Florida Lewd-or-Lascivious Battery Categorically Triggers § 2252A(b)(1)’s 15-Year Mandatory Minimum as “Relating to … Abusive Sexual Conduct Involving a Minor”

Introduction

In United States v. Joshua Havel (11th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 180-month sentence for receipt of child pornography after concluding that the defendant’s prior Florida conviction for lewd or lascivious battery, Fla. Stat. § 800.04(4)(a) (2016), qualifies as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1). That determination matters because § 2252A(b)(1) imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum when a defendant has a prior state conviction “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor.”

The central issue was categorical: whether the elements of Florida’s lewd-or-lascivious-battery statute, evaluated at the “least of the acts criminalized,” fall within (or “relate to”) the generic federal concepts listed in § 2252A(b)(1), specifically “abusive sexual conduct involving a minor.”

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that Florida lewd or lascivious battery categorically qualifies as a conviction “relating to … abusive sexual conduct involving a minor” under § 2252A(b)(1). Applying the categorical approach, the court accepted that the least culpable conduct covered by Fla. Stat. § 800.04(4)(a) is “consensual sexual activity between adolescents aged [twelve] to [fifteen]” with no minimum perpetrator age. Even that least culpable conduct, the court concluded, sufficiently matches the generic definition of abusive sexual conduct involving a minor because it entails sexual conduct with a minor that constitutes “misuse or maltreatment” for sexual gratification, and “relating to” is read broadly.

The panel rejected the defendant’s argument that the comparison should be to the federal offense in 18 U.S.C. § 2243, explaining that the Eleventh Circuit’s governing precedent defines § 2252A(b)(1)’s listed crimes as generic offenses and that Lockhart v. United States did not resolve the interpretive question the defendant pressed. The sentence was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Miller, 819 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2016): Cited for the standard of review—whether a prior conviction triggers a statutory enhancement is reviewed de novo. This frames the appeal as a purely legal inquiry about elements and statutory meaning.
  • United States v. Kushmaul, 984 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2021): The decision’s doctrinal anchor. Kushmaul supplies (1) the use of the categorical approach for § 2252A(b)(1); (2) the instruction that § 2252A(b)(1)’s “non-traditional” offenses are defined by their “ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning”; (3) the broad construction of “relating to”; and (4) the operative definition of “abusive sexual conduct involving a minor” as “a ‘perpetrator’s physical or nonphysical misuse or maltreatment of a minor for a purpose associated with sexual gratification.’” The panel treated itself as bound by Kushmaul, making it dispositive on the interpretive method.
  • Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016): Cited for core categorical-approach principles: focus on elements rather than facts; ignore case-specific conduct. This underwrites the panel’s emphasis that even if Havel’s actual conduct was egregious, the enhancement turns on the statute’s minimum criminalized conduct.
  • Leger v. United States Attorney General, 101 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2024): Used to identify the least culpable conduct under Fla. Stat. § 800.04(4)(a): “consensual sexual activity between adolescents aged [twelve] to [fifteen]” and “no minimum age for the perpetrator.” The panel then distinguished Leger because it interpreted a different statutory scheme (the INA aggravated felony definition) with different text and context.
  • United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2012): Quoted (via Kushmaul) for defining “relating to” as “‘stands in some relation, bears upon, or is associated with’ sexual abuse.” This expansive connective phrase is critical: the prior conviction need not perfectly match a generic offense so long as it bears a sufficient relationship to it.
  • United States v. Padilla-Reyes, 247 F.3d 1158 (11th Cir. 2001): Quoted (via Kushmaul) as the source of the “misuse or maltreatment” definition. It supplies the “abuse” content the panel later uses to reject the argument that its approach reads “abusive” out of the statute.
  • J.A.S. v. State, 705 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1998) and Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla.1994): Cited to explain Florida’s own characterization of lewd or lascivious battery as “Florida’s statutory rape law” and Florida’s rationale that any sexual conduct involving a child is an intrusion regardless of consent, opening the door to exploitation and harm. The panel used these cases to show why the statute’s protected-interest structure aligns with the “misuse or maltreatment” concept.
  • United States v. Hardin, 998 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 2021): Cited as persuasive support that even the “most innocent conduct” under a statutory rape law can “stand[] in some relation to physical misuse or maltreatment for a purpose associated with sexual gratification.”
  • Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347 (2016): Raised by the defendant to argue for defining the generic offenses by federal “counterparts” like 18 U.S.C. § 2243. The panel responded that Lockhart expressly “d[id] not decide” whether the terms in a related statute carry generic meanings or are defined by federal counterparts, and that in any event Eleventh Circuit precedent (Kushmaul) already decided the method for § 2252A(b)(1).

Legal Reasoning

  1. Step 1: Choose the method—categorical approach. Following United States v. Kushmaul, the court applied the categorical approach to § 2252A(b)(1), comparing statutory elements (not facts) and presuming the conviction rested on the least criminalized conduct.
  2. Step 2: Identify the least culpable conduct under Fla. Stat. § 800.04(4)(a). Citing Leger v. United States Attorney General, the panel accepted that the minimum conduct is consensual sexual activity between 12–15-year-olds, and that the statute imposes no minimum age on the perpetrator.
  3. Step 3: Define the relevant generic offense in § 2252A(b)(1). Using Kushmaul, the court treated “abusive sexual conduct involving a minor” as a generic concept defined by ordinary meaning: “misuse or maltreatment” of a minor for sexual gratification. It also relied on § 2256(1)’s definition of “minor” as a person under 18.
  4. Step 4: Apply the “relating to” connector broadly. Under Kushmaul (quoting United States v. McGarity), “relating to” encompasses state offenses that stand in some relation to the generic abuse concept. This reduces the need for a perfect element-by-element mirror.
  5. Step 5: Conclude there is a sufficient match. The panel reasoned that Florida’s statutory rape framework treats sexual activity with minors as inherently intrusive and harmful (citing J.A.S. v. State and Jones v. State), and that this harm/exploitation logic is consistent with “misuse or maltreatment” for sexual gratification. It emphasized that lewd or lascivious battery requires sexual activity with a minor, which it deemed at least as abusive as conduct previously held to qualify in Kushmaul (where the least conduct involved performing a lewd act in front of a minor or enticing a minor).
  6. Step 6: Reject the federal-counterpart comparison. The defendant’s attempt to shift the comparator to 18 U.S.C. § 2243 was rejected because (a) Leger interpreted a different statute (INA) with different language; (b) Lockhart did not decide the generic-vs-counterpart issue; and (c) Kushmaul binds the circuit to a generic-meaning approach for § 2252A(b)(1).
  7. Step 7: Preserve the “abuse” requirement. The panel answered the “abuse is written out” critique by equating “abuse” with “misuse or maltreatment,” supported by a citation to Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

Impact

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion is a clear application of existing Eleventh Circuit doctrine in a recurring sentencing context and signals how panels are likely to treat Fla. Stat. § 800.04(4)(a) going forward: as categorically within § 2252A(b)(1)’s enhancement as “relating to … abusive sexual conduct involving a minor.” Practically, it strengthens the government’s ability to secure the 15-year mandatory minimum in child pornography receipt cases where the defendant has a prior Florida lewd-or-lascivious-battery conviction.

More broadly, the reasoning reinforces two defendant-adverse interpretive moves already present in circuit precedent: (1) defining § 2252A(b)(1)’s terms generically (ordinary meaning) rather than by tight analogy to federal sex-abuse statutes; and (2) using “relating to” as a capacious hook that captures a wide range of state sexual-offense statutes, including statutory rape regimes that treat the protected class (minors) as legally incapable of consent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Categorical approach: A method that looks only to the statute of conviction (its legal elements), not what the defendant actually did.
  • Least of the acts criminalized: The court assumes the conviction could have rested on the minimum conduct the statute covers, then asks whether that minimum still fits the federal enhancement category.
  • Generic offense: A federal “concept” defined by ordinary meaning rather than a specific federal criminal statute.
  • “Relating to”: A broad connector; the prior state offense need only stand in some relation to the listed generic sex-abuse concepts, not match them perfectly.
  • Mandatory minimum: A statutory floor the sentencing judge cannot go below (here, 15 years) once the predicate conditions are met.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Havel’s 180-month sentence by holding that Florida’s lewd-or-lascivious-battery offense, even at its least culpable form, categorically “relat[es] to … abusive sexual conduct involving a minor” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1). The opinion’s significance lies in its reaffirmation of United States v. Kushmaul: § 2252A(b)(1) is interpreted through generic, ordinary-meaning definitions coupled with an expansive “relating to,” a combination that tends to sweep many state sex-offense convictions—particularly statutory rape-style offenses—into the enhancement’s reach.