Forced Masturbation Without Genital/Anal Intrusion Is Not “Sexual Assault” Under NRS 200.366

Introduction

In COSBY, JR. v. LESLIE (NRAP 5), 142 Nev., Advance Opinion 11 (Feb. 12, 2026), the Supreme Court of Nevada answered a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada concerning the meaning of “sexual assault” under NRS 200.366.

The case arises from a civil action in which respondent Angela Leslie alleged that appellant William Cosby, Jr. drugged her and forced her to masturbate him by moving her hand on his penis. Leslie sought civil damages and relied on NRS 11.217, a statute eliminating limitations periods for certain civil causes of action “arising from sexual assault” as defined in NRS 200.366. Cosby moved to dismiss, arguing the alleged conduct did not constitute “sexual assault” and, therefore, the claims were time-barred.

The certified question asked: “Whether a person sexually assaults another, pursuant to NRS 200.366, when a perpetrator forces a victim to masturbate them with the victim's hand without their consent?” The Nevada Supreme Court answered no, holding that the statutory definition of “sexual penetration” (as relevant here) requires intrusion into a genital or anal opening.

Summary of the Opinion

The court focused on the statutory definition of “sexual penetration” in NRS 200.364(9), which includes “cunnilingus, fellatio, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or any object manipulated or inserted by a person into the genital or anal openings of the body of another, including sexual intercourse in its ordinary meaning.”

Because the certified question implicated only the “intrusion” clause, the court expressly limited (“cabined”) its analysis to whether “any intrusion” requires intrusion into a genital or anal opening. Interpreting the text by its plain meaning, the court held: forced masturbation—without intrusion into a genital or anal opening—does not constitute “sexual penetration,” and therefore does not constitute “sexual assault” under NRS 200.366.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Mack v. Williarns, 138 Nev. 854, 522 P.3d 434 (2022):

    The court relied on this decision for the standards governing whether to accept a certified question under NRAP 5—namely, that the Nevada Supreme Court has discretion to answer certified questions where no controlling Nevada authority exists and the issue is determinative in the federal case. Here, the absence of published Nevada precedent on forced masturbation under NRS 200.366 and the time-bar implications for Leslie’s civil claims supported accepting certification.

  • Echeuerria v. State, 137 Nev. 486, 495 P.3d 471 (2021):

    Cited for the proposition that a certified question presents a “pure question of law” reviewed de novo. This framing was important because the court did not weigh credibility or evidence; it interpreted statutory text.

  • Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 251 P.3d 177 (2011):

    Provided the core statutory-interpretation framework: the court’s primary goal is to give effect to legislative intent, beginning with the statute’s text; if the language is clear and unambiguous, the court enforces it as written. This “plain meaning” methodology drove the outcome.

  • Kassebaurn v. State, Dep't of Corr., 139 Nev. 311, 535 P.3d 651 (2023):

    Cited for the interpretive sequencing—start with the text of the statute. The opinion followed that directive by parsing the syntax of NRS 200.364(9)’s “intrusion” clause.

  • Lofthouse v. State, 136 Nev. 378, 467 P.3d 609 (2020):

    Supported the approach of assigning statutory terms their “plain and ordinary meanings.” The court used dictionary definitions (Merriam-Webster) for “intrusion” and “intrude” to confirm the thrust/force-in concept, then tied that meaning to the statute’s explicit object: intrusion “into the genital or anal openings.”

Legal Reasoning

The interpretive dispute centered on how to read the nested phrase in NRS 200.364(9): “any intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or any object manipulated or inserted by a person into the genital or anal openings of the body of another”.

Leslie argued that when the “intruding instrument” is a body part, the statute covers intrusion “of any part of a person’s body” even if not into a genital or anal opening (thus, a hand could be the “intruded-into” body part). Cosby argued that the statute requires intrusion into a genital or anal opening regardless of whether the instrument is a body part or object.

The court adopted Cosby’s reading based on grammar and structure:

  • The statute “qualifies the type of intrusion” by identifying both (a) the target of the intrusion—“into the genital or anal openings”—and (b) the means—“any part of a person’s body” or “any object manipulated or inserted.”
  • Read as a whole, the clause describes two parallel forms of penetration:
    1. Intrusion of any body part into a genital or anal opening; and
    2. Intrusion of any object (manipulated or inserted by a person) into a genital or anal opening.
  • Because forced masturbation (as framed by the certified question) involves forcing a penis into a hand—rather than forcing any body part or object into a genital or anal opening—it does not meet the statutory definition of “sexual penetration.”

The court emphasized a limiting point: it did not interpret the “fellatio” or “cunnilingus” components of NRS 200.364(9), stating the certified question did not place those elements at issue. The holding is thus confined to the “intrusion” clause.

Impact

The decision has immediate and likely substantial consequences in both criminal classification and civil limitations litigation:

  • Boundary-setting for “sexual penetration” under Nevada law (intrusion clause): The opinion establishes a clear rule that “sexual penetration,” as relevant to the intrusion clause, requires entry into a genital or anal opening. Conduct involving coerced manual contact—without such entry—falls outside NRS 200.366 on this theory.
  • Civil claims and NRS 11.217: Because NRS 11.217’s limitations relief depends on whether the civil action “arises from sexual assault” as defined by NRS 200.366, the opinion may narrow the set of older claims that can avoid time bars when the alleged conduct is forced masturbation without genital/anal intrusion. Plaintiffs may need to plead and prove qualifying penetration (or proceed under other tort theories without the benefit of NRS 11.217’s elimination of limitations periods, depending on the underlying statutory conditions and any other applicable tolling).
  • Charging and plea dynamics: In criminal practice, the rule can influence charging decisions where the alleged conduct is coerced manual stimulation. Prosecutors may look to other offenses (outside the scope of this opinion) when penetration into a genital/anal opening cannot be alleged or proven. Conversely, defendants may invoke this precedent to contest “sexual assault” charges predicated solely on forced masturbation absent the requisite intrusion.
  • Legislative response possibility: By anchoring the holding in text and plain meaning, the court implicitly signals that any broader coverage (e.g., expressly including forced masturbation within “sexual assault” absent intrusion) would be a matter for legislative amendment rather than judicial expansion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Certified question (NRAP 5): A federal court can ask the Nevada Supreme Court to answer a determinative question of Nevada law when Nevada precedent does not already resolve it. The Nevada Supreme Court answers only the legal question, not factual disputes.
  • De novo review: The court reviews the legal question from scratch, without deferring to another court’s interpretation.
  • Statutory interpretation / plain meaning: The court starts with the statute’s wording. If the words are clear, the court applies them as written rather than adopting a broader policy -based interpretation.
  • “Sexual penetration” vs. sexual contact: Under the intrusion clause of NRS 200.364(9), “penetration” is not mere touching or manual stimulation; it is defined as intrusion into a genital or anal opening (even if slight). The opinion does not decide what other statutes may cover forced masturbation; it only decides whether it is “sexual assault” under NRS 200.366 on the presented facts.
  • Cabining the holding: The court limited its interpretation to the “intrusion” clause and expressly avoided construing the “fellatio” and “cunnilingus” portions of the definition.

Conclusion

COSBY, JR. v. LESLIE (NRAP 5) establishes a concrete interpretive rule for Nevada’s sexual assault statute: under the intrusion clause of NRS 200.364(9), “sexual penetration” requires intrusion into a genital or anal opening; forced masturbation without such intrusion is not “sexual assault” under NRS 200.366.

The opinion is significant not only for criminal-law classification but also for civil litigation, where statutory limitations consequences may turn on whether alleged conduct qualifies as “sexual assault” under NRS 200.366. By grounding its decision in grammatical structure and plain meaning, the court clarified the statute’s boundary and left any expansion of coverage to the Legislature.