From Automatic Discharge to Due-Process Balancing:
Aragon v. Martinez Redefines the Remedy for Untimely Sex-Offender Parole Reviews in New Mexico

Introduction

Aragon v. Martinez, consolidated with State v. Lusk, presented the Supreme Court of New Mexico with a recurring and previously un-answered question: What is the proper remedy when the New Mexico Parole Board misses the statutorily mandated deadlines for reviewing the duration of a sex-offender’s indeterminate parole? While the statutory command in NMSA 1978, § 31-21-10.1(C) is unmistakably mandatory (“shall review” after five years and every 2½ years thereafter), the Legislature never supplied an enforcement mechanism. Petitioners Jason Aragon and Ronald Lusk—both long past their first five-year mark without hearings—sought immediate, unconditional release on habeas corpus. The State countered that, at most, they were owed belated hearings, not an automatic discharge.

The Court’s unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Vigil, rejects the jurisdictional/automatic-release theory and instead adopts a due-process-based remedial model anchored in the familiar Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. The decision sets a new precedent that will guide not only sex-offender parole cases but any statutory scheme in which the government’s failure to adhere to mandatory procedural deadlines implicates liberty interests.

Summary of the Judgment

1. The statutory deadlines for sex-offender parole duration review hearings are mandatory but not jurisdictional; missing them does not automatically extinguish the Parole Board’s authority.
2. Because the statute creates a protected liberty interest in a timely review, failure to hold the hearing triggers procedural due-process scrutiny.
3. Applying the three-factor Mathews test, the Court found that the extreme delays (≈12–13 years) violated due process.
4. Relief, however, is not per se release. District courts must hold evidentiary hearings to assess prejudice and fashion “narrowly tailored” remedies—ranging from discharge to lesser relief—while barring the State from relying on evidence that arose only after the date a timely hearing should have been held.
5. Other constitutional challenges (separation of powers, vagueness, Apprendi, double jeopardy) were deemed unpreserved but may be raised on remand.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• State v. Cooley, 2023-NMCA-089: Established that untimely probation-duration hearings do not oust a court’s jurisdiction; remedy lies in due-process analysis. The Supreme Court expressly extends Cooley’s logic from probation to parole.
• Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): Provides the three-factor test for assessing adequacy of procedural safeguards. The Court applies it step-by-step to parole duration hearings.
• Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972): Recognized that parolees possess conditional liberty protected by due process; cited to underscore that some process—though less than that due a free citizen—is constitutionally required.
• State v. Thompson, 2022-NMSC-023: Held that “parole” in § 31-21-10.1 includes “in-house” parole. Critical here because both petitioners spent years incarcerated past their sentences while “on parole.”
• McCutcheon v. Cox, 1962-NMSC-175: Discusses indeterminate parole as a tool to individualize punishment; informs the statutory-purpose analysis.
• Other references: Nguyen v. Bui (statutory interpretation), Archuleta v. Santa Fe Police Dep’t (de novo review of due-process issues), Garduño (fairness principle).

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Mandatory vs. Jurisdictional

Using Compton and Tomlinson, the Court distinguishes between statutory commands that are essential to an agency’s power (jurisdictional) and those that merely impose duties (mandatory). Because § 31-21-10.1 contains no language divesting the Board of authority for non-compliance, and because other provisions evince a legislative intent to maintain Parole Board supervision until affirmative discharge, the deadlines are mandatory – not jurisdictional.

b. Existence of a Liberty Interest

The statute’s wording (“shall review …” and the clear-and-convincing burden on the State) supplies “particularized standards,” satisfying the Olim v. Wakinekona test for a state-created liberty interest: sex offenders are entitled to timely opportunities to regain freedom once public-safety justifications can no longer be established.

c. Application of Mathews Factors

1. Private interest: Avoiding unnecessary parole restrictions—especially acute after 5+ years.
2. Risk of error / value of additional safeguards: No hearings for a decade meant zero chance to contest continued supervision; risk of erroneous deprivation is therefore high.
3. Government interest: Public safety and efficient administration, but the state has long been statutorily obliged to hold such hearings, so the added burden is minimal.

Balancing these elements, the Court finds the existing “procedure”—essentially none—constitutionally inadequate.

d. Remedy Tailoring

Building on Lopez v. LeMaster, the Court commands a case-specific inquiry into prejudice. Key guideposts for district courts:

• State may not rely on evidence post-dating the missed hearing.
• Parolee may invoke the absence of subsequent mandatory hearings as additional prejudice.
• Possible relief spectrum: immediate discharge, credit for time served, adjusted conditions, or other equitable orders.

3. Impact of the Decision

• Administrative Practice: The Parole Board must prioritize calendaring sex-offender reviews. Failure now exposes the State to Mathews-based habeas claims and potential releases.
• Litigation Strategy: Defense counsel will frame future habeas petitions around demonstrable prejudice rather than automatic-release arguments. The State will need contemporaneous documentation capable of satisfying the clear-and-convincing burden as of each statutory interval.
• Legislative Response: The decision highlights a remedial gap. Legislators may codify explicit consequences (e.g., presumptive release or fixed credit) or allocate resources to ensure timely hearings.
• Broader Jurisprudence: Aragon extends Cooley to parole and primes New Mexico courts to apply Mathews whenever a mandatory procedural statute lacks a built-in remedy—probation, parole, or beyond.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Indeterminate Parole: A parole term with only a minimum (e.g., 5 years) and a maximum (20 years or life). Actual length is decided over time.
• In-House Parole: The offender has finished the prison sentence but remains incarcerated—technically “on parole”—usually for lack of an approved release plan.
• Jurisdictional vs. Mandatory Deadline: Missing a jurisdictional deadline nullifies authority; missing a merely mandatory deadline violates a duty but leaves authority intact.
• Mathews Test: A three-part balancing tool (private interest, risk of error, government interest) courts use to decide what procedural protections are constitutionally required.
• Clear and Convincing Evidence: More demanding than “preponderance,” less than “beyond reasonable doubt”; must generate an “abiding conviction” of truth.

Conclusion

Aragon v. Martinez charts a middle path between two extremes: unthinking adherence to statutory text that would force automatic release, and unrestrained agency discretion that would excuse years-long neglect. By rooting the remedy in procedural due process, the Court preserves the Legislature’s public-safety goals while safeguarding parolees’ liberty interests. Going forward, the Parole Board must treat the five-year and 2½-year checkpoints as constitutional as well as statutory imperatives. District courts, armed with the Mathews framework, will serve as the backstop—capable of ordering discharge, but only after weighing demonstrable prejudice and the State’s safety concerns. The opinion thus stands as a significant precedent for New Mexico administrative and criminal law alike, fostering both accountability and calibrated justice.