Forfeiture on Petition for Review and the Prejudice Requirement for Administrative-Closure Due Process Claims

1. Introduction

This Sixth Circuit decision denies a petition for review where the petitioner, a Mexican national who entered the United States as a child, challenged the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection, and separately alleged due-process error from an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision to rescind administrative closure.

The petitioner’s protection theories rested on (i) childhood abuse by family members, (ii) relatives’ alleged cartel ties and a family killing, and (iii) generalized risks to vulnerable children in Mexico. Procedurally, the case also involved an attempt to administratively close removal proceedings while the petitioner’s mother pursued a pending T-visa application (through which the petitioner sought derivative status).

The key appellate issues were not whether the petitioner’s narrative could support relief in the abstract, but whether she preserved challenges to the agency’s dispositive grounds and whether she showed prejudice from the closure-related process she attacked.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court therefore denied the petition for review and denied the motion to stay removal as moot.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

• Karimijanaki v. Holder, 579 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2009): The court applied the familiar rule that when the Board of Immigration Appeals adopts the IJ’s decision and adds reasoning, the reviewing court examines the IJ decision as supplemented by the Board. This framed the scope of review and ensured the Sixth Circuit evaluated the agency’s layered reasoning, not just the IJ’s original order.
• Bi Qing Zheng v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 287 (6th Cir. 2016): Cited twice for core procedural standards: (i) due-process claims in removal proceedings are reviewed de novo, and (ii) even if a procedural defect exists, the petitioner must show prejudice—that the defect “led to a substantially different outcome.” The prejudice requirement was decisive in rejecting the administrative-closure due-process challenge and informed the neutrality/bias analysis.
• Ortiz v. Garland, 6 F.4th 685 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985)): Used to restate an asylum element where harm is inflicted by private actors: the applicant must show the government is “unable or unwilling to control” the persecutor. Although the petitioner argued this point on the merits, the Sixth Circuit ultimately did not reach it because forfeiture of other grounds independently defeated relief.
• Vasquez-Rivera v. Garland, 96 F.4th 903 (6th Cir. 2024): Cited to distinguish withholding from asylum—same protected-ground nexus concept but a higher likelihood standard for persecution. This reinforced that the unchallenged nexus finding is fatal to both forms of relief.
• Cruz-Samayoa v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1145 (6th Cir. 2010): The cornerstone forfeiture authority: arguments not meaningfully developed in the opening brief are forfeited. The Sixth Circuit used this rule to treat the petitioner’s omissions—failure to challenge social-group cognizability, nexus, future-persecution findings, and CAT elements—as dispositive.
• Aguilar Peralta v. Garland, No. 23-3483, 2024 WL 196665 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2024): Cited for the appellate efficiency principle: when an unchallenged agency ground independently supports denial of relief, the court need not reach other challenged grounds. This case supplied the analytical bridge from forfeiture to outright denial without merits adjudication.
• Guzman-Torralva v. Bondi, 154 F.4th 880 (6th Cir. 2025): Applied to CAT briefing: a conclusory sentence does not preserve a claim. The decision treats CAT as requiring distinct elements (torture plus official involvement/acquiescence), not satisfied by recycling asylum-style “protection” arguments.
• Huicochea- Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2001): Recognized the baseline due-process guarantee in removal proceedings: a “full and fair hearing.” The court accepted the framework but held the claim failed for lack of prejudice.
• Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 17 (B.I.A. 2017): Used to characterize administrative closure as a docket-management tool that does not terminate proceedings, confer lawful status, or grant relief. This characterization mattered to prejudice: even if the case had remained closed longer, closure itself would not have changed removability or granted protection.
• Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994): The controlling bias/neutrality standard: adverse rulings and routine case management do not establish bias; the record must show “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism,” prejudgment, or comparable indicia. The Sixth Circuit used Liteky to reject the neutrality claim premised largely on speed and unfavorable outcomes.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is structured around two gatekeeping doctrines that often decide immigration petitions for review: issue forfeiture and prejudice.

A. Forfeiture as a merits-stopper

On asylum and withholding, the agency denied relief on multiple grounds: no past persecution; failure to show the Mexican government was unable or unwilling to control private actors; non-cognizable proposed social groups; no nexus to a protected ground even assuming cognizable groups; and no objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. On petition for review, the petitioner developed only two arguments (past persecution and inability/unwillingness).

Applying Cruz-Samayoa v. Holder, the court treated the unbriefed grounds as forfeited—particularly the agency’s no-nexus determination. Then, applying Aguilar Peralta v. Garland, it held that an unchallenged, independently sufficient ground (no nexus) ends the asylum/withholding analysis regardless of whether the petitioner might be correct about past persecution or governmental protection.

B. CAT’s distinct elements and briefing burden

CAT relief requires proof of likely torture with government involvement, consent, or acquiescence. The court emphasized that the petitioner’s CAT presentation—“one conclusory sentence”—did not engage those elements. Under Guzman-Torralva v. Bondi, that level of briefing fails to preserve the claim.

C. Due process requires prejudice, not just procedural complaint

Turning to administrative closure, the petitioner argued due process was violated when the IJ granted DHS’s reconsideration motion the same day it was filed and decided merits the next day, allegedly depriving her of a meaningful chance to respond and suggesting lack of neutrality.

The court assumed arguendo that more response time might have been appropriate, but under Bi Qing Zheng v. Lynch a due-process claim still fails absent prejudice. The prejudice analysis was concrete:

• The IJ had authority to reconsider before jurisdiction vested in the Board (8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)).
• Administrative closure was discretionary and, per Matter of W-Y-U-, merely docket management—not a grant of immigration relief or lawful status.
• The IJ relied on case-management factors independent of alleged filing defects: the case’s age, completion of the merits hearing, and the projected 29-month T-visa adjudication timeline.
• The record did not show the mother’s T-visa approval was likely or imminent, nor that derivative status would likely alter the removal outcome; notably, the appeal itself took nearly five years with no favorable T-visa decision in the record.
• Rescinding closure did not prevent the petitioner from presenting her protection claims because evidence and argument had already been completed at the merits hearing.

On the neutrality argument, Liteky v. United States supplied the governing lens: speed and adverse rulings, standing alone, do not demonstrate “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.” The court found no record evidence of prejudgment or advocacy by the IJ.

3.3. Impact

• Appellate briefing discipline (especially in immigration): The decision reinforces that petitioners must challenge each dispositive ground (e.g., nexus, social-group cognizability, future fear, CAT acquiescence). Developing only select points can result in denial without merits review of the argued issues.
• Nexus as a decisive chokepoint: Even substantial factual disputes about harm severity or police protection may become irrelevant if the agency’s nexus finding is left unchallenged. Practically, nexus is not an “optional” issue on review; it is often outcome-determinative.
• CAT is not “asylum plus”: The court’s use of Guzman-Torralva v. Bondi underscores that CAT requires separate analysis (torture likelihood and official involvement/acquiescence). Boilerplate or conclusory CAT briefing risks forfeiture.
• Administrative closure challenges must show real-world prejudice: Because closure is framed as docket management (per Matter of W-Y-U-), a petitioner alleging due-process error must connect the challenged procedure to a plausible change in outcome—e.g., concrete evidence that collateral relief is likely and would materially alter removability or eligibility for relief.
• Bias claims face a high evidentiary bar: Under Liteky v. United States, litigants should expect that timing, efficiency, and unfavorable decisions will rarely suffice absent explicit indicia of prejudgment or hostility.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Nexus”: The requirement that persecution be because of a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or “particular social group”). If harm is for personal, criminal, or generalized reasons unrelated to a protected ground, nexus fails.
• “Particular social group” (PSG) cognizability: A proposed group must meet legal criteria (commonly including particularity and social distinction). If the group is not legally recognized, asylum/withholding can be denied even if the applicant fears harm.
• “Unable or unwilling to control”: When the persecutor is not the government, the applicant must show the government cannot or will not provide protection. This is separate from proving serious harm.
• Withholding of removal: Similar to asylum but harder to win; it generally requires a higher likelihood that persecution will occur.
• CAT protection: Focuses on torture and requires government involvement (directly or by acquiescing). It does not require a protected ground, but it does require more than generalized danger.
• Administrative closure: A pause on active litigation (docket management). It does not grant status or cancel removal proceedings.
• Forfeiture on appeal: If an issue is not meaningfully argued in the opening brief, the court treats it as abandoned and will not decide it.
• Prejudice (due process): Even if procedure was imperfect, the petitioner must show the error likely changed the result.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision is a procedural road map: (1) on petition for review, failure to meaningfully challenge each independent agency basis for denial—especially nexus and CAT elements—results in forfeiture and is often dispositive; and (2) due-process attacks on administrative-closure handling require a concrete showing of prejudice, not merely rapid timing or dissatisfaction with docket management.

In broader context, the opinion reinforces that immigration outcomes in federal court frequently turn less on the underlying factual narrative than on preservation of issues, disciplined briefing, and demonstrable harm from alleged procedural defects.