Florida “Community Control” Is “Confinement” Under the INA’s “Term of Imprisonment,” Preserving Aggravated-Felony Expedited Removal and Defeating § 1326(d) Collateral Attacks

1. Introduction

United States v. Kyle Maharaj (11th Cir. Aug. 13, 2026) is an unlawful-reentry appeal under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). The defendant, Kyle Kerian Maharaj, sought dismissal of his indictment by collaterally attacking the validity of the prior removal order that served as a predicate for the § 1326 prosecution. His theory was that the prior removal used expedited procedures available only for aggravated felons, but his predicate Florida robbery conviction allegedly did not qualify as an “aggravated felony” because he received two years of Florida “community control,” which he argued is not a “term of imprisonment of at least one year.”

The key questions were whether Maharaj could satisfy the statutory prerequisites for a collateral attack under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), and—centrally—whether Florida community control counts as a “term of imprisonment” by constituting “confinement” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Maharaj’s motion to dismiss. Applying de novo review to the collateral challenge (citing United States v. Zelaya), the court held Maharaj failed to satisfy the second and third requirements of § 1326(d): (2) deprivation of the opportunity for judicial review and (3) fundamental unfairness.

The panel concluded that Maharaj’s Florida sentence of two years of community control constitutes a “term of imprisonment” because the INA defines that term to include a period of “incarceration or confinement.” Relying on Herrera v. United States Attorney General (house arrest qualifies as “confinement”), Florida’s statutory definition of community control, and the court’s own description of community control as “a form of in-house arrest” (citing Anderson v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.), the panel held the predicate offense was properly treated as an “aggravated felony.” As a result, the expedited removal premise was not legally erroneous, and Maharaj’s related arguments (including ineffective-assistance framing) could not establish either deprivation of judicial review or fundamental unfairness.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Zelaya, 293 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002)
    Role in this case: Provided the standard of review: “[a] defendant's collateral challenge to his underlying deportation order is an issue of law reviewed de novo.” This framing matters because it positions the Eleventh Circuit to independently evaluate whether the legal prerequisites in § 1326(d) are met, including the predicate “aggravated felony” characterization.
  • Herrera v. United States Attorney General, 811 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2016)
    Role in this case: The controlling interpretive anchor. Herrera held that the INA’s “term of imprisonment” includes “confinement,” and upheld treating house arrest as “confinement” for aggravated-felony purposes. Maharaj’s attempt to characterize Florida community control as something short of “imprisonment” was rejected as materially indistinguishable from the house-arrest confinement recognized in Herrera. The panel also used Herrera to rebut the argument that only actual jail time counts.
  • Singh v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2009)
    Role in this case: Distinguished and found not controlling. Maharaj argued Singh implicitly established that Florida community control is not a “term of imprisonment” because Singh discussed when the aggravated-felony predicate “did not exist until” a community-control violation triggered a prison sentence longer than one year. The panel rejected this inference: Singh addressed res judicata and did not analyze the INA’s definition of “term of imprisonment” (“incarceration or confinement”) at all.
  • Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979)
    Role in this case: A statutory-construction canon supporting the court’s textual reading. The panel invoked Reiter for the proposition that disjunctive terms connected by “or” are ordinarily given separate meanings. That canon underpinned the conclusion that “confinement” must mean something broader than “incarceration.”
  • Ilchuk v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 434 F.3d 618 (3d Cir. 2006)
    Role in this case: Persuasive authority used (via Herrera) to reinforce that the INA’s definition reaches “more than just time spent in jail,” and that house arrest is a serious restriction of liberty consistent with “confinement.” The Eleventh Circuit relied on this logic to treat community control—defined by Florida as intensive supervised custody with restricted freedom—as similarly “confinement.”
  • Anderson v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 752 F.3d 881 (11th Cir. 2014)
    Role in this case: Used to characterize Florida community control as “a form of in-house arrest,” supporting the analogy to house arrest in Herrera. This was an important bridging move: it helped equate the Florida sentencing mechanism with the “confinement” previously held sufficient under the INA.

B. Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning is built around a single hinge: Maharaj’s § 1326(d) theory depended on showing that the prior expedited removal was premised on a legal error (mislabeling his robbery conviction as an aggravated felony). If there is no legal error—because community control counts as a “term of imprisonment”—then the asserted deprivation of judicial review and alleged fundamental unfairness collapse.

The court resolved the “term of imprisonment” question through two mutually reinforcing routes:

  1. Binding circuit interpretation (Herrera):
    Herrera interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) to include “confinement” distinct from “incarceration,” and accepted house arrest as “confinement.” Maharaj “failed to meaningfully distinguish” community control from house arrest, especially given Florida’s statutory definition and the Eleventh Circuit’s own description of it as a form of in-house arrest. Thus, the court treated Herrera as foreclosing Maharaj’s argument.
  2. Independent textual reading:
    The panel stated that even if Herrera were not dispositive, the text of § 1101(a)(48)(B) compels the same result. “Term of imprisonment” includes “incarceration or confinement,” and the disjunctive signals that confinement extends beyond jail or prison. The statute further covers “any suspension of the imposition or execution” of the sentence, supporting the conclusion that Congress did not limit “term of imprisonment” to time actually served behind bars. The court also consulted dictionary definitions (Black’s Law Dictionary and Merriam-Webster) to confirm that “confinement” encompasses restraint within limits—not solely imprisonment in a penal institution.

With that predicate resolved, the court’s § 1326(d) disposition was straightforward: Maharaj’s “aggravated felony” premise was correct, so his attempt to show that expedited removal was “erroneous” could not establish that the removal proceedings deprived him of judicial review or were fundamentally unfair. His effort to repackage the theory as ineffective assistance (counsel “should have sought judicial review” of the aggravated-felony question) also failed because the underlying aggravated-felony argument lacked merit.

C. Impact

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision has clear practical significance within the Eleventh Circuit’s existing framework:

  • Reinforces Herrera’s breadth: The opinion extends Herrera’s house-arrest reasoning to Florida “community control,” treating intensive supervised custody and home/community restriction as “confinement” under the INA.
  • Constrains § 1326(d) collateral attacks in the aggravated-felony/expedited-removal context: Defendants who predicate a collateral attack on the claim that noncarceral sanctions are not “terms of imprisonment” face a steep barrier in the Eleventh Circuit, particularly where the sanction functionally resembles house arrest or supervised custody with severe liberty restraints.
  • Signals limited utility of Singh for “community control” arguments: Singh cannot be used (at least without more) to imply a substantive rule about “term of imprisonment,” because the Eleventh Circuit treats Singh as a case about res judicata timing, not INA sentencing definitions.
  • Immigration consequences for Florida sentencing dispositions: The reasoning underscores that alternatives to incarceration— if sufficiently restrictive—may still trigger aggravated-felony consequences when the statute turns on “confinement,” not solely prison time.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Collateral attack under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d): A defendant charged with unlawful reentry generally cannot relitigate the old removal order unless he proves all three elements: (1) he exhausted administrative remedies; (2) he was improperly deprived of judicial review; and (3) the order’s entry was fundamentally unfair.
  • Aggravated felony (INA): A term of art that triggers severe immigration consequences, including streamlined removal procedures. Here, the relevant aggravated-felony definition includes a “crime of violence” with a “term of imprisonment” of at least one year.
  • “Term of imprisonment” includes “incarceration or confinement”: The decision emphasizes that “confinement” is broader than jail time. Restrictive sanctions like house arrest—and, here, Florida community control—can qualify.
  • Expedited removal for aggravated felons (8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)-(c)) and FARO: The INA provides streamlined administrative removal mechanisms for certain noncitizens, including those with aggravated felonies. The “Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO)” is the resulting administrative order in that expedited track.
  • Fundamental unfairness: In this setting, it generally requires showing both a procedural defect and prejudice—i.e., that the alleged error mattered. If the removal classification is legally correct, prejudice is difficult (or impossible) to show based on that theory.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit held that Florida “community control”—defined as intensive supervised custody restricting an offender’s freedom in the community and home—constitutes “confinement” and therefore a “term of imprisonment” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B). Drawing principally on Herrera v. United States Attorney General, and reinforcing the conclusion through textual analysis and ordinary interpretive canons (including Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.), the court rejected Maharaj’s attempt to invalidate the aggravated-felony predicate of his expedited removal. Because the predicate was valid, Maharaj could not satisfy the deprivation-of-judicial-review or fundamental-unfairness prongs of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), and his unlawful-reentry indictment stood.