Full-Scheme Drug Sentencing and the Limits of Recusal Based on a Litigant’s Attacks

Case: United States v. William Richardson
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed: November 10, 2026
Disposition: Judgments affirmed

Precedential status: The opinion expressly states that it is nonprecedential under Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 5.7. It applies existing law rather than establishes a new binding rule.

1. Introduction

This consolidated appellate disposition addresses the permissible scope of drug-quantity findings at sentencing, the application of sentencing enhancements, notice of criminal contempt charges, and judicial recusal. Its central practical lessons are that an incomplete investigative spreadsheet does not necessarily limit sentencing evidence and that a defendant cannot require a judge’s removal simply by directing accusations and insults at the judge.

The United States prosecuted William Richardson for offenses arising from the acquisition and distribution of oxycodone and oxymorphone, related health care fraud, and firearm possession. Controlled purchases and a residential search in 2014 revealed drug trafficking and firearms. Investigators later uncovered a scheme involving prescriptions obtained through false representations to health insurance providers, with the pills intended for resale rather than personal consumption.

After several appointed attorneys withdrew, Richardson proceeded without counsel, assisted initially by standby counsel. He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to all charged counts except Count Eight, the firearm-in-furtherance charge, which was dismissed without prejudice. The District Court imposed 300 months’ imprisonment and eight years of supervised release.

Separate contempt proceedings followed Richardson’s threatening letters to his fifth appointed attorney and the attorney’s family. Richardson was convicted of indirect criminal contempt. He also sought the trial judge’s recusal, arguing that his own hostile filings had created an adversarial relationship incompatible with impartial adjudication.

The Third Circuit consolidated the appeals for disposition only. Richardson represented himself in the appeal addressing his underlying convictions and sentence; counsel represented him in the appeal challenging the refusal to recuse.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The panel affirmed on every issue presented:

  • Drug quantity: Wiretap evidence and pharmacy records supported the sentencing quantity. Neither an earlier, incomplete spreadsheet nor judicial estoppel confined the Government to 730 kilograms of converted drug weight.
  • Sentencing: No Guidelines career-offender enhancement had been imposed. The prior-felony-drug enhancement applied to the relevant substantive, aiding-and-abetting, and conspiracy offenses, and the challenged grouping of counts was proper.
  • Wiretap suppression: Richardson’s valid, unconditional guilty plea foreclosed the particular challenge to the pretrial suppression ruling.
  • Contempt: His claim that no contempt charge existed failed because he received the notice required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42.
  • Recusal: Richardson’s accusations against the judge did not themselves establish an appearance of bias, and the judge’s response did not demonstrate partiality.

3. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

The panel cited this decision for liberal construction of arguments submitted by a self-represented litigant. It therefore considered Richardson’s arguments generously, including his awkwardly framed contention that there was no valid contempt charge. That interpretive approach did not excuse the merits of his claims or eliminate applicable appellate standards. Its influence was procedural: it enabled meaningful consideration of his submissions rather than rejection based merely on their wording.

United States v. Gray, 942 F.3d 627, 630–31 (3d Cir. 2019)

This case supplied the distinction between clear-error review of factual sentencing findings and de novo review of legal determinations. That distinction shaped the drug-quantity analysis. The appellate court did not independently reconstruct the entire trafficking record; it examined whether the District Court’s factual estimate was clearly erroneous while retaining independent review over the governing legal principles.

New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)

The Supreme Court’s description of judicial estoppel provided the framework for rejecting Richardson’s attempt to hold the Government to the earlier 730-kilogram figure. The doctrine generally prevents a party from succeeding on one position and later obtaining an advantage through a contradictory position.

Here, the Government had expressly disclaimed the spreadsheet figure as its sentencing position, and the District Court had not accepted that figure. The panel therefore found neither the asserted prior position nor prior success on it. The decision distinguishes an evolving evidentiary calculation from the manipulation of judicial proceedings that estoppel addresses.

United States v. Guyton, 144 F.4th 449, 458 (3d Cir. 2025), and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)

These decisions supplied the four-part plain-error framework governing unpreserved sentencing challenges. Richardson needed to identify an error that was plain, affected substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Their significance lies in the heightened threshold for obtaining relief after failing to preserve an objection. In this case, however, the panel generally rejected the challenged sentencing decisions at the first step: it found no error, making further analysis of prejudice and institutional fairness unnecessary.

United States v. Porter, 933 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2019)

The panel relied on this case to reject Richardson’s challenge to the denial of wiretap suppression. As quoted in the opinion, a defendant who enters an unconditional guilty plea cannot challenge pretrial rulings that are irrelevant to the judgment of conviction. The panel treated Richardson’s plea as valid and the challenged suppression ruling as falling within that limitation.

The opinion did not decide whether the wiretaps were lawful. Its conclusion concerned the availability of that issue after the plea, not the underlying merits of suppression.

United States v. Dorsey, 105 F.4th 526, 528 (3d Cir. 2024)

This decision reinforced the use of plain-error review for the unpreserved objection to the calculation of Richardson’s base offense level. The panel then applied the Guidelines’ grouping provisions to conclude that the drug counts and firearm count were properly treated together. The citation supported the review framework rather than supplying a distinct substantive grouping rule.

Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006)

This case established abuse of discretion as the standard for reviewing denial of recusal. The appellate inquiry was therefore whether the refusal to recuse exceeded the permissible bounds of judgment under the governing impartiality standard. The panel concluded that it did not.

Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 168 (3d Cir. 2004)

This precedent provided the central rationale for rejecting Richardson’s recusal theory. Allowing a litigant’s unilateral accusations to establish judicial disqualification would permit parties effectively to veto judicial assignments. The panel applied that concern directly: Richardson could not manufacture an appearance of partiality merely by accusing the judge of corruption and criminal conduct.

The principle is limited. It rejects automatic disqualification based on a litigant’s attacks; it does not make a judge’s actual response to those attacks irrelevant.

4. Legal Reasoning

A. Drug Quantity Could Be Established Beyond the Preliminary Spreadsheet

The Presentence Report initially used a converted drug weight of 730 kilograms derived from an FBI spreadsheet. The Government later presented additional calculations and supporting evidence. Richardson argued that the earlier figure should control.

The panel rejected that position because the initial spreadsheet omitted prescriptions obtained between 2012 and 2015. The agent also testified that it was not intended to calculate all relevant conduct attributable to Richardson. Its incompleteness undermined the premise that it represented a definitive sentencing ceiling.

The District Court instead relied on two evidentiary sources:

  • Wiretap evidence from April and May 2016 connecting Richardson to an average monthly converted drug quantity of approximately 230 kilograms.
  • Pharmacy prescription records supporting at least 5,860 kilograms of converted drug weight.

The court limited its estimate to the twenty-two-month period it identified with Count Three and arrived at approximately 4,400 kilograms. That placed Richardson within the 3,000-to-10,000-kilogram range corresponding to base offense level 32.

An important explanatory limit: The opinion does not provide the intermediate arithmetic connecting the stated monthly average to the final 4,400-kilogram estimate; multiplying 230 by twenty-two does not itself produce that figure. The disposition should therefore be understood as appellate approval of the record-supported estimate, not as a fully reproducible mathematical account. The separate pharmacy evidence supported a quantity within the same Guidelines range.

Richardson’s discovery request for earlier spreadsheet drafts appears in the background, but the panel did not separately develop a disclosure analysis. The opinion should not be treated as announcing a general rule about access to investigative spreadsheet drafts.

B. Relevant Conduct Was Not Confined to the 2014 Investigation

Richardson sought to restrict sentencing to the drug amounts associated with the 2014 investigation. His guilty plea to Count Three defeated that proposed limitation because the conspiracy count covered August 2014 through June 2016.

The panel also relied on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2), which includes acts forming part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. The relevant sentencing inquiry thus extended beyond a single investigative episode.

The holding remains record-specific. It does not establish that every drug transaction involving any alleged conspirator automatically counts against every defendant. Here, the court accepted evidence connecting Richardson to the continuing trafficking conduct and the quantities used.

C. Judicial Estoppel Did Not Freeze an Unadopted Calculation

Richardson’s estoppel argument confused an initial evidentiary calculation with a litigation position successfully advanced before the court. The Government expressly stated that the 730-kilogram figure did not represent its drug-quantity position. The District Court had never accepted that figure either.

Consequently, this was not a situation in which the Government obtained one favorable ruling on a factual position and then reversed course to obtain another. The rejection of estoppel preserves the distinction between correcting or supplementing an incomplete calculation and strategically taking incompatible positions that have received judicial acceptance.

D. Statutory Recidivist Enhancements Differ from Guidelines Career-Offender Status

Richardson characterized one challenged enhancement as a career-offender enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 851. The panel responded that no Guidelines career-offender enhancement had been applied: his criminal history category was III rather than the category VI associated with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.

The distinction matters. Section 851 concerns the procedure for invoking qualifying prior convictions for increased statutory punishment; the Guidelines career-offender provision is a separate mechanism. An objection to an enhancement that was never imposed cannot justify resentencing.

By contrast, the prior-felony-drug enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) did apply. Richardson had qualifying prior cocaine-trafficking convictions. The panel explained why the enhancement reached each relevant form of liability:

  • Substantive distribution: Section 841(b)(1)(C) applied directly to Count Six.
  • Aiding and abetting: Under 18 U.S.C. § 2, an aider and abettor is punishable as a principal, supporting application to Counts Four and Five.
  • Conspiracy: Section 846 subjects conspirators to the penalties prescribed for the underlying offense, supporting application to Count Three.

The panel thus rejected an attempt to distinguish these forms of participation where the governing statutes expressly align their penalties.

E. Grouping Reflected Continuing Conduct and the Firearm Connection

The five drug counts were properly grouped under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) because Richardson’s dealing was ongoing or continuous. That treatment supported a calculation reflecting the continuing trafficking activity rather than isolated snapshots.

The firearm count was properly grouped with the drug counts under § 3D1.2(c) because it embodied conduct treated as a specific offense characteristic under the drug guideline, § 2D1.1(b)(1). This analysis concerned Guidelines treatment of related conduct; it did not revive the dismissed firearm-in-furtherance charge.

F. The Contempt Challenge Turned on Notice

Richardson asserted that there was no contempt count. Although he raised the argument in the appeal from his underlying criminal judgment rather than the separate contempt judgment, the panel considered it liberally and rejected it because he had received the notice required by Rule 42.

The opinion’s discussion is narrow. It does not provide a detailed analysis of the contempt evidence, punishment, or every procedural requirement governing criminal contempt. Its express conclusion is that the asserted absence of a validly noticed contempt charge was unsupported.

G. A Defendant Cannot Manufacture Recusal Through Insults Alone

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must recuse when the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. This is an appearance-based standard, not merely an inquiry into the judge’s personal assurance of fairness.

Richardson relied principally on his own filings calling the court corrupt and criminal. Those unilateral accusations did not themselves establish an objectively reasonable appearance of bias. Otherwise, a party could manipulate judicial assignments by escalating attacks until the assigned judge withdrew.

The panel also examined the judge’s actual response. Judge Hornak declined to repeat Richardson’s profanity, described himself as having “a thick skin,” and stated that the remarks did not affect his judgment on the merits. Read in context, the panel considered this a measured response rather than evidence of retaliation or prejudgment.

The reasoning therefore had two components: Richardson’s accusations could not create automatic disqualification, and the judge’s response supplied no independent basis for finding partiality. The decision does not suggest that genuinely biased judicial conduct would be insulated from review merely because a litigant had first behaved abusively.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Converted drug weight
A Guidelines measure that translates different controlled substances into a common sentencing scale. It is not necessarily the physical weight of the pills or drugs seized.
Relevant conduct
Conduct sufficiently connected to the offense to count at sentencing, including qualifying acts within the same course of conduct or common scheme.
Judicial estoppel
A doctrine preventing a party from gaining an advantage through a position inconsistent with one it previously advanced successfully in court. An incomplete calculation not adopted by the court does not necessarily trigger it.
Clear error and de novo review
Clear-error review gives substantial deference to trial-court factual findings. De novo review means the appellate court decides a legal question independently.
Plain error
A demanding standard for objections not properly preserved below. An obvious mistake alone is insufficient; the additional requirements concerning rights and judicial fairness must also be satisfied.
Grouping
A Guidelines method for calculating related counts together rather than treating every count as a wholly independent sentencing unit.
Indirect criminal contempt
Punishable interference with judicial authority arising outside the judge’s immediate presence. Richardson’s challenge concerned whether he received the required notice of that separate proceeding.
Recusal
A judge’s withdrawal from a proceeding when disqualification is required, including when a reasonable observer could question the judge’s impartiality.

6. Potential Impact and Limits

Sentencing evidence: The opinion illustrates why preliminary investigative summaries need not cap sentencing quantities when fuller, reliable evidence supports a different result. Prosecutors benefit from clearly identifying provisional calculations, while defendants seeking a lower quantity must address the completeness and reliability of the later evidence.

Preservation of objections: The repeated use of plain-error review underscores the importance of raising specific sentencing objections in the District Court. Liberal construction of self-represented filings does not eliminate preservation requirements.

Judicial administration: The recusal analysis protects courts against tactical efforts to force reassignment through personal abuse. At the same time, its attention to the judge’s measured response reinforces that judicial conduct remains independently reviewable.

Limited doctrinal reach: The opinion does not establish a universal drug-extrapolation formula, decide the substantive legality of the wiretaps, comprehensively resolve contempt procedure, or categorically reject recusal whenever a litigant attacks a judge. Because it is nonprecedential, its significance lies principally in its illustration of existing doctrine rather than binding force in later cases.

7. Conclusion

United States v. William Richardson affirms a sentence based on the broader proven trafficking scheme rather than an incomplete initial calculation, distinguishes statutory recidivist punishment from Guidelines career-offender treatment, and rejects recusal manufactured through a litigant’s own accusations.

Its broader significance is practical: sentencing turns on supported relevant conduct, appellate relief depends heavily on preservation and review standards, and judicial impartiality is assessed objectively—not dictated by a party’s hostility.