Forfeiture of Niz-Chavez Notice-to-Appear Claims-Processing Objections Raised After IJ Proceedings

1. Introduction

In Socorro Perez-Hernandez v. Todd W. Blanche, Acting U.S. Attorney General (6th Cir. July 28, 2026), the Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging (1) the denial of a motion to suppress evidence of identity/alienage, (2) the denial of a motion to terminate or remand based on a defective notice to appear (NTA) under Niz-Chavez v. Garland, and (3) the denial of withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

The petitioner, a Guatemalan national who identifies as Maya Quiché, entered the United States without admission or parole. After a local police stop for observed littering and subsequent state charges relating to false identification/obstruction, DHS initiated removal proceedings. Before the immigration judge (IJ), Perez-Hernandez sought suppression (alleging Fourth/Fifth Amendment and regulatory violations), and sought withholding/CAT based on threats tied to an intrafamilial land dispute in Guatemala. After the IJ denied relief and the BIA affirmed, Perez-Hernandez also pursued termination/remand arguments based on Niz-Chavez—first framed as a jurisdictional defect, later as a claims-processing defect.

Key issues included: (a) when suppression is available in removal proceedings and what constitutes a prima facie “egregious” Fourth Amendment violation; (b) whether Miranda warnings are required for admissibility in removal proceedings or to show coercion under 8 C.F.R. § 287.8; (c) whether NTA defects are timely raised when asserted after IJ proceedings; (d) whether the petitioner proved a nexus to a protected ground for withholding; and (e) whether the petitioner established a likelihood of torture for CAT relief.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Suppression denied: The court held Perez-Hernandez failed to establish a prima facie case of an unlawful stop or coercion. The littering observation supplied reasonable suspicion (if not probable cause), defeating a race-based “egregious violation” theory. The lack of Miranda warnings did not render statements inadmissible in civil removal proceedings, nor did it show coercion under 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(vii).
• Termination/remand denied as untimely: Treating the time-and-place requirement as a waivable/forfeitable claims-processing rule, the court held Perez-Hernandez forfeited the objection by raising it only after the IJ decision (and, in claims-processing form, more than a year after Niz-Chavez).
• Withholding denied for lack of nexus: Substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that the threats arose from a personal, intrafamilial land dispute, not because of a protected ground (including family-based or politically perceived group formulations).
• CAT denied for lack of likelihood of torture: Substantial evidence supported the finding that torture was not “more likely than not,” especially given no past torture and the family’s ability to relocate within Guatemala.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and the court’s posture

The panel reaffirmed familiar Sixth Circuit administrative-review architecture: jurisdiction over final orders under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (Mohammed v. Bondi), treating the BIA decision as final when it issues a separate opinion (Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch), and reviewing the IJ to the extent adopted by the BIA (Juan Antonio v. Barr). It applied de novo review to legal determinations and substantial-evidence review to factual findings (Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip v. Garland; Mazariegos-Rodas v. Garland), emphasizing the “compelled to conclude” constraint from 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) as articulated in Urias-Orellana v. Bondi. Denials of termination/remand were reviewed for abuse of discretion (Ahmed v. Mukasey; Vang v. Gonzales), with the abuse-of-discretion definition drawn from Marqus v. Barr.

2) Suppression in removal proceedings: “egregious” Fourth Amendment violations and prima facie showings

The opinion situated suppression within the Supreme Court’s civil/criminal divide: the exclusionary rule is classically criminal (Herring v. United States), generally not civil (United States v. Janis), and the Court “came out against” applying it in deportation hearings in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, while leaving open the possibility for “egregious” or “widespread” violations. The panel described “egregious” violations using Lopez-Mendoza’s formulation: conduct that transgresses fundamental fairness and undermines probative value.

The court also relied on the burden framework for suppression motions in immigration court: the noncitizen must first produce proof establishing a prima facie case (Luevano v. Holder quoting Burgos). Within the Sixth Circuit’s own approach, it referenced Nolasco-Gaspar v. Holder and United States v. Navarro-Diaz for the proposition that an egregious-violation theory fails absent evidence of being questioned solely because the person is Hispanic or in a random attempt to check immigration status.

On race-based stops, the panel assumed (without deciding) that a stop based solely on race could qualify as “egregious,” noting sister-circuit support (Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales; Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS). But it found no prima facie case because the officer personally observed a littering offense—an objective basis for a stop under United States v. Sokolow and United States v. Arvizu reasonable-suspicion principles. The petitioner’s argument that no littering charge was filed did not negate probable cause/reasonable suspicion; the court cited Courtright v. City of Battle Creek for the notion that an ultimate charging decision does not retroactively erase probable cause.

3) Fifth Amendment due process, self-incrimination, and Miranda in civil removal proceedings

For procedural due process, the court relied on the noncitizen’s entitlement to due-process protections in removal proceedings (Reno v. Flores) and the baseline of notice and opportunity to be heard (A.A.R.P. v. Trump). It articulated “fundamental fairness” using Panetti v. Quarterman and applied the Sixth Circuit’s evidentiary standard that evidence must be probative and its use fundamentally fair (Galvan v. Holder quoting Alexandrov v. Gonzales).

For self-incrimination, the panel summarized the Fifth Amendment framework from Lefkowitz v. Turley and Baxter v. Palmigiano, and described Miranda’s prophylactic role via Miranda v. Arizona and J.D.B. v. North Carolina. Critically, the court aligned with other circuits that Miranda warnings are not a prerequisite for admitting statements in civil removal proceedings, citing Zuniga v. Garland and Puc-Ruiz v. Holder.

4) NTA defects after Pereira/Niz-Chavez: jurisdiction vs claims-processing and forfeiture

The court distinguished between the stop-time holdings of Pereira v. Sessions and the “single document” holding of Niz-Chavez v. Garland, versus the question whether an immigration court has jurisdiction. It noted the BIA’s post-Niz-Chavez jurisdictional interpretation in Arambula-Bravo (no jurisdictional impact).

The opinion then treated the time-and-place requirement as a claims-processing rule framework “generally” addressed in Fernandes, emphasizing that claims-processing rules can be waived/forfeited (McIntosh v. United States). It endorsed the BIA’s approach that objections are generally timely only if raised before the close of pleadings before the IJ (Fernandes).

The panel rejected reliance on Matter of Vargas because, despite a multi-year delay, proceedings were still open there—unlike here, where the objection came after the IJ’s decision. It also rejected the argument that Niz-Chavez excused delay, invoking Santizo-Soto v. Garland for the proposition that Niz-Chavez “simply explained what [the statute] had meant all along,” meaning the statutory argument could have been presented earlier.

5) Withholding of removal: nexus and “personal dispute” characterization

For withholding, the court cited the statutory nexus requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) and summarized Sixth Circuit nexus doctrine: a protected ground must be “a reason” for persecution (Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland quoting Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr), and nexus is a factual finding reviewed for substantial evidence (Sebastian-Sebastian). The court relied on its precedent that “personal matters,” “personal vendetta,” or “revenge” do not satisfy nexus (Kamar v. Sessions; Sebastian-Sebastian), and it cited cases rejecting land-dispute theories as protected-ground persecution (Solis-Nolasco v. Holder).

The court reinforced limits on family-based theories through Cruz-Guzman v. Barr, noting that targeting a family member as a “means to an end” is insufficient if the end is unconnected to another protected ground.

6) CAT: likelihood of torture as a threshold and relocation evidence

The panel recited the regulatory definition of torture and official involvement/acquiescence using Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1), and the multi-factor CAT evaluation in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3) as applied in Amir v. Gonzales. It relied on the absence of past torture and the family’s ability to relocate, citing Cristobal-Leon v. Holder. Finally, it treated likelihood of torture as dispositive before reaching acquiescence arguments, citing Garcia-Aranda v. Garland for a two-step framing that ends if the applicant cannot show likely torture.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Suppression: objective justification defeats a prima facie “race-only” stop claim

The panel’s suppression analysis is methodical: even assuming a race-only stop could be “egregious” under Lopez-Mendoza, Perez-Hernandez never cleared the threshold prima facie showing. The officer observed a misdemeanor (littering) in real time, creating lawful grounds for an investigatory stop. That objective basis undercuts the assertion that the stop was “solely” based on race. The court also resisted inferring racial motive from later charging decisions, treating probable cause/reasonable suspicion as evaluated at the time of the stop, not by what charges were ultimately filed.

2) Fifth Amendment and regulations: Miranda’s absence is not itself coercion in removal proceedings

The court separated three concepts that are often conflated: (a) Miranda as a prophylactic rule in custodial interrogation, (b) due-process fundamental fairness in civil removal hearings, and (c) regulatory coercion under 8 C.F.R. § 287.8. It held that identity-related statements were probative and their use not fundamentally unfair, and further that the lack of Miranda warnings, standing alone, does not establish involuntariness or coercion for purposes of constitutional suppression or § 287.8(c)(2)(vii).

3) NTA defects: claims-processing objections must be timely raised before the IJ

The core procedural holding is forfeiture: once NTA defects are treated as claims-processing issues (not jurisdictional), the respondent must raise them during IJ proceedings—generally before pleadings close—or lose the benefit. The opinion underscores that Niz-Chavez does not create a “late-raising” exception where the statute pre-existed and the argument was available. By rejecting both the “Vargas gap” argument and the “couldn’t have known” argument, the court reinforced a strong timeliness discipline around NTA-based termination/remand motions.

4) Withholding: personal land dispute framing defeats nexus, even when recast as political or PSG-based

The panel treated the nexus defect as dispositive and, consistent with substantial-evidence review, deferred to the agency’s factual characterization: the great uncle’s threats were a means to obtain property in an intrafamilial dispute. The petitioner’s attempt to introduce a “political dimension” failed because the record lacked specifics (timing, connection, causation) linking political opinion or perceived political support to the threats. Notably, the court pointed to testimony implying politics followed the land dispute, rather than motivating it.

5) CAT: failure on likelihood of torture ends the inquiry

The CAT analysis turns on a threshold gate: without showing it is more likely than not that torture will occur, debates about state acquiescence do not matter. The court found substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s conclusion based on no past torture and successful internal relocation by the family—facts that commonly weigh heavily against CAT probability.

C. Impact

• Stronger forfeiture framework for NTA-based motions: The decision reinforces that, within the Sixth Circuit, NTA time-and-place defects framed as claims-processing issues must be raised before the IJ (generally before pleadings close) to avoid forfeiture. It also signals skepticism toward arguments that Niz-Chavez justifies late invocation when the statutory text long predated the case.
• Suppression remains exceptional in removal proceedings: By emphasizing the prima facie requirement and crediting an objective, observed misdemeanor as sufficient to justify a stop, the opinion narrows the practical space for “egregious violation” suppression arguments where any articulable basis exists independent of immigration status.
• Miranda-based suppression theories face headwinds in immigration court: The opinion aligns the Sixth Circuit’s approach with other circuits: Miranda warnings are not required for admissibility in removal proceedings, and their absence is not, without more, coercion under 8 C.F.R. § 287.8.
• Nexus discipline in family/land-dispute claims: The court continues a line of cases rejecting “personal dispute” persecution theories, cautioning applicants that recasting a private conflict as PSG- or political-based requires concrete record evidence connecting motive to a protected ground.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Exclusionary rule (and why it rarely applies in immigration court)

In criminal cases, evidence obtained unlawfully is often excluded to deter police misconduct. Removal proceedings are civil, and INS v. Lopez-Mendoza generally rejects applying that rule—except possibly for extreme (“egregious” or “widespread”) violations.

“Egregious” Fourth Amendment violation

A particularly serious constitutional violation that offends fundamental fairness and may justify excluding evidence even in a civil removal case. A stop based only on race is often discussed as a candidate example, but the noncitizen must still show a factual basis for that claim.

Miranda warnings vs. voluntariness

Miranda warnings are safeguards designed mainly for criminal prosecutions. In removal proceedings, the absence of Miranda warnings does not, by itself, make statements inadmissible or prove coercion.

Jurisdictional rule vs. claims-processing rule

Jurisdictional defects can usually be raised at any time because they concern a tribunal’s power to act. Claims-processing rules are mandatory instructions about procedure, but a party can waive or forfeit them by not raising them on time. The court treated NTA time-and-place defects as claims-processing concerns that must be timely asserted.

Withholding “nexus”

Even if harm is severe, withholding requires proof the harm is connected to a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or particular social group). Harm driven by a private land dispute or personal vendetta usually fails this requirement.

CAT’s two key steps

First, show torture is more likely than not. Second, show it would occur with government involvement or acquiescence. If step one fails, the claim fails.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision denies relief across the board while clarifying several recurring immigration-litigation pressure points: suppression requires a prima facie showing of an egregious (or comparable) violation, and an objectively justified stop defeats a race-only theory; Miranda’s absence does not, without more, establish coercion or inadmissibility in removal proceedings; NTA-based termination/remand arguments framed as claims-processing objections are forfeited if not raised during IJ proceedings; personal land disputes, even when rhetorically connected to politics or family status, commonly fail the withholding nexus requirement; and CAT claims fail at the threshold absent a demonstrated likelihood of torture.