Fourth Circuit Requires Claim-Element Specificity in Rule 23 Predominance/Commonality; General “Unpaid Work” Policies and Overbroad Class Definitions Won’t Suffice

I. Introduction

Case: Thomas Overby, Jr. v. Anheuser-Busch, LLC
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date: June 15, 2026
Posture: Interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f) from an order certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class asserting Virginia wage claims; employer also sought review of denial of FLSA collective-action decertification.

The case concerns hourly workers at Anheuser-Busch’s Williamsburg, Virginia brewery who alleged they were not paid for various pre- and post-shift activities (e.g., donning/doffing PPE, COVID-19 screening steps, shift handoffs, tool-related tasks). The district court certified a broad class of all non-exempt brewery employees subject to a particular timekeeping system from July 1, 2020 through final disposition.

The Fourth Circuit framed the “core” issue as the level of specificity district courts must use when analyzing Rule 23 commonality and predominance—particularly where plaintiffs rely on generalized “policies” that may conceal meaningful differences among employees’ tasks, timing, locations, and governing legal standards.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit vacated the Rule 23 class-certification order and remanded for further proceedings, holding the district court committed legal error by finding commonality and predominance satisfied despite substantial variation in (1) whether employees performed the alleged off-shift tasks, (2) where/when they performed them, and (3) which legal standards applied (given a material change to Virginia overtime law in July 2022).

The court also held it lacked jurisdiction in the Rule 23(f) appeal to review the district court’s refusal to decertify the FLSA collective action, and therefore dismissed that portion of the appeal.

On remand, the Fourth Circuit noted the district court may consider narrower subclasses (e.g., by time period, department, or COVID-protocol exposure), but emphasized each subclass must independently satisfy Rule 23.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The controlling Fourth Circuit framework: Stafford v. Bojangles' Restaurants, Inc.

The opinion treats Stafford v. Bojangles' Restaurants, Inc., 123 F.4th 671 (4th Cir. 2024) as binding and dispositive on the level-of-generality problem. Bojangles warned that reliance on “overly generalized company policies” will “typically defeat” class certification because such formulations can “mask a multitude of disparities.” Applying that directive, the court found the district court here defined the common question at too high a level—“whether Anheuser-Busch failed to compensate mandatory pre- and post-shift labor in violation of Virginia law”—without tying the question to the concrete elements that would actually have to be proven for each worker.

2. Rule 23 rigor and “classwide resolution”: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes

Citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), the court reiterated that plaintiffs must “affirmatively demonstrate” Rule 23 compliance, and that commonality requires a question capable of “classwide resolution” that can resolve a central issue “in one stroke.” The Fourth Circuit used Wal-Mart to reject the district court’s broad policy question as a form of “semantic gerrymandering”: a question can be stated abstractly enough to sound common while still requiring individualized proof on the facts that establish liability.

3. What counts as a “common question”: Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo

The court invoked Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442 (2016) for the evidentiary touchstone: a common question exists where “the same evidence will suffice” for each member’s prima facie showing or the issue is susceptible to generalized proof. Here, whether any given worker performed uncompensated pre/post work (and whether it was required, off-shift, and compensable) depended on individualized evidence. Tyson Foods also mattered to the damages discussion: statistical averaging and common proof can sometimes work for donning/doffing, but only after the court confirms sufficient uniformity and a viable common methodology.

4. Predominance’s heightened demand: Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor

Relying on Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), the court emphasized predominance is “far more demanding” than commonality. The Fourth Circuit used Amchem to underscore that Rule 23(b)(3) is the setting where courts must be most attentive to aggregation’s costs, especially when individualized inquiries threaten to overwhelm any common nucleus.

5. Abuse of discretion and Rule 23 legal error: EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, Mr. Dee's Inc. v. Inmar, Inc.

The court framed its standard of review through Mr. Dee's Inc. v. Inmar, Inc., 127 F.4th 925 (4th Cir. 2025) and EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2014): a district court abuses its discretion when it materially misapplies Rule 23, including through legal error—precisely what the Fourth Circuit found in the district court’s generalized commonality/predominance analysis.

6. The limits of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over FLSA collective rulings: Harris v. Med. Transp. Mgmt., Inc., Reinig v. RBS Citizens, N.A., Myers v. Hertz Corp.

The Fourth Circuit dismissed the employer’s request to review the denial of FLSA decertification, noting that sister circuits have declined to expand Rule 23(f) review to encompass FLSA collective-action decertification decisions. It cited Harris v. Med. Transp. Mgmt., Inc., 77 F.4th 746 (D.C. Cir. 2023), Reinig v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 912 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2018), and Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 2010). The practical point: even if Rule 23 and FLSA analyses overlap, Rule 23(f) is not a general portal to review non-Rule 23 interlocutory orders.

7. Class definition precision and “circularity”: Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., In re White, Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs.

To critique the breadth of the certified class, the court relied on Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2006) (clear, precise class parameters), In re White, 64 F.4th 302 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (risk that circular class definitions conceal Rule 23 problems), and Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2012) (danger of lumping together disparate plaintiffs with varying claims). The Fourth Circuit’s central criticism was that the class definition effectively presumed all hourly employees had viable claims, despite record evidence that some never performed particular tasks, performed them on-shift, or were not employed during relevant policy periods (e.g., COVID protocols).

8. Other cited authorities shaping the court’s caution about aggregation

• United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. 381 (2018) and Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979): class actions are an exception to the rule of party-specific litigation.
• Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736 (2023) (quoting Friendly): certification can create settlement pressure (“blackmail settlements”), reinforcing why courts must police Rule 23 thresholds.
• Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974): class actions can promote efficiency and economy—benefits that dissipate when individualized mini-trials dominate.
• Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2003): individualized damages inquiries do not usually defeat certification by themselves, but liability must still be capable of classwide proof.
• Speerly v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 143 F.4th 306 (6th Cir. 2025) (en banc): generalized questions can undermine the requirement to identify common questions tied to concrete elements of each claim.
• Bamonte v. City of Mesa, 598 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2010), the Department of Labor’s Field Operations Handbook ch. 31 § 31b13, and 29 U.S.C. § 254(a): cited to illustrate why “getting dressed for work” and commutes are often non-compensable, highlighting that location and context (home vs. workplace; pre-shift vs. on-shift) can be legally dispositive.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court’s central move: break the “policy” question into liability elements that require individualized proof

The district court’s certified “common questions” asked (i) whether Anheuser-Busch compensated mandatory pre/post tasks (including COVID protocols) and (ii) whether any failure violated Virginia law. The Fourth Circuit held those questions only look common because they assume away the disputed predicates: that each employee actually performed off-shift work, that it was required, that it occurred outside scheduled hours (and was not already paid), and that it was compensable under the applicable law.

Once those predicates are made explicit, the court found the record revealed substantial variation along three axes that defeat commonality and predominance:

1. Task variation (whether the work happened at all): not every employee performed the same alleged categories (e.g., handoff meetings were inconsistent and role-dependent; COVID protocols did not apply to workers hired after February 2022; additional PPE varied by job).
2. Time/place variation (where/when the work happened): some employees donned PPE at home, others in locker rooms, others during shift hours; some tasks occurred on-shift (already compensated) or off-site (potentially non-compensable). The court highlighted that “putting on your work boots … before leaving the house” may not be compensable in the same way as on-site donning/doffing.
3. Legal-standard variation (which law applies): Virginia’s overtime scheme changed materially in July 2022, with VOWA moving to a framework that “parrot[s]” the FLSA, including principles that treat certain preliminary activities as non-compensable. Because the proposed class spanned both regimes, individualized determinations would be needed to know which standard applied to which employee and which time period.

2. Predominance and the “mini-trial” problem

The court’s predominance analysis flows directly from the above: if liability turns on individualized evidence about which tasks a given worker performed, whether they were mandatory, and whether they occurred off-shift under the relevant statute at the relevant time, then a class proceeding risks devolving into “countless mini-trials.” That outcome is precisely what Rule 23(b)(3) predominance is designed to prevent because the efficiency and fairness justifications for aggregation collapse when individualized proof becomes the main event.

3. Damages models are not a cure-all—though they may matter on remand

The court acknowledged that individualized damages calculations alone usually do not defeat certification (citing Gunnells), and that averages or bifurcation can sometimes be used (Tyson Foods; Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946) is cited in the opinion). But it stressed that the district court must first ensure the underlying liability questions are sufficiently uniform and that any proposed common damages method is valid.

4. The class definition itself intensified the Rule 23 errors

Independently, the Fourth Circuit found the class definition impermissibly broad: it effectively included “all hourly employees” subject to the timekeeping system, with no tailoring to the tasks alleged, the time windows that mattered (e.g., COVID protocols), or the statutory regime differences. Such breadth risks “presum[ing] … that all [employees] … have a viable claim,” thereby concealing the very individual differences Rule 23 requires courts to confront.

5. Subclasses as a possible path—but not an escape hatch

The court pointed to Rule 23(c)(5) subclasses as a potential remedy (e.g., by COVID-protocol exposure, pre-/post-2022 statutory regime, or department), but reiterated that each subclass must undergo a full Rule 23 analysis and actually increase homogeneity enough to satisfy commonality and predominance.

C. Impact

• Heightened practical rigor in wage-and-hour class certification: This decision reinforces—using Bojangles as the lodestar—that plaintiffs cannot obtain certification by pointing to a general “pay only scheduled shifts” practice plus a broad set of alleged off-the-clock activities. Courts must evaluate whether the classwide question is answerable with common proof tied to claim elements for the workers actually included.
• Temporal and statutory-change sensitivity: The court made statutory change (here, the July 2022 VOWA revision) a central predominance/commonality obstacle. Future wage classes spanning multiple legal regimes should expect pressure to split by time period or otherwise show why differing legal standards do not fracture liability proof.
• Location and on-shift/off-shift distinctions become class-certification fault lines: The opinion highlights “where” and “when” as class-defeating differences—especially for PPE donning/doffing and similar preparatory acts—foreshadowing more granular battles over whether conduct occurred at home, on premises, or during compensated time.
• Appellate jurisdiction clarification in hybrid Rule 23/FLSA cases: By refusing to piggyback FLSA decertification review onto Rule 23(f), the Fourth Circuit aligns with other circuits and signals that litigants should not expect interlocutory review of collective-action rulings merely because a companion Rule 23 appeal exists.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Commonality (Rule 23(a)(2))

The class must share at least one question that can be answered the same way for everyone using common evidence—and that answer must matter to the claim. A vague question like “Did the company underpay employees?” sounds common but often isn’t, because the real questions are who did what work, when, where, and under which law.

Predominance (Rule 23(b)(3))

Even if some common question exists, it must be more important than the individualized questions. If the case would require many person-by-person determinations to decide liability, common questions do not “predominate.”

“Semantic gerrymandering”

The court’s label for drafting an extremely general “common question” that hides the individualized issues that actually decide the case.

Overbroad / circular class definition

A class definition is problematic when it effectively assumes everyone in a broad group has a claim, rather than defining membership using objective, claim-relevant criteria. Overbreadth can mask internal differences that defeat Rule 23.

Subclasses (Rule 23(c)(5))

Courts can divide a proposed class into smaller groups (e.g., by department or time period) to increase uniformity. But each subclass must independently satisfy Rule 23.

FLSA “collective action” vs. Rule 23 “class action”

An FLSA collective action typically includes only employees who opt in; a Rule 23 class usually includes everyone who fits the definition unless they opt out. Even if the factual issues overlap, a Rule 23(f) appeal does not automatically authorize appellate review of FLSA collective-action rulings.

V. Conclusion

Overby v. Anheuser-Busch deepens the Fourth Circuit’s post-Bojangles insistence that Rule 23(b)(3) certification cannot rest on broad “policy” characterizations of unpaid work. Courts must connect common questions to the concrete elements of liability and confront variations in tasks, timing, location, and governing law. The decision also cautions district courts to craft precise, claim-aligned class definitions and to use subclasses only where they genuinely increase cohesion and satisfy Rule 23. Finally, it confirms that Rule 23(f) does not provide a backdoor to interlocutory review of FLSA collective-action decertification decisions.