate whether the proof meets a sufficiency standard analogous to whether a fact question could be submitted to a jury.
  • People ex rel. Vega v Smith, 66 NY2d 130 (1985), Matter of Sleiman v New York State Cent. Register of Child Abuse & Maltreatment, 193 AD3d 1323 (4th Dept 2021), Matter of Kordasiewicz v Erie County Dept. of Social Servs., 119 AD3d 1425 (4th Dept 2014), and Matter of Saporito v Carrion, 66 AD3d 912 (2d Dept 2009): Cited for the proposition that the key inquiry is whether hearsay is relevant and probative enough to constitute substantial evidence on its own.

C. Fundamental fairness as a constraint on reliance on hearsay

  • Matter of Tufariello v Barry, 60 AD2d 813 (1st Dept 1978) and Matter of Strain v Sarafan, 57 AD2d 525 (1st Dept 1977): These cases support the Court’s move from “hearsay is admissible” to the deeper question: whether the nature of the hearsay, in context, makes the hearing unfair.
  • Racing-discipline context cited as framing authority: Matter of Fusco v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 88 AD3d 1240 (3d Dept 2011) and Matter of Shuman v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 40 AD3d 385 (1st Dept 2007). The Court used these to show that, even in racing regulation, substantial evidence and fairness require more than conclusory paperwork when the test process is central.
  • Matter of Brown v Murphy, 43 AD2d 524 (1st Dept 1973): This was the principal comparator for why the letters here were insufficient: bare assertions of results without reliability indicia can fail as substantial evidence and raise fairness concerns.
  • “Compare” decisions illustrating what a sufficient foundation can look like in racing cases: Matter of Dutrow v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 97 AD3d 1034 (3d Dept 2012); Matter of Czermann v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 68 AD3d 1580 (3d Dept 2009); Matter of Laterza v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 68 AD3d 1509 (3d Dept 2009); Matter of Case v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 61 AD3d 1313 (3d Dept 2009); and also Matter of Dutrow v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 18 AD3d 947 (3d Dept 2005). While the Opinion does not recite each case’s evidentiary details, their collective role is to underscore that racing drug cases commonly include (and may require) a demonstrated testing foundation, not merely a result statement.
  • Remittal/annulment for unfairness anchored by: Matter of Riverton Funeral Home v Whalen, 63 AD2d 887 (1st Dept 1978), Matter of Erdman v Ingraham, 28 AD2d 5 (1st Dept 1967), and “compare” Matter of Warner v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 99 AD2d 680 (4th Dept 1984). These authorities bolster the remedy chosen: remand for a new hearing where fairness defects infect the proof.

D. Burden of proof in racing drug proceedings

  • Matter of Case v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 61 AD3d 1313 (3d Dept 2009) and Matter of Mosher v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., 74 NY2d 688 (1989): The Court treated these as controlling on a key allocation principle: the agency must make an initial showing that a properly conducted test resulted in a positive finding. The Court rejected the notion that the Hearing Officer could shift the practical burden to petitioner by suggesting he “could call” the lab director; foundational proof belongs to the regulator first.

E. Preservation of SAPA arguments

  • Matter of Independent Health Assn. v New York State Dept. of Social Servs., 210 AD2d 638 (3d Dept 1994) and Matter of R.W. Granger & Sons v State of N.Y. Facilities Dev. Corp., 207 AD2d 596 (3d Dept 1994): These were used to hold that petitioner could not pivot on appeal to a different SAPA theory (publication of notice of adoption under State Administrative Procedure Act § 202 [5]) when his petition targeted a different procedural defect (lack of a public hearing).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Step one: distinguish preservation from fairness. The Court agreed petitioner did not preserve a direct methodological attack because he did not contest chain of custody or methodology. But the Court treated the admitted letters as raising a separate, reviewable concern: whether the agency’s proof, in kind and quality, made the hearing fundamentally fair.
  2. Step two: apply substantial-evidence standards with real scrutiny. Using 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, the Court reaffirmed that substantial evidence requires probative proof of a type that could warrant a factfinder’s determination. Hearsay may qualify, but only if it carries adequate indicia of reliability and probative force for the point to be proved.
  3. Step three: identify the evidentiary gap. The Commission relied solely on two letters to establish the bute concentration overage. The New York letter reported the overage but did not provide the testing method; the California letter described a method but neither letter addressed reliability or general acceptance of the testing used to detect and quantify bute.
  4. Step four: enforce the agency’s initial burden in drug-threshold discipline. Citing Matter of Case v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd. and Matter of Mosher v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., the Court held that it was the Commission’s burden to first show that a properly conducted test yielded a positive finding. The Hearing Officer’s comment that petitioner could call the lab director did not cure the foundational absence; it risked inverting the burden.
  5. Step five: conclude unfairness and order the appropriate remedy. Given that the letters were the sole proof of a dispositive element (the over-threshold concentration) and lacked a reliability foundation, the Court deemed the hearing fundamentally unfair and remanded for a new hearing rather than definitively resolving the merits of the violation.

3.3 Impact

The Opinion’s practical rule is that, even though hearsay may be admissible and sometimes sufficient in administrative proceedings, an agency seeking to prove an equine drug-threshold violation cannot rest exclusively on laboratory result letters unless the record also establishes a reliability foundation for the testing (e.g., what was done, how accuracy is assured, and that the methodology is accepted and dependable for the purpose).

Likely effects include:

  • More robust evidentiary presentations by the Gaming Commission in drug cases—through testimony, detailed laboratory documentation, validation materials, or other competent proof that demonstrates reliability and acceptance, not merely numerical results.
  • Sharper hearing practice around foundational showings: agencies may proactively build the record under State Administrative Procedure Act § 306 (relaxed evidentiary rules) while still satisfying the court’s demand for probative reliability.
  • A fairness backstop for licensees: even where a party does not perfectly preserve a scientific-method challenge, courts may intervene when the agency’s proof structure effectively deprives the party of a fair opportunity to test the reliability of the dispositive evidence.
  • Litigation focus shift: disputes may turn less on whether “hearsay is allowed” and more on whether the hearsay is sufficiently explanatory and verifiable to carry the agency’s burden.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

CPLR article 78 / substantial evidence
Article 78 is the main vehicle to challenge New York administrative action. When “substantial evidence” applies, the court asks whether the agency had enough reliable proof that a reasonable factfinder could accept. It is not a re-trial, but it is also not rubber-stamping.
Hearsay in administrative hearings
Unlike in many courtroom trials, hearsay is often admissible in administrative hearings. But admissible does not automatically mean sufficient—especially where the hearsay is conclusory and the only proof on a critical point.
Foundation / reliability / general acceptance
A “foundation” is the background needed to trust evidence. For lab test results, that typically means enough information to show the test is dependable (how it works, quality controls, validation, and that it is generally accepted for the measurement at issue). The Court found that bare letters stating results, without such context, were inadequate as the sole proof.
Burden of proof (initial showing)
The regulator must first establish that a properly conducted test produced a positive/over-threshold finding. Only then does the burden meaningfully shift to the licensee to rebut, explain, or mitigate. The Opinion reinforces that the agency cannot satisfy its initial burden by telling the licensee to call the lab director.
Preservation
To raise an argument on appeal, it generally must be clearly raised at the hearing or in the petition. Here, a specific scientific-method challenge was deemed unpreserved, and a newly framed SAPA argument was also rejected as not properly before the court.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Pletcher v New York State Gaming Commission establishes a cautionary evidentiary rule for New York administrative discipline in racing: although hearsay may be used, a determination based solely on lab result letters—without a demonstrated reliability foundation for the testing—can render the hearing fundamentally unfair and cannot stand under substantial-evidence review. The decision reaffirms that agencies bear the initial burden to show a properly conducted test, and it signals that foundational rigor matters most when the agency’s proof consists of nothing more than a result summary.