Full Municipal Indemnification Under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07 for Officer’s Compensatory Section 1983 Liability

Introduction

This commentary examines the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Roger Dean Gillispie v. Miami Township, Ohio, et al., Nos. 23-3999/4000/4001 (6th Cir. May 2, 2025). After nearly 21 years in prison for wrongful convictions on sexual‐assault charges, Roger Dean Gillispie sued Detective Matthew Scott Moore and Miami Township under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A jury awarded him $45 million in compensatory damages, and the district court held Miami Township liable to indemnify Moore in full. All parties appealed various rulings, including Monell supervisory‐liability claims, the size of the award, evidentiary and jury‐instruction issues, and the scope of municipal indemnification under Ohio law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in full, clarifying both § 1983 municipal‐liability standards and the meaning of “good faith” and “scope of employment” under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Gillispie’s Monell supervisory liability claims against Miami Township. He had alleged that the Township ratified unconstitutional evidence suppression and identification procedures or failed to train its officers adequately. The court held that there was no evidence of a final policymaker’s ratification and no deliberate indifference in training or supervision.
The court upheld the $45 million compensatory‐damages verdict as supported by a preponderance of the evidence and not “so excessive as to shock the conscience.” Testimony about decades of incarceration, violence in a maximum‐security prison, loss of reputation, and inability to form a family supported the award.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Miami Township’s Rule 59(e) motion to reduce or remit the award, emphasizing the limited scope of judicial review of jury verdicts and comparing similar large wrongful‐conviction awards.
Detective Moore’s motions under Rules 50 and 59 were held unpreserved or meritless, and his proposed instruction on suggestive lineups was not required as the court’s instructions were neither confusing nor prejudicial.
On the Township’s declaratory‐judgment claim, the Sixth Circuit sustained the district court’s reliance on the jury’s special interrogatories, which found Moore acted in good faith and within the scope of his employment. It interpreted Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07 to require full indemnification of compensatory judgments against an employee, and it declined to consider too‐late constitutional challenges to the statute.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): Established that a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat‐superior theory; liability only attaches where a policy or custom is the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation.
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989): Held that inadequate training may support municipal liability only upon a showing of “deliberate indifference” to known or obvious risks.
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986): Defined “final policymaker” and clarified that mere discretionary acts by officers do not automatically bind a municipality.
Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793 (6th Cir. 2019): Spelled out four routes to Monell liability: illegal official policy, ratification by a final policymaker, inadequate training, or a custom of toleration.
Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2009): Addressed Brady‐duty violations under § 1983 and held that bad faith need not be shown for suppression claims—but did not govern Ohio indemnification law.
Ayers v. City of Cleveland, 156 N.E.3d 848 (Ohio 2020): Confirmed that only the employee, and not third‐party creditors, may invoke the Ohio indemnification statute.

Legal Reasoning

Monell Claims: The Sixth Circuit applied de novo review to summary judgment and held that Gillispie offered no evidence of ratification by a final policymaker or proof of deliberate‐indifference training deficiencies under Jackson. A mere assertion that officers “followed Township policies” does not equate to ratification of constitutional violations, and the record showed existing policies and academy training—no pattern of repeated violations or single‐incident failure to train.

Damages Review: Under Rule 59(e), a district court may correct clear errors or prevent manifest injustice—but cannot lightly disturb a jury’s compensatory‐damages award. The Sixth Circuit emphasized the broad deference due to juries on pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life, and it found that the evidence (years of isolation, violence, stigma, loss of family life) fully supported $45 million.

Indemnification Standard: The court interpreted Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07(B) by its plain language. A political subdivision “shall indemnify” an employee for compensatory judgments unless the officer acted in bad faith or outside the scope of employment. Because the jury found neither bad faith nor a manifestly out‐of‐scope act, the Township’s duty to indemnify Moore “in the amount of any [compensatory] judgment” was automatic—and not limited by Moore’s personal ability to pay.

Untimely Constitutional Challenge: Miami Township belatedly argued that § 2744.07 violates the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Supremacy Clauses—without having given prompt Rule 5.1 notice to the Ohio Attorney General. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s exclusion of that argument as unduly prejudicial to opposing parties a decade into litigation.

Impact

This opinion reaffirms the strict requirements for Monell claims in the Sixth Circuit and underscores the difficulty of proving municipal liability without direct evidence of policy‐level ratification or training indifference.
The decision cements a broad reading of Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07(B), confirming that municipalities must fully indemnify officers for compensatory § 1983 judgments when officers act in good faith and within their employment scope—and cannot cap indemnity based on an officer’s resources.
It provides guidance on the narrow scope of judicial review of large jury awards in civil rights cases, stressing that emotional and reputational harms—especially in wrongful‐conviction contexts—justify multi‐million‐dollar verdicts.
The ruling warns municipal defendants about the need for early and complete briefing on statutory challenges to avoid forfeiture under Rule 5.1.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 1983 Claim: A lawsuit alleging that a government official violated someone’s federal rights under color of law.
Monell Liability: The principle that a municipality can only be sued under § 1983 if its own policies or customs caused the violation, not simply because it employs the wrongdoer.
De Novo Review: The appellate court considers questions of law from scratch, without deferring to the lower court’s decision.
Indemnification: When an employer (here, a local government) agrees to pay for liabilities (judgments) incurred by its employee’s official conduct.
Rule 59(e): The federal rule that allows a court to revise its judgment due to clear error, new evidence, or manifest injustice.
Rule 5.1: Requires prompt notice to the appropriate attorney general whenever a party challenges the constitutionality of a state or federal statute.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Gillispie v. Miami Township reinforces core § 1983 and municipal‐liability doctrines while clarifying Ohio’s statutory indemnification regime. Municipalities now face clear standards: absent evidence of bad faith or manifestly out‐of‐scope actions, Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07(B) compels full indemnification of compensatory rights‐violation judgments. The opinion also underscores the high bar for Monell claims, the deference to jury determinations on damages, and the importance of timely constitutional‐challenge procedures. Collectively, these holdings will guide future litigation over wrongful‐conviction awards, municipal indemnity obligations, and the interplay of federal civil‐rights law with state indemnification statutes.