Freezing the Speedy Trial Act Clock at the Motion to Dismiss and Enforcing Oral Pronouncement of Supervised Release: Commentary on United States v. Le (4th Cir. 2025)

Freezing the Speedy Trial Act Clock at the Motion to Dismiss and Enforcing Oral Pronouncement of Supervised Release: Commentary on United States v. Le (4th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s published decision in the consolidated appeals arising from the prosecution of the Northern Virginia “Reccless Tigers” gang: United States v. Joseph Duk‑Hyun Lamborn, United States v. Young Yoo, United States v. Peter Le, and United States v. Tony Minh Le, decided November 18, 2025, by Chief Judge Diaz, joined by Judge Gregory and Senior Judge Keenan.

The case involves a sprawling gang‑related narcotics enterprise, the kidnapping and murder of Brandon White (a debtor and perceived “snitch”), a complex multi‑defendant trial, and a battery of post‑trial challenges. The opinion touches numerous doctrinal areas:

  • Denial of a last‑minute continuance in a voluminous, COVID‑delayed case;
  • Refusal to substitute counsel days before trial, followed by the defendant’s partial pro se participation;
  • Sufficiency of the evidence for kidnapping conspiracy, kidnapping resulting in death, murder in aid of racketeering, and killing while engaged in drug trafficking;
  • Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment speedy trial challenges in a multi‑defendant, superseding‑indictment context;
  • Use of acquitted conduct and enhancements at sentencing for a gang leader;
  • The now‑frequent problem of inconsistency between oral pronouncement of supervised release conditions and written judgments under United States v. Rogers.

Although the court ultimately affirms the convictions and most sentences, it vacates the sentences of Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter Le and remands, exclusively to correct supervised release conditions that were not orally imposed at sentencing. Substantively, the opinion is notable for:

  • Adopting—explicitly for the Fourth Circuit—the sister‑circuit rule that, for Speedy Trial Act purposes, delay after a defendant files a motion to dismiss does not count toward a violation; and
  • Reinforcing that non‑mandatory supervised release conditions must be orally pronounced (or expressly incorporated) to be valid.

II. Case Background and Procedural History

A. The Reccless Tigers and the Murder of Brandon White

The Reccless Tigers were a Northern Virginia gang primarily trafficking marijuana and cocaine. Over time, they formed two offshoots: “Tiger Side,” promising members “more money and more drugs,” and “Club Tiger,” effectively a prospect group for younger recruits. Membership lines among the three units were fluid.

The principal defendants’ roles:

  • Joseph Duk‑Hyun Lamborn: one of the gang’s first members;
  • Young Yoo: involved in drug operations; White’s creditor on a longstanding marijuana debt;
  • Peter Le (“Peter”): a leader of “Club Tiger” and an active organizer;
  • Tony Minh Le (“Tony”): leader of “Tiger Side,” with ties to the California‑based “Asian Boyz” gang.

Brandon White, formerly fronted marijuana by Yoo, remained in debt years later. After another member, David Nguyen, assaulted White over the unpaid debt—and White testified against Nguyen—Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter devised a retaliatory plan to “fuck[] up” White for “snitching.”

Two of White’s friends, themselves indebted to the gang, lured White to a parking lot in exchange for Peter’s promise to cancel their debts. Two cars awaited: Lamborn and Peter in one, Yoo in the other. Lamborn and Peter forcibly wrestled White into their car, and the two vehicles drove to Richmond, Virginia. At a wooded roundabout, Lamborn and Peter took White into the woods; Yoo soon joined. Witnesses heard gunshots. Lamborn, Peter, and Yoo reemerged without White.

Subsequent admissions included:

  • Lamborn told fellow gang members he shot White;
  • Yoo told another member that Peter handed him a knife in the woods and that he stabbed White, later disposing of clothing and the knife;
  • White’s body, found later, showed both gunshot wounds and “sharp force injuries,” consistent with stabbing.

Lamborn later returned to attempt to relocate White’s body but abandoned it, still wrapped in a tarp.

B. Indictments and Superseding Indictments

Before White’s body was discovered, a grand jury (in August 2019) charged Lamborn, Yoo, Peter, Tony, and others with drug conspiracy and related trafficking offenses (this was already the third superseding indictment). A February 2020 trial date was continued to allow the government to investigate new charges.

After White’s body was found and his death investigated, a fourth superseding indictment (August 2020) significantly expanded the case:

  • All four defendants: conspiracy to distribute narcotics;
  • Lamborn, Yoo, Peter (but not Tony): racketeering conspiracy (RICO), kidnapping conspiracy, kidnapping resulting in death, murder in aid of racketeering (VICAR), killing while engaged in drug trafficking (21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A)), and (for Lamborn only) discharging a firearm resulting in death;
  • Tony (who was not involved in White’s murder): new counts of racketeering conspiracy and possessing a destructive device in furtherance of drug trafficking, related to separate firebomb attacks.

C. COVID‑Era Continuances and Pretrial Motions

Over the ensuing two years, the district court continued the trial date three additional times, primarily because:

  • COVID‑19 restrictions limited counsel’s ability to meet with detained clients, and
  • The discovery was extraordinarily voluminous and complex.

In May 2021, Tony moved to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment; the court denied the statutory claim (and, as the appellate court later notes, failed explicitly to rule on the constitutional claim).

In April 2022, the week before trial, Lamborn’s attorneys, at his request, moved to withdraw. The court denied the motion as untimely and unsupported by “irreconcilable differences.” Four days before trial, the defendants jointly sought yet another continuance to review a large, recent discovery production. The court denied that motion, and trial began April 11, 2022.

D. Trial, Verdicts, and Sentences

At trial, Lamborn’s attorneys handled the bulk of his defense, but he eventually dismissed them, proceeded pro se, and personally delivered closing argument. Yoo and Peter moved for acquittal under Rule 29, both motions being denied.

The jury found:

  • Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter guilty of:
    • Racketeering conspiracy;
    • Murder in aid of racketeering;
    • Kidnapping conspiracy;
    • Kidnapping resulting in death;
    • Drug conspiracy;
    • Killing while engaged in drug trafficking;
  • Lamborn also guilty of discharging a firearm resulting in death;
  • Peter also guilty of:
    • Maintaining drug‑involved premises;
    • Distribution of marijuana and cocaine;
    • Possessing a firearm during a drug trafficking offense;
    • Money laundering conspiracy.

Each of these three received life sentences plus supervised release terms.

The jury found Tony guilty of racketeering conspiracy and drug conspiracy, and found drug quantities of at least 1,000 kg of marijuana and at least 500 g of cocaine. It acquitted him of the destructive‑device counts. The presentence report (PSR), however, attributed 15 kilograms of cocaine to Tony and recommended guideline enhancements for leadership role, firearm possession, and use of violence (based in part on firebombing evidence). The district court adopted the PSR and imposed 312 months’ imprisonment.

E. Issues on Appeal

On appeal, the defendants raised multiple issues:

  • Denial of the joint continuance motion filed four days before trial;
  • Denial of Lamborn’s motion to substitute counsel;
  • Sufficiency of the evidence against Yoo and Peter on kidnapping and murder charges;
  • Tony’s Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment speedy trial challenges;
  • Procedural reasonableness of Tony’s sentence (acquitted conduct, guideline enhancements, sentencing disparities);
  • Discrepancies between oral pronouncement and written supervised release conditions as to Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter.

III. Summary of the Fourth Circuit’s Decision

The Fourth Circuit’s disposition can be summarized as follows:

  • Continuance denial: No abuse of discretion and no demonstrated prejudice.
  • Substitution of counsel for Lamborn: Denial upheld; any error deemed harmless because counsel provided an adequate defense.
  • Sufficiency challenges by Yoo and Peter:
    • Evidence sufficient to support kidnapping conspiracy and kidnapping resulting in death;
    • Evidence sufficient to support murder in aid of racketeering (VICAR) on an aiding‑and‑abetting theory;
    • Evidence sufficient to support killing while engaged in drug trafficking under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A).
  • Tony’s Speedy Trial Act claim:
    • Fourth Circuit applies its recent decision in United States v. Myrick to distinguish speedy‑trial clocks for original and newly added counts;
    • Holds that, following sister circuits, only pre‑motion delay counts for a Speedy Trial Act violation; delay after filing a motion to dismiss is irrelevant;
    • Finds all relevant delay excludable under “ends‑of‑justice” and co‑defendant provisions; no statutory violation.
  • Tony’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim:
    • Although the district court did not expressly address the constitutional claim, the Fourth Circuit conducts its own Barker v. Wingo analysis;
    • Length of delay favors Tony, but reasons for delay, assertion of rights, and lack of concrete prejudice favor the government; no violation.
  • Procedural reasonableness of Tony’s sentence:
    • Use of acquitted conduct and higher drug quantity was permissible under then‑binding circuit precedent (Medley), and the new guideline amendment on acquitted conduct is substantive and not retroactive;
    • Firearm, violence, and leadership enhancements supported by the record; no clear error;
    • No unwarranted nationwide sentencing disparity under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) merely because co‑defendants received lesser sentences.
  • Supervised release conditions:
    • Written judgments for Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter contained non‑mandatory “standard” and “special” conditions not orally imposed or incorporated at sentencing;
    • Under Rogers and Mathis, such conditions are invalid; the court vacates these defendants’ sentences and remands for resentencing (limited to correcting supervised release conditions).

The judgment is therefore: affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

IV. Analysis of Major Issues and Precedents

A. Denial of the Last‑Minute Continuance

1. Legal standard and key precedents

Denial of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion, a standard the Supreme Court has framed as “broad discretion” for trial judges. The touchstone is whether the court engaged in “an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.” (Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1983)). Even if denying the continuance were an abuse of discretion, reversal requires a showing of specific prejudice to the defense (United States v. Hedgepeth, 418 F.3d 411, 419 (4th Cir. 2005)).

The Fourth Circuit reiterates that:

  • Limitations on counsel’s time and preparation alone do not necessarily violate the Sixth Amendment (Morris); and
  • More is required than a “general allegation of ‘we were not prepared’” to show prejudice (United States v. LaRouche, 896 F.2d 815, 825 (4th Cir. 1990)).

2. Application in this case

Defense counsel moved for a continuance just four days before trial, citing the volume of recent discovery. The district court denied the motion, explaining that:

  • The bulk of the evidence had been available for about a year;
  • Jencks material and cooperating witness identities had already been disclosed, and further delay risked witness safety, especially in a case involving the retaliatory murder of a cooperating witness;
  • Much of the recent production was marginal or not directly relevant to the charged overt acts, and the government had complied with discovery orders and agreed to help organize the materials.

The Fourth Circuit characterized these explanations as reasoned, not arbitrary. The court also observed that prior extensive COVID‑related continuances undercut any claim that this district judge was obsessed with speed for its own sake.

3. Prejudice (or lack thereof)

On prejudice, the defendants emphasized a forensic anthropologist’s expert report allegedly buried in the production; they argued that, had they had more time, they could have retained a rebuttal expert. The panel rejected this argument on two grounds:

  • The government disclosed the identity of the forensic anthropologist months earlier; counsel therefore knew they might need counter‑expertise independent of when the final report appeared; and
  • Defense counsel’s cross‑examination of the expert was thorough, and defendants failed to identify any specific shortcoming attributable to denial of more time (LaRouche; United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 739 (4th Cir. 2006)).

Without a concrete showing that some critical, favorable evidence could not be marshaled due to the denial, the court refused to disturb the verdict.

B. Substitution of Counsel and Lamborn’s Pro Se Involvement

1. Governing framework: Smith and progeny

Denial of a motion to substitute appointed counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion using the three‑factor test from United States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 580 (4th Cir. 2011):

  1. Timeliness of the motion;
  2. Adequacy of the district court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaints;
  3. Whether the conflict resulted in such a breakdown in communication that it prevented an adequate defense.

Where the court adequately inquires, its factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Even if there were error, harmless‑error analysis applies (United States v. Horton, 693 F.3d 463, 467 (4th Cir. 2012)).

2. Timeliness and the nature of the conflict

The motion to withdraw was filed only four business days before trial—clearly untimely under Fourth Circuit precedent (e.g., United States v. Blackledge, 751 F.3d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 2014)). The district court reasonably concluded that new counsel could not meaningfully prepare in the limited remaining time.

On the adequacy of the inquiry, the district judge conducted a lengthy hearing, allowing Lamborn to explain his dissatisfaction, which centered on:

  • Not being provided with enough discovery; and
  • Insufficient in‑person contact with counsel during COVID‑restricted jail conditions.

The court found that a protective order limited what discovery could be shared directly with Lamborn and that much of the rest was irrelevant to his defense. It also credited counsel’s time records showing substantial preparation, notwithstanding pandemic limitations.

A key factual wrinkle was Lamborn’s claim that months earlier, he had asked his sister to text his lawyers and request that they withdraw, after a long period without contact. Counsel responded not by moving to withdraw, but by visiting Lamborn nearly weekly. Lamborn conceded he did not renew a clear request to withdraw during these later meetings. The court found that the relationship had effectively been repaired until the eleventh‑hour written motion.

3. Breakdown in communication and harmlessness

Invoking Smith and Blackledge, the panel emphasized that there was no evidence counsel failed to engage in “basic trial preparation,” and Lamborn had opportunities to confer about witnesses and defense theories. Unlike cases such as United States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891 (4th Cir. 1994) (no pretrial contact, essentially no work performed), here counsel were working diligently.

Moreover, any arguable error was harmless. The inquiry is whether counsel nonetheless provided an adequate defense at trial (Horton). Lamborn did not argue that his lawyers performed deficiently in the courtroom; his only prejudice claim was that he later almost attacked his lawyer and chose to proceed pro se for closing arguments. The panel correctly notes that this later breakdown does not retroactively render earlier representation ineffective.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Kidnapping and Murder Counts (Yoo and Peter)

1. Standard of review

Denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de novo, but with extremely heavy deference to the jury. The question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact‑finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); United States v. Dennis, 19 F.4th 656, 665 (4th Cir. 2021)).

Critically:

  • The court does not weigh evidence or review witness credibility (United States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 2003));
  • The government may prevail solely on circumstantial evidence (Dennis, 19 F.4th at 665);
  • Jurors are presumed to resolve evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government (United States v. Freitekh, 114 F.4th 292, 308 (4th Cir. 2024)).

2. Kidnapping resulting in death and kidnapping conspiracy

For kidnapping resulting in death under 18 U.S.C. § 1201, the elements are drawn from United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 512 (4th Cir. 2008): seizure/abduction, holding, interstate transportation, and death resulting. Conspiracy requires an unlawful agreement, knowing and voluntary participation, and an overt act (United States v. Camara, 908 F.3d 41, 46 (4th Cir. 2018)); “mere presence” is insufficient (United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1059 (4th Cir. 1985)), but association, conduct, and duration can show knowing participation (Dennis, 19 F.4th at 669–70).

The panel catalogues powerful evidence:

  • Abdulkadir’s testimony that Peter promised to wipe his and Sayf’s drug debts if they brought White to him, and that Peter helped secure a car;
  • Aagesen’s testimony that he overheard Yoo and Peter discuss a plan to lure White to a parking lot to “get fucked up,” splitting into two cars;
  • Witnesses who saw Peter wearing latex gloves, wrestling White into a car, and then saw Yoo and Peter drive separately on the interstate; Yoo called Peter’s car to coordinate the rendezvous for the murder site.

Yoo and Peter tried to shift blame to Abdulkadir and Sayf, but the appellate court correctly notes that defendants’ “more plausible” alternative explanation is irrelevant at this stage. Once the jury credited the government’s witnesses, their coordinated conduct easily sufficed to prove both the conspiracy and the substantive kidnapping ending in death.

D. Murder in Aid of Racketeering and Killing While Engaged in Drug Trafficking

1. Murder in aid of racketeering (VICAR) and aiding and abetting

For murder in aid of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1959, the government must prove:

  1. An enterprise;
  2. Engaged in racketeering activity;
  3. A murder violating federal or state law;
  4. Committed for pecuniary gain or to gain, maintain, or increase position in the enterprise.

(United States v. Ortiz‑Orellana, 90 F.4th 689, 701 (4th Cir. 2024)). For aiding and abetting, the defendant must “knowingly associate” with and participate in the criminal venture, sharing the principal’s criminal intent, with some act of assistance beyond mere presence (United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 357 (4th Cir. 2003); Love, 767 F.2d at 1059).

The court relies on:

  • Evidence Yoo brought a gun in his car to the abduction;
  • Lamborn and Peter forcibly taking White into the woods; Yoo joining shortly after;
  • Lamborn telling them to run, but Yoo and Peter staying; gunshots heard; all three returning without White;
  • Pak’s testimony that Yoo said Peter handed him a knife that he used to stab White in the woods; and
  • Forensic evidence of stab wounds and gunshot wounds on White’s body.

Although defendants attacked Pak’s credibility and noted that no one directly saw what happened in the woods, the panel emphasizes two established principles:

  • Juries may credit a single witness’s uncorroborated testimony (Dennis, 19 F.4th at 667); and
  • Circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a conviction.

At minimum, the jury could find that Yoo and Peter knowingly remained in the woods with Lamborn, anticipating the murder, thus sharing his lethal intent and aiding and abetting the killing.

2. Killing while engaged in drug trafficking, 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A)

Section 848(e)(1)(A) penalizes intentionally killing—or causing the intentional killing of—an individual while “engaging in or working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise.” The Fourth Circuit, citing United States v. Hager, 721 F.3d 167, 185–86 (4th Cir. 2013), reiterates that there must be a “meaningful” nexus between the killing and the drug conspiracy; it is not enough that the two coincide temporally.

That nexus is straightforward here: White was a debtor in a marijuana scheme with Yoo and had testified against a Reccless Tigers member. The gang’s violent enforcement of debts and retaliation against suspected cooperators were part of its modus operandi. Yoo and Peter did not dispute this link on appeal, and the same evidence supporting VICAR also supports § 848(e)(1)(A).

E. Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Right (Tony)

1. The Speedy Trial Act framework and Myrick

The Speedy Trial Act obligates commencement of trial within 70 days of the later of indictment or initial appearance, subject to numerous exclusions (18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1)). If non‑excludable delay exceeds 70 days, dismissal is mandatory on defendant’s motion (§ 3162(a)(2)).

Two exclusions were central here:

  • Ends‑of‑justice continuances (§ 3161(h)(7)(A)), which require on‑the‑record findings that the continuance’s “ends of justice” outweigh the interest in a speedy trial, often because of case complexity, unusual circumstances, or the need for adequate preparation;
  • Co‑defendant delay (§ 3161(h)(6)), which excludes “a reasonable period of delay” when the defendant is joined with a co‑defendant whose speedy trial clock has not yet expired and no severance has been granted; under United States v. Carey, 746 F.2d 228, 231 (4th Cir. 1984), an exclusion for one is an exclusion for all.

A preliminary issue was how to measure the speedy‑trial clock in light of the superseding indictment. Applying its recent decision in United States v. Myrick, 150 F.4th 308 (4th Cir. 2025), the panel explains:

  • Filing a superseding indictment does not reset the speedy trial clock for previously charged offenses or for offenses required by double jeopardy principles to be joined with them;
  • When a superseding indictment adds “new and different” counts that are not the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes, a separate 70‑day clock runs from the later indictment for the new counts.

Here:

  • Tony’s drug conspiracy charge originated in the third superseding indictment, with his initial appearance on November 19, 2019; his 70‑day window for that count would, absent exclusions, have expired January 29, 2020.
  • The racketeering conspiracy count was first added in the fourth superseding indictment (August 2020); because it is not the “same offense” as drug conspiracy (United States v. Devine, 40 F.4th 139, 150 (4th Cir. 2022)), a separate speedy‑trial clock for RICO began on September 2, 2020, expiring, absent exclusions, November 11, 2020.

2. New Fourth Circuit rule: Post‑motion delay is irrelevant to the violation

Crucially, the panel then “follow[s] our sister circuits’ approach” and holds that:

Delays that postdate the filing of a motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act don’t matter.

This aligns the Fourth Circuit with other circuits (First, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh) that have held a motion to dismiss under the Act is effective only for pre‑motion periods (United States v. Connor, 926 F.2d 81, 84 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Wirsing, 867 F.2d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457, 460 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sherer, 770 F.3d 407, 411 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Mathis, 96 F.3d 1577, 1579 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Weidenburner, 550 F. App'x 298, 304 (7th Cir. 2013)).

Practically, this means:

  • The “snapshot” for a Speedy Trial Act violation is taken as of the date the defendant files the motion to dismiss; and
  • Delays thereafter (whether excludable or not) cannot retroactively create a violation for that motion.

That is the opinion’s most significant new procedural holding.

3. Ends‑of‑justice continuances and “magic words”

Tony argued that the district court did not sufficiently invoke § 3161(h)(7)(A) because it failed to use the phrase “ends of justice” when denying his motion. Relying on United States v. Hart, 91 F.4th 732, 740 n.4 (4th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Pair, 84 F.4th 577 (4th Cir. 2023), the panel reiterates:

  • No “magic words” are required, so long as the court contemporaneously places on the record facts showing that the ends of justice outweigh speedy‑trial interests;
  • The key is that those findings exist by the time the court rules on the motion to dismiss, as required by Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 507 (2006).

The district court’s explanations—complex multi‑defendant RICO/narcotics case, long time span of offenses, numerous counts and codefendants, voluminous discovery, need for defense preparation, and the COVID‑19 pandemic—easily qualify as valid bases for ends‑of‑justice continuances. The Fourth Circuit notes that the record reflects contemporaneous balancing for each continuance, not post‑hoc rationalization.

4. Co‑defendant delay and “reasonableness”

For § 3161(h)(6), the court applies the “reasonable delay” factors from United States v. Robinson, 55 F.4th 390, 399 (4th Cir. 2022):

  • Defendant’s efforts to obtain severance;
  • Prejudice to the defendant;
  • Length of the delay.

Tony did eventually object and move to sever, but only after agreeing to a trial date outside the 70‑day window and to at least one continuance. The district court denied severance due to the complexity and interrelation of the evidence—unsurprising in a RICO/drug case—and Tony did not separately appeal that denial. The panel also notes:

  • Delays of up to 22 months have been deemed reasonable in some contexts (Robinson);
  • Tony alleged prejudice only from the joinder (being tried alongside defendants facing murder charges), not from the delay itself—a misdirected claim under Robinson.

Accordingly, the court finds the co‑defendant exclusion applicable and the delay reasonable.

5. Sixth Amendment speedy trial (Barker analysis)

Separate from the statute, the Sixth Amendment requires a “speedy and public trial.” Under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), courts consider:

  1. Length of delay;
  2. Reasons for delay;
  3. Defendant’s assertion of the right;
  4. Prejudice (oppressive incarceration, anxiety, and—most important—impaired defense).

Although the district court did not expressly decide Tony’s Barker claim, the panel performs its own de novo analysis, using the factual findings already made in the Speedy Trial Act context (consistent with United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 451 (4th Cir. 2012)).

The court’s conclusions:

  • Length: Delay approaching or exceeding a year is presumptively prejudicial (Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992); Burgess, 684 F.3d at 452). This factor favors Tony.
  • Reasons: Complexity of the case and the COVID‑19 “unpredictable and unavoidable public health crisis” are “valid reasons” for delay, weighing against a finding of violation (Pair, 84 F.4th at 589; United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 272 (4th Cir. 2009)). Tony’s cursory claim that the delays were “unnecessary” did not rebut the record; this factor favors the government.
  • Assertion: Tony did assert speedy trial rights but not consistently; he acquiesced in several delays before objecting. Under Barker and Pair, this undercuts the strength of his claim, favoring the government.
  • Prejudice: Tony alleged generalized investigative prejudice and difficulty conferring with counsel while detained during COVID‑related lockdowns. However, he identified no lost witness, degraded testimony, or missing exculpatory evidence. These are “generalized” complaints insufficient for Barker prejudice (Robinson, 55 F.4th at 400; Hall, 551 F.3d at 272; Pair, 84 F.4th at 591). This factor favors the government.

With three of four Barker factors favoring the government and with statutory timelines satisfied, the court underscores the recurring observation that “it will be the unusual case” where the Sixth Amendment is violated but the Speedy Trial Act is not (Pair, 84 F.4th at 589). This is not that unusual case.

F. Sentencing Issues: Acquitted Conduct and Enhancements (Tony)

1. Use of acquitted conduct and the non‑retroactivity of the guideline amendment

The PSR attributed 15 kg of cocaine to Tony, despite the jury’s finding only that he conspired to distribute at least 500 grams and acquitting him of destructive‑device counts. The district court:

  • Adopted the higher drug quantity (yielding a base offense level of 32); and
  • Applied a two‑level violence enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2)) based on evidence that Tony ordered firebombings.

At the time of sentencing, Fourth Circuit precedent plainly allowed consideration of acquitted conduct proven by a preponderance of the evidence (United States v. Medley, 34 F.4th 326, 335–36 (4th Cir. 2022)). Tony did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence under that standard. Instead, he pointed to a subsequent Guideline amendment (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c)) instructing that acquitted conduct generally should not be used in calculating the guideline range.

The panel refuses to apply that amendment retroactively, relying on United States v. Goines, 357 F.3d 469, 474 (4th Cir. 2004), which distinguishes clarifying amendments (retroactive on direct appeal) from substantive ones (not). Because the new rule on acquitted conduct changes existing law in the circuit, it is substantive. The court also cites the Eleventh Circuit’s similar conclusion in United States v. Shanks, 2025 WL 1621179, at *4 (11th Cir. June 9, 2025) (per curiam).

Even beyond that doctrinal point, any error in cocaine quantity would be harmless. Tony’s marijuana quantity of 3,400 kg—consistent with the jury’s finding of 1,000 kg or more—already placed him in the same base offense level (32) under § 2D1.1(c). Thus, reducing the cocaine quantity to 500 g would not change the guideline range.

2. Firearm enhancement

Under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), a two‑level enhancement applies if a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed, unless it is “clearly improbable” that the weapon was connected with the offense. The government must show a temporal and spatial nexus linking the firearm, drug activity, and defendant (United States v. Mondragon, 860 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 2017)), which can be satisfied by guns located where a drug conspiracy is carried out or furthered (United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 912 (4th Cir. 2017)).

Gang witnesses testified that Tony kept a gun at his house, where he also received marijuana shipments. This is a textbook temporal‑spatial connection under Mondragon. Tony did not show it was “clearly improbable” the gun was connected to the drug offense; thus the enhancement was correctly applied.

3. Leadership and violence enhancements

The court affirms a four‑level leadership enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), focusing on guideline comment n.4 factors:

  • Tony was an early member and founder of “Tiger Side,” widely regarded as a leader;
  • He was deeply involved in drug production, distribution, and recruitment;
  • Witnesses testified they took “orders from Tony” regarding drug distribution and proceeds.

Those facts support findings of decision‑making authority, planning, recruitment, and control over others.

The two‑level violence enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(2) rested on the district court’s finding by a preponderance that Tony ordered multiple firebombing attacks. That conduct, though the subject of acquitted counts, was still usable at sentencing under pre‑amendment law. Tony did not meaningfully contest the factual basis. Hence, the enhancement stands.

4. Alleged unwarranted sentencing disparities (§ 3553(a)(6))

Tony argued that his 312‑month sentence produced an unwarranted disparity compared to co‑defendants who received lower sentences. The panel invokes its recent decision in United States v. Lawson, 128 F.4th 243, 257 (4th Cir. 2025), stressing that § 3553(a)(6) is primarily concerned with nationwide disparities, not differences within a single case. A sentence is not unreasonable simply because it is harsher than a co‑defendant’s.

Tony offered no evidence that his sentence diverged markedly from national norms for similarly situated gang leaders. The district court, in any event, directly addressed his disparity argument, explaining that Tony was “undeniably the leader” and “at the epicenter” of the organization’s money‑making operations. Under United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 220 (4th Cir. 2015), this explanation satisfies the obligation to consider and respond to the argument.

G. Supervised Release Conditions: Oral vs. Written Sentences

1. The Rogers / Mathis rule

A defendant has a right to be present at sentencing (Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(3)), and the oral pronouncement controls where it conflicts with the written judgment. In United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), the Fourth Circuit held that all non‑mandatory conditions of supervised release—whether called “standard,” “special,” or anything else—must be orally imposed. A written judgment cannot add conditions that were never mentioned or expressly incorporated at the hearing.

Later, in United States v. Mathis, 103 F.4th 193 (4th Cir. 2024), the court reaffirmed this principle and clarified the remedy: vacatur and remand for resentencing when written non‑mandatory conditions were not orally imposed.

2. Application to Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter

At the sentencing hearings for Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter, the district court mentioned only a few “special conditions.” Yet their written judgments:

  • Included all of the Guidelines’ recommended “standard” conditions, which are non‑mandatory and thus must either be read aloud or expressly incorporated; and
  • Added additional “special” conditions that had never been discussed, such as:
    • Restrictions on incurring new credit charges; and
    • A requirement that Lamborn make a good‑faith effort to obtain his GED.

Because these conditions were never orally imposed or incorporated by reference at sentencing, the written judgments conflict with the oral sentences in a legally significant way. Under Rogers and Mathis, the Fourth Circuit holds that it must vacate each of these defendants’ sentences and remand for resentencing (limited to supervised release conditions).

The government correctly conceded this error on appeal, underscoring how firmly entrenched the Rogers rule now is in Fourth Circuit practice.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

For clarity, several complex doctrines invoked in the opinion can be distilled as follows:

  • Speedy Trial Act clock:
    • Starts at indictment or first appearance, whichever is later;
    • Stops for specified periods (continuances, co‑defendant delays, motion practice, etc.);
    • Must not exceed 70 non‑excludable days before trial begins;
    • After this opinion, the only delay that matters for a violation is the delay before a defendant files a motion to dismiss.
  • Ends‑of‑justice continuances:
    • Allow judges to extend the trial date when fairness and effective preparation require it;
    • Require on‑the‑record reasons showing that justice outweighs speed;
    • “Magic words” are unnecessary, but factual findings must be clear and timely.
  • Co‑defendant delay:
    • In joint trials, if time is excluded for one defendant, it is excluded for all;
    • The delay must be “reasonable,” considering efforts to sever, prejudice, and length.
  • Barker test (Sixth Amendment speedy trial):
    • A balancing test of four factors: length, reasons, assertion, prejudice;
    • No single factor is dispositive, but strong, specific prejudice is usually key.
  • Aiding and abetting:
    • Not a separate crime, but a theory of liability;
    • Requires that the defendant knowingly assist and share the intent of the main perpetrator;
    • Mere presence or knowledge is not enough.
  • Kidnapping resulting in death vs. kidnapping conspiracy:
    • The substantive offense (kidnapping resulting in death) punishes the actual seizure, holding, interstate transport, and resulting death;
    • The conspiracy punishes the agreement and any overt act, even if the kidnapping is unsuccessful or incomplete.
  • RICO/VICAR murder:
    • Requires an enterprise engaged in racketeering;
    • The murder must be committed for money, status, or position in that enterprise;
    • Gang status enforcement, retaliation against informants, and debt collection are classic examples.
  • Killing while engaged in drug trafficking (§ 848(e)(1)(A)):
    • Targets intentional killings committed in furtherance of large‑scale drug enterprises;
    • There must be a meaningful connection between the killing and the drug operation, not mere coincidence.
  • Acquitted conduct at sentencing (pre‑amendment law):
    • Judges could consider conduct the jury acquitted, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence;
    • The Sentencing Commission has now discouraged that practice in guidelines, but the new rule is not automatically retroactive.
  • Supervised release conditions:
    • Mandatory conditions (set by statute) automatically apply and need not be listed;
    • Any other conditions—“standard” or “special”—must be announced at sentencing or clearly incorporated by reference;
    • If they appear only in the written judgment, they are invalid in the Fourth Circuit.

VI. Likely Impact and Broader Significance

A. Speedy Trial Act practice in complex, multi‑defendant cases

This opinion has several practical consequences for the handling of complex gang/RICO/drug cases in the Fourth Circuit:

  • Post‑motion clock freeze: Defendants and counsel must understand that delay after a Speedy Trial Act dismissal motion cannot create a statutory violation for that motion. Strategic timing matters: waiting to file may increase the window of potentially countable delay, but filing too late locks in a record potentially favorable to the government.
  • Superseding indictments: Prosecutors can add new counts without resetting the clock for older ones, but must recognize that new, non‑double‑jeopardy‑related charges start their own 70‑day clocks under Myrick.
  • COVID and complexity as justifications: The opinion reaffirms that pandemic‑related restrictions and significant complexity (multiple defendants, voluminous discovery, RICO overlays) are legitimate bases for ends‑of‑justice continuances. Defense counsel should anticipate that generalized objections will rarely suffice to defeat them.
  • Co‑defendant strategy: Tony’s experience illustrates the importance of early and consistent assertion of speedy trial rights and prompt motions to sever, if a defendant wishes to escape the inertia of joint scheduling.

B. Continued (but possibly waning) permissibility of acquitted conduct

The panel’s treatment of acquitted conduct reflects a transitional period in federal sentencing. Although the Guidelines now caution against using acquitted conduct in calculating ranges, this opinion underscores:

  • District courts sentencing under pre‑amendment law did not err in considering such conduct if supported by a preponderance of the evidence;
  • Substantive changes in guidelines do not apply retroactively on direct appeal absent express direction from the Commission or statute.

Future defendants sentenced under the new guideline regime in the Fourth Circuit will likely press courts to minimize or reject acquitted conduct. But for already‑sentenced defendants, this opinion suggests that direct appeals invoking the amendment will generally fail absent some separate constitutional or statutory defect.

C. Supervised release: A firm and growing line of cases

The vacatur of three life sentences—solely because of supervised release conditions—illustrates how seriously the Fourth Circuit takes the oral pronouncement requirement after Rogers. District judges within the circuit must:

  • Either recite all non‑mandatory conditions at sentencing; or
  • Explicitly incorporate a written list (e.g., “the standard conditions of supervised release as set forth in the Eastern District of Virginia standing order”).

Defense counsel, for their part, should carefully compare oral pronouncements to written judgments and promptly seek correction where mismatch exists. This opinion reinforces an emerging body of law making supervised release conditions a recurring and fertile ground for partial appellate relief.

D. Evidentiary sufficiency in gang/murder cases

On the sufficiency issues, the opinion:

  • Reaffirms the deference given to juries’ credibility determinations, especially in gang cases where cooperating witness testimony may conflict;
  • Signals that active participation in an abduction and presence at a murder scene, coupled with circumstantial evidence of planning and post‑crime admissions, are more than enough to support convictions for conspiracy, kidnapping resulting in death, and VICAR/§ 848(e) murder.

The message is that appellate courts will not lightly disturb verdicts in complex gang prosecutions, even where no one “saw” the critical moments, provided the circumstantial web is robust.

E. Counsel substitution and trial‑management discretion

The decision also underscores the breadth of trial judges’ discretion in managing last‑minute counsel issues. While defendants have a right to effective representation and to conflict‑free counsel, they do not have a right to tactical “reset” of the defense on the eve of trial absent demonstrable irreconcilable conflict that prevents an adequate defense.

Future defendants seeking new counsel close to trial will need to show:

  • Sustained and severe breakdowns in communication;
  • Concrete prejudice to trial preparation, not just dissatisfaction with strategy or limited contact due to institutional constraints like COVID.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Le (Lamborn, Yoo, Peter Le, and Tony Le) is a wide‑ranging opinion that largely affirms convictions and sentences from a formidable, pandemic‑era RICO/narcotics/murder trial, while also delivering a clear procedural message on two fronts.

First, by adopting the sister‑circuit rule that Speedy Trial Act violations are assessed only on pre‑motion delay, and by robustly applying ends‑of‑justice and co‑defendant exclusions, the Fourth Circuit signals continued deference to district courts’ docket‑management in complex cases, especially under pandemic conditions. It also reiterates that the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right will rarely be found violated where the statutory scheme is satisfied and no specific prejudice is shown.

Second, by vacating life sentences because of unannounced supervised release conditions, the court cements Rogers and Mathis as powerful tools ensuring that defendants are sentenced in open court, not by silent paperwork. This requirement now has real teeth: failure to orally impose or properly incorporate non‑mandatory conditions will continue to trigger vacatur and remand.

Along the way, the opinion affirms the continued—though perhaps diminishing—role of acquitted conduct in federal sentencing, clarifies application of leadership and firearm enhancements in gang contexts, and reiterates the high bar for overturning jury verdicts based on circumstantial, but cohesive, evidence in violent gang prosecutions.

In sum, Le is an important precedent for practitioners handling complex multi‑defendant federal prosecutions in the Fourth Circuit. It offers guidance on timing and substance of Speedy Trial Act motions, strategic considerations around severance and continuances, the framing of sentencing challenges in an evolving guideline landscape, and the careful policing of supervised release conditions at sentencing. Its most enduring doctrinal contributions are likely to be the “clock‑freezing” rule for Speedy Trial Act motions and the further entrenchment of the oral‑pronouncement requirement for supervised release.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

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